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ABSTRACT 
This study asks two broad questions: How did state and society in colonial Singapore 
respond to the social needs of a human life over time, at birth, youth and adulthood, during 
illness, injury and unemployment, and finally old age, retirement and death? What kind of 
state eventually emerged to address those needs? Addressing those questions, this study 
offers an augmented understanding of state-building via a colonial policy that created a social 
welfare state in late colonial Singapore. The state is more than a series of institutions, 
bureaucracies, and policies erected for the purposes of administering a territory and its 
peoples. The state is also the result of historical processes and experiences arising from 
individual decisions and actions. The social welfare state here refers to the institutions, 
structures, processes, and the individuals working within to effect social welfare. Arising 
from a mix of metropolitan and global factors, social welfare was part of a new imperial 
policy after the Second World War to create cohesive communities out of plural societies that 
would eventually be self-governing, and ideally join the British commonwealth of nations. 
The history presented is a local one as the introduction and implementation of social welfare 
in postwar Singapore were complicated by local circumstances, namely the unpredictable 
responses of a colonial society unfamiliar with a deliberate state presence in social welfare 
and the challenges of decolonization. This study puts at the forefront the migrant worker, the 
colonial administrator, the concerned volunteer, the social welfare officer, the social worker, 
and the people they helped. Their lives and experiences gave meaning and coherency to the 
social welfare state that emerged in late colonial Singapore. Each individual moreover 
experienced colonialism differently and vividly, making it more than an ordinary period of 
time in Singapore’s past. Colonialism’s varied legacies on Singapore have yet to be fully 
appreciated, especially those affecting social policy, state-societal relations, nation-building, 
and historical research. This study is an attempt at elucidating those issues.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: EXPANDING THE SINGAPORE STORY 
 
The basis of Singapore history, as an academic field of study, has not changed much 
since the initial general histories offered by Constance Mary Turnbull and others.1 The 
underlying question driving most inquiries into Singapore’s past can be surmised as why 
Singapore succeeded despite seemingly insurmountable odds. As such, histories of Singapore 
follow a template that usually begins with Stamford Raffles establishing a trading settlement 
on the island in 1819. They then take the reader through the interactions, moments and 
events, and personalities, pre-identified to be significant. Those typically involved an 
overview of the colonial period, the ethnic differences in society, the Second World War, and 
the postwar trials and tribulations, namely the struggles against communism, communalism, 
and then after 1965, for survival. The trope of a struggle against odds is popularly known as 
The Singapore Story. Since 1997, this has been the basis for a National Education program 
that has been embedded into various educational levels and during National Service.2 The 
Singapore Story is also incidentally the title of the memoirs of the late Lee Kuan Yew, 
Singapore’s first Prime Minister.3  
Scholarly responses to the Singapore Story trope have, over time, enriched the field. 
Some add detail and expound on known events.4 Others, such as the counter-responses, aim 
                                                          
1 Representative histories include C. M. Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, 1819-2005 (Singapore: NUS 
Press, 2009), Mark Ravinder Frost, Yu-mei Balsingamchow, Singapore: A Biography (Singapore: Editions 
Didier Millet; National Museum of Singapore, c2009), and Edwin Lee, Singapore: The Unexpected Nation 
(Singapore: ISEAS, c2008). See also Ernest C. T. Chew and Edwin Lee (eds.), A History of Singapore 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991).  
2 The National Education program officially commenced in 1997. It was initially supported by an ambitious 
public exhibition in 1998 entitled “The Singapore Story: Overcoming the Odds”, which produced companion 
educational and resource materials, such as Eugene Tan Hwi Choon, in consultation with Kwa Chong Guan, The 
Singapore story: A Learning Nation – Select Bibliography (Singapore: National Reference Library, National 
Library Board, 1998), and The Singapore Story: Overcoming the Odds – An Interactive Multimedia Experience. 
A National Education Project by Ministry of Information and the Arts (Singapore: MITA, c1999). National 
Education is not a stand-alone school subject, but communicated via suitable subjects, such as History, 
Geography, and Social Studies. Elements of the Singapore Story trope are also incorporated into lecture sessions 
during National Service, and form the basis of the Singapore Studies curriculum at the university level. For an 
overview, go to “Welcome to the MOE National Education Website”. URL: 
http://ne.moe.edu.sg/ne/slot/u223/ne/index.html. Accessed 19 November 2016.  
3 Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings; Times 
Editions, 1998), and Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000: Memoirs of 
Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings; Times Editions, c2000). It is not the first book to have 
“Singapore Story” in its title. Noel Barber, a British journalist, had earlier published The Singapore Story: From 
Raffles to Lee Kuan Yew (London: Fontana, 1978).  
4 Singapore’s constitutional and political changes have been analyzed by Albert Lau, A Moment of Anguish: 
Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998), Albert 
Lau, The Malayan Union Controversy 1942-1948 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990), and Tan Tai 
Yong, Creating "Greater Malaysia": Decolonisation and the Politics of Merger (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008). 
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to highlight the deficiencies of the narrative, namely the excessive focus on the “victors” of 
history, mythmaking, and the historiographical concerns from uncritical engagement with a 
perceived metanarrative.5 In doing so, Singapore’s social and political histories, as well as 
scholarly examinations of Singapore historiography, have become more substantive since the 
beginning of the twenty-first century.6 There have also been efforts to rethink historical 
conventions, such as the place of Raffles and 1819, and to situate Singapore’s past in broader 
historical contexts, such as the Malay-speaking world, European imperialism in Southeast 
Asia, and World history.7 They have enriched Singapore history by enhancing our knowledge 
about Singapore’s past and adding nuance to historiographical approaches.  
The increased quantity in historical scholarship provides a sound foundation from 
which we can move beyond the conventional template of significant “national” moments, 
                                                          
5 Representative publications include: Loh Kah Seng, “Within the Singapore Story: The Use and Narrative of 
History in Singapore”, Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 
(1998), pp. 1-21; the essays in Hong Lysa and Huang Jianli, The Scripting of a National History: Singapore and 
Its Past (Singapore: NUS Press, c2008), Michael D. Barr and Zlatko Skrbiš, Constructing Singapore: Elitism, 
Ethnicity and the Nation-Building Project (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2008), chapter two, and Terence Chong, 
“Introduction: The Role of Success in Singapore’s National Identity”, in Terence Chong (ed.), Management of 
Success : Singapore Revisited (Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010). More recently, 
historians, scholars, and former political dissenters have combined efforts, resulting in the following Tan Jing 
Quee and Jomo K.S. (original eds.); Poh Soo Kai (2015 edition), Comet In Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong In History 
(Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia: SIRD & Pusat Sejarah Rakyat, 2015), Poh Soo Kai, Tan Kok Fang and 
Hong Lysa, (eds.), The 1963 Operation Coldstore In Singapore: Commemorating 50 Years (Malaysia: SIRD & 
Pusat Sejarah Rakyat, 2013), Tan Jing Quee, Tan Kok Chiang & Hong Lysa (eds.), The May 13 Generation: 
The Chinese Middle Schools Student Movement And Singapore Politics In The 1950s (Selangor: Strategic 
Information and Research Development Centre, c2011), Poh Soo Kai, Tan Jing Quee, Koh Kay Yew (eds.), The 
Fajar Generation: The University Socialist Club and The Politics of Postwar Malaya and Singapore (Petaling 
Jaya, Selangor: SIRD, 2010).  
6 See for instance James Francis Warren, Ah Ku and Karayuki-San: Prostitution in Singapore, 1870-1940 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, c2003. Originally published in 1986), James Francis Warren, Rickshaw 
Coolie: A People's History of Singapore 1880-1940 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, c2003. Originally 
published in 1993), Brenda S. A. Yeoh, Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: Power Relations and The 
Urban Built Environment (Singapore: Singapore University Press, c2003. Originally published in 1996), Carl A. 
Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and The Culture of Control (London: Routledge, 2006), Michael Barr and 
Carl A. Trocki (eds.), Paths Not Taken: Political Pluralism in Post-War Singapore (Singapore: NUS Press, 
c2008), and Loh Kah Seng, Squatters into Citizens: The 1961 Bukit Ho Swee Fire and The Making of Modern 
Singapore (Singapore: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with NUS Press and NIAS Press, 
c2013). Historiographical examinations include: Nicholas Tarling (ed.), Studying Singapore's Past: C.M. 
Turnbull and The History of Modern Singapore (Singapore: NUS Press, c2012), Loh Kah Seng & Liew Kai 
Khiun (eds.), The Makers & Keepers of Singapore History (Singapore: Ethos Books; Singapore Heritage 
Society, c2010), and Derek Heng Thiam Soon (ed.), New Perspectives and Sources on The History of 
Singapore: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach (Singapore: National Library Board, c2006). 
7 Representative publications include Kwa Chong Guan, Derek Heng, Tan Tai Yong, Singapore: A 700-Year 
History: From Early Emporium to World City (Singapore: National Archives of Singapore, c2009), Carl A. 
Trocki, Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore, 1784-1885 
(Singapore: NUS Press, c2007. 2nd ed.), John N. Miksic, Singapore and the Silk Road of the Sea, 1300-1800 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2013), Derek Heng and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied (eds.), Singapore in Global 
History (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, c2011, Karl Hack and Jean-Louis Margolin, with Karine 
Delaye (eds.), Singapore From Temasek to the 21st Century: Reinventing the Global City (Singapore: NUS 
Press, c2010), and Peter Borschberg, The Singapore and Melaka Straits: Violence, Security and Diplomacy in 
the 17th Century (Singapore: NUS Press, c2010). 
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events, and personalities. Here, my approach takes its cue from Harry Benda’s observations 
in his 1961 article, “The Structure of Southeast Asian History”.8 Benda spoke of moving 
beyond a model of “historical interactions”, as 
 
focusing on the record of such contacts may do little by way of accounting for 
the probable internal dynamics underlying them…. The dramatic personae – 
the lusty potentates, usurpers, adventurers and their retinues … disappear from 
the stage, to make room for the bloodless bureaucratic administrators of 
modern colonial regimes. The history of modern Southeast Asia then only too 
often becomes the history of European colonial regimes, from which 
Southeast Asians … get progressively drained. And yet, it is in the most 
recent, ‘history-less’, era that structural changes of perhaps unparalleled 
proportions and vehemence grip the area.9 
 
Benda’s article was originally in response to a debate (in decolonizing Malaya and 
Singapore) over the place of a local or externalist (colonial) view in the writing of Southeast 
Asian history.10 It is not my intent to uncover the “Southeast Asian”, or in this case, a 
                                                          
8 Harry J. Benda, “The Structure of Southeast Asian History: Some Preliminary Observations”, Journal of 
Southeast Asian History, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Mar., 1962), pp. 106-138. Benda’s use of “structure” in the article was 
to contrast with the conventional focus on historical “events”, and also in response to George Cœdès’ “Southeast 
Asian infrastructure”, as used in the latter’s 1948 publication, Les états hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie, 
which was translated and published in English as The Indianized states of Southeast Asia; edited by Walter F. 
Vella; translated by Sue Brown Cowing (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, c1968). As such, 
Benda’s use of “structure” draws less from the “structuralist movement” found in anthropology, literary and 
linguistic studies, and more from the longue durée concept espoused by the Annales School and Fernand 
Braudel in particular. In his preface to the first edition of The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in 
the Age of Philip II, Braudel distinguishes three historical times: the slow, “almost timeless” “geographical 
time” (l’histoire quasi immobile), the “slow, perceptible rhythms” of “social time” (the  history of “groups and 
groupings) (longue durée), and “individual time”, or histoire événementielle, (“the history of events:  surface 
disturbances, crests of foam that the tides of history carry on their strong backs. A history of brief, rapid, 
nervous fluctuations, by definition ultra-sensitive; the least tremor sets all its antennae quivering”) (pp. 20-21). 
Braudel expounded on these concepts in a 1958 article, in particular the longue durée. (Wallerstein did not 
translate the term, choosing to use the original French instead). Braudel explained variations of the longue 
durée, first as “cycles” and/or “intercycles”, as “secular trends”, and finally, as “structures”. Braudel (translated 
by Wallerstein) elaborated: “By ‘structure’, social observers imply an organization, a degree of coherency, 
rather fixed relation between realities and social masses. For us historians, a structure is certainly an assemblage, 
an architecture, but even more it is a reality that time can only slowly erode, one that goes on for a long time. 
Certain structures, in their long life, become the stable elements of an infinity of generations. They encumber 
history and restrict it, and hence control its flow. Other structures crumble more quickly. But all structures are 
simultaneously pillars and obstacles…. Think of how difficult it is to break through geographical frameworks, 
certain biological realities, certain limits to productivity, even one or another spiritual constraint. Mental 
frameworks are also prisons of the longue durée”. Braudel, “in “History and the Social Sciences”, pp. 178-179.  
The last term was apparently replicated in early Southeast Asian historiography, through Benda’s article, which 
was published four years after Braudel’s 1958 article. Anthony Reid has built on this concept in his two-volume 
Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce. (This draws on Immanuel Wallerstein’s translation of Fernand 
Braudel’s “History and the Social Sciences: The Longue Durée”. Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 32, 
No .2 (2009), pp. 171-203. Originally published as "Histoire et Sciences sociales: La longue durée". Annales. 
Histoire, Sciences Sociales. Vol. 12, No. 4 (1958): pp. 725-753). 
9 Benda, “The Structure of Southeast Asian History”, pp. 111-112.  
10 See also John Smail, “On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Modern Southeast Asia”, Journal of 
Southeast Asian History, Vol 2, No. 2, (Jun., 1961), pp. 72-102. Originally a paper read at a 1961 conference for 
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“Singaporean” perspective. Rather, I want to engage some of the “unparalleled” structural 
changes that had affected colonial Singapore. In this study, those changes refer to the 
dynamics contributing to and arising from the shift in colonial policy, particularly the change 
from a situation where state and society were reluctant to act even when confronted with 
evidence of poverty and destitution, to a situation where a deliberate official state presence in 
social welfare was present and even welcomed.  
 
Colonialism and Social Welfare in Singapore History 
 
A deliberate examination of these changes underpins a better appreciation of the 
impact of colonialism on Singapore state and society. Studies of Singapore’s past typically 
take British colonialism for granted. In other words, colonialism was a specific but mere 
period of time preceding independent Singapore.11 The study of the origins and evolution of 
colonial policy, and crucially, their implications, is all but absent in examinations of 
Singapore’s path to unexpected independence in 1965 and its nation-building efforts before 
and thereafter.12 Early histories of Singapore are products of a time when historical 
                                                          
Southeast Asian history in Singapore, Smail’s article was in response to a debate between the two heads of the 
history departments in the Singapore and Kuala Lumpur branches of the University of Malaya, respectively 
Kennedy G. Tregonning and John Bastin. The former had stated that the European presence in Southeast Asia 
was incidental at best (See Tregonning’s reviews of Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal, by L. A.  
Mills, and Malaya, by N. Ginsberg and C.F. Robert, Journal of South Seas Society, Vol. 14, Issue 1 & 2, 1958, 
pp. 123-124. Bastin responded in his 1959 inaugural lecture. See John S. Bastin, The Study of Modern Southeast 
Asian History; An Inaugural Lecture Delivered in The University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur on 14 December, 
1959 (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, 1959). Smail’s thoughts set the tone and direction 
in approaching Southeast Asia’s past via a perspective autonomous of nationalistic sentiments and colonial 
perspectives. Ho Chi Tim discusses the centricity debates in “The Intellectual and Institutional Origins of 
JSEAH and JSEAS”, ISA (International Sociological Association) E-Bulletin, Number 15, March 2010. For a 
recent comprehensive overview of Southeast Asian historiography, see Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallels: 
Southeast Asia in Global Context, c.800-1830 / Vol. I: Integration on the Mainland (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), chapter 1.  
11 For instance, Edwin Lee gives an uncomplicated cause-and-effect interpretation of the colonial period on 
Singapore society in Singapore: The Unexpected Nation, making it appear as if colonialism was merely a period 
before the nation. Lee does examine in more detail the effects of British rule in The British as Rulers. But the 
narrative does not go beyond a top-down, cause-effect dichotomy. 
12 Scholarly focus tends to be extremely localized. Colonial policy is acknowledged insofar to explain decisions 
on local developments in Singapore. See for instance Albert Lau, “Nationalism” in the Decolonization of 
Singapore”, in Marc Frey, Ronald Pruessen, and Tan Tai Yong (eds.), The Transformation of Southeast Asia: 
International Perspectives on Decolonization (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004), pp. 180-196, and 
Edwin Lee, Singapore: An Unexpected Nation. Lee focused more on the actions and decisions of “local” 
individuals and parties, revolving around the Singapore Story narrative of a struggle against difficult 
circumstances. British colonialism was acknowledged insofar that Raffles founded a trade settlement on the 
island in 1819, and the British governed the island until self-government in 1959 and independence with 
Malaysia in 1963. The counterpart nation-building histories for Malaysia and Indonesia engage more fully the 
colonial legacies in the creation of certain types of societies. See Cheah Boon Kheng’s Malaysia: The Making of 
a Nation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), chapter one; and Taufik Abdullah adopts a 
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scholarship was relatively less complicated. Pioneering historians of Singapore (and Malaya) 
possessed worldviews predominantly influenced by the reality of being a British colony. This 
approach has produced histories centered on the “bloodless bureaucratic administrators of 
modern colonial regimes”.13 Recent histories of Singapore, while advancing Singapore 
historiography, generally treat British colonialism similarly, either as an historical backdrop, 
or as an “object” to critique and / or to get past (so as to tell or to counter the Singapore 
Story). Sympathetic historians have presented British colonialism as the forerunner of 
modernity in Singapore, transforming a quiet fishing village into a thriving and cosmopolitan 
port city.14 Less neutral perspectives have presented British rule as negligent, bringing about 
social ills, and as a conduit for state surveillance and repressive measures.15 Such 
observations are not inaccurate. But they contain assumptions that understate, hide even, 
structural changes. Colonialism in Singapore after the Second World War was fundamentally 
different from colonialism before the war. The very idea of a colonial government 
deliberately being involved in the personal affairs of an individual at different life stages was 
new. Colonialism becomes more than a mere period of historical time. It was a phenomenon 
that provoked, intentionally or otherwise, myriad historical experiences.  
This study uses social welfare as a medium to understand those experiences better and 
in doing so, to address and engage conventional notions of colonialism in Singapore. The 
                                                          
similar approach in Indonesia: Towards Democracy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 
chapters one and two. 
13 See for instance Wong Lin Ken, The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914, with Special Reference to the States of 
Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang (Tucson: Published for the Association for Asian Studies by the 
University of Arizona Press, 1965), Wong Lin Ken, The Trade of Singapore, 1819-69 / with a new introduction 
by Wang Gungwu (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society; Bandar Puchong Jaya, 
Selangor, Malaysia: Printed for the MBRAS by Academe Art & Print. Services Sdn. Bhd. Malaysia, c2003. 
Originally published in 1961), Eunice Thio, British Policy in the Malay Peninsula, 1880-1910 (Singapore, 
University of Malaya Press, 1969), Yeo Kim Wah, Politics of Decentralization: Colonial Controversy in 
Malaya 1920-1929 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press [for] ISEAS, 1982), Yong Mun Cheong, H .J. Van 
Mook and Indonesian Independence: A Study of His Role in Dutch-Indonesian Relations, 1945-48 (Singapore: 
National University of Singapore Library, 1982), and Edwin Lee, The British as Rulers: Governing Multi-Racial 
Singapore 1867-1914 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, c1991). 
14 Examples include the inclusion of “modern” in the title of the third edition of Mary Turnbull’s classic history 
of Singapore – earlier editions were simply “A History of Singapore”; and Edwin Lee’s exposition of 
inheritance of “modern’ structures in government, economy, and approaches to society in “The Colonial 
Legacy” in Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley (eds.), Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern 
Singapore (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989). 
15 For instance, James Warren writes in Rickshaw Coolie: “Examination of the major sequential decisions made 
by the Colonial Government of Singapore in regard to housing, water supply, waste disposal and sewerage from 
the 1880s to 1930s, shows that the city’s rulers consistently chose alternatives the minimized costs at the 
expense of the coolie population”. (p. 325). In his study of the Maria Hertogh riots of 1950, Khairudin Aljunied 
presents the British colonial state as one that resorted, as part of its response to the riots, to increased 
surveillance and expansion of policing and suppressive measures. See Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied, 
Colonialism, Violence and Muslims in Southeast Asia: The Maria Hertogh Controversy and Its Aftermath 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2009), in particular chapters 3 and 4. 
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meaning of “social welfare” is elastic, shifting according to context and purpose. In the 
broadest understanding possible, the idea of welfare refers to the “well-being” of society or 
individuals, or simply put, what is good for people.16 In a narrower sense, welfare refers to 
“public payments or services given to individuals to support them”.17 The latter 
understanding, while helpful in providing a precise focus, does not immediately capture the 
complexities involved in providing financial assistance or a personal social service, and the 
broader contexts in which such assistance or services are given in the first place. The 
narrower definition is moreover one value judgement away from a social stigma.18 The 
broader understanding of social welfare is more suited to a wide-ranging historical study. The 
well-being of society covers a wide – perhaps infinite – range, as social needs do evolve over 
time and differ in different locations. This approach lends itself to theoretical examinations of 
the dynamics and consequences of social policy, the social theories that underpin and drive 
people’s words and deeds in different contexts, and of power relations within society and/or 
between state and society.19 
This study does not attempt to theorize Singapore’s colonial or post-colonial approach 
to welfare. Its first priority is to build up the necessary empirical foundation for further 
research into less familiar parts of Singapore history. The following chapters focus 
principally on the historical developments and structural changes in Singapore’s colonial 
                                                          
16 Paul Spicker, Principles of Social Welfare: An Introduction to Thinking about the Welfare State, p. 8. 
Originally published by Routledge in 1998. See also Martin O'Brien and Sue Penna, Theorising Welfare: 
Enlightenment and Modern Society (London: Sage, 1998), pp. 7-8. 
17 Lynn Hollen Lees, The Solidarities of Strangers: The English Poor Laws and the People, 1700-1948 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 2. 
18 From the mid-1970s, the term “welfare” became either a description of a state of dependency or a synonym 
for financial assistance given to particular sections of society. Katz cites former President Bill Clinton’s promise 
“to end welfare as we know it....” in The Price of Citizenship, p. 1. Such usage is generally more prevalent in 
America, though there are similar tones in Britain. See Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State: 
A History of Social Policy since the Industrial Revolution (Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, third ed.), pp. 280-295. 
19 In Theorising Welfare, O'Brien and Penna highlight and discuss the theoretical underpinnings of various 
intellectual responses to social needs in modern (European) society over time, connecting and organizing those 
as the by-products of and responses to the Enlightenment, such as Liberalism, Marxism, Neo-liberalism, and 
Poststructuralism. The latter, O'Brien and Penna suggest, was part of an intellectual response emerging during 
the 1960s that questioned the linearity of Enlightenment-based ideologies and values, such as modernity and 
progress. Here, Michel Foucault’s theoretical work on discourse, power and knowledge, surveillance and 
governmentality, brought to bear on public and private issues such as government, the body, gender, and 
sexuality, have been engaged to explicate various aspects of social work and social policy. See O'Brien and 
Penna, Theorising Welfare, pp. 2-4 and 108-132. See also contributions in Adrienne S. Chambon, Allan Irving, 
Laura Epstein (eds.), Reading Foucault for Social Work (New York: Columbia University Press, c1999); Martin 
Hewitt, “Bio-Politics and Social Policy: Foucault's Account of Welfare”. Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 12, 
No. 2 (February 1983), pp. 67-84; Simon Biggs and Jason L. Powell, “A Foucauldian Analysis of Old Age and 
the Power of Social Welfare”. Journal of Aging & Social Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2 (February 2001), pp. 93-112; 
and Jason L. Powell and Hafiz T.A. Khan, “Foucault, Social Theory and Social Work”. Sociologie Romaneasca, 
Vol. 10, No. 1 (2012), pp. 131-147. 
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state and society. In doing so, the study provides the historical context to existing scholarship 
on social welfare and social policy in Singapore, an area hitherto dominated by economists, 
sociologists, and social work professionals. Their focus is typically on the contemporary and 
on policy. They give a brief historical outline of social policies and services up to the point of 
the study, after which they examine the effectiveness of social policies, or to situate 
Singapore’s social policies within East and Southeast Asia.20 To that end, this study could be 
used as a historical basis for an informed and grounded study of the theoretical underpinnings 
of Singapore’s historical responses to social needs. 
The few publications that provide historical overviews generally attribute the 
introduction of social welfare to the need to address social dislocations resulting from the 
Japanese Occupation and the ascension of the British Labour Party in 1945.21  Within those 
overviews are hints of a nuanced history of how and why social welfare came to Singapore. 
Discussing social welfare in the context of Singapore’s postwar socio-political developments, 
Mary Turnbull noted the changing attitudes in Europe “towards the role of government ... 
after the Second World War”, where “citizens came to demand more active official 
involvement in providing social services and improving living standards at home and in the 
colonies”.22 Positing progress and stability as the objectives of governance, she also observed 
that “both the colonial authorities and the Progressives [the Singapore Progressive Party] 
                                                          
20 Social welfare is these instances, is a part of a social policy that encompasses health, education, public 
housing and social security; or refers to specific social policies, legislation or services dealing with poverty 
alleviation, social security, or community development. See Linda Y. C. Lim, “Social Welfare”, in Sandhu and 
Wheatley (eds.), Management of Success, pp. 171-197, Nalia Tan, “Health and Welfare”, in Chew and Lee 
(eds.), A History of Singapore, pp. 339-356; Ann Wee, "Where We Are Coming From: Social and Welfare 
Interventions When Singapore Was a British Colony", in Ann Wee & Kalyani K. Mehta (eds.), Social Work in 
the Singapore Context - Second Edition (Singapore: Pearson Education South Asia Pte. Ltd., 2011), pp. 21-72; 
Linda Low and Aw Tar Choon’s Social Insecurity in the New Millennium: The Central Provident Fund in 
Singapore (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004) and Housing A Healthy, Educated And Wealthy 
Nation Through The CPF (Singapore: Times Academic Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, 1997); Mukul 
Govinda Asher, Compulsory Savings In Singapore: An Alternative to the Welfare State (Dallas, Tex.: National 
Center for Policy Analysis, 1995) and Social Adequacy and Equity of the Social Security Arrangements in 
Singapore (Singapore: Times Academic Press for the Centre for Advanced Studies, 1991); and M. Ramesh, 
Social Policy in East And Southeast Asia: Education, Health, Housing and Income Maintenance (New York, 
N.Y.: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004) and “One and a half cheers for provident funds in Malaysia and Singapore”, in 
Kwon Huck-Ju (ed.), Transforming the Developmental Welfare State in East Asia (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire; New York, N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 191-208; and Tang Kwong Leung, Social Welfare 
Development in East Asia (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, N.Y.: Palgrave, 2000).  
21 In addition to Ann Wee’s chapter, historians Edwin Lee and Mary Turnbull also explained the introduction of 
colonial social welfare similarly. See Lee’s “Colonial Legacy”, in Management of Success, p. 37, and Turnbull’s 
A History of Modern Singapore, pp. 241-243. It is probable that Wee and the historians referred to the first 
official report of the Singapore Department of Social Welfare. 
22 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, p. 241. 
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recognized the need for a new approach to social welfare and education if Singapore was to 
become a settled, self-governing society”.23  
This “new approach” refers to a government assuming more responsibility for the 
well-being of the people, differing from the prewar laissez faire approach that had influenced 
Singapore’s economy and governance since Raffles.24 Edwin Lee observes a change in the 
style of governance, commenting that the “radical thinking on welfare in post-war Britain and 
the war-ravaged conditions in Singapore caused an important step to be taken, namely, the 
establishment of the Department of Social Welfare in June 1946”.25 Discussing the origins of 
social services in Singapore, Ann Wee does not deviate much from the narrative adopted by 
the historians. She does however highlight a continuity from the Chinese Protectorate, first 
established in 1877, to the new social welfare department created.26 With minor differences, 
all three histories see the Social Welfare Department as an example of a break from a prewar 
laissez faire approach to governance to a situation where state intervention to improve the 
well-being of society was not merely tolerated but actively pursued. 
At a minimal, the above suggests a much more substantive history of social welfare in 
Singapore than is currently acknowledged. This history has been hidden by negative 
                                                          
23 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, p. 241. Turnbull summarizes the main highlights of the work of the 
Department in a couple of paragraphs. Her treatment of the origins of colonial social welfare was cursory, 
unavoidably so in a general history of Singapore. 
24 The term laissez faire is used in this study as it was understood by policymakers and intellectuals at the height 
of colonial policy discussions during the 1930s and 1940s, and later by historians and scholars of Singapore 
state, economy and society. Generally speaking, laissez faire refers primarily to an economic system relatively 
free of government intervention. Historically speaking, it was a philosophy usually associated (rather simply at 
times) with Adam Smith’s writings, and was formed in response to mercantilism and supporting state activism 
prevalent between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. The term however has been historically conflated to 
include approaches to governance and society, as seen in John Furnivall’s historicizing of colonial policy and 
administration (Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, Chapter 2); and Derek Fraser’s description of Britain’s 
pre-welfare state approach to social policy (Fraser, British Welfare State, Chapter 5). In Singapore history, 
Raffles is popularly understood as the introducer of laissez faire principles to Singapore, but as Turnbull subtly 
noted, that was only in the economic sense, the prime example being Singapore’s free port status. Raffles’ 
guiding principles were more mixed, ranging from a humanitarian impulse (seen in his opposition to slavery), a 
belief in the moral attributes of government (seen in his plans for education to mitigate the excesses of free 
trade), and to approaches that were in line with Jeremy Bentham and the Utilitarians (as seen in his belief in the 
rule of law, town planning, and the penal system). (See Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, pp. 36-50). 
The colonial state in Singapore could be more accurately understood as a limited or a minimal state, to protect 
basic liberties and to maintain a free trade economy. For a discussion of the limited / minimal state, see Leszek 
Balcerowicz, “Toward a Limited State”. Cato Journal, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Fall 2004), pp. 186, 191-192, and a 
useful overview of the historical evolution to a “positive state”, Howard M. Leichter, A Comparative Approach 
to Policy Analysis: Health Care Policy in Four Nations (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), Chapter 2. The idea of a limited state has a long history rooted in Liberal traditions roots, and is generally 
traced to John Locke’s writings on the role of government in The Second Treatise of Civil Government, first 
published in 1690. See relevant readings in Ronald J. Terchek and Thomas C. Conte (eds.), Theories of 
Democracy: A Reader (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001). 
25 Lee, “Colonial Legacy”, p. 37. 
26 Wee, “Where We Are Coming From”, pp. 27-33 and 48.  
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perceptions of welfare at the highest levels of policymaking and further perpetuated in 
scholarship. Since independence in 1965, successive People’s Action Party governments have 
publicly asserted that Western-style welfarism was not for Singapore. Such assertions have 
been colored by Lee Kuan Yew’s vision of a “fair, not welfare” society. In his memoirs, Lee 
explained: 
 
when governments undertook primary responsibility for the basic duties of the 
head of a family, the drive in people weakened. Welfare undermined self-
reliance. People did not have to work for their families' well-being. The 
handout became a way of life. The downward spiral was relentless as 
motivation and productivity went down. People lost the drive to achieve 
because they paid too much in taxes. They became dependent on the state for 
their basic needs.27 
  
Lee's views on Singapore's social policy persisted long after he stepped down as Prime 
Minister. At various points during their tenure as Prime Ministers, his successors, Goh Chok 
Tong and Lee Hsien Loong, have warned Singaporeans not to construe government social 
assistance as a step towards a “welfare state”, and to avoid “dependency mentality” or a 
“welfare mentality”.28 In those instances, the terms “welfare” and “welfare state” have been 
understood as synonyms for cash hand-outs, a state of dependency, or as a warning of the 
excesses of European-style welfarism.29 Such interpretations have built up a certain 
impression of an anti-welfare state in Singapore, an impression reinforced to some extent by 
public and scholarly commentaries.30 For instance, even though financial assistance amounts 
increased in 2007, Chua Beng Huat observed that the Singapore government 
 
                                                          
27 Lee, From Third World to First, p. 126. 
28 National Archives of Singapore (NAS), Speeches and Press Releases (SPR). Goh Chok Tong, [no title], 
(Speech at The Swearing-in Ceremony of Mayors of Community Development Council Districts on Saturday, 5 
January 2002); Lee Hsien Loong, [no title], (Speech at the launch of ComCare, 28 June 2005). 
29 On Singapore's narrow interpretation of welfare, see Ng Kok Hoe, “Four Fallacies about the Singapore 
Welfare State”, in Social Dimension Singapore: The Online Blog Magazine for Singapore Social Work. 
http://www.social-dimension.com/2011/09/four-fallacies-about-the-singapore-welfare-state.html. Accessed 8 
July 2016. For a concise summary of government views on welfare over time, see Philip Mendes, "An 
Australian Perspective on Singaporean Welfare Policy" in Social Work and Society-The International Online-
Only Journal, Vol. 5, no. 1, 2007. 
30 Jacqueline Loh writes “Singapore has always adopted a firm anti-welfare approach in its social and economic 
policy...” in “Bottom Fifth in Singapore”, Social Space, Issue 4, 2011, p. 68. See also Lian Kwen Fee, “Is There 
a Social Policy in Singapore”, in Lian Kwen Feeand Tong Chee Kiong (eds.), Social policy in post-industrial 
Singapore (Boston: Brill, 2008), Chua Beng Huat, “Emerging Issues in Developmental Welfarism in 
Singapore”, in James Lee and Kam-wah Chan (eds.), The Crisis Of Welfare In East Asia (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, c2007), and his quotes in The Straits Times, 22 March 2008, “Welfare spending: Is it just 
about money?”; The Straits Times, 21 March 2008, “Singapore's new welfarism: 'Give it to them'”;  The 
Economist, 13 February 2010, “The stingy nanny: The city-state stays strict with the needy”, and The Straits 
Times, 1 September 2015, “Beware the welfarism trap”.  
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continues to maintain a three-point principle: fostering self-reliant individuals, 
family as the first line of support, and “many helping hands”. … This mode 
has enabled the government to displace the idea that social welfare of the 
needy is the sole responsibility of the state, instead of just contributing its 
share as a constitutive part of the helping hands, and avoid the idea that 
citizens are “entitled” to state welfare provisions.31 
 
While factual, these observations do not immediately explain the considerable and 
sustained state interventions over time to ensure a certain level of individual and community 
well-being. Affordable housing, for instance, has always been hailed as one of the 
cornerstones of a “fair, not welfare, society”.32 From 1960, the Housing and Development 
Board’s public housing program was consistently expanded and intensified to the point where 
over 80% of Singapore’s population have been housed in (and owned) apartment flats since 
1985.33 The Central Provident Fund scheme, an inheritance from the colonial period, is a 
compulsory savings program originally for retirement. The scheme has been adjusted over 
time, creating a series of sub-accounts to pay for healthcare needs, as well as for housing and 
children’s education.34  More recently, the principle of self-reliance has also been undermined 
by successive economic downturns, persistent concerns with structural unemployment, an 
aging population, increased costs of living, and electoral setbacks. Since the twenty-first 
century, income transfers from the state to the individual have substantially increased.35 From 
2006, older, low-income workers received Workfare payouts as an incentive to stay 
employed.36 In 2014, workers in selected low-income occupations was ensured a minimum 
                                                          
31 Chua, “Emerging Issues in Developmental Welfarism in Singapore”, p. 36. The Many Helping Hands 
approach and the reasons for the shift are discussed in Ho Chi Tim and Ann Wee, “Singapore Chronicles: Social 
Services” (forthcoming publication by Institute of Policy Studies and Straits Times Press). 
32 Lee, From Third World to First, p. 126. 
33 Belinda Yuen, “Squatters No More: Singapore Social Housing”, Global Urban Development Magazine, Vol. 
3, Issue 1, November 2007. See also Asad Latif’s biography of Lim Kim San, the first chairman of the Housing 
and Development Board, for a more personal take on the task of developing Singapore’s public housing. Asad-
ul Iqbal Latif, Lim Kim San: A Builder of Singapore (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). 
34 The Central Provident Fund is presented in the official website as a “…comprehensive social security system 
that enables working Singapore Citizens and Permanent Residents to set aside funds for retirement. It also 
addresses healthcare, home ownership, family protection and asset enhancement”. Central Provident Fund 
Board, CPF Overview. https://www.cpf.gov.sg/Members/AboutUs/about-us-info/cpf-overview. Accessed 9 June 
2016. The website describes Singapore’s approach to social policy: “Singapore's social policies embody its 
national philosophy of an active government support for self-reliance. This reinforces individual effort and 
responsibility for the family: values that keep our society strong”. Central Provident Fund Board, “History of 
CPF”. https://www.cpf.gov.sg/Members/AboutUs/about-us-info/history-of-cpf. Accessed 9 June 2016. 
35 One of the earliest forms of income transfers was the New Singapore Shares and the Economic Restructuring 
Shares, both of which were given out in 2001 and 2003 respectively to help lower-income households to deal 
with economic downturns. The government also gives annual rebates for utilities (such as water and electricity). 
36 One year later, Workfare payouts became more regular as the scheme was modified to provide quarterly, 
instead of annual, “income supplements” to low-wage workers who stay employed for at least three consecutive 
months. I received $127 as a “low-wage worker” in November 2013. For an examination of the introduction of 
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entry-level wage via a Progressive Wage Model.37 From July 2016, pension-like grants will 
be given to the low-income elderly on a permanent and regular basis as part of a Silver 
Support Scheme. There has also been talk of introducing some form of social insurance in 
Singapore.38 One version of it came to pass in late 2015 with Medishield Life, a universal 
health insurance scheme that covered for life the medical needs of Singaporeans.39 The 
creation in late 2012 of a new Ministry of Social and Family Development moreover poses 
another intriguing historical continuity. The new ministry oversees the present-day versions 
of functions and services that first appeared more than sixty years ago in June 1946.40 Then, 
they were introduced by the colonial government and administered by the Social Welfare 
Department. Social welfare, at that time, was not objectionable. It “signified a broad and 
progressive program with wide public support”, while the “welfare state embodied a 
generation’s hopes and aspirations for universal economic security and protection from the 
worst consequences of life’s ordinary hazards”.41  
 
Expanding Singapore History 
 
These seeming colonial continuities call for a reconsideration of Singapore history 
and historiography. Via social welfare history, or in other words, an understanding of how 
state and society responded over time to various social needs, Singapore’s allegedly “short 
history” expands considerably in scope and depth. For instance, the introduction of a social 
welfare department in 1946 was a manifestation of a colonial policy of development and 
welfare. That policy was the result of historical processes located outside the usual ambits of 
Singapore historiography, which are typically limited writing or countering the Singapore 
                                                          
Workfare in Asia, see Irene Y. H. Ng, “Workfare in Singapore”, in K. C. Chak & K. Ngok (eds.), Welfare 
Reform in East Asia: Towards Workfare? (U.K.: Routledge, 2011). 
37 Tharman Shamugaratnam, [No Title] (Speech given at the e2i Best Sourcing Symposium on 8 January 2014). 
38 See Manu Bhaskaran, et. al., “Background Paper. Inequality and the Need for a New Social Compact”, in 
Kang Soon Hock and Leong Chan-Hoong (eds.), Singapore Perspectives 2012 – Singapore Inclusive: Bridging 
Divides (Singapore; Hackensack, N. J.: World Scientific Pub. Co., c2013). 
39 Singapore Ministry of Health, “Home – Medishield Life”. https://www.medishieldlife.sg/. Accessed on 8 June 
2016. MediShield Life is a national health insurance scheme that provides lifelong protection for all Singapore 
Citizens and Permanent Residents against large medical bills”. The scheme is compulsory, removes the previous 
limit of ninety years of age, and covers all pre-existing medical conditions. “  
40 Singapore Ministry of Social and Family Development, “History & Milestones – Ministry of Social and 
Family Development”. http://app.msf.gov.sg/AboutMSF/OurOrganisation/HistoryMilestones.aspx. Accessed 5 
July 2016. (Webpage was last amended on 30 July 2014). See also Singapore Ministry of Community 
Development, Youth and Sports, Helping Hands Touching Lives: 60 Years Making a Difference (Singapore: 
Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports (MCYS), 2007). 
41 Katz, The Price of Citizenship, p. 1 
12 
 
 
 
Story. Conceptually, the deliberate introduction of a seemingly benevolent policy in a 
colonial situation encourages a reconsideration of colonialism, in all of its aspects, in 
Singapore history.42 This is especially so when key institutions and processes of the social 
welfare state created during the late colonial period exist still in present-day Singapore. This 
in turn raises questions about the categories of colonizer and colonized during the 
decolonization process, the role of individuals in bringing forth change at the state and 
societal level, the colonial-era structures (and their underlying assumptions) inherited and 
brought forward into the post-colonial period, and from there, their impact on our historical 
and contemporary understanding of social policy, state formation, and nation-building.  
These are not limited to Singapore, and when fully expounded on, can better explicate 
Singapore’s historical connections to colonial and post-colonial Southeast Asia, the British 
Empire, and global developments. This study attempts to understand those connections via a 
history of state-building, in particular the act and consequences of building a social welfare 
state in late colonial Singapore. Those attempts were part of a new colonial policy to create a 
more cohesive community after the Second World War, one that would be self-governing and 
eventually join similar nations within the British sphere of influence. The history is a local 
one based in Singapore. But colonial welfare originated from a mesh of metropolitan, 
imperial, and global factors and processes. Its consequent introduction and implementation in 
postwar Singapore were further complicated by local circumstances, such as the absence of 
precedent for an official presence in social welfare (and its implications), the obstructive 
nature of colonial society, and the challenges of decolonization. My research was guided by 
two questions: How did state and society in colonial Singapore respond to social needs at 
various points in a human life, such as birth, youth and adulthood, illness and injury, work 
and unemployment, old age and retirement, and death? What kind of state eventually 
emerged to address those needs?  
In addressing those questions, this study offers an augmented understanding of state-
building. The state is more than a series of institutions, bureaucracies, and policies, erected 
                                                          
42 Following a seminar, a historian residing in Singapore remarked that it is odd for Singaporeans to perceive 
colonialism as a negative experience. Coming from someone who teaches history, his rather careless comment, 
and its underlying assumptions, have troubling and uncomfortable implications for the study of Singapore’s past 
in the country. For one, he has ignored or dismissed the historical experiences of individuals and communities 
that have been excluded from a supposed colonial success story in Singapore, such as ethnic, linguistic and 
social class minorities, and political opposition. He is also ignorant of substantial research that have highlighted 
colonial-era suppression of student activists, trade unions and political dissent. Worse, the underlying 
assumption of his comment, that colonialism was beneficial for Singapore, risks essentializing Singapore’s 
colonial experience, and from a professional point of view, misses the opportunity to engage colonialism as a 
historical experience, whether in Southeast Asia or in other parts of the world. 
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and maintained for the purposes of administering a population within a territory.43 It is also 
made up of historical processes and lived experiences arising from individual decisions, 
actions, and interactions.44  The social welfare state, as seen in the title of this study, refers to 
the institutions such as the Social Welfare Department and related organizations, and to the 
structures and processes maintained by individuals working within or with those institutions 
to effect social welfare. This study puts at the forefront the latter. These were the migrant 
worker, the colonial administrator, the social welfare officer, the concerned citizen, the lady 
volunteer, and the social worker. Their various needs, concerns, and interactions, understood 
in their own right, are more than a mere foil for or a simplistic counter-response to historical 
metanarratives. Taken together, their lives and experiences give coherency and structure to 
the social welfare state, namely its institutions, processes and interactions, that emerged in 
late colonial Singapore. Moreover, each individual had experienced colonialism differently 
and vividly, providing an opportunity to understand colonialism not merely as a period of 
time in Singapore’s past, but also as a conduit to better appreciate the diverse array of 
historical experiences arising from a period of Singapore history usually taken for granted. 
 
The Global Origins of Colonial Welfare 
 
Singapore’s social welfare history is an indelible part of the origins and development 
of colonial welfare. The shift from an earlier and relative laissez faire approach to colonial 
                                                          
43 Conventional approaches to the state draw from Max Weber’s definition: “The state exists whenever there is a 
special apparatus that has a monopoly on the use of force in a given territory”. Quoted in Leszek Balcerowicz, 
“Toward a Limited State”. Cato Journal, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Fall 2004), p. 185; originally from Max Weber’s 
Economy and Society. 
44 My understanding of the state is informed by Benedict Anderson’s description: “The state has to be 
understood as an institution [emphasis in original text], of the same species as the Church, the university, and 
the modern corporation. Like them, it ingests and excretes personnel in a continuous, steady process, often over 
long periods of time…. [T]he state not only has its own memory but harbors self-preserving and self-
aggrandizing impulses, which at any given moment are ‘expressed’ through its living members, but which 
cannot be reduced to their passing personal ambitions”. Cited in Robert Taylor, The State in Myanmar 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), p. 4. (Originally published in 1987 as The State in Burma (London: C. Hurst & 
Co.). Anderson’s quote comes from “Old State, New Society: Indonesia’s New Order in Comparative Historical 
Perspective’, Journal of Asian Studies, XLII, 3 (May 1983), p. 478. In addition to Weber’s definition, another 
useful definition: “A state is the means of rule over a defined or "sovereign" territory. It is comprised of an 
executive, a bureaucracy, courts and other institutions. But, above all, a state levies taxes and operates a military 
and police force. States distribute and re-distribute resources and wealth, so lobbyists, politicians and 
revolutionaries seek in their own way to influence or even to get hold of the levers of state power”. Global 
Policy Forum, What is a “State”? https://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/what-is-a-state.html. Accessed 
8 July 2016. For introductory overviews on the state, see Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States 
in Western Europe (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), and Peter B. Evans, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back in (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
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governance to colonial welfare is part of a world history of responses to social needs.45 The 
impetus for colonial welfare can be traced to the convergence of several broad historical 
developments. Those included increased imperial competition on the world stage, a shift in 
attitudes towards poverty and social needs in the metropole, and the impact of crisis 
moments, such as economic slumps and wars. All of those led to a reexamination of existing 
assumptions about social needs throughout the early decades of twentieth century, resulting in 
increased state responsibility for social security and other social services. 
 
The Berlin Conference (1884-1885) and British Imperialism 
 
The British Empire took on various forms in different time periods.46 In the nineteenth 
century, the British Empire was a collection of overlapping components scattered across the 
world map. It was an “Empire of white settlement”, located mainly in North America, parts of 
the Caribbean (or the West Indies), South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. It was also 
simultaneously an “Empire in India”, and an “Empire of conquests or wartime acquisitions”, 
otherwise known as the “dependent empire” that expanded between 1780 and 1914.47 British 
Singapore was in the latter grouping, which included territories, settlements, and ports along 
the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. By the early nineteenth century, the British Empire was in the 
midst of discarding the vestiges of an “old colonial system” that was based on monopolies of 
trade and navigation routes and a subservient relationship between the colony and the home 
country.48 The new system was based on the concepts of free trade and responsible 
                                                          
45 Briefly, a world history narrative of responses to social needs begins with the agitation for civil and political 
rights during the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and the nineteenth century’s drive 
for universal suffrage. The twentieth century welfare state represented the culmination of movements for a 
person’s right to social and economic security. This teleology was first presented by Thomas Humphrey 
Marshall in his 1949 lecture on “Citizenship and Social Class” published in Citizenship and Social Class, and 
Other Essays (Cambridge [Eng.] University Press, 1950). See also Peter Baldwin, "Beveridge in the Longue 
Duree", in John Hills, John Dutch, and Howard Glennester (eds.), Beveridge and Social Security: An 
International Perspective (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994). Albert O. Hirschman discusses the counter-
responses to Marshall’s teleology in The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991).  
46 It is conventionally accepted that there were several incarnations of the entity known as the British Empire. 
The first empire began with the Integerrenum (or the foundations of the Laws of Trade) in 1651, and ended with 
in the early nineteenth century with the “modification” and “dismantling” of the Navigation Acts. A second 
distinct “empire” was thought to exist in the period beginning with the Treaty of Paris in 1783, and ended during 
the 1850s and1860s. For an overview, see P. J. Marshall, “The First British Empire”, and C. A. Bayly, “The 
Second British Empire”, in Robin Winks and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), The Oxford History of the British 
Empire: Volume V: Historiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
47 Andrew Porter, “Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century”, in Andrew Porter and Wm 
Roger Louis (eds.), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 4. 
48 W. David McIntyre, Colonies into Commonwealth (Blandford P, 1966), pp. 17-19, 32-39. 
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government within the colonies. As the twentieth century beckoned however, competition, 
national and imperial, intensified. The imperial ambitions of Germany after its national 
unification in 1871, and other European nations, such as France, Russia, Italy and Belgium, 
and the emergence of United States of America and Japan, posed new challenges to the status 
of Britain as a Great Power. Imperialist fervor peaked during the final decades of the 
nineteenth century. From the 1870s, European nations organized expeditions into the African 
continent, extending European national competition more forcibly into the international 
arena. Tensions escalated in the wake of the French seizure of Tunisia in 1881, British 
intervention in Egypt in 1882, and increased German activity in the continent. In response, 
Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor, hosted an international conference in Berlin to 
preempt open hostilities. The Berlin West Africa Conference began in November 1884 and 
was concluded in February 1885. The final agreement, the General Act, laid down principles 
to govern the behavior of interested parties in Africa.49  
The General Act had implications for imperial activities elsewhere in the world. Of 
relevance to this study were two articles known collectively as the principle of “effective 
occupation”. Article 34 required “any power acquiring coastal territory on the African 
continent to notify all other such powers of their claim”. Article 35 required signatories “to 
insure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of the 
African continent sufficient to protect existing rights....”50 Taken together, these two articles 
meant that “the occupying power had to establish sufficient authority over its territories to 
ensure protection of its vested interests”.51 In practice, this meant colonial governments could 
not ignore potential interference from competitors. The threat of an alternative power 
                                                          
49 They were: “Chapter I Declaration relative to Freedom of Trade in the Basin of the Congo, its Mouths and 
circumjacent Regions, with other Provisions connected therewith (Articles 1-7); Chapter II Declaration Relative 
to the Salve Trade (Article 9); Chapter III Declaration Relative to the Neutrality of the Territories Comprised in 
the Conventional Basin of the Congo (Articles 10-12); Chapter IV, Act of Navigation for the Congo (Articles 
13-15); Chapter V, Act of Navigation for the Niger (Articles 26-33); Chapter VI, Declaration Relative to the 
Essential Conditions to be Observed in Order the new Occupations of the Coasts of the African Continent may 
be held to be Effective (Articles 34-35); Chapter VII General Dispositions”. The conference included 
participants from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the United States 
of America, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Sweden-Norway, and Turkey (Ottoman Empire).  
50 General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa, 26 February 1885. 
http://africanhistory.about.com/od/eracolonialism/l/bl-BerlinAct1885.htm. Accessed 13 January 2016. 
51 G. De Courcel, “The Berlin Act of 26 February 1885”, in Stig Forster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, and Ronald 
Robinson (eds.), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and The Onset of 
Partition (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 255. See also S. E. Crowe, The Berlin West 
African Conference 1884–1885 (London: Longmans Green, 1942), p. 176 and chapter “The Third Basis: 
Effective Occupation”; I. Geiss, “Free Trade, Internationalization of the Congo Basin, and the Principle of 
Effective Occupation”, in Bismarck, Europe, and Africa, pp. 269-270, and Frederick John Dealtry Lugard, The 
Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: F. Cass, 1965; fifth ed., first published in 1922), chapter 1. 
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intervening would, in theory at least, “encourage” a proactive approach to the administration 
of a colonial territory and its peoples, either via through direct territorial control, or through 
social policies, or both.52 Such inclinations were, at that point in time, fundamentally at odds 
with the prevailing laissez faire philosophy of colonial governance and economy. 
A direct connection has yet to be established between the “effective occupation” 
principle and the willingness of colonial governments to provide social services. It is 
interesting however to note a significant increase in colonial activity around and from the 
time of the Berlin Conference. This period of “high imperialism” did not merely entail the 
physical annexation of territories and thereafter maintenance of territorial boundaries. It also 
witnessed an expansion of the European presence in Africa and Asia, and the corresponding 
expansion of the reach and responsibilities of the colonial state. In Southeast Asia, the Dutch 
introduced the Ethical Policy in 1900, ostensibly for the well-being of the indigenous 
population in Java. The new policy required new state agencies to implement and enforce 
new measures for agricultural (irrigation), migration and education services.53 Elsewhere, the 
Americans and the French implemented their particular brands of colonial rule in the 
Philippines and Indochina respectively. The former implemented an approach ostensibly with 
the end-goal of self-government and independence for the Philippines.54 The latter, on the 
other hand, went into Indochina with a strong sense of the civilizing mission.55 The British 
followed an imperial policy that was later theorized and described as the Dual Mandate in 
their imperial territories, recognizing twin responsibilities of the imperial power to develop 
                                                          
52 The essence of “effective occupation” was not something entirely original. The British had used it to great 
effect against the Spanish and Portuguese, the elder imperial powers before the nineteenth century. During the 
Berlin Conference, the tables were turned on the British by the Germans and the French, who were eager to 
prove their imperial credentials. Geiss, “Effective Occupation”, p. 270. 
53 On the Ethical Policy (or Ethische Politiek), see Robert Cribb, 'Development Policy in the Early 20th 
Century', in Jan-Paul Dirkse, Frans Hüsken and Mario Rutten (eds.), Development and Social Welfare: 
Indonesia’s Experiences Under the New Order (Leiden: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 
1993), pp. 225–245, and Frances Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice In The Netherlands Indies, 
1900-1942 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, c1995), Chapter 1. See also D. H. Meijer, “Dutch 
Colonial Policy in Indonesia with some indication of its aims”, in C. M. MacInnes (ed.), Principles and Methods 
of Colonial Administration (London: Butterworths Scientific Publications, 1950), pp. 57-69, and Ming Goovars, 
Dutch Colonial Education – The Chinese Experience in Indonesia, 1900-1942; translated by Lorre Lynn 
Trytten; with a foreword by Wang Gungwu (Singapore: Chinese Heritage Centre, 2005). 
54 For an overview, see Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano (eds.), The Colonial Crucible: Empire In 
The Making Of The Modern American State (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, c2009), Warwick 
Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, And Hygiene In The Philippines (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2006), and Julian Go and Anne L. Foster (eds.), The American Colonial State In The 
Philippines: Global Perspectives (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
55 For background to French imperial policy, see Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea 
of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, c1997), in 
particular chapter 1: “The Setting: The Idea of the Civilizing Mission in 1895 and the Creation of the 
Government General”.   
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its territories and its peoples, and to support the national and imperial goals of the 
metropole.56 
In British Malaya, the responsibilities of the colonial administrations (of the Straits 
Settlements and the Federated Malay States) increased exponentially. The Chinese 
Protectorate, previously limited to the jurisdiction of the Straits Settlements, was included in 
the administration of the Federated Malay States. A Labour Department was established in 
1911 to manage the increasing numbers of South Asian laborers.57 An Education Department 
had been created earlier in 1878 to organize the hitherto haphazard growth of schools to meet 
an increasing demand for skilled clerks.58 Public health services were also introduced at the 
turn of century, as the colonial state took a keener interest in infant welfare.59 In Singapore 
proper, the Municipal Commission was established in 1880 to oversee the development of 
Singapore town, which included managing the supply of water, electricity and gas, roads and 
transportation, public health and hygiene.60 The Singapore Improvement Trust was also 
created in 1927 to improve the living conditions of urban dwellers.61 Those are but snippets 
of the colonial state’s physical expansion in Singapore and in other parts of Southeast Asia. 
Its expansion had several implications for historical research. One of which was the 
increasing number of responsibilities, and the corresponding increase in departments, 
institutions, legislation, and staff to manage those responsibilities. This in turn generated 
greater amounts of documents and records, which were duplicated in copious amounts – a 
                                                          
56 As termed and described by Frederick Lugard in The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. To some 
extent, Lugard was explaining what had gone on before since the late nineteenth century, rather than pointing a 
way forward. The publication appeared moreover during a period of reflection of the nature and purpose of 
colonialism. 
57 The Labour Department had roots in the “appointment in 1884 by the Straits Settlements government of an 
Indian Immigration Agent under the terms of the Indian Immigration Ordinance. See Norman J. Parmer, 
Colonial Labor Policy and Administration: A History of Labor in The Rubber Plantation Industry in Malaya, 
c.1910-1941 (Locust Valley, N.Y.: Published for the Association for Asian Studies by J.J. Augustin, 1960), pp. 
130-140 for organization of the department, and pp. 140-165 for administration of labor in British Malaya. 
58 For overview of early developments in education in the Straits Settlements, see David D. Chelliah, A History 
of the Educational Policy of the Straits Settlements, With Recommendations for a New System Based on 
Vernaculars (Kuala Lumpur: Printed at the Govt. Press, 1948) and H. E. Wilson, Social Engineering in 
Singapore: Educational Policies and Social Change, 1819-1972 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
c1978). Subsequent publications on education in Singapore tend to focus more on post-1965 developments, such 
as nation-building, as well as specific issues, such as the place of Chinese vernacular schools. 
59 See Leonre Manderson, Sickness and the State: Health and Illness in Colonial Malaya, 1870-1940 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Lynn Hollen Lees (2011). “Discipline and Delegation: Colonial 
Governance in Malayan Towns, 1880–1930”, Urban History, Vol. 38, No. 1 (May 2011), pp. 48-64.  
60 Brenda Yeoh discusses the origins of the Municipal Board in Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore, chapter 
2. See also Khoo Kay Kim, “The Municipal Government of Singapore, 1887-1940” (Unpublished academic 
exercise. Dept. of History, University of Malaya, 1960), and Then Lian Mee, “The Singapore Municipality, 
1946-1959 (Unpublished academic exercise. Dept. of History, University of Malaya, 1960). 
61 See Yeoh, Contesting Space, pp. 161-170, for the origins of the Singapore Improvement Trust. 
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process aided by enhancements in print and communication technology. It is no coincidence 
that substantive research into Singapore and Malaya’s past usually begins from the late 
nineteenth century.62 
The shift in approach to colonial administration was explained by John Sydenham 
Furnivall (1878-1960).63 In Colonial Policy and Practice, Furnivall observed that 
colonization throughout the nineteenth century occurred more frequently through the 
investment of capital, in contrast to earlier colonization through human settlers.64 He noted a 
change beginning in the 1870s, from the earlier laissez faire approach to a “new philosophy” 
based on efficiency and social justice.65 This was not a total disavowal of earlier Liberal 
beliefs that “economic progress was a sufficient guarantee of general welfare, both material 
and welfare”.66 But rather that Liberal doctrine, from then on, included a “double strand 
combining the practical common sense of Adam Smith and [Jeremy] Bentham with the 
humanitarian ideals of Rousseau and the French Revolution”.67 Furnivall suggested a variety 
of factors for the change. Those ranged from epochal moments in world history, such as the 
opening of the Suez Canal in late 1869, demands for greater state intervention for economic 
purposes, and a growing awareness of social injustice, most of which drove social 
movements in the metropole during the late nineteenth century.68  The new philosophy gave 
rise to the “new imperialism”, particularly in the “struggle for Africa” and “jockeying” for a 
piece of China. Furnivall suggested the race for imperial territory, and subsequently, the need 
                                                          
62 For instance, Yeoh’s Contesting Space is based primarily in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
James Warren began his study of rickshaw coolies and prostitutes in the 1880 and 1870 respectively, 
63 Furnivall was a former colonial official in the Indian Civil Service. He worked in Burma from 1902 until his 
retirement in 1931. He studied in Leiden University from 1933 to 1935, researching colonial policy and 
administrations in British Burma and the Dutch East Indies. Representative publications include Colonial Policy 
and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge 
University Press. First edition published in 1948, second edition in 1956), Netherlands India: A Study of Plural 
Economy / with an introduction by A. C. D. de Graeff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, first edition 
published in 1939; second edition in 1967), and The Fashioning of Leviathan (Rangoon: Zabu Meitswe Pitaka 
Press, 1939; originally published in Journal of the Burma Research Society, pp. 1-138). 
64 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 1. “Colonization originally implied settlement, but the tropics have 
been colonized with capital rather than with men, and most tropical countries under foreign rule are 
dependencies rather than colonies, though in practice both terms are used indifferently”. 
65 Furnivall organized the administration of British Burma into the following periods: laissez-faire (1826-1870), 
efficiency and social justice (1870-1923), and political democracy (1923-1940). The Netherlands India’s 
administration was defined mainly via the Culture (1830-1870), Liberal (1870-1900), and Ethical (1900 
onwards) systems, with the final system ushering in the beginnings of political democracy. 
66 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 28. 
67 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 62. For a narrative of the major social and economic philosophers, 
see Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age (New York: Knopf, 1984). 
68 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, pp. 62-63. He explained the new philosophy as the result of 
“[Charles] Darwin’s principle of the survival of the fittest it derived a justification of efficiency, and, from St-
Simon, Robert Owen and other Socialists of various schools, the doctrine of social justice”. (p. 62). 
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for effective administration, were moderated by a sense of social justice. All of which 
resulted in paternalistic rationalizations of colonial rule, such as the “White Man’s Burden”, 
so as to promote “the general welfare of the world and of their tropical subjects”.69 
Furnivall’s observations were formed through years of service in the Indian Civil 
Service, and then further developed as a student of colonial administration in Leiden 
University between 1933 and 1935. His views were not unique. The interwar years were a 
time of “growing interest in the welfare and development of the population of colonies, 
protectorates and mandates....”70 In 1931, Arnold Dirk Adriaan de Kat Angelino, an official in 
the Dutch East Indies government, made similar rationalizations for colonial rule.71 
Examining the development of colonial policy, Kat Angelino noted that there had been a shift 
from the “White Man's Burden” to a “Universal Human Task”.72 He suggested a form of 
synthesis between the values of “East and West”, based primarily on “human kinship”, a 
sense of solidarity within humankind. The end-goal of colonial policy should never be a 
suppression or destruction of the “soul of the East”, but rather paternalistically, to “widen its 
horizons” by applying lessons learned from Western modernization and science. On the eve 
of the Second World War, the nature of British imperialism, which had been shifting ever so 
gradually since the late nineteenth century, was one or two crises away from a decisive 
change in policy. 
 
The Global Quest for Social Security 
 
Simultaneous developments in the metropole and elsewhere in the British Empire 
were just as impactful, albeit in a less direct fashion. The new colonial policy was affected by 
metropolitan responses to poverty and other social ills, and more broadly, the global quest for 
                                                          
69 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 62. He referenced directly the main title of Rudyard Kipling’s 
1899 poem. He explained those aspects of colonial rule, such as efficient administration and social justice, as 
finding “expression in British policy as the doctrine of ‘the White Man’s Burden’”. This is an interesting 
appropriation of Kipling’s poem, published partly to commemorate American intervention in Spanish 
Philippines. At best, Furnivall’s observations should be taken as those made by a former colonial official with 
continued interest in the integrity of the British Empire, especially after 1945. For historical narrative of British 
social thought in the latter nineteenth century, see Gertrude Himmelfarb, Poverty and Compassion: The Social 
Ethic of the Late Victorians (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991). 
70 Arnold Dirk Adriaan de Kat Angelino, Colonial Policy – Volume One: General Principles / abridged 
translation from the Dutch by G. J. Renier in collaboration with the author (The Hague: M. Nijhoff; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1931), p. 1. 
71 De Kat Angelino was a Leiden-trained sinologist who worked closely with the government of the Dutch East 
Indies. The first volume is entitled General Principles, the second Dutch East Indies. Publication was written 
for or as part of a conference organized by the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1931.  
72 DE Kat Angelino, Colonial Policy – Volume One: General Principles, see Chapter II: Call to Leadership. 
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social security. Social security in this study refers to the social policies and services that offer 
protection against certain life contingencies, usually a social insurance scheme.73 Those in 
turn were affected by several historical factors, namely the immediacy of crisis moments, 
such as economic slumps and wars, and the longer-term effects of industrialization and 
urbanization on perceptions of poverty and social needs.  
The original social security measures were introduced primarily in response to the 
fallout of war, economic slumps, and from those, the potential threat of social unrest. For 
instance, pensions and disability benefits were provided to the survivors and the dependents 
of war victims of the American Civil War.74 In Europe, the earliest state-wide social security 
schemes emerged in Imperial Germany. Between 1883 and 1887, Bismarck introduced social 
security legislation in a bid to outflank the social democratic movement. Social security took 
the form of social insurance for sickness and accidents, and pensions for old age and 
disability.75 Bismarck’s social legislation was a fundamental break “from the old system of 
poor relief to future pension rights backed by a legal entitlement, from voluntariness to 
compulsory participation, from the communal to the Reich level”.76 German legislation 
became the basis of social security in continental Europe. It was copied wholesale in 
Denmark, Belgium and Switzerland, and inspired Austrian and Scandinavian versions of 
social security.77 By 1900, most Western European countries had legislated for some form of 
social insurance, usually for industrial accidents and health, and pensions for old age.78 
                                                          
73 An adaptation of the definition given by the International Labour Organization: “A society that provides 
security for its citizens protects them not only from war and disease, but also from the insecurities related to 
making a living through work. Social security systems provide for basic income in cases of unemployment, 
illness and injury, old age and retirement, invalidity, family responsibilities such as pregnancy and childcare, 
and loss of the family breadwinner. Such benefits are important not only for individual workers and their 
families but also for their communities as a whole”. Taken from International Labour Standards on Social 
Security, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/social-
security/lang--en/index.htm. Accessed 6 July 2016. 
74 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in The United States 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992). Skocpol suggests that the 1932 New 
Deal was not the beginning of social provision from the federal level, but rather another one in a historical 
process that began after the American Civil War. 
75 Michael Stolleis, Origins of The German Welfare State: Social Policy in Germany to 1945; translated from 
the German by Thomas Dunlap (Berlin; New York: Springer, c2013), pp. 50-51, 73. Sickness insurance was 
financed principally by employer and employee contributions, while accident insurance and pensions for old age 
and disability were financed by employer contributions and state subsidies.  
76 Bismarck’s Imperial Message of 17 November 1881 expounded further: “{T]hat the healing of the social 
harms will have to be sought not exclusively through the repression of social-democratic excesses, but equally 
so through the positive promotion of the welfare of the workers”. Quoted in Stolleis, Origins of the German 
Welfare State, p. 55 
77 Asa Briggs, “The Welfare State in Historical Perspective”, European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 2 
(1961), pp. 246-247; and Hennock, British Social Reform and German Precedents, pp. 126-151. 
78 Pierson, “Origins and Development of the Welfare State, 1880-1975”, see pp. 52-53 for tables. 
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Britain soon followed. Between 1905 and 1914, the Liberal Government led by Herbert 
Asquith and David Lloyd George, introduced state pensions for old age, and insurance for 
sickness and unemployment – all of which laid the foundations of the postwar welfare state in 
Britain.79 Across the Atlantic, the Great Depression similarly paved the way for American 
social security. In 1935, Franklin Roosevelt pushed through his “New Deal”, a social 
insurance scheme that provided old age pensions, grants to states for dependent children, 
maternal and child welfare, and unemployment compensation.80 The quest for social security 
also became international in 1944, when the International Labour Organization declared 
social security to be part of its aims and purposes.81 
The imperial side of the social security story is lesser known but no less significant. 
For one, the Empire actually stole a march on the metropole. In 1898, New Zealand, at that 
time a self-governing colony, was the first in the British Empire to provide old age pensions. 
They were funded primarily by taxation, and provided “to people of good character, but with 
little or no means, above the age of sixty-five”.82 This was followed by the colonies of New 
South Wales and Victoria in 1901. In 1908, the Commonwealth of Australia, by then a 
Dominion of the British Empire, introduced federal legislation to provide in all states 
pensions for old age, the blind and permanently disabled.83  In 1938, New Zealand, by then a 
Dominion, led the way again by introducing the world’s first comprehensive Social Security 
Act. Unifying existing social security schemes, the Labour Government put into place a 
                                                          
79 See for an overview, Fraser, British Welfare State, pp. 159-192 for introduction and implementation of 
Liberal social policy between 1905 and 1914 (pp. 193-202) for social policy during and after World War I.  
80 The scheme was funded by payroll tax and contributions from employers. The full text of the 1935 Social 
Security Act is available online. The official website for the US Social Security Administration also gives an 
introductory overview of social security in the United States and the world in general. URL: 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/. Accessed 13 June 2016. 
81 This was known as the Declaration of Philadelphia. The relevant clause, Clause (f) of Part III, reads: “The 
Conference recognizes the solemn obligation of the International Labour Organization to further among the 
nations of the world programmes which will achieve, the extension of social security measures to provide a 
basic income to all in need of such protection and comprehensive medical care”. Full text available online at 
Key Document – ILO Constitution. 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO#declaration. 
Accessed 13 June 2016. See also Jeremy Seekings, “The ILO and Welfare Reforms in South Africa, Latin 
America, and the Caribbean”, in Jasmien Van Daele, Magaly Rodríguez García, Geert Van Goethem, Marcel 
van der Linden (eds.), ILO Histories: Essays on the International Labour Organization and Its Impact on the 
World During the Twentieth Century (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 140. 
82 Briggs, “The Welfare State in Historical Perspective”, p. 243. For overview and analysis of the old age 
pensions scheme, see David Thomson, A World Without Welfare: New Zealand's Colonial Experiment 
(Auckland: Auckland University Press with Bridget William Books, 1998), pp. 154-165.  
83 Briggs, “The Welfare State in Historical Perspective”,  p. 244. For historical overviews of social security 
systems in British territory, see Ronald Mendelsohn, Social Security in the British Commonwealth (University 
of London: The Athlone Press, 1954). See also New Zealand Social Security Department, with the co-operation 
of the Health Department, The Growth and Development of Social Security in New Zealand (A Survey of Social 
Security in New Zealand from 1898 to 1949) (Wellington, New Zealand, 1950). 
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“grand framework”, which provided benefits for “Disabilities arising from Age, Sickness, 
Widowhood, Orphanhood, Unemployment….”84  
 
Societal Pressures 
 
Social security legislation came about from substantial societal pressures, which were 
responses to the social ills of industrialization, capitalism, and urbanization. The latter part of 
the nineteenth century witnessed a series of economic crises that rocked the industrial 
societies of Europe and the United States.85 In response, various intellectual thoughts and 
social movements emerged, such as Marxism, Communism, Socialism, which also saw the 
entry into politics of workers, women, and others fighting for the vulnerable. In England, the 
economic slumps led to a middle-class “rediscovery” of poverty.86 The massive scale of 
unemployment as a result of sustained economic depression forced a reexamination of earlier 
assumptions of poverty. The impact was moreover not limited to the individual worker. 
Unemployment also exerted pressure on older forms of social protection and security. Family 
and communal institutions, such as trade guilds and mutual aid organization, were weakened 
by industrialization and urbanization over the nineteenth century.87 From the late nineteenth 
century, poverty was no longer thought to be caused by individual indolence or an accepted 
part of life.88 This played out, throughout the late Victorian period and into the new century, 
in the form of literary publications, scientific surveys, worker and other social movements, 
                                                          
84 Mendelsohn, Social Security in the British Commonwealth, p. 182. For a comparison with the American 
social security system introduced in 1935, see Raymond Richards, Closing the Door to Destitution: The Shaping 
of the Social Security Acts of the United States and New Zealand (University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994).  
85 It was known as the Great Depression until the 1930s slump took over the moniker. The late nineteenth 
century slump is also known as the Long Depression, referencing the series of successive “panics” that 
occurred. See Hans Rosenberg, "Political and Social Consequences of the Great Depression of 1873-1896 in 
Central Europe". The Economic History Review. Vol. 13, Issue 1/2, 1943, pp. 58–73, and A. E. Musson, "The 
Great Depression in Britain, 1873-1896: A Reappraisal". The Journal of Economic History. Vol. 19, Issue 2, 
1959, pp. 199–228. For a more narrative account, see Himmelfarb, Poverty and Compassion, pp. 68-75, and 
Fraser, British Welfare State: pp. 144-145. 
86 Fraser, British Welfare State, pp. 144-147. Himmelfarb referenced E. P. Thompson’s observation (in The 
Making of the English Working Class) of a gap between the 1849 publication of Henry Mayhew’s London 
Labour and the London Poor, and the 1889 publication of Charles Booth first volume of Life and Labour of the 
People in London. See Poverty and Compassion, pp. 10-11 and fn. 24. 
87 Stolleis, Origins of the German Welfare State, pp. 50-51. See also Greg Eghigian, Making Security Social: 
Disability, Insurance, and The Birth of the Social Entitlement State in Germany (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, c2000), pp. 25-66. 
88 Bronislaw Geremek discusses the assumptions about poverty and their implications on policy, scholarship, 
and public response in his introduction to Poverty: A History, translated by Agnieszka Kolakowska (Oxford, 
UK; Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 1-14. 
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the formation of new organizations with political ambitions, and legislation for social 
security.89  
Awareness of persistent poverty in England was moreover given a scientific basis, 
namely through the social surveys conducted by Charles Booth and Seebohn Rowntree.90 
Poverty now could be quantified, calculated as a poverty line, and therefore, theoretically at 
least, eradicated in an objective fashion. Approaching poverty through objective and 
scientific methods further buttressed a healthy self-belief that something should and could be 
done about eliminating poverty.91 The Charity Organisation Society was founded in 1869 as a 
response to the messy proliferation of philanthropic organizations since the mid-nineteenth 
century. To tackle the perceived inefficient wasteful manner of tackling poverty, the society 
carried out several initiatives, including an Enquiry Department to “conduct investigations 
and collect information”, a system of “visitors” (based on clergy practices of visiting the poor 
with food and clothing), and a “School of Sociology”. Those innovations in approaches to 
poverty laid the foundations for the present-day casework system.92  
Other social reform movements also emerged during the period of economic slumps. 
Toynbee Hall was founded in 1884 in the East End of London, an initiative that sought to 
bring together the rich and the poor to live together in a settlement house.93 Octavia Hill, a 
founder of the Charity Organisation Society, initiated a settlement movement to provide low-
                                                          
89 Himmelfarb gives an extremely accessible history of these developments in Britain in The Idea of Poverty and 
Poverty and Compassion. For a more analytical approach to American and European social security systems, 
see Michael B. Katz, In The Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America (New York: 
Basic Books, c1986), Daniel Levine, Poverty and Society: The Growth of the American Welfare State in 
International Comparison (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, c1988), E. P. Hennock, British Social 
Reform And German Precedents: The Case Of Social Insurance, 1880-1914 (Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon 
Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), E. P. Hennock, The Origin of the Welfare State in England 
and Germany, 1850–1914: Social Policies Compared (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Franz-
Xaver Kaufmann, European Foundations Of The Welfare State; translated from the German by John Veit-
Wilson; with the assistance of Thomas Skelton-Robinson (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), Eghigian, 
Making Security Social, Stolleis, Origins of The German Welfare State. 
90 Charles Booth conducted a massive social investigation of London life. It was divided into three sections on 
poverty, industry and religious influences, and spanned almost two decades (1886-1903). It was published as the 
multi-volume Life and Labour of the People in London, the first volume appearing in 1889. Seebohn Rowntree 
conducted a more concise social survey of York, published in 1901 as Poverty: A Study of Town Life. See 
Fraser, British Welfare State, pp.144-150. See also Himmelfarb, Poverty and Compassion, pp. 79-178, for a 
historical overview of the work done by both men. 
91 Himmelfarb attributed this to the strong belief in the value of the scientific method and the use of statistics to 
measure standards and progress. See Poverty and Compassion, pp. 21-30. See also Howard Glennerster, John 
Hills, David Piachaud, and Jo Webb, One Hundred Years of Poverty and Policy (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
York, U.K., 2004), pp. 18-26. 
92 Himmelfarb commented that while these were not original initiatives, the COS was the first to aggressively 
publicize and increased awareness of such works. See Himmelfarb, Poverty and Compassion, pp. 192, 194-196. 
See also Fraser, British Welfare State, pp.142-144. 
93 Himmelfarb, Poverty and Compassion, pp. 236-143. 
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cost and clean housing for the poor.94 This movement went beyond British shores. It also 
inspired the establishment of Hull House in Chicago by Jane Addams and Ellen Gates Starr in 
1889.95 The Salvation Army was another movement that went abroad and eventually reached 
Singapore in 1935. It was originally established as the East London Christian Mission in the 
East End of London, England in 1865. The mission was founded by a Methodist minister, 
William Booth, as a response to the perceived exclusivity of established churches to only the 
upper strata of society. Booth took his message to the streets to provide a church for the 
“poor, the homeless, the hungry, and the destitute”. In 1878, the mission was renamed the 
Salvation Army.96 Initially an all-inclusive evangelical mission, the Salvation Army from 
1890 also initiated social service programs to complement its evangelical wing, such as the 
establishment of “rescue homes”, “slum out-posts”, job-creation, and food relief.97  
There was an unmistakable socialist tinge in such public movements and calls for 
social reform. Social action moreover had political implications. In 1884, the Fabian Society 
was created, and drew together a varied mix of personalities, from academics to civil servants 
to politicians, from trade unionists to social activists to public intellectuals.98 The society was 
partly responsible for the formation of the British Labour Party. Originally known as the 
Labour Representation Committee, the political party was the result of attempts to coordinate 
the growing numbers of socialist groups, and sustained workers’ movements and socialist 
thought in the late nineteenth century.99 The Labour Party would only form the British 
government in 1924.100 But the social and political pressures that created the political party 
made their presence felt early on. They pressured the Liberal Party, one of Britain’s oldest 
political parties, to adapt to prevailing circumstances and to introduce old-age pensions and 
social insurance.101 Just as how the authoritarian figure of Bismarck may not immediately be 
                                                          
94 Himmelfarb, Poverty and Compassion, pp. 210-218.  
95 Himmelfarb, Poverty and Compassion, p. 241. 
96 Himmelfarb, Poverty and Compassion, pp. 219-230. For a detailed examination of the organization’s origins, 
see Pamela J. Walker, Pulling the Devil's Kingdom Down: The Salvation Army in Victorian Britain (Berkeley, 
[Calif.]; London: University of California Press, c2001). 
97 Walker, The Salvation Army, pp. 1-2, 236-240. 
98 For overview of Fabianism in the late nineteenth century, see Himmelfarb, Poverty and Compassion, pp. 350-
378. See also Edward R. Pease, The History of the Fabian Society (London: Frank Cass & Co., first published in 
1916).  
99 See for a brief overview of origins of the Labour Party, Fraser, British Welfare State, pp. 150-158. 
100 For overview of social policy of the first British Labour government (1924 to 1931), especially in tackling 
unemployment, see Fraser, British Welfare State, pp. 202-226. 
101 Fraser, British Welfare State, pp. 161-168, and Himmelfarb, Poverty and Compassion, pp. 375-380. Fraser 
makes the point that the Liberals, before 1909, had to be prodded along by Labour back-benchers (p. 161); but 
by the second decade of the twentieth century, some Liberals had fully embraced New Liberals. Winston 
Churchill, then President of the Board of Trade, was quoted as saying: “Socialism wants to pull down wealth, 
Liberalism seeks to raise up poverty…. Socialism assails the maximum pre-eminence of the individual – 
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associated with the origins of the welfare state, those measures were pushed through by a 
political party not usually associated with deliberate state intervention. But the New or 
Constructive Liberalism of the Liberal Party in the early twentieth century was different from 
its predecessors’ classic Liberalism, which upheld the traditions of personal liberty, laissez-
faire economics, and minimal government intervention.102 New Liberalism retained the 
emphasis on personal liberty but also acknowledged state responsibility to remove obstacles 
to “social capacity, such as those arising from lack of education, poor health and bad 
housing”.103 Even before social insurance, the Liberal Government had provided free school 
meals, easier access to secondary education, and probation services for juveniles as an 
alternative to prison.104  
From the vantage point of world history, what happened in England was part of a shift 
in the status quo when compared with other industrialized societies. On the eve of the Second 
World War, the metropole and industrial societies elsewhere in Europe, Australia, New 
Zealand, and the United States had established a track record of state intervention to address 
needs arising from various social contingencies. These mainly took the form of social 
insurance, which espoused the principles of self- and shared responsibilities between the 
individual and the state. The assumption of state responsibility for some of life’s social 
contingencies had also stuck, as seen in the tax-funded pension schemes for old age and 
disabilities.  
 
War and the Beveridge Plan 
 
War was simultaneously a catalyst for changes to social policy and a reinforcement of 
prevailing approaches to governance and society. On a basic level, as seen in the benefits paid 
out to American Civil War veterans and dependents, a minimum level of care is needed.105 On 
                                                          
Liberalism seeks to build up minimum the minimum standard of the masses. Socialism attacks capital, 
Liberalism attacks monopoly”. (p. 178). 
102 The Liberal Party grew out of the former Whig Party during the 1850s. It formed the government several 
times throughout the nineteenth century, most famously by William Gladstone. The social legislation was 
passed by the Liberal Government led by Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith, and supported by David Lloyd 
George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer (who was assisted by Winston Churchill). See Fraser, British Welfare 
State, pp. 159-192, for overview of Liberal social policy between 1905 and 1914. 
103 T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Organization (1895 edn.), pp. 206-209. Quoted in 
Briggs, “The Welfare State in Historical Perspective”, p. 245. Briggs cited Green as a primary intellectual 
influence for the change in Liberal thought. 
104 Fraser, British Welfare State, pp. 161-164. 
105 See Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in The United 
States (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992). Skocpol also suggests that the 
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another level, war also necessitated a more centralized approach so as to better harness 
resources for victory. For instance, the poor physical conditions of recruits to fight the Boer 
War forced the British to reexamine existing health measures and nutrition policy. During the 
First World War, the British government realized that fighting a war on a global scale could 
not be done without some level of central planning and coordination, and the support of home 
and colonial society.106  
The totality of the Second World War (and the reach of German bombers) swept aside 
any residual laissez faire and liberal pretensions in the metropole, as food rationing and 
evacuations necessitated greater state involvement in society.107 The firsthand experiences of 
near-defeat and despair also spurred an economist William Beveridge to conceptualize a 
grand vision of social justice and social security in return for wartime sacrifices.108 This was 
published in December 1942 as Social Insurance and Allied Services.109 The Beveridge Plan, 
as it was popularly known, was “part legislative proposal, part visionary philosophy”.110 The 
543-page report was extremely well-received for a government-commissioned report.111 In 
laying out a plan for postwar reconstruction, the Beveridge Plan presumptuously assumed 
eventual victory (as it was unclear at that point how the war would develop). They were 
presented in uncomplicated terms. Beveridge called for a “scheme of social insurance against 
interruption and destruction of earning power and for special expenditure arising at birth, 
marriage or death”. Simply put, an “assurance of a certain income” during life 
contingencies.112 The scheme was to be universal, covering all citizens without 
discrimination. Pensions and allowances, funded from taxation, were to be given to the 
elderly and children below working age. A social insurance scheme, funded by contributions 
                                                          
1932 New Deal was not the beginning of social provision from the federal level, but rather another one in a 
process that began after the American Civil War. 
106 The low physical and nutritional standards of British soldiers “strengthened the hand of health reformers” to 
create a Ministry of Health. See Fraser, British Welfare State, pp. 195-196. The First World War was also a 
catalyst for political reforms in India, or at least raised the hopes and aspirations of Indian nationalists in return 
for their contributions and support during the war. 
107 Richard Titmuss expounded on wartime social policy, namely food rationing, evacuation, and healthcare, in 
Problems of Social Policy (London: H.M.S.O.: Longmans, Green, 1950). This publication was part of the 
British government’s official history of the Second World War. 
108 See for instance, Elizabeth Thompson, “The Climax and Crisis of the Colonial Welfare State in Syria and 
Lebanon during World War II”, in Steven Heydemann (ed.), War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle 
East (Berkeley: University of California Press, c2000), pp. 59-99. See also Fraser, British Welfare State, 
Chapter 8; Geoffrey Finlayson, Citizen, State, and Social Welfare in Britain – 1830-1990 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994), chapter 3, and Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, Introduction. 
109 William Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied Services (London: H.M.S.O., 1942). 
110 Baldwin, “Beveridge in the Longue Duree”, p. 39. 
111 The report sold “some half a million copies: quite unprecedented for a technical government publication…. 
About fifty thousand copies sold in the United States”. Abel-Smith, “The Beveridge Report”, p. 18.  
112 Social Insurance, pp. 9 and 153. 
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from employer and employees, and administered by the government, would cover workers in 
times of need, such as unemployment, disability (injury), sickness, maternity, and death 
(benefits for dependents). In addition, a comprehensive national health service was to be 
constituted to provide medical treatment and rehabilitative services for all citizens.113 
Beveridge’s plan was not universally accepted, and encountered opposition from 
Churchill’s War Cabinet and from non-governmental interest groups.114 Nonetheless, public 
opinion was on Beveridge’s side.115 In 1944, the War Cabinet published several White Papers 
on social policy, and a Ministry of National Insurance was created in anticipation of 
upcoming changes.116 Between 1945 and 1948, the Labour Government passed four pieces of 
legislation that formed the structural core of what came to be known as the welfare state.117 
They were the Family Allowance Act, the National Insurance Act, the Industrial Injuries Act, 
and the National Assistance Act. They were supported further by a National Health Service 
Act (1946) that provided for free medical services financed primarily out of taxation. All 
social security measures were operational from 5 July 1948, also known as the appointed 
                                                          
113 Beveridge’s plan hinged on three assumptions: children’s allowances, comprehensive health and 
rehabilitative services, and full employment. (Social Insurance, pp. 153-165). These three assumptions were the 
primary cause of tensions between him and the Treasury, which balked at the potential cost of administering the 
scheme. See Fraser, British Welfare State, pp. 241-242, Addison, The Road to 1945, pp. 216-228, and Paul 
Bridgen, “A Straitjacket with Wriggle Room: The Beveridge Report, the Treasury and the Exchequer's Pension 
Liability, 1942-59'”, Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 17, No. 1, (2005; 2006), pp. 1-25. 
114 The report was supposed to have been signed off by the Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance 
and Allied Services, of which Beveridge was Chairman. But in January 1942, Beveridge was informed that the 
committee members were to be regarded as “advisers and assessors”, and that the report, “when made, will be 
your own report; it will be signed by you alone….” Social Insurance, p. 2. See also Fraser, British Welfare State, 
p. 235; José Harris, William Beveridge: A Biography (Oxford, England; New York: Clarendon Press, c1997; 
rev. ed.), and Brian Abel-Smith, "The Beveridge Report: Its Origins and Outcomes", in Hills, Dutch, and 
Glennester, Beveridge and Social Security, p. 15. 
115 When the report was published in December 1942, it appeared as if a corner had been turned in the war. By 
the end of 1942, Britain had survived the Battle of Britain, and the United States and the Soviet Union had 
entered the war as allies. The report moreover came after the British won a major victory – its first land victory 
– over the Germans in El Alamein, Egypt. See also Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: British politics and the 
Second World War (London: Cape, 1975), pp. 217-218; and Harris, William Beveridge, in particular chapter 
“Aftermath of the Beveridge Report”. 
116 Fraser, British Welfare State, pp. 242-245. The White Papers were on A National Health Service, 
Employment Policy, Social Insurance, and Educational Reconstruction. 
117 Earlier use of “welfare state” referred to it as a type of state, as opposed to “Power States” exemplified by 
authoritarian regimes in interwar Europe. See for a genealogy of the term, Klaus Petersen and Jørn Henrik 
Petersen, “Confusion and divergence: origins and meanings of the term ‘welfare state’ in Germany and Britain, 
1840–1940”. Journal of European Social Policy. Vol. 23, No. 1, (2013), p. 47. Daniel Wincott traced the first 
postwar use of the term to a 2 November 1946 article in The Times, where it had been used to in the context of 
the mid-term elections in the United States. The Times’ Washington Correspondent was commenting on how the 
Republicans associated “extra-governmental functions” with the “ongoing creation of a “welfare” state, a 
process to which the first two years of Woodrow Wilson and the pre-war years of Franklin Roosevelt powerfully 
contributed”. Daniel Wincott, “Original and imitated or elusive and limited? Towards a genealogy of the welfare 
state idea in Britain”, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds.), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and 
Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2014), pp. 135-136.  
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day.118 The Beveridge Plan can be understood as one end-point of state and societal responses 
to social needs in industrial and urban societies. Beveridge’s plan was less revolutionary than 
it might have appeared to be during wartime. His plan was essentially a consolidation of 
state-administered social insurance that had been introduced earlier in the twentieth 
century.119 These schemes evolved over time, but the principles of state and societal 
responsibility persisted, specifically the responsibility for unavoidable social contingencies 
and the idea of self-responsibility through payment of insurance contributions. 
 
A New Policy: The Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940 
 
The formulation of colonial policy in London was not insulated from metropolitan 
circumstances. Again, imperial developments predated and anticipated metropolitan policy. 
Two years before the Beveridge Plan was announced, the Colonial Office introduced a new 
policy of development and welfare for the empire. The immediate catalyst came from 
emerging social tensions in the British Empire, brought about by the 1930s Great Depression, 
and the exacerbation of imperial anxieties by a looming war. Throughout the 1930s, British 
territories in the West Indies and Africa experienced sustained labor and social unrest.120 The 
1937 and 1938 riots in the West Indies provoked severe criticism back in England. A Royal 
Commission formed to determine the causes of the unrest completed its report in 1939.121 The 
commission’s findings were so damning that the report was not published in its entirety until 
1945.122 Still, in the midst of a war that partly questioned their competence to rule an empire, 
the British dared not stay idle. 
                                                          
118 Fraser, British Welfare State, pp. 245-264. “Appointed Day” reference on page 262. 
119 Addison, The Road to 1945, p. 213. For reconsideration of Beveridge’s legacy, see Hills, Dutch and 
Glennester (eds.), Beveridge and Social Security, chapters 4 to 8. 
120 See John Harrison, “The Colonial Legacy and Social Policy in the British Caribbean”, in James Midgley and 
David Piachaud (eds.), Colonialism and Welfare: Social Policy and the British Imperial Legacy (Cheltenham, 
U.K.; Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, c2011), and Michael Ashley Havinden and David Meredith, 
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121 Havinden and Meredith, Colonialism and Development, pp. 197-198. 
122 “The social services in the West Indies are all far from adequate for the needs of the population, partly as a 
result of defects of policy, and largely through the paucity of the funds at the disposal of the Colonial 
Governments which are in the main necessarily responsible for these services… The diets of the poorer people 
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which would help to ensure adequate food supplies for the dis-placed population…. Housing is generally 
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Colonialism and Development, p. 198. 
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The British parliament debated the Colonial Development and Welfare bill in the 
summer of 1940. In July, the bill became law after receiving the royal assent.123 The Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1940 adjusted existing policy, from one of colony self-
sufficiency to a “forward policy” of centralized planning and metropolitan aid.124 The Act 
originally set aside £55,000,000 for development projects in the colonial territories and social 
research. The amount was to be spent over ten years, capped at an annual maximum of 
£5,000,000 for developmental projects, and £500,000 per year for social research.125 The 
monies were intended for capital and recurrent expenditure for projects to develop the 
economy of the colonies and to provide a basic level of social services for its peoples. Those 
included works “such as irrigation, agricultural development works, and similar works of 
economic development which will increase productivity”. The object was still to “develop the 
Colonies so that as far as possible they become self-supporting units”, but at the same time, 
“their citizens must enjoy a proper standard of social services, and we shall count as 
qualifying for assistance … every part of the health and medical activities and every part of 
the educational activities of a colonial Government”.126 
The Act was a statement from the metropole accepting responsibility for the welfare 
of the colonies. Malcolm MacDonald,127 the Act’s chief architect during his tenure as 
Secretary of State for the Colonies (1938 to 1940), invoked the bill’s significance: 
                                                          
123 See House of Lords Debates (HL Deb), 20 March 1940, vol. 115 cc970-1017, House of Commons Debates 
(HC Deb), 21 May 1940, vol. 361 cc41-125, HL Deb, 2 July 1940, vol. 116 cc723-48, and HC Deb, 17 July 
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d’Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social. Cited in Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in 
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127 Son of Britain’s first Labour Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, Malcolm MacDonald (1901-1981) had an 
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was Secretary for State for the Colonies from May 1938 to May 1940 for Neville Chamberlain’s government 
30 
 
 
 
 
At this critical hour let the world mark the passage of the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Bill through the British Parliament as a sign of our 
faith in ultimate victory. This nation will pass triumphantly through its present 
ordeal…. When the enemy is worsted and the war is finished, Britain will still 
exercise vast responsibilities for the government of Colonial peoples. In the 
meantime we must not default upon our Colonial obligations, we must not let 
slip the experienced skill of our guiding hand; we must still, even now, have a 
constant care to protect and to promote the well-being of our fellow subjects in 
the Empire overseas…. [T]he Bill which we are discussing this afternoon 
breaks new ground. It establishes the duty of taxpayers in this country to 
contribute directly and for its own sake towards the development in the widest 
sense of the word of the colonial peoples for whose good government the 
taxpayers of this country are ultimately responsible.128  
 
In terms of actual grants, Singapore did not draw as much as other imperial territories 
in Africa or the West Indies.129 The impact for Singapore was subtler. The assumption of 
imperial responsibility changed the approach to colonial administration. The prewar laissez 
faire approach must be discarded, driven by a sense that the colonial state could and should 
do more for society than it did before. Any reservations in the British metropole about state 
intervention in the dependent colonies were, at least in principle, swept away by the 1940 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Centralized planning from the metropole was needed 
to effect changes for a better postwar future, and the Colonial Office was reorganized to meet 
new obligations.130  
Wartime circumstances further reinforced the new approach. Of note was the pressure 
exerted by the Americans on the British regarding the latter’s imperial possessions. This was 
                                                          
and Minister for Health (1940-1941) for Winston Churchill’s National Government. After the war, he was 
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Concurrently, MacDonald was also Chancellor of the University of Malaya (1949-1961). See for a biographical 
study Clyde Sanger, Malcolm MacDonald: Bringing an End to Empire (New York: McGill-Queen's University 
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128 My emphasis. HC Deb, 21 May 1940, vol. 361 cc41-42, 45. The significance of the last sentence was taken 
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1 in Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, 1929-70: A Brief Review.  
130 Martin and Petter, Colonial Office at War, pp. 38-46. Then Prime Minister Winston Churchill described the 
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campaign, see B. P. Farrell, The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940-1942 (Singapore: Monsoon Books Pte. 
Ltd., 2015), and Noel Barber, Sinister Twilight: The Fall of Singapore (London: Cassell, 2002). 
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spelled out in third clause of 1941 Atlantic Charter, which indicated that the Americans and 
the British would “respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under 
which they will live….”131 This clause was interpreted as a repudiation of the British Empire, 
and gave the Colonial Office and the British government additional incentive to reexamine 
existing principles of colonial administration.132 The manner in which British Singapore 
surrendered to the Japanese in February 1942 exacerbated existing imperial insecurities.133 
Britain’s “worst disaster” only increased public awareness of earlier colonial ambivalence 
towards their “tropical East Ends” (a reference to the poorer areas in London). As the 
Japanese military swept the rest of Southeast Asia and threatened British India, earlier 
warnings of the inherent weaknesses (and loyalties) of colonial plural societies, seemed to 
have come true.134  
Furnivall had introduced the plural society concept during the interwar years.135 He 
described the scene: 
 
[T]he first thing that strikes the visitor is the medley of peoples – European, 
Chinese, Indian and native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix 
but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and 
language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the 
market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different 
sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same 
political unit. Even in the economic sphere there is a division of labour along 
racial line.136 
 
                                                          
131 The full clause reads: “[T]hey respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which 
they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been 
forcibly deprived of them….” 
132 The reaction of the Colonial Office to the Atlantic Charter is discussed in Martin and Petter, Colonial Office 
at War, pp. 117-143. Responses culminated in a statement of colonial policy in 1943: “We are pledged to guide 
Colonial people along the road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire. We are pledged 
to build up their social and economic institutions, and we are pledged to develop their natural resources … The 
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trusteeship, although I think some of us feel now that that word "trustee" is rather too static in its connotation 
and that we should prefer to combine with the status of trustee the position also of partner”. HC Deb 13 July 
1943 vol. 391 cc47-151. See also Martin and Petter, Colonial Office at War, pp. 147-163. 
133 Martin and Petter, Colonial Office at War, pp. 121-127. 
134 See Joanna Lewis, Empire State-Building: War & Welfare in Kenya 1925-52 (Oxford: James Currey; 
Nairobi: E.A.E.P.; Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000). p. 94. Lewis cites articles by Margery Perham, a 
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collected in Mary Bull and Alison Smith (eds.), Margery Perham and British Rule in Africa (Great Britain: 
Frank Cass, 1991). 
135 First introduced in Netherlands India. See in particular Chapter XIII, pp. 446-470. It was “a society ... 
comprising two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political 
unit”. (p. 446). 
136 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, pp. 304-305.  
32 
 
 
 
Furnivall saw the plural society in the Federated Malay States as the “obvious and 
outstanding” result of contact, where the indigenous population was barely a quarter of total 
population in the wake of sustained immigration of labor.137 Compared to other societies that 
supposedly possessed common traditions seen in Canada, the United States, or Australia, the 
plural society had “no common social will to set a bar to immigration, which has been left to 
the play of economic forces”.138  
The concept of a common social appeared consistently in Furnivall’s discourse and 
studies of the plural society, colonial policy and administration. In 1941, Furnivall suggested 
nationalism as a possible solution to the fault-lines of the colonial plural society created: 
“Nationalism can provide an effective counter to economic forces”.139 The institution of 
government would facilitate the “re-integration of society through Nationalism”: 
 
[This] should aim especially at bridging the gulf between natives and the 
modern world, and at convincing capitalists that independence is in the interest 
of economic progress; in other words [Government] should aim at converting 
nationalists into capitalists and capitalists into nationalists. Government also 
has the duty to convert “present administrative machinery designed originally 
for maintaining peace and quiet, or law and order, into a service of “social 
engineers”, charged with the function of creating, organizing, and giving effect 
to social demand.140 
 
Furnivall’s arguments provided the intellectual ballast for the change in colonial policy.141 
After the Second World War, the British embarked on “a worldwide experiment in nation 
building”.142 Colonial government was to play a central role in fostering nations out of 
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colonial societies, with the broader aim of preparing the formerly colonized (and now 
partners) for self-government and/or eventual independence. In Singapore, this resulted in the 
deliberate pursuit of a social policy, which manifested in the establishment of a social welfare 
department.  
In 1944, the Colonial Office circulated an information pamphlet entitled Welfare in 
British Colonies, authored by Lucy Mair, an anthropologist.143 She traced the development of 
the Colonial Office’s social service portfolio to initial concerns over education and public 
health. This expanded to include labor issues, youth welfare, community development, and 
the penal system (including juvenile delinquency). As “all welfare measures are directed 
towards raising the general level of the community”, she observed that social welfare in a 
broader sense “covers the whole field of those policies and services that would be described 
in America as “nation-building”.144 Describing a “narrower sense” of social welfare, Mair 
listed “those aspects of social welfare which are not the special interest or concern of other 
Departments”. These included:  
 
[T]he stimulation of community activities of all kinds through such 
organizations as village councils, community associations, and co-operative 
societies; welfare work in connection with housing estates and land settlement; 
the relief of the destitute, whether young or old; the development of youth 
services and recreational facilities, including home industries; the treatment of 
adult and juvenile delinquents, the aftercare of adult prisoners and the general 
care of prisoners while still in prison.145 
 
In practice, social welfare became a collection of services and functions that did not 
immediately fit conventional government work. For better or worse, those “aspects” would 
form the basis and raison d’être of Singapore’s social welfare department after the Second 
World War.  
The Beveridge Plan was an added complication. The report had “dazzled” the 
Colonial Office, and fired the imagination of colonial governments and budding local 
nationalists throughout the empire.146 The Beveridge Plan was not merely a vision of a 
                                                          
colonies into self-government as soon as possible (though that was not expected to be soon), and to consolidate 
links with Britain on a permanent basis, so that ex-colonies would remain in the Commonwealth”.  
143 Lucy Philip Mair, Welfare in the British Colonies (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944), 
pp. 101-102. Mair was a British anthropologist from the London School of Economics and Political Science. In 
1943, she joined the Ministry of Information. After the war, she returned to LSE and became a professor in 
colonial administration and applied anthropology. 
144 Mair, Welfare, p. 101.  
145 Mair, Welfare, p. 101. These were quoted from the report of the West India Royal Commission. 
146 “Dazzled” reference noted by Lewis in Empire State-Building, p. 53. For Beveridge’s impact on the empire 
and the world, see contributions in Hills, Dutch and Glennester (eds.), Beveridge and Social Security, in 
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victorious postwar future for British society. It offered a template for colonial societies 
planning a post-colonial future.147 Beveridge’s plan was anchored on the assumption of 
cooperation between “the State and the individual”, which involved the former offering social 
security in return for the individual’s “service and contribution”.148 The example of this 
cooperation is the social insurance scheme, funded by individual contributions and managed 
by the state. Ideally, this would foster a sense of responsibility in the individual, not only for 
themselves, but to their community and country. The essence of the post-Second World War 
welfare state was: 
 
[A] state in which organised power is deliberately used (through politics and 
administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least three 
directions - first, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income 
irrespective of the market value of their work or their property; second, by 
narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet 
certain social contingencies (for example, sickness, old age and 
unemployment) which lead otherwise to individual and family crises; and 
third, by ensuring all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered 
the best standards available in relation to a certain range of social services.149 
 
In other words, the welfare state was the ideal vision of a fair and equitable society. Every 
individual was guaranteed a minimum income and an optimal standard of living, with state 
and society sharing responsibility. This vision was fundamentally at odds with the reality of 
the hierarchical nature of the plural society fostered by laissez-faire colonialism. Though 
committed to a rebranding of the British Empire, the Colonial Office was nonetheless eager 
to dampen the enthusiastic response to the Beveridge Plan. It warned against indiscriminate 
implementation without due consideration to the particular “social structures” of different 
colonies. Any attempt to implement social security in the colonies must take into account the 
adequacy of the “economic and financial base” of the colony as well as the particular needs 
of the colony.150 
                                                          
particular chapters 9 to 14.  The impact of the Beveridge plan on Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) is discussed in Laksiri 
Jayasuriya, “Sri Lanka’s Experience of Social Development: Towards Equity and Justice”, in Gabriele Koehler 
and Deepta Chopra. (eds.) Development And Welfare Policy In South Asia (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014).  
147 James Midgley, “Imperialism, Colonialism, and Social Welfare”, in Midgley and Piachaud (eds.), 
Colonialism and Welfare, p. 38. See also contributions in “Part II: Issues and Country Experiences”. 
148 Social Insurance, pp. 6-7. 
149 Briggs, “The Welfare State”, p. 228.  
150 Colonial Office, Social Security in the Colonial Territories. Papers on Colonial Affairs, No. 5 (London: 
Colonial Office, June 1944). Social security was broadly defined as “freedom from want” or “the provision of 
guaranteed maintenance on some minimum scale for every individual in a community”. The incompatibility of 
the Beveridge Plan for Kenya is noted by Lewis in Empire State-Building, pp. 51-52.  
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Still, by the end of the Second World War, British colonial policy was irrevocably 
altered. Just as Britain was anticipating its own welfare state, the Colonial Office was 
committed to its “forward policy” of development and welfare. Relative to what occurred 
before, it was a modern approach, with the underlying objective (without a firm timetable) of 
preparing its empire for self-government or independence. In practice, this reversed prewar 
colonial approaches to governance and society in Singapore and elsewhere, which in turn 
necessitated a more involved colonial administration. Social welfare was to be an integral 
part of this more involved colonial state.  
 
Colonial Welfare, State-building, and the Role of Society 
 
The introduction of social welfare in late colonial Singapore then becomes a case 
study, along the same vein of historical examinations of colonial state and society in 
Southeast Asia and in general. The idea of colonial welfare is a recent addition to historical 
scholarship. Scholars of colonial history, developmental studies, and social policy have only 
just begun to trace the colonial origins of social policies and programs in post-colonial 
nations.151 As such efforts are preliminary, they are, for the time being, limited to uncovering 
prima facie continuities between the colonial and post-colonial eras.152 Given the significant 
continuities and parallels between colonial-era and post-colonial developments in former 
colonies, there is much potential in studying the implementation of social policies, especially 
during the period where many colonies were transiting to political independence.153 The idea 
of colonial welfare is intriguing. At first glance, the notion of a benevolent colonial power, 
                                                          
151 In March 2010, a symposium was organized by the London School of Economics and Political Science 
(LSE), on “Welfare and Colonialism: Social Policy and the British Imperial Legacy”. Papers were presented on 
social security and social services, and covered a considerable swathe of the former British Empire, such as 
West Indies, Africa, the Far East, India, and Australia.  Papers from this symposium were published in Midgley 
and Piachaud (eds.), Colonialism and Welfare. See for an earlier, more social policy focus publication, 
Catherine Jones Finer and Paul Symth (eds.), Social Policy and The Commonwealth: Prospects for Social 
Inclusion (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
152 Contributions in Colonialism and Welfare took the position that “social policy in the developing world 
cannot be understood without examining the way welfare policies and programmes introduced during the 
imperial era have continued to influence current policy making”. 
153 Midgely and Piachaud referred to “research in international social welfare” that has been “documenting and 
analysing the welfare institutions and social policies” of various societies. Such research are platforms to 
understand economic dependency or the underdevelopment theory (espoused particularly by Andre Gundar 
Frank), or economic and social development on a global scale. (Midgley and Piachaud, Colonialism and 
Welfare, pp. 2-3). The “Global South” generally refers to developing countries in the southern hemisphere. The 
north-south division is used as a reflection of the differences in social and economic development, which more 
often than not reflected the status of former colonizers and colonized. See James Midgley, “Imperialism, 
Colonialism and Social Welfare”, in Midgley and Piachaud, Colonialism and Welfare, pp. 36-52. 
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proactive in the provision of social services, is difficult to reconcile with perceptions of the 
colonial experience as a “dark time” in human history, a period of time that ended “golden 
ages” of traditional civilizations, and which preceded the rise of modern nation-state.154 The 
editors of Colonialism and Welfare for instance acknowledge that readers of their book 
“would be more concerned with ‘illfare’ resulting from imperial oppression than the policies 
and programs adopted to promote the ‘well-being’ of colonized people”.155  
Still, various scholars have demonstrated the complexities of colonialism, and in turn, 
the ambiguous nature of colonizer and colonized categories. This came about from a renewed 
interest in colonialism during the 1980s and 1990s. Frederick Cooper suggests that interest 
resulted from the failure of modernization theories to achieve predicted outcomes, and the 
consequent economic and social instabilities in former colonies.156 Moreover, earlier 
assumptions of colonialism were questioned by new intellectual developments. These 
included the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism – the mea culpa of anthropology as 
the handmaiden of colonialism, Foucauldian theories of power and governmentality, and 
subaltern studies from South Asia.157 Rather than taking colonialism and certain categories 
for granted, such as colonized and colonizer, more scholars began to make colonial processes 
the subject of their enquiries.158 For instance, Ann Stoler’s studies of gender, racial identities, 
and bureaucratic practices in the Dutch East Indies ask us to reconsider the meaning of 
certain categories, such as colonizer and colonized, or colonialism itself.159 These new 
approaches have enriched our understanding of the colonial past. But it might have come at a 
                                                          
154 More extreme perceptions are based to some extent by publications focusing on the more violent and 
traumatic aspects of colonialism. See for instance Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth – originally 
published in French in 1961 as Les Damnés de la Terre, and Albert Memmi’s The Colonizer and the Colonized. 
155 Midgley and Piachaud, Colonialism and Welfare, pp. 3-4. 
156 For a historical overview of interest and disinterest in colonial studies, see Frederick Cooper “The Rise, Fall, 
and Rise of Colonial Studies” in Colonialism in Question, pp. 33-58. 
157 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, pp. 46-52. See Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, “Between 
Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda”, and other contributions in Ann Laura Stoler and 
Frederick Cooper (eds.), Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, c1997). Self-awareness of anthropology’s complicity in colonialism began in Talal Asad (ed.), 
Anthropology & the Colonial Encounter (London: Ithaca Press, 1973). 
158 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, p. 52.  
159 Representative literature includes Ann Laura Stoler’s Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and The 
Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, c2002), and Along the Archival Grain: 
Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, c2009). Cooper 
remarked in reference to Stoler’s work: “The distinction between colonizer and colonized, rather than being 
self-evident, had to be continually reproduced, which led colonial regimes to pay inordinate attention to 
relatively small categories of people on crucial fault lines: racially mixed children, colonizers who “went native” 
… There was a danger of reproducing the wrong kind of colonization”. (Cooper, Colonialism in Question, p. 
49). 
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price, as history was usually “occluded” by the seeming “modernity” of these newer 
approaches.160 
Still, substantive histories have been written examining the colonial state and its 
impact on colonial society. In such instances, social policy, in the form of social (or personal) 
services, health, education, or labor protection, is usually the preferred medium. These 
include French and British colonial policies on African labor during the late colonial period, 
the historical development of a colonial state via social welfare in Kenya, and approaches to 
colonial medicine and public health in British India and French Morocco.161 Others have also 
used colonial welfare and social policy, to examine the colonial state, its social security 
institutions, and their interactions and impact on local society, with Africa being an especially 
rich area for this particular approach.162  
There are similar studies of various aspects of the colonial state in Southeast Asian 
history. Broadly speaking, those studies have focused on governmental institutions and 
structures, such as the military, executive and legislative bodies, the economy or the 
bureaucracy, or more abstractly, on the state as an autonomous entity. The Southeast Asian 
colonial state becomes either the precursor to the post-colonial state, an object to resist and to 
rebel against, or more subtly (via the application of Foucauldian concepts of power and 
governmentality) as an institution capable of surveillance and coercion. These approaches 
have produced scholarship ranging from studies of violence and coercion, state resistance or 
                                                          
160 He had especially strong views about the occlusion and obfuscation of historical experiences via Foucauldian 
concepts and Subaltern approaches. “[B]ut if the overall experience of nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
colonizers is slotted into a notion of “colonial governmentality” or “colonial modernity”, the effort obscures 
more than it reveals”. (p. 49). Commenting on the Subaltern approach to colonialism of “domination without 
hegemony”, Cooper notes that “nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial regimes had neither the capacity for 
coercive domination that [Ranajit] Guha attributes to them nor a disinterest in articulating hegemonic strategies, 
however inconsistent. The history of anticolonial politics does not easily split into autonomous subalterns and 
colonized elites channeled into patterns of opposition bounded by the categories of imperial rulers; the politics 
of engagement are more complex than that”. (p. 50). 
161 Cooper observed: “A careful study of late colonialism will hopefully be a step toward future analysis of how 
social issues were framed and reframed in the post-colonial era”. See Larry J. Butler, Industrialisation and the 
British Colonial State: West Africa 1939-1951 (London; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1997); Frederick Cooper, 
Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); Joanna Lewis, Empire State-Building: War & Welfare in Kenya, 1925-52 (James 
Currey Ltd., Oxford, UK, 2000); David Arnold, Colonizing The Body: State Medicine And Epidemic Disease In 
Nineteenth-Century India (Berkeley: University of California Press, c1993), and Ellen J. Amster, Medicine And 
The Saints: Science, Islam, And The Colonial Encounter In Morocco, 1877-1956; foreword by Rajae El Aoued 
(Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 2013); Baltimore, Md.: Project MUSE, 2014).  
162 See for a representative selection: E. Naylor, “‘Un âne dans l’ascenseur’: late colonial welfare services and 
social housing in Marseille after decolonization”. French History. Vol. 27, No. 3 (2013), pp. 422-447, Jeremy 
Seekings, “British Colonial Policy, Local Politics, and the Origins of the Mauritian Welfare State, 1936–50”. 
The Journal of African History. Vol. 52, No. 2 (2011), pp. 157-177, and A. Eckert, “Regulating the Social: 
Social Security, Social Welfare and the State in Late Colonial Tanzania”. The Journal of African History. Vol. 
45, No. 3 (2004), pp. 467-489. 
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avoidance, the politics of identity (of race, nationality or gender), the impact of technology 
and “modern” infrastructures (such as roads and railways), medicine and public health, 
urbanization, labor and economy, and state- or nation-building.163  
One impression most of those studies give is that the colonial state was an impersonal 
conduit for the implementation of policy. The colonial state was more than that, particularly 
during decolonization, when state apparatus was used as a means to an end. In The End of 
Empire and the Making of Malaya, Tim Harper observes that: 
 
The ‘second colonial occupation’ of British Malaya that occurred in the 
aftermath of the war saw the creation of a viable nation-state as the 
culmination of the imperial mission…. One of the most important keywords of 
late colonialism was community development. The British sought to break 
down the divisions of a plural society, and create an integrated economic and 
political entity, bound together by a shared allegiance, a common culture and 
the obligations of a common citizenship.164 
 
 
 
                                                          
163 In lieu of an exhaustive list, I refer to the following selected publications: Health: Tim Harper and Sunil S. 
Amrith (eds.), Histories Of Health In Southeast Asia: Perspectives On The Long Twentieth Century 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), Lenore Manderson, Sickness And The State: Health And Illness 
In Colonial Malaya, 1870-1940 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Violence / Surveillance: Syed 
Muhd Khairudin Aljunied, Colonialism, Violence And Muslims In Southeast Asia: The Maria Hertogh 
Controversy And Its Aftermath (London; New York: Routledge, 2009); Nation-building: Penny Edwards, 
Cambodge: The Cultivation Of A Nation, 1860-1945 (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, c2007), Tim N. 
Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya (New York: University of Cambridge Press, 1998); 
Identity (Race / Gender): Paul A. Kramer, The Blood Of Government: Race, Empire, The United States, And 
The Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, Women And 
The Colonial State: Essays On Gender And Modernity In The Netherlands Indies, 1900-1942 (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, c2000); Colonial State: Julian Go and Anne L. Foster (eds.), The American 
Colonial State In The Philippines: Global Perspectives (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), Robert Cribb 
(ed.), The Late Colonial State In Indonesia: Political And Economic Foundations Of The Netherlands Indies, 
1880-1942 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994); Technology / Infrastructure: Rudolf Mrázek, Engineers Of Happy 
Land: Technology And Nationalism In A Colony (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), Prisons: 
Peter Zinoman, The Colonial Bastille: A History Of Imprisonment In Vietnam, 1862-1940 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, c2001), Anoma Pieris, Hidden Hands And Divided Landscapes: A Penal History Of 
Singapore's Plural Society (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, c2009); Urbanization: Brenda S. A. Yeoh, 
Contesting Space In Colonial Singapore: Power Relations And The Urban Built Environment (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press, c2003; first edition published in 1996), Economy / Labor: Ann Laura Stoler, 
Capitalism And Confrontation In Sumatra's Plantation Belt, 1870-1979 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, c1995; first edition published in 1985), James C. Scott, The Moral Economy Of The Peasant: Rebellion 
And Subsistence In Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Anne E. Booth, Colonial 
Legacies: Economic And Social Development In East And Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi 
Press, c2007), Decolonization: Marc Frey, Ronald Pruessen, and Tan Tai Yong (eds.), The Transformation of 
Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004). 
See in particular Paul Kratoska, “Dimensions of Decolonization” and Karl Hack, “Theories and Approaches to 
British Decolonization in Southeast Asia” for an overview of British postwar policies. 
164 Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, p. 358. Kratoska also notes the change in colonial 
policy in “Dimensions of Decolonization”. 
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This approach contrasted with the “militant laissez faire” prevalent before the war, where 
humanitarian concerns did not lead to decisive state intervention.165 Harper also notes the 
postwar use of social welfare and broader social policy as a means to build a viable nation-
state.166  
The process was far from smooth. If we assume colonialism as a “system of 
domination and super-imposition”, then, “[d]ecolonization does not mean just the withdrawal 
of the colonial power, but the establishment of new relations between the colonial power and 
the former colony on the basis of equal status and self-determination”.167 The attempts to 
establish new relations did not occur on a blank slate. Such attempts had to deal with existing 
social and economic structures enacted and then maintained by decades of colonial 
administration. For instance, in Singapore and Malaya, the British encountered resistance 
almost immediately from the time they returned. Alarmed by unanticipated Malay opposition, 
the Malayan Union plan was shelved in favor of the Federation of Malaya, which restored the 
prewar social organization of recognizing the Malays as the native community and the rest as 
visitors.168 On the world stage, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China 
moreover were on the ascendancy. For many in Malaya, the Communist Party of Malaya and 
its affiliates represented a viable and inspiring vision of a post-colonial future and an 
immediate alternative to colonial administration. For various reasons, it eventually resorted to 
armed insurgency in 1948, which was pacified by 1960 but officially ended only in 1989.  
Such developments affected indelibly the manner in which social welfare was 
introduced and implemented in Singapore. Communist subversion, among other methods, 
exploited genuine grievances resulting from the harsh social conditions of the postwar years. 
This resulted in social and industrial unrest, which in turn threatened the political status quo. 
There was a sense of purpose on the part of the colonial administration to show that it was 
serious in providing social welfare. At the same time, those developments accelerated 
decolonization. This in turn threw up unanticipated variables that complicated policy 
implementation. As there was little precedent on government-initiated social welfare, the 
                                                          
165 Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, p. 24.  
166 Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, pp. 56-75. 
167 My emphasis. Rudolf von Albertini, Decolonization: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919-
1960 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1971), p. 523. 
168 See Lau, The Malayan Union Controversy, for a detailed study of responses. The consequent tensions, 
compromises, and accepted resolutions for Malaya’s independence laid the framework of the post-colonial state 
in Malaya. Harper concluded his study around the time of independence in 1957. Cheah Boon Kheng’s 
Malaysia: The Making of a Nation details the impact of those complications from the late colonial period after 
1957. 
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British had to rely and engage with individuals and organizations whose actions were not 
always manageable, in particular the women and youths who had survived the war and 
occupation and increasingly asserted themselves in the new social and political order that 
resulted in part from the dysfunctionality brought upon families and households by death and 
violence. As the pace of decolonization quickened, the British were progressively sidelined 
from their own policy by constitutional developments that prioritized local voices in the 
decision-making process.  
 
State-building as a “kind of human practice” 
 
This demonstrates to some extent how the colonial state, or at least its functioning, 
should not be simply perceived as staid or impersonal. The colonial state, as with any other 
institution, was defined by the processes set in motion by the actions and decisions of various 
individuals, which were moreover informed by prevailing contexts. This particular 
understanding draws from three disparate but related works. The first is John Furnivall’s 1939 
The Fashioning of Leviathan. Furnivall’s caustic critique of the beginnings of the British 
Empire in Burma did not show imperial officers mindlessly carrying out their orders. They 
showed instead the complexities of a nascent British presence in Burma, of individuals 
working (within) the system, as Mr. Maingy did with tact and grace; or against it, as Mr. 
Blundell attempted and failed (resulting in a demotion and latter obscurity).169 The second is 
Ann Stoler’s recent reading of colonial anxieties in Along the Archival Grain. Her 
examination of the correspondences to and from Dutch colonial officials in Java, especially 
those of Frans Carl Valck, demonstrates less a confident colonial administration, and more its 
insecurities and anxieties of its individual members.170  
The representations of the colonial state by Furnivall and Stoler representations mirror 
Tony Day’s generic observation of state formation in Southeast Asia “as a kind of human 
practice”.171 Day’s position is informed by studies of the Southeast Asian state, especially 
those before the colonial period. Efforts to find a position relatively free of Western 
                                                          
169 John S. Furnivall, The Fashioning of Leviathan: The Beginnings of British Rule in Burma / edited by Gehan 
Wijeyewardene (Canberra: Published in association with the Economic History of Southeast Asia Project and 
the Thai-Yunnan Project, 1991). Originally published in 1939 by the Burma Research Society.  
170 Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, c2009), chapters 6 and 7. 
171 Day makes a distinction between studying the process of state making and studies of the state as “a finished 
product or structure that has existed in “traditional”, “colonial”, or “modern” forms….” Fluid Iron: State 
Formation in Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003), p. 2. 
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assumptions have led scholars of Southeast Asia to “indigenous” sources, such as 
inscriptions, religious texts, literary works, cultural practices, oral traditions, and local 
government records (as and where available). There is less emphasis, a consequence perhaps 
of the preceding approach, on Weberian-bureaucratic structures, and more on kinship or 
familial bonds, patron-client relationships, the “localization” and use of symbols and rituals 
for legitimacy, and charismatic leadership. In contrast to the rational and bureaucratic states 
usually found in the West, Southeast Asia has the mandala, the galactic polity, the solar polity, 
the commandery, the negara (theater state), the kerajaan (loosely translated as the “condition 
of having a raja”), the cultural state, the “kingdom of words” – to name but a few.172  
Despite certain differences (such as mainland Southeast Asian states were 
comparatively more bureaucratized), their foundations were not fundamentally different. 
They were largely based on personal connections between one who needs assistance and one 
who can provide said assistance. Via certain leadership qualities, such as charisma, and 
favorable circumstances, those personal connections were then brought together and 
expanded into super-structures, legally codified and/or legitimized via extra-legal means. 
This laid the foundations for administrative centralization, which in turn supported territorial 
expansion.173 For example, the patron-client institution of kywanship, translated as 
“bondage”, was an integral part of the kingdom of Pagan.174 Michael Aung-Thwin observes 
that “economic difficulties sometimes drove people to seek security in bondage”, as 
                                                          
172 Tony Day gives a useful introductory overview in Fluid Iron. Amitav Acharya presents an overview of state 
formation scholarship, via political science, in The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a 
Region (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012).  The various Southeast Asian states listed are 
taken from essays by Leonard Andaya and Keith Taylor in Anthony Reid (ed.), Southeast Asia in the Early 
Modern Era: Trade, Power, and Belief (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Stanley J. Tambiah, “The 
Galactic Polity: The Structure of Traditional Kingdoms in Southeast Asia”, Annals of the New York Academy of 
Sciences. Vol. 293, No. 1 Anthropology (1977), pp. 69-97; O. W. Wolters, History, Culture, And Region In 
Southeast Asian Perspectives (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell 
University, 1999 – rev. ed.); Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State In Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, c1980); Jane Drakard, A Kingdom Of Words: Language And Power In 
Sumatera (Kuala Lumpur; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Anthony Crothers Milner, Kerajaan: 
Malay Political Culture On The Eve Of Colonial Rule (Tucson, Ariz.: Published for the Association for Asian 
Studies by the University of Arizona Press, c1982). Victor B. Lieberman, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in 
Global Context, C. 800-1830 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003-2009); Paul Wheatley, 
Nagara and Commandery: Origins of the Southeast Asian Urban Traditions (Chicago, Ill.: University of 
Chicago, Dept. of Geography, 1983). 
173 See Victor B. Lieberman, Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest, c.1580-1760 (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, c1984). Lieberman expands on this concept in his two-volume Strange 
Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c.800–1830 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003 
and 2009). 
174 Michael Aung-Thwin, Pagan: The Origins of Modern Burma (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, c1985), 
figure 2, p. 72. See pp. 75-79 for meaning of bondage in the context of Pagan, and pp. 79-91 for types of 
kywanships. The author suggests “attachment”, instead of “bondage”, as a better description of the kywan 
relationship. (Personal communication). 
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“kywanship promised social security, economic opportunity, family stability, social and 
family status, political mobility, and in some cases, even a better rebirth”.175 Similarly, the 
success of Malay maritime polities depended on the ruler’s ability to harness the labor and 
loyalty of the orang laut (sea-faring peoples). Leonard Andaya identifies the orang laut as a 
“vital component of the [Kingdom of Johor’s] power structure”.176 One moment in the 
kingdom’s history aptly illustrates the group’s significant role. The 1699 regicide of Sultan 
Mahmud destabilized the Kingdom of Johor, leading to the gradual fragmentation of the 
Malay world, and the eventual denigration of the orang laut community.177  
Approaching from the perspective of social welfare, that is the provision for the well-
being of the individual and society at large, allows us to connect studies of state-building 
across different geographical areas and historical periods. It provides a basis for an intimate 
insight into how the late colonial state was formed in Singapore, through the “eyes” and 
deeds of social welfare officers, social workers, volunteers, and the people they helped, who 
in turn are integral parts and extensions of social histories in Southeast Asia, especially that of 
women and of gender relations. Conventionally cast in passive social roles, typically during 
and from the colonial period, women played a significant role in establishing the foundations 
of the social welfare state in Singapore, and in developing Singapore’s postwar society in 
general.178 They did this in varied roles, such as medical doctors, politicians, academicians, 
volunteers, almoners and social welfare officers. The social welfare history presented in the 
following pages is partly constructed around the life and career of a local woman, whose 
experiences with the Salvation Army and later the Social Welfare Department, bridge in a 
personal way the pre- and postwar periods of Singapore’s social welfare history. Moreover, 
the manner in which society proactively responded to a deliberate state presence in social 
welfare can also be party captured in the work of a group of lady volunteers supporting a 
                                                          
175 Aung-Thwin, Pagan, p. 76. He cites two cases. One where a person in debt offered his services as a kywan 
and another case of two brothers who had been orphaned and hence “sought a patron and became his kywan”. 
(p. 83). The author takes inspiration from a similar type of relationship in Europe, as described by Marc Bloch: 
one who takes the man (whose service is desired) “into one’s household, to feed and clothe him … to grant him 
return for his services an estate, which if exploited directly or in the form of dues levied on the cultivators of the 
soil, would enable him to provide for himself”. Quoted in p. 82; originally from Marc Bloch, Feudal Society. 
176 Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor, 1641-1728 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 
44-52. For a more recent examination of the orang laut’s relationship with their chosen leaders, see Leonard Y. 
Andaya, Leaves of the Same Tree: Trade and Ethnicity in the Straits of Melaka (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i 
Press, 2008), chapter 6. 
177 Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 2001. First edition in 1982), pp. 112-113. See also Andaya, Leaves of the Same Tree, p. 200. 
178 For an excellent overview the postwar women’s movement in Singapore that eventually led to the Women’s 
Charter in 1961, see Phyllis Chew Ghim Lian. "The Singapore Council of Women and the Women's 
Movement", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 112-140. 
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child nutrition policy. Not all lady volunteers were the mere spouses of colonial officials or a 
bored socialite passing the time. She was typically the first face / voice a starving child saw / 
heard, a listening ear for desperate mothers and wives, transforming into a fierce advocate for 
women and children’s rights after being exposed to intolerable levels of poverty. Her story, 
and of others in the chapters that follow, can only add to the fairly new subfields of women 
history and gender relations in Southeast Asian history. They not only complement and 
contrast with the predominantly male-perspective of Singapore’s postwar history, the mix of 
local, Asian, British and other European women moreover blurred the lines between colonizer 
and colonized in effecting a colonial policy.179  
 
Thesis and Outline 
 
In a way, this fits the ideal depiction of the post-Second World War welfare state, 
supposedly a state that was not “remote” or “impersonal”, but a “close-at-hand, essentially 
personally manipulated piece of machinery”, whose collective power was harnessed to 
support social rights.180 The following six chapters of this study elaborate on the thesis that 
state-building can be understood as the processes set in motion by the decisions and actions 
of individuals. To glean insights into state-societal interactions regarding social welfare, the 
following chapters presents and contrasts two viewpoints, that of the government or 
policymaker, and the appropriate non-government counterparts from Singapore society – 
except for Chapters 4 and 5, where the former presents the government side of the story, and 
the latter discusses several societal responses to the official presence in social welfare. 
Chapter 1 has discussed how a social welfare history calls for a reexamination of 
conventional approaches to Singapore history and historiography, by situating a local history 
in the broader historical contexts of colonial welfare, state-building and society in Southeast 
Asia. Chapter 2 connects those contexts to the local situation in pre-Second World War 
Singapore. It gives an overview of state and society in early colonial Singapore, examines the 
reluctance of both state and society to act decisively during moments of need, and outlines 
the plans for social welfare to Singapore. It is essentially the “before” to the “after” of the 
                                                          
179 For an introductory overview of women in Southeast Asia’s colonial and modern history, see Barbara 
Watson Andaya, “Studying Women and Gender in Southeast Asia”. International Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 
4, No. 1 (January 2007), especially pp. 123-128. Andaya also explores women in early modern Southeast Asian 
economy, society and culture in The Flaming Womb: Repositioning Women in Early Modern Southeast Asia 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, c2006). 
180 Briggs, “The Welfare State in Historical Perspective”, pp. 243-244. 
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following chapters, illustrating the entrenched structures and attitudes the postwar policy of 
colonial welfare had to confront. Chapter 3 outlines the situation during wartime and 
occupation, and the British Military Administration period immediately after. Developments 
during those periods anticipate the issues confronting the British as they attempted to 
introduce social welfare in Singapore. Social welfare, and colonial policy in general, was no 
longer the sole purview of the returning colonizers. The British found that they had to 
respond decisively to incursions made by a variety of local interests, which in turn forced 
them to adjust initial plans. This process of negotiation, compromise, and outflanking 
attempts all served to project a particular type of social welfare, and hence, colonial state. 
Chapters 4 and 5 can be read as a two-part history of the introduction and the impact 
of an official presence in social welfare, which eventually created a social welfare state in late 
colonial Singapore. Effective implementation of policy requires institutional and 
administrative support. The introduction of social security in Europe, the United States, and 
elsewhere, was followed by the establishment of institutions and structures to administer 
those schemes.181 Chapter 4 discusses the establishment of the Social Welfare Department, 
and its attempts to position social welfare as a government function. Still, the Social Welfare 
Department could only do so much in the face of extremely daunting social conditions in late 
colonial Singapore. It required support from the communities it purportedly served and the 
relevant expertise to carry out social welfare work. Chapter 5 discusses the impact of an 
official state presence in social welfare, as represented by the Social Welfare Department, 
through the histories of the Social Studies Diploma program, the Social Welfare Council, and 
the Family Planning Association. Those histories give multiple insights to the processes of 
                                                          
181 In Imperial Germany, the Reichsversischerungsamt was initially directly responsible to the Reich Chancellor, 
and later to the Reich Ministry of Labour from 1914. By 1927, it oversaw all social insurance programs, 
handling tens of thousands of individual cases every year. After the Second World War, former 
Reichsversischerungsamt staff helped formulate postwar “social jurisdiction”. See Eghigian, Making Security 
Social, p. 74, and Stolleis, Origins of the German Welfare State, p. 73. In Britain, introduction of social 
insurance meant a restructuring of earlier institutions. The Ministry of Health in 1919 was the result of the 
“merging of the old Local Government Board with the Insurance Commissioners”, the former of which oversaw 
the institutions of the 1834 Poor Laws. In 1929, a Local Government Act replaced Poor Law guardians (drawn 
from local parishes) with Public Assistance Committees (PACs). In 1935, an Unemployment Assistance Board 
was established to oversee destitution relief on a “national level”. In 1942, Beveridge called for the 
establishment of a Ministry of Social Security (eventually a Ministry of National Insurance). He also called for 
the suppression of “present system of Approved Societies giving unequal benefits for equal compulsory 
contributions….” See Fraser, British Welfare State, pp. 191, 195-197, 214-215, 244, and Social Insurance, pp. 
11, and 22-26 (for elaboration).  
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state-building in the context of decolonization, outlining how individual initiative contested 
and interpreted broad policy objectives on the ground.182  
Taken together, the histories described in Chapters 4 and 5 reflect the building and 
realization of a social welfare state, in other words the creation and maintenance of 
institutions, structures, and their underlying attitudes towards the well-being of society. These 
elements still exist in present-day Singapore, positing a fair amount of continuity. The 
institutions and organizations described in Chapter 5 have been succeeded by the Department 
of Social Work in the National University of Singapore, the National Council of Social 
Service, and the Singapore Planned Parenthood Association. The Social Welfare Department, 
as noted above, is succeeded by a new Ministry of Social and Family Development.  
Chapter 6 examines the longevity of the social welfare state via a biography of state-
building. It builds on the idea of state-building as a human practice by presenting the personal 
histories of those intimately involved in effecting social welfare. The connections, bonds, 
attachments (or whichever suitable synonym pleases the reader) forged between social 
welfare officers, their clients and families are not dissimilar from the patron-client 
relationships that formed the basis of early Southeast Asian states. Even if it was ultimately 
undeveloped, the original intent was to position social welfare as central to Singapore’s 
postwar community.183 It seemed ideal. Social welfare officers and social workers came into 
contact with different sections of Singapore society in the course of their work. They assisted 
war victims, persons with disabilities, the elderly and the destitute, the juvenile delinquent, 
the desperate parent, or the malnourished child. They acted as bridges to other government 
departments, religious bodies, and voluntary organizations. The social welfare officer and 
their affiliates were significant cogs, in most instances unknowingly, in the machinery of the 
late colonial state. 
Their work ensured the social welfare state persisted through the political changes of 
the postwar period, and long after the British left and independence was attained. The social 
welfare state could have moreover been something more, emerging as it did in the shadow of 
the British welfare state after the Second World War. A deliberate state presence in social 
                                                          
182 The introduction of social security in Britain for instance was contested. To push through legislation, the 
Liberal Government had to negotiate with various interests, such as the Friendly Societies, private insurance 
companies, the medical profession, organized labor, and its own party’s ideological bias against bureaucratic 
intervention. The final version of Lloyd George’s health insurance did not include widows and orphans’ benefits 
as a concession to commercial interests, and was operated by “approved societies” rather than government. 
Fraser, British Welfare State, pp. 179-184 and Hennock, British Social Reform and German Precedents, pp. 
126-151 and final chapter. 
183 As suggested by Harper in The End of Empire, pp. 62-75. 
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welfare was perceived by many as only the precursor to a comprehensive social security 
system in Singapore, ideally based on social insurance. The search for social security in late 
colonial Singapore encapsulates the major themes highlighted in this study, such as 
assumption of a central role for the state in social welfare and nation-building, the unintended 
consequences of policy implementation (caused to some extent by the complications of 
decolonization), and the substantial role of individual initiative. Chapter 7 serves as the 
culminating point of this study, first by reiterating these themes in narrating the abortive 
attempts to create a classic welfare state in late colonial Singapore, and from there, highlight 
intriguing continuities and parallels between colonial-era and contemporary social policies in 
Singapore. 
To a point, the stillborn classic welfare state represented a failure of rudimentary 
nation-building driven by British colonial interests. Nevertheless, though the end-goals of a 
colonial welfare and development policy were not completely realized, attempts to introduce 
social welfare have left behind legacies in Singapore that are yet to be fully appreciated. 
Colonial history, in this study, is not about the “white people” in Singapore.184 It is also about 
the processes, contributed to by the decisions and actions of both colonizer and colonized, 
informed by their inherent beliefs, histories, and peculiarities. This in turn created a particular 
type of social welfare state that can still be seen in contemporary Singapore. This study aids 
understanding of policymaking in general, not only in uncovering information and data, but 
also in highlighting the broader complexities and local variables that affect a seemingly 
straightforward exercise of policy implementation.185 
 
Note on Sources 
 
My research has benefited immensely from the archival holdings of the National 
Archives of Singapore and the Central Library of the National University of Singapore, as 
                                                          
184 Variation on quote by Cooper in Colonialism in Question, p. 34. “Historians, by the 1960s, also started to 
look away from colonial history, for to study it too much, even critically, was to reinforce the old canard that 
real history meant the history of the white people in Africa; the new history that new nations needed was a 
history of either the precolonial past or the anticolonial past; colonial history could be taken as a too-familiar 
given”. Quote is made in reference to African history. But it is striking how applicable Cooper’s comments are 
for Southeast Asian history, especially the latter’s initial search for an autonomous, non-colonial Southeast 
Asian perspective from the 1960s. 
185 See C. A. Bayly, et. al. (eds.), History, historians and development policy: a necessary dialogue 
(Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press: distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), in particular Michael Woolcock, Simon Szreter and Vijayendra Rao, “How and why history 
matters for development policy”, pp. 3-38. 
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well as access to the digital database of newspapers published in Singapore (NewspaperSG). 
In addition to the institutional records of government departments and official proceedings, 
the National Archives of Singapore also holds the oral histories and private letters of 
Protectors of Chinese, the Secretaries for Social Welfare, social welfare officers, professional 
social workers, and private welfare organizations.186 Some recollect the obstacles to 
overcome when building up an unprecedented government agency from scratch. Others 
provide an insider’s view of some of the Social Welfare Department’s core functions. Some 
are from the vantage point of the colonial officer (or the expatriate as they were known from 
the 1950s), making decisions from more senior government positions. A considerable number 
comes from someone born and raised in Singapore or Malaya. They began at junior or mid-
level staff positions, but later rising through the ranks as the pace of decolonization 
accelerated.  
To be sure, oral histories are predominantly memories and reflections, rationalized 
moreover long after the fact and consequently subjected to more contemporaneous influences 
and conditions.187 Bearing that in mind, they are not presented in this study as “objective 
truth”, to be trusted as representations of the past as it precisely was, a la Leopold von Ranke. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of detailed historical examinations of Singapore society, they 
provide a much-needed sense, and at times heart-rending accounts, of difficult living 
conditions in the past. As far as possible, those are corroborated by contemporaneous records 
such as government publications and newspaper articles. More critically, the memories and 
reflections are used in this study to understand state-building as a human practice, and not 
merely a narrative of institutions. The events and circumstances the interviewees choose to 
remember and then to inform their interviewers lend coherence and meaning to the social 
welfare state they helped established in responding to social needs, and from there and more 
abstractly, to the idea of social welfare in Singapore. 
To present Singapore society after the Second World War, my study also makes use of 
dissertations prepared by students of the Social Studies Diploma program. The NUS Central 
                                                          
186 As and where possible, oral histories presented in this chapter are reproduced verbatim as heard in the 
recording. This approach may at times include grammatical errors and awkward sentence structures, but it is 
done to mitigate the chances of misrepresenting the interviewee. Where necessary, the interviewer’s question 
will also be included for context.  
187 For a background into the development of oral history in Singapore and several critiques of its use, see 
contributions in P. Lim Pui Huen, James H. Morrison, Kwa Chong Guan (eds.), Oral History in Southeast Asia: 
Theory and Method (Singapore: National Archives of Singapore and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998). 
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Library has in its holdings over a hundred such dissertations.188 There is currently no 
definitive listing of the titles. Those available for reference can roughly be grouped into the 
following categories: (1) The social structures of particular communities;189 (2) Physical 
locales and social institutions;190 (3) Trades and vocations (some of which do not exist 
anymore);191 (4) Traditions and culture;192 (5) Contemporary social issues and related policies 
and processes.193 Between 1952 and 1974, this program served as the training ground for 
social workers. The approach taken in these dissertations were predominantly ethnographical. 
Hence, they have intrinsic value to the historian of social conditions in postwar Singapore 
and Malaysia. They complement newspaper reports, clinical presentations of social life in 
government publications, and act as a substitute for hitherto inaccessible case files of welfare 
recipients.  
                                                          
188 Searchable via the online catalog of the NUS Central Library, using “Social Studies Dept.” as a search word. 
A selected bibliography of departmental publications can be found in Lee Bee Lum and Ngiam Tee Liang, A 
Select Bibliography on Social Issues, Social Services and Social Work in Singapore and Malaysia: Based on 
The Publications of the Staff and Graduates of the Department of Social Work, National University of Singapore 
(Singapore: Department of Social Work, National University of Singapore, 1984). 
189 These included studies of Straits Chinese, Jews, Javanese, Hainanese, Teochew, Hakka, Ceylon Tamils, 
Malayalees, Arabs, and “Malaysians” (referring to groups from the Malay-speaking regions in Southeast Asia) 
190 These include studies of a Malay village in the southern islands, kampongs outside city limits, or even 
specific places and sites such as Bugis street and Indian and Chinese temples, Christian churches, the mosque in 
the city and in the suburban area 
191 These include studies of general hawking, small industries (such as soy sauce trade), trishaw riders, 
Bhutanese peddlers, “rag and bone” traders, jaga kerata (literally “taking care of cars”) boys, leisure activities 
of the poor in Chinatown, the samsui women laborers, Indian labor in the lighterage industry, and Cantonese 
domestic amahs. 
192 These included studies of the Malay “magician and medicine men” in Singapore, the bomoh in Kelantan, the 
Chinese physician and his patients, Chinese lineage settlements, childcare in a rural village, Malay practices and 
beliefs in rice cultivation, caste practices in Tamil and Hindu communities, and the haj in Singapore. 
193 For instance, there were studies on treatment of tuberculosis, juvenile delinquency, women criminals, opium 
addicts, alcoholics, the blind, persons with physical and mental disabilities, abandoned children, large families, 
family disputes, begging and vagrancy, responses to child illnesses, the chronic sick and dying, care for the 
elderly and the indigent, the impact of rehousing and resettlement on social relationships. Also related were 
studies on government policies and societal responses addressing those issues, such as employment assistance 
for persons with disabilities, youth clubs, a child fostering scheme, a Catholic organization providing welfare, 
and the rehabilitation of a juvenile delinquent. 
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CHAPTER 2. PREWAR SINGAPORE: WELFARE, STATE, AND SOCIETY 
 
This chapter gives the background to social welfare in Singapore before the Second 
World War. It is a truism to state that Singapore was a colonial possession of the British from 
1819. It is however less accurate to assume that colonial authority was omnipresent. There 
are instances where the colonial state was extremely reluctant to provide any form of social 
alleviation. This reticence was not limited to the government. Singapore society established 
and maintained a variety of social services. These were however mostly created for specific 
needs within each individual community. Singapore’s colonial society was a plural society, a 
situation driven by economic objectives and defined by divergent (rather than common) 
outlooks. It took a series of economic and social crises, and motivated individuals and 
organizations, to push state and society out of its conventional laissez faire position, and take 
a more holistic approach to social welfare. 
 
The Backdrop: Early Colonial Singapore 
 
There were several discernible stages in British colonial policy in Singapore. The 
initial period, from 1819 to 1826, saw the attempt to establish and develop an economy and 
society very much based on the ideals of Singapore's “founder”, Stamford Raffles, but limited 
by the practical realities experienced by his Residents, William Farquhar and John Crawfurd. 
The British, represented by the East India Company, were effectively a tenant of local Malay 
chiefs, “renting” rights and space to conduct trading and commercial activities. During this 
period, the Dutch, who had established their presence in the region and in the neighboring 
Riau Archipelago, disputed Singapore’s status as a British territory. The 1824 Anglo-Dutch 
Treaty established distinct Dutch and British spheres of influence. The Malacca Strait was 
used as the line of demarcation, with the British free to operate northwards of the strait in the 
Malay Peninsula, and the Dutch in Sumatra. In the same year, a Treaty of Friendship and 
Alliance was concluded between the British Resident and the local Malay chiefs in 
Singapore, with the latter effectively ceding the “perpetual title” of the island to the Company 
and its heirs.1 
Singapore’s economy and society drastically changed after 1819. Raffles envisioned 
Singapore as a center of free trade, in opposition to the Dutch and Spanish policies of 
                                                          
1 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, p. 47. 
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“monopoly, trade restriction and territorial expansion”.2 Custom duties were banned and port 
charges were kept to a minimum, which had the immediate effect of plugging the young 
trading settlement into well-established regional trade networks, and over time undercut the 
protectionist Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies.3 The island's population expanded quickly, 
from an initial estimate of about 1,000 inhabitants in 1819 to over 5,000 in 1821. In 1830, 
Singapore's population stood at over 16,000, with the Chinese forming the majority (about 
6,500). By 1860, it grew to almost 81,000, with the Chinese population increasing to 50,000, 
or about two-thirds of the island's population.4 
Raffles had grand plans for his new settlement, informed by a personal crusade in 
ensuring the freedoms of local peoples and to guide them to those freedoms via “European 
enlightenment, liberal education, progressive economic prosperity, and just laws”.5 He had a 
vision of a government that not only gives “the utmost freedom of trade and equal rights to 
all...”, but also one that protects property and person, upholding the Liberal tradition of 
individualism. At the same time, the frontier-like environment of Singapore afforded 
opportunities Raffles eagerly embraced. He laid down plans for an orderly town, with well-
demarcated zones for different ethnic groups and spaces for commercial and leisure activities. 
An experimental Botanic Gardens was created to “provide the foundation for a prosperous 
agriculture”. Slavery and gambling were to be abolished, legislation enacted to protect 
Chinese migrants, and the establishment of a judiciary system to enforce those laws. 
Moreover, in anticipation of Singapore becoming a regional center for intellectual exchange, 
Raffles also envisioned an education policy that “must keep pace with commerce in order that 
its benefits may be ensured and its evils avoided”.6 
There are two parts to any kind of policy: the originating ideas and their 
implementation. Indeed, a policy is only seen as successful if the idea has been successfully 
implemented. Raffles’ failures and successes do speak to the historical circumstances that 
restricted and encouraged the development of individual ideas. For example, an orderly town 
and the abolition of slavery were visible manifestations of British will and power. They 
                                                          
2 Carl Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control (UK: Routledge, 2005), p. 9. 
3 For study of Singapore’s early trade, see Wong Lin Ken, The Trade of Singapore, 1819-69 (Kuala Lumpur: 
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society; Bandar Puchong Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia: Printed for the 
MBRAS by Academe Art & Print. Services Sdn. Bhd. Malaysia, c2003). For a detailed examination of the 
changes in Singapore’s economy from the late nineteenth century, see W. G. Huff, The Economic Growth of 
Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994). 
4 Turnbull, A Modern History of Singapore, p. 55. 
5 Turnbull, A Modern History of Singapore, p. 26. 
6 Turnbull, A Modern History of Singapore, p. 42. 
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undermined traditional forms of authority, whose power and status were based primarily on 
the ability to harness the labor and loyalty of their subjects. On the other hand, social reforms 
for education did not have any obvious tangible contribution to the economy but still 
necessitated immediate expenditure and regular outlay, while the experimental Botanic 
Gardens fell through after the demise of the gambier and pepper plantations on Singapore. 
Farquhar and Crawfurd encountered difficulties implementing Raffles' ideas. The former fell 
afoul of Raffles when it became known that he had condoned slavery and debt bondage, 
perceived as they were as local traditions, while Crawfurd could not solicit sufficient support 
to implement Raffles' education ideas. They operated on minimal expenses and encountered 
local hostility to policies that undercut traditional authority, such as anti-slavery laws, 
migration control and a judiciary system to oversee and enforce such laws.7 
This was followed by a period of general negligence of the British settlement by the 
Indian government in Calcutta. Between 1826 and 1867, Singapore, along with Malacca and 
Penang, was administered collectively as the Presidency of the Straits Settlements. In 1830, 
as a result of financial difficulties, the Straits Settlements ceased to be a Presidency and 
became a portion of the Bengal Presidency centered in Calcutta. The local mercantile 
community chafed under Calcutta's administration for a variety of reasons. Those ranged 
from Calcutta's interference in Singapore's laissez-faire economy, to (ironically enough) the 
absence of meaningful government involvement over issues such as piracy, inadequate 
judicial and security measures, the dumping of Indian convicts, and the Chinese problem.8 
From 1857, they actively sought the transfer of the Straits Settlements from the Bengal 
Presidency to the Colonial Office.9 The latter reluctantly assumed direct responsibility over 
the colony because it entailed increased expenditure. An ugly transfer of administration 
ensued, where senior officials, including the Governor of the Straits Settlements himself, 
were forcibly retired.10 In 1867, the Straits Settlements formally became a Crown Colony, a 
status that continued until the British lost its Malayan possessions to the Japanese in 1942. 
This period coincided with broader administrative trends that moved away from Liberal 
ideals of non-interference, and to, as John Furnivall saw it, a modified Liberal attitude that 
justified state intervention for the purpose of efficiency and social justice. 
 
                                                          
7 Turnbull, A Modern History of Singapore, pp. 38-43. 
8 Turnbull, A Modern History of Singapore, p. 87. 
9 Turnbull, A Modern History of Singapore, pp. 87-89. 
10 Turnbull, A Modern History of Singapore, pp. 87-89. 
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The Reluctant Colonial State (and Society) 
 
The agitation to transfer administrative powers from Calcutta to London was one of 
the earliest instances of a local community attempting to define and assert itself.11 Here, the 
term “local” is not defined by nationality, ethnicity, or place of origin. Instead, I take “local” 
to indicate a sense of belonging to a territory, be it territorial, such as Singapore town or 
island, or political, such as the Straits Settlements or the idea of British Malaya. Hence, the 
local community in Singapore included both European and Asian elements. At the turn of the 
twentieth century, Singapore population had expanded rapidly. In 1871, 94,300 persons were 
recorded in the whole of Singapore. In 1901, that figure rose to 229,900, of which 193,100 
were living in the town area. Over the next two decades, Singapore’s population increased to 
over half a million by the 1930s. On the eve of the Second World War, there were over 
700,000 people living and working in Singapore.12 The population of Singapore was 
predominantly Chinese, and concentrated within the municipality limits. By the early 
twentieth century, the Chinese community consistently formed over 75% of the 
municipality’s population, the Indian and Malay communities at roughly 10% each, and 
Europeans at less than 2%.13  
Administrative authority was therefore not representative of Singapore society, as the 
minority British took up key decision-making positions in the colonial government and in the 
Straits Settlements Legislative Council.14 It is conventional to understand British rule in 
Singapore in terms of a “divide-and-rule” approach. But this may unwittingly suggest a 
proactive deliberateness that might not have been present. Instead, it is more accurate to see 
British rule in prewar Singapore, at least before the Second World War, as primarily to ensure 
the facilitation of economic activities. This meant that on one level, individual communities 
were left on their own devices, and on another, government only responded when its raison 
d’être was sufficiently threatened by disturbances. 
 
 
                                                          
11 See for a general overview of civil society in Singapore history, E. Kay Gillis, Singapore Civil Society and 
British Power (Singapore: Talisman, 2005). 
12 Huff, The Economic Growth of Singapore, p. 158.  
13 Huff, The Economic Growth of Singapore, p. 158 (Table 5.4). 
14 See Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, pp. 94-95. See also quote from the Official Commission of 
1875 on page 93: “We believe that the vast majority of Chinamen who come to work in these Settlements return 
to their country not knowing clearly whether there is a government in them or not”. 
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Absence of a “Common Social Will” 
 
There was hence the absence of the common social will, as highlighted by Furnivall 
in Colonial Policy and Practice. The tedious process in which the Pauper Hospital and the 
Chinese Protectorate were established is illustrative. The former took almost two decades just 
to begin construction. From 1821, beggars and vagrants in Singapore could seek refuge and 
food in a “large attap boarded shed” (a dwelling that uses the leaves and other parts of an 
attap palm, usually as a thatched roof). However, as the trade settlement expanded, the 
numbers of destitute needing medical attention also increased. The European mercantile 
community however refused to pay for what it saw was a predominantly Chinese problem. It 
felt that the Chinese, having benefited “from their stay in Singapore and had become 
wealthy ... should contribute towards supporting their poor”. A Chinese merchant, Tan Tock 
Seng, eventually made a donation to erect the building in 1844. This was fifteen years after 
the idea of the hospital was originally mooted. The donation moreover was conditioned on 
others providing the financial means to support the running of the hospital. Even though 
construction was completed in 1847, the hospital did not take in patients until 1849, when the 
government’s hand was forced after a storm destroyed the original “shed” that tended to the 
sick and destitute.15 
The establishment of the Chinese Protectorate in 1877 was similarly drawn-out and 
frustrating.16 From the 1860s, the numbers of Chinese migrants into Singapore steadily 
increased due to the opening of new markets in the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, the 
corresponding increase in demand for labor to work in the agricultural estates and tin mines, 
and the push factors of natural disasters and man-made crises in China.17 However, 
                                                          
15 See Lee Yong Kiat’s historical overview of “The Pauper and Tan Tock Seng Hospitals in Early Singapore”, in 
The Medical History of Early Singapore (Tokyo: Southeast Asian Medical Information Center, 1978). 
16 See Eunice Thio, “The Singapore Chinese Protectorate: Events and Conditions leading to its Establishment” 
(Unpublished academic exercise, Department of History, University of Malaya, 1952), p. 25. (Later published as 
“The Singapore Chinese Protectorate: Events and Conditions Leading to its Establishment, 1823-1877”. Journal 
of the South Seas Society, Vol. 6, Issue 1/2, (1960), pp. 40-80. The history of the Chinese Protectorate is 
collected in three separate articles, all written more than a half-century ago. Eunice Thio's article covers the 
events leading to the establishment of the Protectorate. For the first thirty years of the Protectorate, see Ng Siew 
Yoong, “The Chinese Protectorate in Singapore, 1877-1900”, Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 2, No. 1, 
(1961), pp. 76-99. For the years up to the Second World War, see Chu Tee Seng, “The Singapore Chinese 
Protectorate, 1900-1941” (Unpublished academic exercise - Dept. of History, University of Malaya, 1960). 
Edwin Lee examines the institution through the lens of colonial governance in The British as Rulers: Governing 
Multiracial Singapore 1867-1914 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1991), while James Warren’s Ah ku 
and Karayuki-san: Prostitution in Singapore, 1870-1940, highlights Chinese Protectorate activities in managing 
prostitution and controlling disease. 
17 During the nineteenth century, China suffered from a series of wars (the Opium Wars in 1839-42 and 1856-
1860), internal strife (the Taiping Rebellion in 1850-1871), as well as a series of famines and epidemics. 
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immigration control was non-existent. This allowed for the malicious abuse of the coolie 
trade, specifically the blatant kidnapping of sinkehs (translated into “new guests”), sometimes 
in broad daylight.18 The situation in Singapore was so atrocious that it caught the attention of 
the Qing government in China, which had begun to recognize its overseas subjects from the 
1860s.19  
The Chinese mercantile community submitted several petitions between 1871 and 
1873 to the colonial government for greater protection of the sinkehs.20 Chief among their 
proposals was establishing an Immigration Office where sinkehs upon their arrival can be 
informed about their rights under British law.21 The initial version of the proposed legislation 
met with difficulties as the European mercantile community – with a substantial presence in 
the Legislative Council – opposed the bill. Their reservations include the apparent inadequacy 
of the proposed legislation without proper enforcement, and the costs incurred in enforcing 
such legislation. This was a strange mix of altruism and economic considerations, similar to 
that surrounding the establishment of the Pauper Hospital.22 But as a result, the proposed 
Chinese Immigrants Ordinance remained in limbo for the next four years. The stalemate was 
broken with an ultimatum from the Colonial Office in 1876 to look into the conditions and 
processes of the coolie trade, and the Protectorate was finally established in 1877. 
 
Antecedents of State Welfare 
 
The Chinese Protectorate is usually understood in Singapore history as the official 
response to the excesses of the Chinese secret societies, and later on, the government 
department that oversaw the control of prostitution and sexually transmitted diseases.23 That 
it was originally an official agency to ensure the safety of the newly arrived Chinese migrant, 
a pseudo immigration department of sorts, is not as well-known. Even lesser known was its 
connections to the postwar Social Welfare Department, and how its work, as it evolved, laid 
the foundations for the postwar colonial approach to social welfare, as operated from the 
                                                          
18 Lee, The British as Rulers, pp. 76-77; also Thio, “Chinese Protectorate”, pp. 25-35. 
19 See Yen Ching Hwang, Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late 
Ch'ing Period (1851-1911) (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985) and Robert L. Irick, Ch'ing Policy 
Towards the Coolie Trade 1847-1878 (Republic of China: Chinese Materials Centre, 1982). 
20 Lee, The British as Rulers, p. 77. 
21 Thio, “Chinese Protectorate”, p. 48. 
22 Thio, “Chinese Protectorate”, pp. 39-41. 
23 Ng Siew Yoong’s article on the activities of the Chinese Protectorate begins with an overview of the unrest 
caused by Chinese secret societies. James Warren discusses the agency from the perspective of colonial 
management of prostitution.  
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level of government. For example, the first Secretary for Social Welfare, Thomas Ferguson 
Percy McNeice, was a Protector of the Chinese in the Straits Settlements and the Malay states 
between 1925 and 1942.24 His memories (compiled in 1981) illustrate the evolution and 
scope of the Chinese Protectorate’s work. What McNeice recollected about his work as a 
Protector appeared deeply personal: 
 
The work in the Chinese Protectorate is very largely dealing with Chinese 
people who came in with complaints of any sort. It might be a complaint of a 
wife against her husband, it might be a complaint of a child against the 
parents, or might be a complaint of parents against the child saying the child is 
disobedient. Or it might be a matter of wages. Anything really that affect 
anybody was dealt with by the Chinese Protectorate. We were there really to 
listen to complaints and try to solve problems as they came along.25 
 
Rowland Henry Oakeley, a contemporary and colleague of McNeice, gave a more detailed 
description.26 He recalled meeting people on a daily basis in the Chinese Secretariat building 
along Havelock Road. The taijin (Hokkien for “great person” as Protectors of Chinese were 
respectfully called), sat behind a desk in a huge hall with a standing capacity of three to four 
hundred people at any one time, waiting to receive any Chinese and their complaints. There 
were no restrictions on entry, nor was payment required. The taijin was aided by a Chinese 
interpreter and two boys who acted as runners.  
Oakeley recalled, with some incredulity, a situation where a newly arrived twenty-
five-year-old colonial officer trying to assist with a diverse buffet of problems, ranging from 
labor disputes (such as recovering unpaid wages), to women seeking protection from spousal 
abuse (and sometimes vice versa), to “uneducated” workers requesting “chits” to seek 
medical treatment at the hospital.  Reflecting on his efforts, Oakeley commented that 
“sometimes it worked, sometimes it did not”. He and other taijins had the authority to 
summon errant employers, to compel them to the negotiation table, and to pay owed wages. 
                                                          
24 National Archives of Singapore (NAS), Oral History Centre (OHC), Thomas Percy Ferguson McNeice. The 
Civil Service – A Retrospection. Accession Number 000099. Interviewed in 1981. 22 Reels. He worked in 
various positions in the Chinese Protectorate. This included being a District Officer of Christmas Island in 1928 
to oversee the large Chinese labor force working and living there, and was at various times Assistant Protector 
and later Protector of Chinese in Singapore, Johor, Perak, and Kedah. He also oversaw Chinese education in the 
Federated Malay States, and acted as a police magistrate. A brief biography is available in the City Charter 
special edition of The Straits Times, 1951. 
25 NAS OHC, Percy McNeice, reel 1. 
26 NAS OHC, Rowland Henry Oakeley. The Public Service – A Retrospection. Accession Number 001332. 
Interviewed in 1991. 4 reels. Born in 1909, Oakeley arrived in Malaya in 1931 as a Far Eastern cadet in the 
Malayan Civil Service was similar to that of McNeice’s. He held various positions in the Chinese Protectorate in 
Singapore and the Malay States before the war, and was interned by the Japanese. After the war, he rejoined the 
MCS and working in the Labour Department in Singapore. 
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Nevertheless, they had no authority over personal matters and family conflicts. Oakeley 
recalled a particularly sensitive case of a Chinese female wanting to marry a Malay. He could 
do nothing except to advise the girl’s family to take her away. Still, the fact that Chinese 
attempted to seek redress for a host of personal problems was indicative of the Chinese 
Protectorate’s good reputation among the Chinese community. A couple of children managed 
to make their way to the taijin to lodge a complaint against their own mother, alleging that 
she had thrown them out into the streets. Those accusations were eventually found to be 
baseless. Oakeley thought it was telling that even little children knew who to turn to in times 
of need (real or perceived). The personal contact between the taijins and the Chinese 
community represented one of the few intimate contact points between state and society in 
prewar colonial Singapore. This process would be continued by the postwar Social Welfare 
Department. 
Things did move comparatively faster after administration of Singapore, as part of the 
Straits Settlements, came directly under the Colonial Office in London. In 1876, following a 
series of official enquiries into their well-being, a similar ordinance was passed regulating the 
entry, working conditions, and wages of Indian laborers entering the Straits Settlements.27 
This ordinance was superseded in 1884 by a new Indian Immigration Ordinance, part of 
which created the Indian Immigration Department, whose officers (called Indian Immigration 
Agents) performed similar “protector” functions to those in the Chinese Protectorate.28 This 
department was eventually absorbed into a new Labour Department in 1912 (which was 
established in 1911 for both the governments of the Straits Settlements and the Federated 
Malay States).29  
Responsibility for the well-being of the Chinese and Indian laborer was generally left 
to their employers, who would provide food, shelter, and an income from work provided. The 
finer details, such as work and living conditions, did not immediately fall under the purview 
of government. Indeed, as far as possible, colonial policy did not interfere in areas identified 
to be personal spaces of the individual. The colonial government only responded after 
                                                          
27 Summarized details of the Indian Immigration Protection Ordinance (1876) can be found in R. N. Jackson, 
Immigrant Labour and The Development of Malaya, 1786-1920 (Kuala Lumpur: Govt. Pr., 1961), pp. 61-62. 
The Chinese Immigrant Ordinance did not regulate the working conditions of the Chinese laborer, only his entry 
and movements in Singapore. 
28 The Indian Immigration Department was based in Penang, where the majority of South Asian immigrants 
disembark. The Chinese Protectorate headquarters was in Singapore, where the Chinese laborers mainly arrived. 
Both agencies had representatives throughout the Straits Settlements, and later in the Federated Malay States.  
29 J. Norman Parmer, Colonial Labor Policy and Administration: A History of Labor in the Rubber Plantation 
Industry in Malaya, c.1910-1941 (Locust Valley, N.Y.: Published for the Association for Asian Studies by J.J. 
Augustin, 1960). 
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prolonged pressures, as seen in the extended delay in establishing the Pauper Hospital, the 
Chinese Protectorate, and the Labour Department. Even then, the colonial government 
preferred to “share” the responsibility with leading members of the community. The Indian 
Immigration Department for instance was supported by a committee of government officials 
and representatives from planter associations and the South Asian community.30 
The Singapore Po Leung Kuk was another example of this approach.31 It was 
originally established in 1886 as a society for the protection of women and girls under the 
ambit of the Chinese Protectorate.32 From 1888, the Po Leung Kuk referred to a place of 
refuge for those rescued from brothels and kidnappers.33 It was chaired by the Protector of 
Chinese, and supported by the leading members of the Chinese and European communities. 
They visited known brothels, raised funds for the home’s upkeep, training programs and 
overall management, and even vetted applications for marriage proposals to the girls.34 From 
anecdotal evidence, it appears that the Chinese Protectorate or the government did not 
directly manage the home. The Catholic nuns were managing the Po Leung Kuk during the 
war, but when this arrangement was initiated is unknown.35 
There is an interesting historical difference between the Po Leung Kuks that appeared 
in Singapore, the rest of the Straits Settlements and the Malay states, and the version in Hong 
Kong. In the former, the Po Leung Kuk referred to a home and was an initiative of the 
colonial government.36 In Hong Kong, the Po Leung Kuk was a voluntary organization 
                                                          
30 The Indian Immigration Committee was created in 1906. While the Indian Immigration Department 
performed functions akin to the immigration officer, the committee was created ostensibly to directly manage 
the supply of Indian immigrant labor to meet increasing demands. Jackson, Immigrant Labour, pp. 115-126. 
31 Po Leung Kuk directly translates to “Protect Virtue Office”. Other English nomenclature includes Office for 
the Protection of Innocents in Yen Ching Hwang, A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya 
1800-1911 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986) or “Office to Protect Virtue” in Edwin Lee, The British 
as Rulers. James Warren stated that the records of the Singapore Po Leung Kuk seemed to have disappeared. 
Warren, Ah Ku and Karayuki-san, p. 15. Ann Wee suggests that the records might have been destroyed when 
the Japanese took over the Chinese Protectorate building. See also Manderson, Sickness and the State, pp. 191-
195, and Grace Paul, “The Poh Leung Kuk in Singapore: Protection of Women and Girls” (Unpublished 
academic exercise. Dept. of History, National University of Singapore, 1989). 
32 The Straits Times Weekly Issue, 20 February 1886, “The Protection of Women and Children”. 
33 It was originally opened in Kandang Kerbau. The home was relocated to York Hill in 1928. The structures 
would be used later after the Second World War by the Social Welfare Department. See Tan Beng Neo’s story 
in Chapter 6. The Straits Times Weekly Issue, 29 April 1890, “Annual Report on the Chinese Protectorate. 
Singapore, for the year 1889”, and The Straits Times, 22 September 1932, “Chinese Topics in Malaya”. 
34 Lee, The British as Rulers, p. 92. Lee suggests that the Po Leung Kuk attempted to act as a more humane 
competitor to the brothels, where marriages between clients and prostitutes were known to happen. McNeice 
recalled that the Po Leung Kuk also took in Malay and Indian girls, though fewer compared to the Chinese. 
NAS OHC, Percy McNeice, reel 13. 
35 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, Women Through the Years: Economic & Family Lives. Accession Number: 
000371. Interviewed in 1983. Reel 13 (of 26). 
36 See Manderson, Sickness and the State, pp. 191-195. Manderson notes a shift in policy, from protecting the 
man to protecting the woman. This shift coincided with the “discovery” of reproduction’s “perceived role in 
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established ten years earlier in 1878 by local Chinese.37 It was set up to eradicate the trade in 
kidnapped women and girls for prostitution, and had within its staff investigators who also 
actively tracked and apprehended kidnappers. But another objective was to distinguish 
kidnapped women and girls, and actual prostitutes, from the mui tsai.38 The mui tsai, 
translated literally from the Cantonese as “little sister”, was a topic of controversy during the 
interwar years, within the context of increasing imperial concerns over the flesh trade, child 
slavery, and control of diseases.39 In the context of this study, what happened in Hong Kong 
was an indication of a social will. In this case, it was to preserve, within British colonial rule, 
what was then deemed a local Chinese custom of alleviating poverty and/or improving the 
fortunes of the female child, through the transfer of the child in return for money. 
 
Family Networks and Community Support 
 
A similar “social will”, either to change or to preserve, was all but absent in Singapore 
during the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. Save for the Chinese 
Protectorate, state presence in the personal affairs of the individual was minimal. From the 
government’s point of view, the well-being of the individual in prewar Singapore was, for the 
most part, the responsibility of their family, community, or employers. The following 
experiences of the three individuals were illustrative of the relative absence of the state in 
prewar Singapore, except during times of war and economic crises. 
Valentine Napoleon Frois was born in Singapore on 8 June 1896, the fourth of five 
children (two sisters and two brothers). Frois’ mother, a Malaccan Eurasian of Portuguese 
descent, passed away when he was seven. His father was a Dutch national born in Singapore. 
                                                          
nurturing the family, in monitoring the health of women and children and providing services for them and in 
intervening in working-class lives with respect to issues of morality and material well-being”. In Poverty and 
Compassion: The Moral Imagination of the Late Victorians, Gertrude Himmlefarb discusses a similar 
perception shift in Europe and explains it as the partial result of an increasing reliance on the scientific method 
to understand and combat poverty. 
37 Henry Lethbridge, Hong Kong, Stability and Change: A Collection of Essays (Oxford University Press, 1978). 
38 Lethbridge suggested that organization also helped preserved practices deemed immoral in Western eyes (as 
well as delaying “Westernization”). This changed when influential Chinese adopted Western ideas of modernity 
and society, and hence adopting the British understanding of mui tsai as another form of slavery. Lethbridge, 
Hong Kong, Stability and Change, pp. 79, 93-94, and 96. 
39 Colonial Office. Mui Tsai in Hong Kong and Malaya: Report of a Commission (London: HMSO, 1937). This 
report has two parts, a majority and a minority report. Generally, the majority report took a more optimistic view 
of the mui tsai question, while the minority report (by a woman) argued for “generalised protection” – 
protection for all girls under the age of twelve – because of the difficulty in defining and detecting a mui tsai. 
See Chu Tee Seng “The Singapore Chinese Protectorate 1900-1941”, and more recently, Rachel Leow, Contexts 
of abolition: The Mui Tsai controversy in British Malaya, 1878-1938 (Cambridge: Centre of South Asian 
Studies, 2008). 
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He was educated, and thus was able to work in various positions in the colonial 
administration, earning enough to give his family a decent standard of living. However, a 
weakness for gambling led to considerable debts that made family life more difficult. Frois’ 
elder brother held the family together. However, in 1921, he died of tuberculosis at age 
twenty-nine. Their father, heartbroken at his son’s death, died six months later. His sisters 
already married and living elsewhere, Frois moved out to live with friends, leading a carefree 
bachelor lifestyle. By that time, Frois had been working for seven years, as his family was 
unable to continue supporting his education after he turned eighteen in 1914. Not that he 
minded as he was yearning to earn a wage himself. He worked as a dispatch clerk in a trading 
house until he was “asked to leave” due to a row with the chief clerk. Unable to find 
employment in Singapore, Frois moved north to Port Dickson (in Negri Sembilan in Malaya) 
to stay with one of his sisters, and managed to find work as a shipping clerk. In 1931, after 
nine years of service, the company asked him to leave, but this time due to the firm’s inability 
to stay afloat during the economic depression. Frois then returned to Singapore to live with 
his younger brother. He found work as a wharf clerk with another shipping company, and 
remained in that position until the Japanese invaded in 1942.40 
Augustin Polycarp Gomez arrived in Singapore in 1922. He was born on 26 January 
1895, in Trivandrum, the capital city of Travancore-Cochin (now part of Kerala). He was the 
third of three children by his father’s second wife. His sisters died young. One from a 
stomach ailment when she was nine, and the other from typhoid at thirteen. Gomez had an 
elder step-brother from his father’s first marriage. He was married with five children, but an 
initial well-paying job was soon undermined by gambling debts and other unseemly vices. At 
the same time, his father’s business went under, and more debts were incurred. Hence, at 
seventeen years of age, Gomez left school and worked to support his parents and his 
stepbrother’s family. Through family contacts, Gomez moved to Ceylon to work as a clerk in 
one of the bigger estate and produce agencies of that time (Bois Brothers Ltd.). He earned 
enough to pay off his father’s debts, to continue supporting his family, as well as to have 
something in reserve for himself – apparently sufficient to attract six to seven marriage 
proposals when he decided to settle down.  
By then, Gomez had worked in Ceylon for about ten years. In 1922, he married and 
soon after, left to work in an estate in Johore, Malaya. His brother-in-law, who had suggested 
                                                          
40 Malcolm N. Coelho, “Old man on public assistance: an intensive case study of two individuals”. 
(Unpublished academic exercise--Dept. of Social Studies, University of Malaya, 1958). Information was taken 
from personal interviews and the Social Welfare Department case files of the individuals he interviewed. 
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he come over, met him in Singapore. He worked in various rubber estates around Malaya as a 
“field conductor” (an overseer), and soon earned enough to bring his family over to stay. But 
an illness to his wife forced her to return home for treatment with their children. In 1932, due 
to falling rubber prices and a worldwide economic depression, Gomez lost his job and was 
repatriated back to India. Back home, he used his savings to purchase a plot of land and 
constructed a home for his family. The remainder of his earnings were spent on treating his 
wife’s illness. Gomez managed to return to Malaya in 1934 when economic conditions 
improved, where he remained until the Japanese invaded.41 
Wong (a pseudonym) arrived in Singapore in 1933.42 Originally from Guangdong, 
China, Wong had worked in Hong Kong for close to ten years before moving to Singapore. 
Wong’s eldest sister had encouraged him to move because of better employment 
opportunities in Malaya compared to Hong Kong. When Wong first arrived, he stayed in a 
kongsi, a lodging house organized according to vocation or point of origin. There, a 
roommate recommended an apprentice position in a motor engineering firm, paying four 
dollars a month and two free meals a day. Wong lost his job when the firm went bankrupt 
barely seven months after he had joined. In search of better fortune, he moved north to Kuala 
Lumpur in Malaya but was unable to find permanent employment. In desperation and to 
support his wife who had joined him from China, he began hawking a variety of items, such 
as “pins, needles, thread and paper flowers”, to make ends meet. Wong recalled the first three 
years in Malaya were the hardest economically for him and his family. Eventually he found a 
job working for a Chinese contractor, making about seventy cents a day. Wong started out 
doing manual labor before picking up carpentry skills making windows and doors. He then 
moved to Johore Bahru working as a carpenter for various contractors and building firms, in 
the process helping to build the Johore Bahru General Hospital. Wong eventually found 
himself back on Singapore Island just before the war, working in the British naval base in 
Sembawang. 
Central to the three men’s lives were their families. Family connections assisted 
Gomez and Wong in settling down and finding work after their arrival in British Malaya. The 
one instance where the state made an appearance was in the repatriation of Gomez back to 
India, which was provided for by laws regulating Indian labor immigration. In contrast, 
                                                          
41 Information from Coelho, “Old man on public assistance”. 
42 “Wong” was a pseudonym given by the researcher to protect his identity. Chia Cheong Fook, “The Place of 
the Hawker in the Community: A Research Paper”. (Unpublished academic exercise - Dept. of Social Studies, 
University of Malaya, 1954). 
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family was the principal safety net for Frois while he was unemployed during the Great 
Depression. Wong on the other hand had arrived in the middle of that depression, and relied 
primarily on his own wits (and the freedom to move) to ensure he found income to tide over 
periods of unemployment. 
Frois’s situation was similar to those who had been domiciled or were native to the 
land. The Malay community for instance used kinship ties as insurance against life 
contingencies. Studying the Singapore Malay community in the late 1940s, Judith Djamour 
found that a Malay got a “sense of security” from being “surrounded by members of his 
family”, also known as saudara.43 The Malay could count on his or her family and relatives 
for social support during times of need, such as sickness, pregnancy, marriage problems etc. 
She found that an individual was pitied if they lived alone, even the person was rich and 
healthy. The well-to-do Singapore Malay was not obligated to help the poor beyond basic 
necessities, such as food, shelter, or monetary assistance. It was however a custom, referred 
to as “adat Melayu”, and considered morally good to give assistance during “real crises” 
caused by ill health, unemployment, or widowhood.44  
In the absence of family or extended kin in a foreign land, community support was 
essential for immigrants. The Chinese migrant in particular could call on a plethora of clan, 
district, dialect associations, and related social organizations. They provided services for the 
transient worker, such as accommodation upon arrival, contact points for employment, 
monetary aid during times of need, travel fare, and perhaps most critically for the single 
Chinese laborer unable to return home, a proper burial service upon death.45 Religious 
institutions such as churches, mosques, and temples also performed similar functions and 
services for the Christian, Muslim, Taoist, Buddhist, or Sikh migrant. Resources were drawn 
from members of each community, usually through payment of membership subscriptions or 
religious tithes. 
Social needs were transient in Singapore’s colonial plural society. The migrant’s needs 
were decidedly straightforward. A place to stay upon arrival, some food, and, if he had not 
                                                          
43 Judith Djamour. Malay Kinship and Marriage in Singapore (The Athlone Press University of London, first 
published in 1959, reprinted with corrections 1965), p. 35. 
44 Djamour, Malay Kinship, p. 47-48. 
45 This is a summary of a well-researched area in Overseas Chinese histories. See also Kwek Swee Soo, “An 
Account of the Sources of Benevolent Assistance which are Asian in Origin and Organization” (Unpublished 
academic exercise, Dept. of Social Studies, University of Malaya, 1954), Maurice Freedman, “Immigrants and 
Associations: Chinese in Nineteenth-century Singapore”. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 3, 1960, 
pp. 25-48; Sharon A. Carstens, Chinese Associations in Singapore Society: An Examination of Function and 
Meaning (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975), and Yen Ching-hwang, A Social History of the 
Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800-1911 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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already been contracted to a job, information on employment prospects. Then they moved on 
to their jobs, and ostensibly came under the care of their employers. After a time, other needs 
presented themselves, such as social interaction, a place for worship, and more 
fundamentally, medical treatment when sick. As the story of the Pauper Hospital shows, some 
of the earliest welfare institutions for the Chinese were hospitals. This was followed by the 
Thong Chai Medical Institution (established 1867 by Chinese migrants to provide free 
medical services), the Sian Chay Ee Seah (established 1901 specifically for the poor 
Chinese), and the Kwong Wai Siu Free Hospital (established 1910 primarily by and for the 
Cantonese community).46  
Such initiatives were usually community-based, often driven by a religious mission or 
principles, or sheer pragmatism, as can be seen from the following examples. In 1820, Syed 
Omar Ali Aljunied, a Palembang-based trader originally from the Hadhramaut (present-day 
Yemen), established the earliest known wakaf in Singapore, the Masjid Omar Kampong 
Melaka.47 In 1854, members from the Sisters of the Infant Jesus arrived in Singapore (from 
Penang) to set up a convent school for girls and an orphanage (which doubled as a home for 
abandoned children) along Victoria Street.48 In 1904, leading members (predominantly of 
Arab and South Asian descent) of the Muslim community formed the Muslimin Trust Fund 
Association. The association’s primary purpose was to support Muslim orphans and indigent 
children, mainly by establishing and managing Darul Ihsan orphanages.49 In 1913, a female 
medical doctor, Dr. Charlotte Ferguson-Davie, driven by the sight of the sick poor, high 
                                                          
46 See for general overviews Zhuo Shun Fa and Zhuo Kai Ming, Shan ji de gu shi = The Story of Sian Chay 
Medical Institution (Singapore: Se7en Media, 2015), and Singapore Thong Chai Medical Institution, Tong ji te 
ji = Singapore Thong Chai Medical Institution (Special edition) (Singapore: Singapore Thong Chai Medical 
Institution, 2015). Information can also be found in their official websites. 
47 This is the oldest mosque in Singapore, located near the trading and commercial activities along the Singapore 
River. The mosque was originally a wakaf, an endowed donation usually in the form of cash and property for 
the benefit for the Muslim community. The wakaf is discussed typically in terms of economic and financial 
functions, but wakafs also formed the basis for social services such as education for children (madrasahs) and 
social assistance for the needy. The wakaf’s role in the history of Singapore’s social services remains to be 
examined. 
48 The original Convent of the Holy Infant Jesus (CHIJ) school and orphanage still exist in present day 
Singapore, albeit in altered forms. The original CHIJ school has been joined by ten more schools. Care for 
orphans and children expanded into a series of infant and youth institutions under the administration of the 
Infant Jesus Homes and Children’s Centres (a registered voluntary welfare organization). Information for latter 
service taken from official website: http://ijhcc.org/. Accessed July 2016. 
49 One of the original objectives read: “To provide for the maintenance and education of orphans of Muslim 
parents and other unprotected and indigent Muslim children and to receive the custody of such orphans or other 
unprotected and indigent Muslim children and to place them in Darul Ihsan Orphanages for boys and girls 
established and maintained by the Association”. Taken from “Short History of Darul Ihsan Orphanage” 
http://www.mtfa.org/index.php/darul-ihsan/a-short-history/. Accessed July 2016. See also Muslimin Trust Fund 
Association (Singapore), MTFA 80th Anniversary: 80 Years of Welfare Service, 1904-1984 (Singapore: The 
Association, 1984). 
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infant mortality, and overcrowded living conditions, opened a dispensary specifically for 
women and children in 1913. This evolved into the St. Andrew’s Medical Mission, which 
included more dispensaries and clinics in the poorer areas of Singapore town, a training 
program for midwives, a full-fledged hospital in 1923, and a specialized hospital for children 
in 1939.50 In 1928, the Ramakrishna Mission, a spiritual and welfare organization that 
originated in India, opened a branch in Singapore. It ran classes for children and adults, and 
later established and managed two schools (one for girls), a night school for adults, and a 
boys’ home – which also served as shelter during the Japanese Occupation.51  
Welfare initiatives for children and youths were particularly prevalent, especially from 
the Christian faith. On the eve of the Second World War, youth organizations like the Young 
Women’s Christian Association (1875), the Young Men’s Christian Association (1902), the 
Scouts movement (1910), the Girls’ Guides (1917), and the Boys’ Brigade (1930) were fairly 
well-established. These organizations performed a variety of community services, such as 
classes with the aim of improving literacy or for advanced education certificates, training 
programs to improve employability, organization of sporting and recreational events, and 
perhaps much more simply (but no less substantial), fellowship and basic care. Singapore 
society, usually its elite and leading members, were not altogether reluctant to take action on 
specific social needs. The establishment of the Children’s Aid Society (1902) and the Child 
Welfare Society (1924) are two examples of local-based responses, rather than overt 
extensions of religious fervor. The former was a continuation of work of the St. Nicholas 
Society, which had operated a home primarily for destitute European or Eurasian children.52 
The latter was, to some extent, a societal response to an increasing infant mortality rate as 
well as a colonial focus on infant and maternity welfare during the early twentieth century.53 
                                                          
50 A contemporaneous overview is in The Straits Times, 23 September 1932 “Medical Mission in Singapore”. 
See also St. Andrew Mission Hospital, “About Us”. http://www.samh.org.sg/about-us. Accessed July 2016. See 
also St. Andrew's Mission Hospital, From Flicker to Flame: 100 Years of St. Andrew's Mission Hospital 
(Singapore: St. Andrew's Mission Hospital, 2013), and L. Reid & W. Thay, A Light That Shines: The Story of St 
Andrew’s Mission Hospital (Singapore: St Andrew’s Mission Hospital, 2006). 
51 Information taken from “History Ramakrishna Mission Singapore”. 
http://ramakrishna.org.sg/rkmsg/index.php/singapore-mission/history-2/, and “Ramakrishna Mission Boys’ 
Home Singapore”, http://www.rkmbh.org/html/history.htm. Accessed July 2016. See also The Singapore Free 
Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 21 January 1936, “Half Singapore Children Get No Education”, 
The Straits Times, 18 July 1936, “Ramakrishna Mission. Educational Work in Singapore”, The Singapore Free 
Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 3 February 1937, “Opening of Saradamani Girls' School”, and 
The Straits Times, 5 December 1986, “Ramakrishna Mission is 100 years old” 
52 The Straits Times, 9 October 1902, “Children's Aid Society”, and Children's Aid Society, Children's Aid 
Society 1902-2002: A Hundred Years of Caring for Children (Singapore: Watchmen Design Consultants for 
Children's Aid Society "Melrose", 2002). 
53 Manderson, Sickness and the State, pp. 202-203. Manderson connects colonial attention on the child and their 
mothers to developments in the metropole, where via the poor health conditions of working-class men called up 
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The society established and maintained infant welfare centers, which provided milk, medical 
treatment, and general care for babies and expecting mothers.54 In 1939, the Secretary for 
Chinese Affairs for Malaya (representing the colonial administrations of the Straits 
Settlements and the Federated Malay States) reported that there were over 3,500 children 
being cared for in homes and related institutions throughout Singapore and Malaya. The vast 
majority of which came under the care of religious bodies and voluntary organizations, such 
as the homes and orphanages managed by the Roman Catholic mission the Church of 
England, the American Methodist Episcopal mission, the Children’s Aid Society, and the 
Salvation Army.55  
In sum, social welfare services developed purposefully in early colonial Singapore, 
especially from the late nineteenth century. As Singapore’s population grew, social needs 
presented themselves more urgently. However, the structures of a migrant society meant the 
development of social services occurred in a seemingly haphazard fashion. The 
“haphazardness” was mainly due to the organization of colonial society along parochial lines, 
where the individual’s outlook and loyalties were primarily to their own communities. 
Colonial administrators, following policy, were generally reluctant to act, and only did so 
when sufficiently pressured and/or when the circumstances fitted overall policy, such as focus 
on infant health and welfare.  
 
Precursors to Organized Welfare 
 
That situation was tested by the prolonged economic slumps of the 1920s and 
1930s.The Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States did not escape the economic 
slumps of the interwar years, the first during the early 1920s, and the second throughout the 
1930s. There is precious little done on the former’s impact in Singapore, and only marginally 
                                                          
to fight in the Boer War, the British metropolitan state “discovered’ the importance of child welfare and related 
issues. 
54 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 31 January 1924, “Child Welfare”, and 
The Straits Times, 25 April 1924, “Child Welfare Society”. Difference between the two organizations were 
noted in The Straits Times, 7 March 1937, “Child Welfare Society and Municipality”. 
55 He was speaking at an Imperial Social Hygiene Congress in London in 1939. He gave a useful overview of 
the homes and institutions managed by the colonial government, religious bodies (mainly Christian), and 
charitable societies in 1938. State institutions were primarily the Singapore Reformatory (a prison for juveniles 
opened in 1901 along present-day Clementi Road. See Straits Telegraph and Daily Advertiser, 11 May 1899, 
“Reformatory”), and the Po Leung Kuk. See for more details The Straits Times, 24 July 1939, “Singapore 
Reformatory to be run on Borstal Lines?” 
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more research done on the latter.56 Scholarly opinion is divided on the impact of the Great 
Depression on Singapore and Southeast Asia. Depending on the position taken, the prolonged 
economic depression either had minimal impact on the region’s economies and societies (and 
perhaps even benefitted certain sections of society), or caused severe distress in both rural 
and urban communities. Writing on the impact of the Great Depression on Singapore and 
Malaya, W. G. Huff observed how, relative to the Malays, the lack of access to entitlements 
and endowments, such as the ability to buy food or existing land to absorb urban 
unemployment and to grow food, increased pressures on the Chinese migrant community. 
Notwithstanding the distress caused, Huff concludes, “[t]he 1930s ended with Singapore and 
the rest of Malaya shaken but not fundamentally changed, nor pressing for change. Although 
the depression probably left a legacy of more political unrest than would otherwise have 
occurred, this was still comparatively minor”.57 
Agitation for political change might have been minimal, mitigated to some extent by 
the enforced emigration of Indian and Chinese labor. Still, the depression’s impact on 
approaches and perceptions of society’s well-being was substantial. Agitation for political 
change was replaced, in the Singapore case, by agitation for social change. The economic 
depression of the 1930s laid the ground for a more organized approach to social welfare, 
primarily through increasing public outcries that more had to be done for individuals and 
families in financial distress. The thrust and tone of editorials in The Straits Times and The 
Singapore Free Press, coupled with the substantial amount of press ink expended on topics 
such as alleviating unemployment, and providing financial relief, add layers to Huff’s 
concluding observation. In examining this period in Singapore’s history, we can see the 
beginnings of a break with earlier laissez-faire approaches to governance and society. 
                                                          
56 The latter event is discussed in W. G. Huff, “Entitlements, Destitution, and Emigration in the 1930s Singapore 
Great Depression”, The Economic History Review. 2001; 54(2): 290-323. See also Huff, The Economic Growth 
of Singapore, pp. 169-179. For a social perspective, see Yeo Eng Leng “Effects of Great Depression on 
Singapore” (Unpublished academic exercise - Dept. of History, University of Singapore, 1973), Tan Bee Bee, 
“The impact of the Great Depression on Chinese in Malaya and Singapore, 1929-34” (Unpublished academic 
exercise--Dept. of History, Faculty of Arts, Nanyang University, 1980), and Loh Kah Seng, “Beyond "Rubber 
Prices" History: Life in Singapore during the Great Depression Years” (Unpublished Thesis (M.A.)--Dept. of 
History, Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, 2004). 
57 Huff, “The 1930s Singapore Great Depression”, p. 321. Huff referenced J. Norman Parmer’s article “Attempts 
at labor organization by Chinese workers in certain industries in Singapore in 1930s”, in K. G. Tregonning (ed.), 
Papers on Malayan History: papers submitted to the First International Conference of South-East Asian 
Historians, Singapore, January 1961 (Singapore: Journal of South-East Asian History, 1962), pp. 239-255. Huff 
contrasted the event with the Second World War and the Japanese Occupation, crediting the latter as the “more 
severe shock and important turning point….” Huff also provides a brief but useful overview of the “revisionists” 
points of view in his article, pp. 291-292, and fn. 6 (p. 291). He does not fundamentally disagree with their 
views, merely to point out the situation in Singapore and Malaya did not “accord” with such views.  
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Societal Responses: Unemployment Funds 
 
From a brief survey of The Straits Times, The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile 
Advertiser, and other newspapers digitized by the National Library of Singapore, articles 
containing the phrase “unemployment fund” first appeared regularly in the years 1921 and 
1922.58 At the end of 1920, a Straits Times editorial raised the specter of unemployed 
Europeans in Malaya, brought about by unchecked speculation in the rubber trade as well as 
returning servicemen from the First World War.59 In January 1921, a Planters’ Unemployment 
Committee was formed in Kuala Lumpur to “collect funds and to grant relief” to Europeans 
formerly employed in the rubber estates and their dependents.60 An Unemployment Fund was 
established, with donations (or public subscriptions as they were also known), from members 
of the public, planters’ associations in the Malay States, and the governments of the Federated 
Malay States and the Straits Settlements. 
By March 1921, the committee managed to raise about $2,700 on its own, with the 
two colonial governments providing a further $10,000 each. Going by contemporaneous 
reports, the number of applications for aid was small, only about eighty within the first 
couple of months. Assistance was typically given in two ways, either fare for passage away 
from Malaya or temporary financial aid.61 Nonetheless, calls for donations were published 
regularly, along with public listings of donation amounts throughout 1921 and 1922. In 
August 1921, a “non-European” unemployment fund was established to aid Indian laborers 
who lost their jobs in rubber plantations or tin mines.62 The fund’s reach expanded to include 
                                                          
58 Via NewspaperSG, there were over 200 mentions of the term “Unemployment Fund” in 1921, and over 100 in 
1922. There were no records of the term before 1921. After 1922, the number of mentions fell to 26 and fewer. 
Majority of mentions were in The Straits Times and The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser. 
59 The Straits Times, 30 December 1920, “What Can Be Done?”. See also The Straits Times, 31 December 1920, 
“The Past Year”. 
60 The Straits Times, 10 February 1921, “The Rubber Industry”. “The objects of the committee are to collect 
funds and to grant relief to necessitous persons of European birth who have been employed upon rubber estates 
in Malaya and who have lost their employment in consequence of the present rubber crisis and general trade 
depression and to grant relief to the dependents of such persons”. The article noted that the committee had 
approached the “Government” (presumably of the Federated Malay States) for financial support to set up a 
central registry for employment opportunities. For an overview of planter attempts to deal with the 1920s and 
1930s depression, see Desmond John Muzaffar Tate, The RGA History of the Plantation Industry in the Malay 
Peninsula; commissioned by RGA (Malaysia) Berhad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 324-332. 
Tate identifies this fund as the European Unemployment Committee and Fund”, created in 1921 by the FMS 
Department of Labour (pp. 327-328). 
61 The Straits Times, 5 March 1921, “Unemployed”. 
62 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 11 August 1921, “Indian Unemployment 
in Malaya”, Page 5. One of its first fund-raising event was a boxing contest organized by the Eurasian 
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all “Asiatics”, presumably the English-educated Chinese and members of the Muslim 
community who held clerical positions in affected businesses.  
Further research is needed to better understand the social impact of the 1920s trade 
depression, for both European and Asian communities, in Singapore and Malaya.63 Related to 
this current study, I would like to draw attention to public pleas for the colonial governments 
to take a stronger interest in the plight of the unemployed. Representatives from the various 
Planters’ Associations had been lobbying the colonial administrators to do more to alleviate 
the unemployment situation, particularly in light of returning servicemen to an increasingly 
depressed economy. The Straits Times editorial published on 30 December 1920, called on 
the government to acknowledge the full extent of its responsibilities, and noted that the 
numbers of unemployed might be far more than what was publicly known: 
 
We are still hopeful that Government will not regard its obligations as fully 
discharged when it has made provision for the coolies who may be cast out of 
employment owing to the deplorable condition of the rubber trade. We owe a 
great deal to the Europeans also, more particularly to those who fought in the 
war….64 
 
Another editorial lamented the “deplorably inadequate” response to the unemployment fund, 
though also observed that donations during those depressed conditions would be unavoidably 
low. The author then suggested that “If real help is to be given to the European unemployed, 
it must be through the Government and the public bodies finding them work to do”.65  
Repeated attempts by the Planters’ Unemployment Committee were also finally 
successful in obtaining substantive official support. In March 1921, the Acting Controller of 
Labour was appointed as the government’s representative to oversee European 
unemployment, and subsequently chaired the committee.66 Before the month’s end, the 
                                                          
Association (first established in 1919), the Eurasian Literary Association, the Singapore Recreation Club, and 
the Clerical Union. See ad in The Straits Times, 23 August 1921, page 7.  
63 Parmer discusses the colonial government’s response to the economic slumps of the 1920s and 1930s (in the 
context of the rubber industry) in Colonial Labor Policy. See especially penultimate chapter on “Unemployment 
Policy”. Tate covers the human impact, albeit briefly, in The RGA History, pp. 327-330. John G. Butcher briefly 
covers the impact on European planters during the interwar years in The British in Malaya 1880-1941: The 
Social History of a European Community in Colonial South-East Asia (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), pp. 126-134. 
64 The Straits Times, 30 December 1920, “What Can Be Done?” 
65 The Straits Times, 5 March 1921, “Unemployed”. 
66 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 11 April 1921, “Economy and 
Unemployment”. See also Butcher, The British in Malaya, p. 127. Butcher also provided a graphic description 
of unemployed European planters drifting into Singapore in search of work, including blue-collar labor normally 
associated with Asians, such as shoe shining, much to the displeasure of other Europeans attempting to maintain 
a dividing line. (p. 128). 
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governments of the Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements made a grant of 
$10,000 each to the unemployment fund. Government assistance was also sought to create 
and maintain a registry of unemployed persons as well as employment opportunities, and to 
create jobs through public relief work.67 After 1922, the appearance of “unemployment fund” 
in the print media abated, as well as the regular calls for donations and public listings of 
donors and their donations. This in general reflected the upswing in economic fortunes. 
However, following the 1929 Wall Street Crash, the term reemerged with a vengeance, 
appearing consistently in print media throughout the 1930s.68 
In August 1930, Tan Cheng Lock requested government help to address the 
“exceptionally severe economic crisis” afflicting Malaya.69 Tan, a businessman who made his 
fortune in rubber, spoke as a nominated member of the Straits Settlements Legislative 
Council. Speaking of the fall in rubber and tin prices, and its consequences on an economy 
and society that had become a “money-ed civilization”, Tan suggested that the government 
“perform a worthy and noble act of self-sacrifice” by investing monies into the 
“economically sick and anaemic community of Malaya”.70 He continued: 
 
Government, I take it, does accept some responsibility for the welfare of our 
unemployed – a principle recognized by the whole of the civilized world – and 
therefore should contribute to the unemployment funds that have been created 
by public-spirited members of the Community to establish and maintain camps 
to house and feed the workless coolies. Other unemployment funds may be 
started for the purpose of giving subsistence allowances to unemployed clerks, 
planters and other victims of the slump, to all of which Government should 
make grants in aid.71 
 
                                                          
67 The 5 March 1921 article gives insight into the assistance given, and the profile of certain applicants: “The 
cases before the Committee numbered eighty of which fifty-seven were for temporary financial relief or 
passages to other countries. The funds available average out to about $110 per applicant, and something a great 
deal bigger than this is necessary, because among the unemployed who have come under our own notice there 
are married men with families. Further, we believe that all the men who had a little cash in hand have refrained 
from asking relief in the hope something would turn up before they were destitute”. The Straits Times, 5 March 
1921, “Unemployed”. 
68 Number of instances term was mentioned jumped from 48 in 1930 to 143 in 1931, 289 in 1932, and 179 in 
1933. It fell to 61 in 1934, increased again substantially to 128 in 1935, before falling to 61 in 1936 and 
continued declining thereafter. 
69 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 26 August 1930, “Severe Economic 
Crisis”. Verbatim transcription of Legislative Council proceedings the day before on 25 August 1930. Editors 
apparently felt so strongly about Tan’s words they were reprinted again in the 27 August edition. 
70 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 26 August 1930, “Severe Economic 
Crisis”. 
71 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 26 August 1930, “Severe Economic 
Crisis”. 
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A native of Malacca, Tan Cheng Lock had, since the 1920s, been at the forefront of 
calls for greater independence of British possessions (specifically the Straits Settlements), but 
within the British sphere of influence.72 His urging of the colonial government to assume 
greater responsibility for the well-being of the unemployed is noteworthy in the context of the 
then colonial situation – which had initially precluded such sentiments. Members of 
Singapore society did heed Tan’s call. In October 1930, the Clerical Union brought together 
members from the leading social organizations in Singapore to form a committee to 
investigate ways to help the unemployed.73 Initially, the committee wanted to ascertain 
unemployment numbers, but public response to queries were slow and to some extent, the 
public spirit (and will) was absent.74 Eventually, they organized an Asiatic Unemployment 
Fund.75 Donations came predominantly from individuals, sometimes from local business 
firms, and fund-raising events (such as movie screenings and proceeds from admissions into 
amusement and entertainment centers).76 Payment of financial relief was strictly 
administered. Only unemployed clerks could apply, and relief was provided on a case-by-case 
basis – though reapplication was allowed. Fifteen dollars was the maximum assistance rate 
allowed, far lesser than the fifty dollars allowed for “families with more than three children” 
during the last slump. Each application was thoroughly verified for authenticity and to ensure 
the need was genuine. Checks were made on information given, to the extent of performing 
house visits. Errant or false applications were placed on a black list.77 
The lack of information regarding the extent of unemployment, and the absence of 
motivation to find out more, hampered unemployment fund committee’s efforts. The other 
                                                          
72 For background, see K. G. Tregonning, “Tan Cheng Lock: A Malayan Nationalist”. Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies. Vol. 10. No. 1 (1970), pp. 25–76.  
73 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 4 November 1930, “Unemployed Clerks”. 
Information about the Clerical Union can be found in The Straits Times, 27 December 1931, “The Clerical 
Union”. Briefly, the Union invited delegates from the Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA), the Eurasian 
Association, Indian Association, Chinese Association, Moslem [sic] Association, Sinhalese Association, and the 
Ceylon Tamil Association. Huff referred to this fund in “The 1930s Singapore Great Depression”, pp. 301-302.  
74 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 5 September 1931, “Asiatic 
Unemployment Relief”. Moderate headway was made in forming a General Committee and an Executive 
Committee, but it was quickly realized that “almost everyone on the Committee could not spare the time to go 
from one end of the Island to the other to make the necessary investigations”. 
75 Planters associations, affiliated organizations, and individuals (under the banner of an Incorporated Society of 
Planters) also organized unemployment fund committees to aid European planters and their families, either to 
return home or in the provision of temporary assistance to tide over difficulties. See The Singapore Free Press 
and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 26 November 1930, “European Unemployment”. The Singapore Free 
Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 17 December 1930, “European Unemployment Fund”. The 
Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 1 April 1931, “The P.A.M. Annual Meeting”.  
76 Acknowledgements of received donations were regularly published in The Straits Times and The Singapore 
Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser. 
77 The Straits Times, 20 November 1931, “Asiatic Unemployment Fund”. 
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major obstacle was the slow trickle of donations. One year from its inception in October 
1930, the fund managed to top out just a little over $7,000. It had assisted “hundreds of 
cases”. The numbers assisted increased particularly between August and November 1931, 
when “over 300 cases came up for consideration”. It was a marked surge in applications for 
relief as only 107 cases were granted relief in the nine months prior (from October 1930 to 
July 1931)”.78 In November 1931, the fund had not received any donations for one month and 
was down to $162.79 The following month in December, the fund reportedly had only fifty 
dollars left.80 The committee voiced, very publicly, its concerns that the fund would have to 
shut down, and an appeal was sent to the government for aid. Moreover, it drew attention to 
the fact that not only had the governments of the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay 
States not donated as much as they did during the 1920s slump, they had also been 
contributing to the European Unemployment Fund since its inception in 1930.81  
Short of funds and in dire need of fresh donations, the committee for the Asiatic 
Unemployment Fund was eager to publicize the plight of the individuals who came to them 
for help. In December 1931, the fund had registered over five hundred unemployed 
individuals. The Chinese formed the bulk of applicants. Even so, the committee’s honorary 
secretary, Mr. H. C. Chan, observed that they could still call upon relatives and extended 
kinship networks and organizations for aid. In contrast, it was the “Eurasians who are in the 
                                                          
78 The Straits Times, 20 November 1931, “Asiatic Unemployment Fund”. Article noted that “only the most 
urgent and deserving cases … are dealt with”. Majority of applicants were Chinese, with Eurasians “far away 
second while Indians and Malays were together third. A few Jews have also been registered”. By that time, there 
were calls to rename the fund as the Non-European Unemployment Fund to include Eurasian clerks. This was 
resisted until the fund was taken over by the Singapore government in January 1932. See The Straits Times, 8 
June 1931, “Eurasian Unemployed”. [See also comic in The Straits Times, 27 December 1931, Page 10]. 
79 The Straits Times, 20 November 1931, “Asiatic Unemployment Fund”. 
80 The Straits Times, 9 December 1931, “Sufferings of Slump Victims” and 22 December 1931, “The Relief 
Problem”.  
81 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 5 September 1931, “Asiatic 
Unemployment Relief”. The committee also pointed out that the governments had made “very substantial 
contributions” to the European unemployment funds. Within a couple of months of its establishment, the 
European fund managed to raise more than $15,000, and remained in a healthy position throughout 1931. The 
governments of the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States had made donations of $5,000 each in 
1930, a further $5,000 each in early 1931, and another $5,000 by the Straits Settlements government in 
September 1931. See The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 2 October 1931, 
“European Unemployment Fund”; The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 4 
November 1931, “European Unemployment Fund”. To give an indication of the extent of help needed. In 
August 1931, the fund had just over $68,000. By October, it was down to about $21,000, kept afloat by 
donations by the Straits Settlements government ($15,000) and the Ex-Services Association of Malaya (over 
$17,000). See updates in The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 25 August 1931, 2 
October 1931 and 4 November 1931, In total, it collected $250,000 from the public, and government contributed 
close to $140,000: The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 8 December 1934, 
“Distressed Europeans”. 
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worst plight…. They have saved nothing practically for themselves, while in the case of the 
Chinese, many of them can fall back upon their own relatives”.82 
The chair of the unemployment committee, Mr. Lim Kee Cheok, extended an 
invitation to the press to join an investigative expedition of recipients and potential recipients 
of aid, and their living conditions.83 The visit brought the group from one end of the 
municipal limits in Henderson Road and Alexandra Road, to the other in the lorongs off 
Geylang Road up to the Joo Chiat / Katong area. They witnessed firsthand the living 
conditions of Chinese, Tamil, and Eurasian families fallen on hard times. The following is an 
excerpt: 
 
Not far from Zion Road was a little kampong of old-fashioned attap and wood 
huts, black with age, the interiors dark as night. Chinese sat outside them and 
watched us pass. After traversing about 100 yards over the muddy road we 
reached our objective. It was low forbidding place, with dirt and filth to the 
side and under the house. A slimy pool from which a horrible stench arose, 
was opposite the house. Rubbish was dumped all over the place. On our 
arrival about seven children, the eldest was only 12, flocked out to the door 
from the gloomy interior, and they were followed by their mother. An addition 
to the already large family was expected. This little hut had two compartments 
– they could hardly be called rooms – was poorly ventilated and hardly a 
glimmer of the morning sun found its way into the interior. The rent, we were 
told, was $8 – a difference of $12 to the other house in Kampong Teo Chew – 
but one which meant that, although the family went into a dirtier house, 
money could be spent on getting food and other necessities of life. One of the 
seven children was going to school, which was a few miles away, and the only 
way in which he could get there was to walk. No money was available for 
transport. As a contrast to these hovels, a block of brick houses built by the 
Government for their own subordinates stood on the other of the road. What a 
come-down for an English-speaking clerk who probably had been earning $60 
to $70 a month! Now he has to borrow money to maintain his family because 
he cannot obtain further assistance from the Unemployment Committee.84 
 
Appeals for more substantial assistance were eventually heeded. In January 1932, the 
Straits Settlements government took over administration of the Asiatic Unemployment Fund. 
Still, “change” was only in form as the previous committee was retained with slight 
modifications. Other than appointing a government official as the chairman of the committee. 
The approach remained unchanged, which was to solicit donations from individuals and 
                                                          
82 The Straits Times, 20 November 1931, “Asiatic Unemployment Fund”. 
83 Report was published with photos in The Straits Times, 9 December 1931, “Sufferings of Slump Victims”. 
84 The Straits Times, 9 December 1931, “Sufferings of Slump Victims”, 
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organizations in Singapore society.85 This continued until the demise of the fund in December 
1934, ending with a paltry $348.88.86 Having received donations from government and 
society during its first couple of years, the European fund fared slightly better. Depending on 
circumstances and availability of funds, the European committee was able to provide 
anywhere between $20 (usually for an individual) to $100 (for a family), or repatriation fares 
back home. Domiciled Europeans had also the option of joining a Service Company created 
by the Malay States Volunteer Regiment. The Service Company was akin to a public works 
initiative, whereby members assisted in training volunteers. In return, they received 
accommodation for themselves and their families, food, and a small allowance.87  
But by 1933, the fund floundered and more regular public appeals were made.88 In 
March 1933, the chairman of the fund committee, Mr. E. D. Butler, warned that “unless 
further material assistance was forthcoming form the European public, monthly grants would 
have to be reduced by 40%....”89 In May, the fund had only enough to continue giving out 
relief for another three months. In November, notice was given that both government and the 
committee were investigating the possibility of reorganizing the administration of the fund. 
They discovered lapses in administrating the fund that had resulted in “unscrupulous” 
individuals drawing down the fund. The fund was moreover continuously supporting 
“unemployables”, mainly individuals who had little to no prospect of gainful employment 
either because of old age or illness, or had given up. As a result, the coffers were almost 
depleted, and the “local unemployed” (in Singapore) already receiving assistance were 
warned they might not collect relief the following month.90 
                                                          
85 Two new sub-committees were organized. A club sub-committee to solicit donations from local clubs and 
societies, and a “begging” sub-committee to solicit donations from known well-to-do firms and individuals who 
had not donated yet. See The Straits Times, 9 January 1932, “Aid to Workless in Singapore”. By November 
1932, less than a year in operation, the government-chaired committee resorted to public appeals via the press 
for donations. The Straits Times, 5 November 1932, “Asiatic Unemployed in Singapore”. 
86 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 10 January 1935, “Non-European 
Unemployment Fund”. There is little to no information (at time of research and writing) as to the reasons for the 
end of the fund. Updates on donations became more sporadic, and towards the end of 1934, there was the 
general impression that the economy was improving – hence negating the need for such a fund. The Straits 
Times, 21 November 1934, “"Put Their Shoulders" To The Wheel”. 
87 The Straits Times, 3 December 1931, “A European Appeal”. The MSVR camp was located in Port Dickson, 
Negri Sembilan. The same article voiced concerns that the camp might be closed down by the government. It 
also pointed out that it was unfair to force domiciled Europeans to return home. 
88 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 25 March 1933, “Unemployment Crisis”. 
89 The Straits Times, 5 May 1933, “All is not well”. 
90 The Straits Times, 5 November 1933, “European Relief Fund Disclosures”. The fund was reconstituted in 
February 1934 as three Distressed European Funds, one for Singapore and Johore, one for the Federated and 
Un-Federated Malay States, and the last for Penang and Province Wellesley. See for details The Singapore Free 
Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 16 January 1934, “Unemployment Relief”. 
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The needs of the unemployed received a small boost after Rotary International 
established a club in Singapore from June 1930. From a small club in Chicago in 1905, 
Rotary expanded into an international organization with clubs in every continent by 1921. On 
6 June 1930, a dinner at Raffles Hotel marked the inaugural meeting of the Singapore club.91 
The Rotary Club of Singapore would go on to be the understated partner of various social 
services on the island.92 In the immediate context of the Great Depression, Rotary acted as a 
non-partisan conduit for the collection of donations for the unemployed. An unemployment 
fund was mooted as early as 1931, but came about only in 1933. Like the Asiatic and 
European Unemployment Funds, the Rotary unemployment fund solicited donations from the 
general public. The immediate impact of the Rotary unemployment fund during the early 
stages (1932 to 1934) was minimal, as it was just one more fund amongst several at that time. 
Nevertheless, there were tangible differences. For one, the Rotary Club of Singapore 
adopted a non-partisan approach to alleviating social problems regardless of ethnicity or 
creed. Indeed, the origins of Rotary in British Malaya had roots in efforts to create a social 
space for both Asians and Europeans.93 Rotary acted as a broad-based focal point for 
organized action. As Rotarians (as members called themselves) met weekly, donations could 
be collected more regularly. Monies collected were given to all, particularly those who were 
not able to get relief from existing funds.94 In doing so, the Rotary Club marked the 
beginnings of a more organized approach to social welfare. Rotarians were encouraged to 
place service and community above self, and to perform service for the general, rather than 
sectarian, purpose of cultivating fellowship within the community they worked and lived in.95  
                                                          
91 The dinner was presided over by James W. Davidson, Hon. General Commissioner and past vice-president of 
Rotary International. The original Singapore club members were supposedly a cross-section of Singapore 
society: Roland Braddell (President), S. Q. Wong (Vice-President), A. W. W. Ker (Hon. Secretary), Walter A. 
Tyler (Asst. Hon. Secretary), J. A. Clarke (Treasurer), H. C. Atkin Berry, S. J. Chen, Mohamed Eunos, R. J. 
Farrer, A. L. Hoops, and C. E. Wurtzburg (Directors). Information drawn from The Straits Times, 7 June 1930, 
“Rotary Club for Singapore”, The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 11 June 1930, 
“Rotary Comes to Singapore”, and The Straits Times, 6 June 1980, “History of the Rotary Club in Singapore”. 
Earlier in 1929, Rotary International formally inaugurated the first club in Malaya. By 1932, there were seven 
clubs throughout Malaya including Singapore. See Butcher, The British in Malaya 1880-1941, p. 190. 
92 Rotary’s support came primarily in the form of organizing of fund-raisers, and publicity efforts to solicit 
support from its members, who for the most part were members of other prominent organizations, such as 
government, business, and society. See list of initiatives at its website, “Rotary Club – About Rotary”. 
http://www.rotary.org.sg/75years.html. Accessed 14 December 2015. For a historical overview until 1980, see 
Leo Cresson et. al., Rotary Club of Singapore, 1930-1980 (Singapore: The Club, 1980). 
93 Butcher, The British in Malaya, pp. 188-190.  
94 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 14 April 1932, “Unemployment in 
Singapore”. 
95 In addition to the unemployment fund, the Rotary Club of Singapore in its early years sponsored scholarships 
for education, organized publicity efforts to showcase Singapore as a trade and business center (see Rotary Club 
of Singapore, Singapore as an Industrial Centre (Singapore: Printed at the Malaya Pub. House, 1933), 
organized yearly Christmas parties for poor children, and participated in various charitable activities. For an 
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The Rotarians’ approach contrasted with the segregation of existing funds, one each 
for Europeans and for Asians – the latter moreover strictly for members of the clerical 
vocation. Existing perceptions of responsibility, and the foregoing discussion on 
unemployment relief, must be understood in its proper context. Outside the communities the 
initial unemployment funds sought to assist, the rest of Singapore’s population was exposed 
to the whims of the market economy and colonial society. Elsewhere, James Warren depicts 
in some detail the plight, and in some instances fatal circumstances, of impoverished 
rickshaw coolies during the 1930s economic depression.96 Warren attributed the bulk of 
responsibility to the “Colonial Government of Singapore” as it “consistently chose 
alternatives that minimized costs...”, particularly for basic social needs, such as housing, 
water supply, waste disposal and sewerage.97 In discussing various aspects of the slump, 
others have also touched on the myriad of experiences resulting from losing one’s job, and 
being unable to find another.98  
 
The State’s Response (and the Sorry Tale of the Silver Jubilee Fund) 
 
An altruistic, benevolent gesture or commitment by the prewar colonial government 
was never forthcoming. Nevertheless, despite their best efforts, the governments of the Straits 
Settlements and the Federated Malay States became unavoidably involved in financial relief 
as the slump dragged on. It did try to keep at bay permanent or recurrent financial 
commitments. The Straits Settlements government took over only the administration of the 
Asiatic Unemployment Fund in 1932, and did not provide further grants. The colonial 
government had provided grants to the European fund, rather generously as well, in contrast 
to the non-European fund. It paid the bill for repatriation, for unemployed Europeans in the 
Port Dickson camp, and was consulted in the reorganization of the fund’s management at the 
end of 1933. But other than that, the government steered clear of any permanent financial 
commitment to the upkeep of Europeans and Asians in financial distress.  
                                                          
overview the organization’s activities between 1930 and 1934, see The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile 
Advertiser (1884-1942), 22 February 1934, “The Past, Present and Future of Rotary”. 
96 See James Francis Warren, Rickshaw Coolie: A People’s History of Singapore, 1880-1940 (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press, c2003; first published in 1986). 
97 Warren, Rickshaw Coolie, p. 325. 
98 See Huff, “The 1930s Singapore Great Depression”, and Huff, The Economic Growth of Singapore. For an 
attempt at a social history, see Loh Kah Seng, “Beyond Rubber Prices: Negotiating the Great Depression in 
Singapore”. South East Asia Research. Vol. 14, No. 1 (2006), pp. 5-31. For a regional study of the impact of the 
Great Depression, see Peter Boomgaard and Ian Brown (eds.), Weathering The Storm: The Economies of 
Southeast Asia in the 1930s Depression (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000). 
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The one decisive measure colonial authorities did take was facilitating emigration and 
restricting immigration. It was an official policy to repatriate all unemployed South Asians. 
Between 1930 and 1933, close to 200,000 South Asians returned home on government’s 
expense, which included free accommodation, food, clothing, and transport.99 As described 
previously, Augustin Gomez was one of them. He was repatriated in 1932. By then, he had 
worked in Malaya for about ten years, at one stage earning enough to bring his wife and 
young son over, and had two more children. In 1932 however, the drastic fall in rubber prices 
led to retrenchment on a broad scale. After ten years of service, Gomez received $1,500 as a 
gratuity – estimated to be about six to ten months’ salary. (If he had retained his job, his 
salary would have been halved to just above subsistence level). Gomez had by then saved 
enough to build a house and acquire more land in India. However, his wife’s illness severely 
depleted the savings. He and his family managed to survive for a year. He was unable to find 
work, and hence resorted to pawning possessions and lived off income from his land. He 
managed to return to Malaya in 1934.100 
In contrast, the colonial government did little for the distressed sections of the 
Chinese population, in Singapore or in Malaya. Hundreds of jobless laborers left the mines 
and estates in Malaya and converged in Singapore in search of better prospects. Sng Choon 
Yee, a local employee at the Chinese Protectorate, recalled that once the clan associations 
were unable to stem the tide, the grounds at the Chinese Protectorate soon filled up with 
unemployed Chinese looking for help. Sng also recalled particularly lodging houses for 
sailors going over their capacities in the midst of the economic slump, resulting in fights and 
general unrest.101 Aid was ad hoc, and limited mostly to soliciting donations from Chinese 
businesses and associations to finance the return trips of those who sought to return to China. 
The solution was to restrict immigration. On 1 August 1930, monthly quotas were 
imposed on entry on adult Chinese male migrants, from an initial number of just over 6,000 
per month to a mere 1,000 by the final months of 1932.102 The colonial government moreover 
                                                          
99 Huff, “The 1930s Singapore Great Depression”, p. 310. 
100 Coelho, “Old man on public assistance”.  
101 NAS OHC, Sng Choon Yee. Pioneers of Singapore. Accession Number 000064. Interviewed in 1981. Reel 
31 (of 48). 
102 Information taken from Saw Swee Hock, The Population of Singapore (Singapore: ISEAS Pub; 2012; third 
edition), p. 57. Author cited Parmer’s Colonial Labor Policy. The quotas were part of an Immigration 
Restriction Ordinance enacted in 1928, for the purpose of (as Saw perceived it) controlling immigration 
“whenever the influx of immigrants threatened to bring about unemployment or economic distress”. (p. 57). 
Turnbull, on the other hand, explained the ordinance as having the “object of improving labour standards and 
balancing the sex ratio immigrant communities by restricting the inflow of unskilled male labourers”. She also 
situated attempts at controlling Chinese immigration in the context of managing emerging Chinese nationalism. 
See Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, pp. 141-146. Contemporaneous discussion of the bill focused 
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adhered to a strict policy of free repatriation only for the “decrepit and destitute” Chinese, 
and not for the able-bodied unemployed Chinese. This policy was disregarded twice, between 
August and November 1931, and again from May to July 1932, as concerns mounted over the 
“very large numbers of unemployed and fear of loss of control”.103 In 1933, the Straits 
Settlements Alien Ordinance was passed, incorporating earlier legislation to streamline 
existing regulations (including the creation of a new Immigration Department).104 The 
manipulation of migration levers was the best illustration of the colonial society created in 
Singapore and in Malaya. The colonial government had provided the legal apparatus for the 
importation of foreign laborers to work in the burgeoning tin, rubber, and commercial 
enterprises. Yet, as it had done since the beginning of its presence, the colonial government as 
an institution was not actively involved in the colonial society that was being created under 
its auspices, but sought mainly to stave off disorder. 
The sorry tale of the Silver Jubilee Fund is another instance in an uninterrupted line of 
prewar official ambivalence. In 1934, the mood in Singapore had changed. People were more 
optimistic as the economy seemed to be on the road to recovery, encouraged to some extent 
by projections of a budget surplus in 1935.105 The European and Asiatic Unemployment 
Funds had fewer recipients, and more importantly, fewer applications – an indication of an 
economic upswing. Both funds ceased operations on the last day of 1934. The feeling that 
things had turned a corner was further buoyed by preparations to commemorate King George 
V’s silver jubilee year in 1935. Part of the celebrations included the establishment of 
endowment funds to aid the needy and destitute. In early 1935, the drive for donations had 
already began in Penang and Selangor.106 On 18 April, the Straits Settlements governor 
                                                          
more on the ordinance’s scope of powers and its apparent focus on undesirable criminals. See The Straits Times, 
27 March 1928, “Immigration Bill”. 
103 Huff, “The 1930s Singapore Great Depression”, p. 315. Huff takes this information from Parmer, p. 241 (see 
fn. 95). As the latter focused exclusively on Malaya (the records of the Federated Malay States), it is not 
immediately clear if Huff is referring to Singapore and Malaya as a whole, or just Singapore. There was 
moreover a probable complicating factor. Sng recalled in his oral history that by the 1930s, some of the early 
Chinese migrants had started families. Their children, born in the Straits Settlements, were legally British 
subjects. Hence, they could not be repatriated without legal consequences. Sng’s oral history is however sketchy 
on the details. NAS OHC, Sng Choon Yee, reel 31. 
104 Saw, The Population of Singapore, p. 57. The immigration functions previously overseen by the Chinese 
Protectorate were transferred to the new government department. As British and Indian nationalities were not 
covered under the term “Alien”, the new ordinance had the implicit objective (explicitly expressed in private) of 
restricting Chinese immigration, much to the chagrin of the Chinese community in Singapore. See Huff, The 
Economic Growth of Singapore, p. 154, and Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, p. 146 – where she 
quoted Tan Cheng Lock’s vehement objections during the reading of the bill. 
105 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 3 November 1934, “Budget in Brief”. See 
also The Straits Times, 19 November 1934, “Three Budgets”. 
106 Both funds had collected about $50,000 each by the time the Singapore fund was launched in April 1935. See 
The Straits Times, 18 April 1935, “Governor Sponsors Silver Jubilee Fund”, The Singapore Free Press and 
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announced the King George V Silver Jubilee Fund for the settlement of Singapore (also 
known as the Singapore Silver Jubilee Fund). The Silver Jubilee Fund was an endowment 
fund, with its “annual proceeds being devoted to the relief of distressed persons of all races, 
all creeds, all classes and all ages”.107 Management of the fund and relief distribution was 
entrusted to a board of trustees empowered by the Legislative Council. On 25 April, 
Governor Shenton Thomas launched the Silver Jubilee Fund in a ceremony held at the 
Victoria Memorial Hall.108 
Solicitation for public donations was to go beyond the scheduled week-long jubilee 
celebrations, so as to build up a sufficient amount to provide financial aid. Governor Thomas 
gave assurances that Silver Jubilee Fund proceeds would “never be used to lighten public 
expenditure” on services deemed obligatory by the government. Yet, in keeping with existing 
policy, he also warned that while the fund remained open, “no other appeals to the public of 
Singapore for charitable purposes will receive official support”.109 In other words, the Silver 
Jubilee Fund was the proverbial line in the sand. Government made no commitment to donate 
then or in the future. No grants were promised. The burden would fall primarily on the 
goodwill and pockets of Singapore society. 
Singapore society did respond, initially at least. In less than a month, the fund reached 
nearly $50,000.110 By the end of May, it exceeded $60,000. After that, the rate of donations 
slowed, to a point where original projections of three quarters of a million dollars lowered to 
half a million.111 Those expectations had until then been kept private, shared with the press 
perhaps to jolt people into action. No target figure was ever publicly mentioned. But taking 
into account Singapore’s relatively wealthier position vis-à-vis Penang or Selangor, it was felt 
that anything less than $500,000 would be disappointing.112 As early as May, barely a month 
after the SJF began collecting donations, the Singapore Free Press ran an editorial lamenting 
the absence of action following the initial outburst of support and goodwill for fund. It also 
                                                          
Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 18 April 1935, “Prospectus Issued by The Governor”, and The Straits 
Times, 26 April 1935, “Governor Appeals to Singapore Citizens”. The Silver Jubilee Fund, as an institution, has 
not been examined in detail. Edwin Lee makes passing mention of the fund in “Colonial Legacy”. 
107 My emphasis. The Straits Times, 18 April 1935, “Governor Sponsors Silver Jubilee Fund”. Similar Funds 
were also established in Penang and Province Wellesley, Kuala Lumpur, and Selangor. 
108 A detailed description (almost verbatim) can be found in The Straits Times, 26 April 1935, “Fund's Objects”. 
109 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 26 April 1935, “Appeal by Governor”. 
110 The Straits Times, 20 May 1935, “Jubilee Fund”. 
111 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 21 May 1935, “Give Quickly---Give 
Twice”. 
112 See The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 11 May 1935, “Jubilee Week and The Jubilee 
Fund”. The article noted that the Penang fund had over $100,000 by that time. 
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noted that Lim Boon Keng had managed to raise $300,000 for Amoy University, and that the 
Penang fund had exceeded $100,000 (which was its minimum target).  
In comparison, the Silver Jubilee Fund crawled to about $150,000 in November, 
seven months after its launch. A Straits Times editorial did not hold back in a scathing review. 
The “Jubilee Fund has been a failure…. The appeal to the people of Singapore has flopped 
very badly”.113 Another was specific in attributing blame: “That the Fund is not yet big 
enough to earn an appreciable sum in interest is not the fault of the organisers or of the 
Government. It is the fault of the populace”.114 The same editorial also noted: “The number of 
individual donations of $500 or $1,000 is surprisingly low – far, far lower than the number of 
people in the city who could give a $1,000 with less sacrifice than the clerk makes in giving 
his ten cents”.115 The disappointment was compounded by unwelcomed public re-emergence 
of poverty, moreover in the midst of jubilee year revelries. While the repercussions of the 
Great Depression lingered, in many ways the situation had changed since the early 1930s. By 
1935, excess labor had been repatriated and expenses reduced to allow for a budget surplus. 
Hence, there was considerable public outrage when stories circulated of persistent poverty in 
both European and Asian communities, death and near-deaths by starvation, and attempted 
suicides to avoid destitution.116 
 
Families of seven, ten and more lived in low, forbidding places, in poorly 
ventilated compartments. There was dirt and filth all around. Hungry children 
and despairing parents, and pitiful stories of suffering left an indelible 
impression. These conditions unfortunately, still exist. Some of the families in 
the daily hope of getting jobs, have moved into rank, pitch-dark cubicles in 
town houses – set in the very midst of vice and crime. It is the old school of 
Asiatics – the semi-qualified and partially educated clerk of the old type, men 
with slight, if any, knowledge of modern commercial office requirements – 
who find the door of employment irrevocably closed against them.117 
 
                                                          
113 The Straits Times, 21 October 1935 
114 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 8 November 1935, “Is It Enough?” $250,000 was the 
minimum sum needed to generate the required amount of interest to provide financial relief. 
115 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 8 November 1935 
116 See for an overview: The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 26 October 1934, 
"Must Perish from Starvation", The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 26 October 
1934, “Europeans on Verge of Starvation”, The Straits Times, 12 February 1935, “The Unemployed”, The 
Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 1 August 1935, “Mother's Effort To Drown 
Herself, And Daughter”, The Straits Times, 25 August 1935, “Malaya's Renewed Prosperity Mocks The 
Unemployed”, The Straits Times, 29 August 1935, “Unemployment in Singapore”, The Singapore Free Press 
and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 30 August 1935, Singapore Families on the Verge of Starvation”, The 
Straits Times, 2 September 1935, “Starvation!”, The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-
1942), 21 September 1935, “Chinese Rescued By European”, and The Straits Times, 25 September 1935, 
“Protecting Employees”. 
117 The Straits Times, 25 August 1935, “Malaya's Renewed Prosperity Mocks the Unemployed”. 
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John Laycock, lawyer, Municipal Commissioner, and Rotarian, penned a letter describing the 
desperate plight of individuals and families near starvation and destitution:  
 
Sir, on Aug. 19 I received a petition signed by 51 persons. All the signatories 
were in English and by the looks of it they were practically all Straits born 
people. They say they are all family men, some with as many as eight to 10 
dependents to care for. They state that they represent the most pitiful of cases 
of local unemployed. I am prepared to believe that, generally speaking, this is 
a true statement. They say they are utterly destitute. They have often to go 
starving and they are in constant fear of being turned out on to the street for 
arrears of rents. They write to me to ask if I can find any means of helping 
them to get some temporary relief: hoping that at some future time when the 
Silver Jubilee Fund starts to function it will come to their assistance.118 
 
The Rotary Club unemployment fund that began sometime in 1933 had continued into 
1935 as an interim relief fund. By August, at the time of Laycock’s public exposé, the fund 
had only enough to distribute about $100 a month. Laycock called for donations to help 
support the fund for another twelve months, stating: “This town has a moral duty to see that 
its people are not allowed to die of starvation and want. It has a moral duty to itself to see that 
some relief is given in cases of this nature”.119 Laycock’s appeal a round of public debate and 
reflection on issues concerning the role and responsibilities of government, perceived moral 
duties of society, and a proposal for a more permanent structure to deal with societal 
distress.120 All of this took on particular significance in the context of slowing contribution 
rates to the Silver Jubilee Fund by late 1935. In the face of mounting public pressure, the 
colonial authorities finally caved. The Straits Settlements government guaranteed a grant of 
                                                          
118 Laycock’s letter published in The Straits Times, 29 August 1935, “Unemployment in Singapore”, and The 
Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 30 August 1935, Singapore Families on the 
Verge of Starvation”.  
119 Over 250 cases had applied for relief in 1935. Taking the first 200 cases, which represented about 770 
individuals, Laycock estimated that a sum of about $3,465 per month was required (taking into consideration 
fifteen cents per head for food and about an average of $4.74 for monthly rent). Laycock commented: “This 
seems to me to come pretty near to starvation level.... I spend more on my dogs. There are, of course, other 
sources of help. The Catholic Church helps in certain cases; the Protestant Church of England as funds permit; 
other denominations help members as able; and the Child Welfare and the Children’s Aid Society do their best. 
Some cases have been disposed of by the Destitute Strangers’ Aid Fund”. 
120 A sampling of newspaper articles: The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 10 
September 1935, “Assisting Singapore's Workless is a Community Job”, The Straits Times, 16 October 1935, 
“Why Leave It to The Public?”, and The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 8 
November 1935, “Is It Enough?”. In his original letter, Laycock also referenced the Chinese community’s 
ability to give more: “I cannot think that the well springs of charity will prove to have dried up completely. The 
same charitable people who put up $330,000 in March for the maintenance of the University of Amoy cannot 
refuse a poor little dole for workers now starving in Singapore. I think the position only need be put before them 
to recognise the obligation”. There is no evidence that the Chinese community responded to Laycock’s appeal. 
The University of Amoy was in financial difficulty after the business of its main benefactor, Tan Kah Kee, went 
into bankruptcy.   
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$750,000. However, once again sticking to its mantra of collective responsibility, the grant 
was conditional upon the Singapore Municipal Commissioners contributing $500,000.121 The 
monies were eventually approved and credited into the Silver Jubilee Fund by January 1936. 
The fund began disbursing financial aid from April 1936.122 
After a year, the Silver Jubilee Fund was hailed as the first instance of “organised, 
permanent relief of unemployment by the State – or, in our local circumstances, by the 
[Straits Settlements] Government and the Municipality”.123 The same editorial lamented the 
inadequacy of the final capital sum (about “twelve hundred thousand dollars”, or 
$1,200,000), and the reluctance of Singapore society to do and give more. The Straits 
Settlements government did contribute an additional $2,000,000 to the fund in 1937.124 
However, the Silver Jubilee Fund’s sluggish growth was galling for some, even more so when 
compared to the annual “gifts” of $500,000 as contributions from the Straits Settlements for 
“imperial defence”.125 There was a real need for a fully functioning Silver Jubilee Fund. In 
anticipation of the fund, The Straits Times ran an article in 1936 featuring “The people the 
Jubilee Fund will assist”: 
 
Here is a Cantonese family. Father’s present means of support is begging and 
borrowing from friends. Another father’s method of supporting his family is 
taking food on credit from shops! 
 
                                                          
121 First announced in The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 8 November 1935, “Is 
It Enough?” and The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 8 November 1935, 
“Decisive Step to Help Singapore's Workless”. See also The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser 
(1884-1942), 30 November 1935, “Commissioners Contribute $500,000 To Silver Jubilee Fund”, and The 
Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 10 December 1935, “Legislative Council 
Approves $750,000 For Jubilee Fund”. 
122 The Straits Times, 19 February 1936, “$3,500 Every Month”. By then, the fund was capable of some $3,500 
per month. It was passed into law (given “statutory status”) in February 1936. See The Singapore Free Press 
and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 18 February 1936, “Statutory Scheme for Public Assistance”. 
123 The Straits Times, 18 January 1937, “The Jubilee Dole”. The fund was administered by a “full-time officer of 
the Salvation Army and two committees, one which controls the general policy of the Jubilee Fund and another 
which examines individual cases”. 
124 Ostensibly as part of King George VI’s coronation celebrations, but also because the original capital sum (of 
$1,400,000) was deemed inadequate for the approximately 2,000 individuals assisted every month. The Straits 
Times, 13 May 1937, “$2,000,000 More For Singapore Unemployed Relief”, and The Singapore Free Press and 
Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 14 May 1937, “$2,000,000 for Silver Jubilee Fund”. 
125 It began with the colony of the Straits Settlements covering defense costs in Singapore. (See The Straits 
Times, 5 October 1933, “The Colony's Finances”). From 1934 to 1937, $500,000 was given annually as a “free-
will gift”. (See The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 8 February 1934, “A Fine 
Gesture but Too Generous”, The Straits Times, 28 February 1935, “Colony's "Generous" Defence Gift”, The 
Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 12 February 1936, “Another $500,000 Gift from 
Colony”, and The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 27 April 1937, “Fourth Gift of 
$500,000 in 4 Years”). As the war clouds loomed in the late 1930s, the monetary “gifts” increased as well. See 
The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 29 October 1938, “Colony's $10 Million Gift 
for Defence”. (The last amount was spread over five years). 
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In an attap house on the Siglap sea shore lives a happy Eurasian father - happy 
in nothing else but that he has nine children. He laughs and smiles every time 
he talks of them – in spite of the fact he is three months’ rent in arrears and is 
practically starving. 
 
Then in another part of Singapore is a wife whose husband deserted her. An 
order was made for him to maintain her with a monthly allowance of $15. He 
disappeared, however. The Fund helped the woman, and now the Chinese 
Protectorate is co-operating. [Possibly to track down the husband]. 
 
A few days ago a young man came to the Salvation Army headquarters for 
help. Questioning revealed him as a runaway son from parents in Malacca. 
The officers got into touch with the parents. The son was given his train fare 
and a family is now re-united. 
 
A twelve year old Chinese boy was hauled to court for the seventh time for 
illegal hawking. The magistrate decided against imprisonment or detention in 
the Reformatory. Instead, the boy was referred to the “Rotary Fund”, where 
investigations revealed the boy was supporting five siblings and his mother on 
“less than 75 cents a day - the proceeds of hawking cakes and drinks!” The 
family was given financial relief, and arrangements were made to obtain a 
hawking license for the mother. The boy earned an additional five dollars a 
month by being the playmate of the children of a Chinese family. 
 
Then there is a Eurasian family of 14 children ranging from 19 years to three 
months. Father aged 51 and the two eldest sons are unemployed. It is a family 
struggling to lice. Mother-in-law pays the rent of the house, which although 
very poor, is always neat and clean. The children are well-kept though ill-
nourished. Father keeps money and rice from the Fund to keep them from 
starvation.126 
 
An accompanying photo showed “men waiting their turn to receive relief at the Salvation 
Army headquarters in Singapore”. The men did not seem destitute in the sense that they were 
impoverished. Some of them were in shirt and tie, complete with suit jacket and headwear. 
They looked professional and middle-class. As noted earlier, those who could leave or were 
repatriated had already left Singapore. Those who remained either had made Singapore a 
home, or were powerless to help themselves. These were moreover not limited to the Asian 
communities. When their main breadwinners lost their jobs, European families also found 
themselves in hardship. 
 
Here is the tragic story of an Englishman with a wife and five children. They 
once lived in a respectable quarter of the town. They next stayed in a hovel 
among Chinese squatters. Out of work for several years, this man gradually 
sold his belongings until he was left with a few chairs and a couple of tables. 
                                                          
126 The Straits Times, 8 March 1936, “The People the Jubilee Fund Will Assist”. 
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He moved from the house to the hovel during the night, too ashamed to let his 
neighbours see to what quantity his furniture had been reduced. He himself 
carried his few sticks of furniture from the ricksha to his new home situated in 
an estate off a main road. A treasured possession was a canary which sang 
beautifully. He was ready to part with it for $5 in order to move house. 
Fortunately, he received some help, and the canary continued to revive his 
tired spirit when he arrived home every evening after a 14-mile trudge to town 
and back in search of work. He and his family slept on the floor.127 
 
In such instances, the despair of poverty appeared to be accompanied by additional feelings 
of shame. In the same article, there was an inherent expectation of a better standard of living. 
The author observed that while: 
 
No Europeans are so destitute as to lack shelter and a certain quantity of food, 
but there are the miseries – difficult to realise by those in receipt of regular 
incomes – of job-seeking when one is without the wherewithal to purchase 
razor blades, soap or a toothbrush, when one is without tram or ricksha fare 
and when the dhoby has declined (reasonably enough) to return the last white 
suit.128 
 
Another letter details more graphically (and in arresting prose) the shame of poverty: 
 
What great agonies of suffering and hardship are hidden away in some of these 
wretched homes! Many are living from hand to mouth, scarcely ever sure that 
they will get the wherewithal for the morrow, while not a few of the still more 
unlucky ones are actually starving!! Work they are unable to get: property of 
any kind have none. They appeal to friends or relatives for assistance but their 
cries, alas, often fell on ears not deaf but deliberately turned away. It is not so 
much physical pain as mental agony that has to be bravely and patiently borne, 
for, added to the already intolerable pangs of hunger, one has often to bear 
meekly the insults and taunting scoffs of purse-proud and coarse-grained 
people to live in constant dread of being turned out to the streets at any 
moment for arrears of rents; to see wife and children and, in some cases, aged 
parents slowly starved to but mere shadows of their former selves – these are 
the things that take the colour from the cheek, the light from the eyes, the 
buoyancy from the step.129 
 
                                                          
127 The Straits Times, 25 August 1935, “Malaya's Renewed Prosperity Mocks the Unemployed”. See also The 
Straits Times, 18 August 1935, “Destitute Europeans in Singapore”, The Straits Times, 4 August 1935, “The 
Poor Plea for Alleviation of Their Lot”, and The Straits Times, 10 September 1935, “European Fighting Against 
Destitution”.  
128 The Straits Times, 25 August 1935, “Malaya's Renewed Prosperity Mocks the Unemployed”. “Dhoby” is 
Hindi for laundry. In this instance it refers to an Indian laundryperson. 
129 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 22 June 1935, “Our Unemployed”. 
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The author, signed off as sic est vita (Thus is Life), was lamenting the closure in March 1936 
of the Rotary interim relief fund. In less than a year, the fund distributed over $14,000, about 
90,000 katis of rice, milk and other necessities to the “poor of Singapore”.130  
The Rotary receded from the public view when it ceased distributing financial relief 
directly. But it remained a significant (if slightly understated) player in Singapore’s social 
welfare history in organizing fund-raisers and talks to raise awareness of social issues. 
Moreover, its broad-based approach to social services and its proactive members, played a 
key role, not solely in alleviating relief, but perhaps more in providing an organized and 
coherent voice for more action by government and society. Social services were previously 
more or less designed and delivered along ethnicity, creed, or social need. The Rotary’s all-
encompassing and inclusive message of “Service Above Self” provided a common basis – at 
least the potential – for the divergent loyalties of the colonial plural society.  
 
A New Approach: The Salvation Army 
 
In the midst of the “rediscovery” of poverty in Singapore, the all-inclusive approach 
espoused by the Rotarians was given a boost by the Salvation Army. In March 1935, Herbert 
Arthur Lord arrived in Singapore to conduct a month-long study of local social conditions, 
and to assess the feasibility of setting up a base for Salvation Army operations.131 A month 
later, the organization confirmed that it would establish an office in Singapore. It rented “a 
house and office” in Killiney Road and wanted to also establish a meeting center in the 
vicinity of Dhoby Ghaut.132 Lord highlighted two projects the Army was interested in. First, 
                                                          
130 The Straits Times, 21 March 1936, “$14,050 Given to Poor”. Archdeacon Graham White chaired the relief 
committee. He remained in Singapore throughout the war and occupation, and died on 8 May 1945 during 
internment at Sime Road Camp. 
131 See The Straits Times, 15 March 1935, “Salvation Army”, The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile 
Advertiser (1884-1942), 18 March 1935, “Brigadier Lord”, and The Straits Times, 18 April 1935, “Office to be 
Opened: Spiritual and Social Work”. Herbert Arthur Lord arrived in Singapore a veteran Salvationist, having 
worked in Korea and surrounding countries for twenty-five years. Born in Liverpool in 1889 to Salvationists, he 
joined the Salvation Army and began working in Korea in 1909. He remained in Korea until ordered to assess 
the feasibility of starting up Salvation Army centers in Malaya and Singapore. He was interned in Changi during 
the Second World War and the Japanese Occupation. After the war, he returned to Korea and was again interned 
by the North Koreans for three years during the Korean conflict. He survived and died in 1971 in England. For a 
brief biographical background, see The Straits Times, 15 April 1971, “Man who brought the Salvation Army to 
Singapore dies, 83”. 
132 It eventually made its headquarters at the former house of Tan Yeok Nee at the junction of Clemenceau 
Avenue and Penang Road. Tan was a Teochew businessman active in Singapore and Johor in the nineteenth 
century. The house was completed in 1885, and is presently a national monument. See The Singapore Free 
Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 15 January 1938, “Temple House to be Headquarters of Salvation 
Army”, and “Former House of Tan Yeok Nee”, http://www.nhb.gov.sg/places/sites-and-monuments/national-
monuments/former-house-of-tan-yeok-nee. Accessed 21 December 2015. Initially renting the premises, the 
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the establishment of a home for women over nineteen years of age, to complement the Po 
Leung Kuk, which took in younger girls, and second, a program for “boys of all 
nationalities”, to ensure they did not go to prison.133 
The Salvation Army did not waste any time. In June, it took over the management of 
the Singapore Aftercare Association. Originally established by the Rotary Club to assist ex-
prisoners, the association was in danger of being dissolved. In taking over, the Salvation 
Army ensured a social service could continue.134 The Salvation Army also took over the 
administration of the Rotary Club’s relief fund. After a survey of Singapore’s approach to the 
provision of relief, Lord felt that there was an “urgent need for co-ordination of the work of 
distress locally”. He cited instances “where people had applied to the Rotary Club for milk 
for their babies when this could have been obtained from the Child Welfare Society”. Lord 
envisioned some form of “central committee to deal with all applications for distress”, 
primarily to redirect requests and applications to the appropriate organization for 
assistance.135 
Soon after, a relief committee, comprising of “representatives of all communities – 
European, Eurasian, Chinese, Indian and Malay”, was formed. It met weekly to consider and 
to approve cases put forth by Captain Frank E. Bainbridge of the Salvation Army. Designated 
the Relieving Officer, Bainbridge directed the clerical work and investigations into each 
application, introducing a systematic approach to calculating and disbursing financial aid. 
 
The scale of relief is on the general basis of 10 cents a person a day. In 
practical administration however, this has been somewhat modified: the first 
adult in the family receiving a minimum of $5; all other adults in the family 
receive $3 a month, and the grant for children according to a graduated scale 
from birth up to 16 years of age, after which they are classed as adults…. 
Relief is given in the form of cash and rice; for instance, a single individual 
living alone being entitled to $5 a month received 20 katty of rice [about 
twenty-six pounds] and $4 in cash. In the case of babies up to two years old, 
milk is given instead of money.136 
                                                          
Salvation Army bought the land and building for $50,000 in 1940. See The Straits Times, 5 March 1940, 
“Salvation Army to Buy Old Chinese House”. 
133 The Straits Times, 30 April 1935, “Salvation Army in Singapore”. 
134 See for an overview: The Straits Times, 1 June 1935, “Salvation Army May Help Ex-Prisoners”, The 
Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 3 June 1935, “Ex-Prisoners Not Wanted by Local 
Employers”, The Straits Times, 8 March 1940, “Assisting Ex-Prisoners”, and The Straits Times, 16 March 1940, 
“Help for Families of Men Sent to Gaol”. 
135 See The Straits Times, 9 June 1935, “Need to Co-ordinate Relief Work in Singapore”, The Straits Times, 15 
June 1935, “Urgent Need of the Unemployed”. 
136 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 13 January 1938, “Industrial Plan Needed 
for the Workless in Singapore”. To illustrate, Lord noted that in December 1937, the fund assisted 687 cases 
(over 3,000 individuals), distributing $7,399 in cash, 32,700 kati of rice and $96.00 worth of milk. 
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There was unfortunately no further explanation of the basis on which the rates were 
calculated. For comparison, a report by the Chinese Affairs Secretariat indicated that in 1932, 
the average wage of a rubber factory worker was about $6.10 a month (about twenty cents 
per day), and that it was possible to live in Singapore on twenty-two cents a day.137 An able-
bodied female seeking refuge in the Salvation Army’s home in 1936 or 1937 recalled 
receiving $10 for a month: $7 for food, and the rest for additional expenses. This came up to 
about thirty-three cents per day.138 In 1938, the daily wage was forty-five and thirty-five cents 
for a male and a female rubber tapper respectively, with food and lodging provided.139  
The relief rates were well below average daily wages, and presumably subsistence 
levels. This approach was deliberate. Upon taking over the Rotary relief fund in 1935. Lord 
had warned that the fund was an “interim” measure, “primarily for the alleviation of the 
unemployed clerical classes….” The “Fund”, he cautioned, “… cannot stretch to a system of 
Old Age Pensions for the Aged or Poor Relief for an unlimited number of cripples and 
diseased and decrepits”.140 The amount of financial aid that could be given was limited by the 
“small-ness” of the fund, which was fine by Lord because he felt it was “wise only to give 
sufficient to maintain bare sustenance, thereby leaving a margin for personal initiative and 
effort at supplementing this allowance”.141  
Three years later in 1938, Lord’s stance shifted ever so slightly but significantly. A 
core group of unemployed clerks had remained in distress and in need of continuous relief. In 
addition, through the Silver Jubilee Fund’, they “discovered” an increasing number of 
applications coming from a group of “decrepits, aged people and widows”; in other words, a 
“permanent army of distressed”.142 For those still healthy and hence employable, Lord 
proposed some form of an industrial program to absorb the excess labor. He also suggested 
that firms could assist in providing apprenticeships for youths as well as retraining programs 
                                                          
137 Huff, “Entitlements, Destitution, and Emigration in the 1930s”, p. 305. 
138 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo. Women Through the Years: Economic & Family Lives. Accession Number: 
000371. Interviewed in 1983. Reel 5 (of 26).  
139 Coelho, “Old Man on Public Assistance”, p. 46. Author cited information from C. Kondapi, Indians 
Overseas, 1838-1949 (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1951). 
140 The Straits Times, 31 October 1935, “How Workless Are Given Money and Food”. 
141 The Straits Times, 31 October 1935, “How Workless Are Given Money and Food”. For the month of 
October, the fund received 483 applications, of which 308 were successful (about 64%). Chinese and Eurasians 
formed the majority of applications, with Indians coming a distant third.  
142 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 13 January 1938, “Industrial Plan Needed 
for the Workless in Singapore”. 
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for older workers. Lord had no ready answer for the “unemployables”, but observed that “a 
competent social survey” could help in addressing these issues via social legislation. 
The broader point to take away is less the actual actions taken (or not taken), and 
more the fact that social issues were being deliberately and openly discussed, with moreover 
proposals made based on actual work, such as relief distribution. Through its actions, the 
Salvation Army, along with the Rotary Club (acting more as a public awareness forum), 
heralded a new approach to social welfare. It was coherent, organized, and scientific, as 
proposals were based on solid ground work and the statistical data produced from such work. 
This was in contrast to the earlier looser, almost ad hoc, responses to social distress. The 
Salvation Army’s inclusive approach, giving aid regardless of creed or nationality, also 
contrasted with social services developed along communitarian and religious lines. Its 
proactiveness moreover in tackling social ills was at odds with the general reluctance of the 
colonial state (and society) to take decisive action. On the eve of the Japanese invasion in 
December 1941, the Salvation Army was well-established. It was managing five institutions 
in Singapore: A Women and Girls’ Industrial Home in late 1935,143 a Boys’ Industrial Home 
in 1936 and a remand home for boys in 1937,144 a hostel for discharged prisoners in 1938,145 
and a children’s home in 1939.146 The girls’ and boys’ homes in particular had objective of 
ensuring a future for their youthful residents through education and vocational training.147 
In the course of discharging its service, the Salvation Army became the acknowledged 
leader in matters dealing with social issues in Singapore. Its officers administered and 
                                                          
143 See for an overview of the home: The Straits Times, 15 December 1935, “New Home For Women In 
Singapore”, The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 16 December 1935, “New 
Home for Destitute Women in Singapore”, The Straits Times, 16 December 1935, “Home For Women In Need”, 
The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 25 November 1936, “Women's Industrial 
Home Opened By Mrs. Small”, The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 7 August 
1937, Industrial Home Moves”. 
144 The industrial home opened first in November 1936. The remand home was added as a separate extension to 
the original home sometime in early 1939. See The Straits Times, 20 August 1936, “Boys' Home in Singapore”, 
The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 21 August 1936, “Home for Destitute Boys 
in Singapore”, The Straits Times, 29 November 1936, “Rescuing Boys from The Streets of Singapore”, The 
Straits Times, 28 October 1937, “New Remand Home for Boys”, The Straits Times, 19 December 1937, 
“Remand Home for Boys to Open at New Year”. 
145 The hostel was located at Race Course Road, and housed up to thirty persons. The Singapore Free Press and 
Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 1 June 1938, “Salvation Army to Open Hostel”, and The Straits Times, 5 
June 1938, “Ex-Prisoners”. 
146 The Straits Times, 15 January 1939, “Salvation Army to Open New Children's Home”. 
147 For detailed information on how homes were ran and general objectives, see The Straits Times, 9 October 
1938, “How Industrial and Remand Homes Boys Are Trained”, The Straits Times, 19 January 1939, “Salvation 
Army Scheme to Train Domestics”, The Straits Times, 22 March 1939, “Salvation Army's Work for Distressed 
Women”. The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 10 May 1940, “Women Who Have 
Found Protection in "Home"”, The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 24 October 
1940, “Women's Home Run by Salvation Army”. 
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investigated applications to the Silver Jubilee Fund. It acted as a coordinating agency 
between various charitable groups and government, working especially closely with the 
Rotary Club. The organization’s deliberate focus on sections of Singapore society, which 
otherwise did not receive frequent attention, gave the Salvation Army an authority not easily 
challenged. Its officers were not shy in sharing their opinions publicly. For instance, Lord 
voiced his disappointment in the lack of progress in acquiring support for the boys’ industrial 
home, hence delaying its opening until November 1936.148 Through its work with Singapore 
society, the Salvation Army positioned itself as an authoritative commentator on the social 
issues of the day with the experience and knowledge to propose changes. In 1938, it spoke 
out on the need for a different legal system to treat juveniles.149 Through its work, the 
Salvation Army raised public awareness on the plight of at-risk women, the potential fate of 
youths in poverty, and the probable need for institutional care for the destitute and the 
decrepit.150 
 
A Personal Insight: Tan Beng Neo 
 
The memories of Tan Beng Neo, a local officer of the Salvation Army, are a useful 
complement to the above. They not only give an intimate account of the Salvation Army’s 
prewar work and a personal perspective on the impact of the organization’s presence, but also 
an account of someone who had received help from the organization. Beng Neo was born in 
                                                          
148 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 21 August 1936, “Home for Destitute 
Boys in Singapore”. The home was eventually opened in November 1936. It was located at Kim Keat Road (in 
the current Balestier / Whampoa area).  
149 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 18 July 1938, “Special Court for Juvenile 
Offenders”. 
150 The Salvation Army with the Child Welfare Society brought to light the inadequacy of hospital beds and 
medical facilities for babies in The Straits Times, 13 March 1938, “Singapore's Underfed Babies”. It also 
highlighted the growing need to care for vagrants in Singapore in The Straits Times, 28 January 1941, “'Colony' 
For Decrepits in Singapore”, and The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 28 January 
1941, “Institution for Vagrants Needed in Singapore”. Its expertise in social work and social services, as well as 
the institutional aim to expand into Malaya, led to surveys of social needs in Malacca and Selangor: see The 
Straits Times, 6 December 1939, “"Chronic Poverty" Does Exist in Kuala Lumpur”, and The Straits Times, 8 
December 1940, “Destitution and Poverty in Malacca”. It also worked with the prisons service in the aftercare 
of discharged prisoners, and along with the Rotary Club and the Straits Chinese British Association, with the 
police on the matter of unemployed Straits Chinese youths – see The Straits Times, 13 January 1940, “Singapore 
Boys Lured into Secret Societies”. (This issue arose from a memorandum by the Superintendent of Police, 
which pointed out that an increasing number of youths were not employable despite a basic education in English 
and growing concerns that they would turn to illicit activities in their spare time. The proposed solution by the 
Rotary Club was the establishment of youth clubs to provide leadership and vocational training, as well as a 
space with activities to absorb free time. See The Straits Times, 22 February 1940, “Rotary to Investigate Boys' 
Club Movement”, The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 18 August 1938, 
“Insufficient Schools for The Boys of Singapore”). 
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Singapore on 3 October 1914, in an attap shack along Alexander Road. According to the 
Chinese calendar, 1914 was the year of the tiger and hence was slightly inauspicious. Beng 
Neo’s paternal grandmother said (according to Beng Neo): “Give it away. She’s no good.... 
You better give it away. She’ll bring bad luck to the family....” As Beng Neo was the 
firstborn, her mother refused. Over the years, the family moved several times, including once 
to escape the violence of the Sepoy Mutiny in 1915.151 The mother gave birth to another 
seventeen children in total. She “had a baby practically every year”, including several 
stillborn babies. She died young, aged forty-two.152  
By then, Beng Neo was eighteen and was working - against her father’s wishes - at 
the General Hospital at Outram Road as a nurse. There was no formal training and Beng Neo 
learned on the job. Unfortunately, she fell ill, and had to drop out of the four-year course. She 
went home to stay with her parents, but a row with her father led her to run away from home. 
Beng Neo did not state the year, but she recalled her former school principal brought her to 
the Salvation Army at Paterson Road, where it had opened a home for “victimized women” in 
late 1935. “After running away from home, I had no money. I had five or six dollars only. 
And they took me to Paterson Road and ... gave me a bed”.153 Beng Neo was perhaps one of 
the earliest residents of the Women’s Industrial Home (located along Paterson Road). She 
recalled: 
 
It was a house belonging, I think, to Dr. Lim Boon Keng. An attap roof, but a 
huge house. I remember one of the dormitories … four beds. One was an 
Indian girl with a lot of curly hair and very short and she looked so funny in 
bed. And one was another Chinese girl. She kept on talking to herself and 
laughing. And I said, “Good Lord! Have I landed in a mental hospital?” 
Because the Salvation Army officers were all in white, you see. And I had no 
idea who they were. So I couldn’t sleep. I was very upset. I couldn’t sleep…. I 
was there a year.154 
 
                                                          
151 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 1. “A lot of them was killed, Europeans especially were killed. Some were in 
the drain and all that. After a few days, the placed stinked [sic]. I remember my mother carried.... She said, “I 
carried you”. No, my father carried me. And my mother had some bundles of clothing and food and some of the 
neighbors, mostly women and children, all marched from Alexandra Road to town because there was no 
transport. It was very terrifying”. Beng Neo was less than two years old when the Sepoy Mutiny occurred, so 
her memories might have been her mother’s. The mutiny involved soldiers from the Indian Army’s 5th Light 
Infantry Regiment (four of eight companies), lasted seven days, and left forty-seven dead.  
152 By the time Beng Neo’s father died in 1982, he had two wives, twenty-one children, fifty grandchildren, and 
twenty-two great-grandchildren.  
153 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 5. 
154 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 5. 
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Beng Neo stayed at Paterson Road roughly from late 1935 to 1936 before she started 
a year-long midwifery course at Kandang Kerbau Hospital. The Salvation Army paid her fees 
in return for an agreement to work for them. The hospital had intended to hire her after she 
completed her course, but the Salvation Army had other plans for her. Over time, Beng Neo 
became a Salvationist, and in April 1939, she and six other local Chinese, were the first 
graduates of the Salvation Army’s training program of local officers.155 Until the outbreak of 
the Second World War, Beng Neo worked primarily in the nursery section of the Women’s 
Industrial Home, taking care of abandoned babies, or the babies of mothers who were unable 
to care for them. She also worked with senior officers, handing out copies of War Cry, the 
organization’s newsletter, visiting female prison inmates to check on their well-being as well 
as that of their children if any, and go on evening patrols in known red-light districts to check 
on street-walkers. Beng Neo’s oral history provides insights into some of the female inmates:  
 
We visited the prison at least once a week, the female prison and translated for 
her [Colonel Bertha Grey] because there’re lots of women caught … 
prostituting, soliciting on the streets or … making samsu [cheap liquor made 
from caramel, sugar, and water]. I remember we had all the children and the 
girls in our home because the mother was serving a prison sentence for 
making samsu. And while she was there, you see, we visited the home and 
found that nobody was looking after the children. So we took the children. 
Then we had to visit the mother and told her that the children were alright and 
safe with us. And when she is discharged, she could come and take them 
home.156 
 
The Salvation Army also provided aftercare services, aiding ex-prisoners with job 
training so they could make an honest living: 
 
After the woman was discharged, she learned to make brooms. So Colonel 
Grey used to buy brooms from her to help her along and occasionally you 
know, would bring something for her and see how she was getting on. But the 
woman could not speak any English.157 
 
Hence, Beng Neo was brought along on these home visits and street patrols to help with the 
communication between the Salvation Army officer and their clients. Before long, Beng Neo 
                                                          
155 The Straits Times, 3 April 1939, “New Salvation Army Officers” and 4 April 1939, “Salvation Army's New 
Officers”. The articles reported “seven Chinese cadets, who have been in training at the Tank Road Training 
Garrison for the past nine months, will be dedicated at a service at the Tank Road Hall… Messrs. Koh Liang 
Seah (assigned to Siglap section), Yeok Kok Chin (Boys’ Industrial Home), Sim Wee Lee (Penang) and Tan 
Koon Hoi (After-care), Misses Chua Yam Neo (women’s special work), Tan Beng Neo (Balestier Road Corps), 
Lim Siok Chin (Central Corps, Tank Road)”. 
156 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 7. 
157 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 7. 
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was familiar with the “bad areas”, the red-light districts, in Singapore: “At one period I could 
tell you which are the bad houses in Desker Road, Maude Road, Jalan Besar, and all that”. 
Her oral history gives a vivid description of her encounters with street-walkers. 
 
[Question on how they approached the girls]. Oh, [Colonel Grey] says, “How 
are you now? Today are you alright? Have you earned a lot of money? Why 
don’t you choose another type of … way of earning? Why don’t you come to 
our home and we train you how to work?” The girl would say, “Well, I earn 
more money at night than I could earn anywhere else for a month” ... You 
know, we had quite a chit-chat with them. 
 
[Question on whether there were any unpleasant incidents]. No, not really.158 
If they don’t like us, they walked away when they see us coming…. Well, we 
don’t chase after them…. Some of they would smile and talk to us for a few 
minutes…. They don’t really come [joined up with the Salvation Army] 
because some of them are hardened cases, really hardened cases. Only way we 
could get at them is when they are in prison.159 
 
Beng Neo’s and the Salvation Army’s street encounters exploits were recorded and 
published in the newspapers in 1940.160 By then, the Salvation Army was preparing to 
support the war effort. There were growing concerns about prostitution (more accurately, the 
risk of infected soldiers) as the garrison defending Singapore increased, and also in the 
provision of amenities and recreational facilities for soldiers stationed on the island.161 In just 
five years, the Salvation Army had established itself as the leading social service agency in 
Singapore and Malaya, providing services and giving aid on a basis that was as broad and 
inclusive as possible. 
 
 
                                                          
158 She did remark that she “did not like … selling War Cry’s at night. We go to the restaurants and all that, and 
the some of the men are drunk. They come out from the restaurants, very tipsy and trying to grab hold of you 
and all that. I usually run a mile”. 
159 Beng Neo went on to describe the legal situation. Prostitution was only illegal if the girl was caught 
soliciting. “If the man goes to the prostitute willingly, you can’t do much. If they are found trying to stop a man 
and trying to entice the man to go to her room, then that is illegal. But if she wants to do what she wanted with 
her body, nobody can say anything”. 
160 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 9 April 1940, “"Army" Women Interview 
Prostitutes”, and The Straits Times, 9 April 1940, “No Third Party in Local Prostitution”.  
161 This began sometime in late 1939, and broadly included the collection of reading materials and leisure / 
sporting equipment, spaces for recreation, and setting up mobile canteens. See The Straits Times, 29 September 
1939, “Helping the Soldiers”, The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 16 May 1940, 
“Salvation Army's Work for Fighting Forces”, The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-
1942), 19 November 1940, “More Books, Radio Sets, Gramophones Wanted”, The Singapore Free Press and 
Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 3 March 1941, “Entertainment of Service Men”, The Singapore Free Press 
and Mercantile Advertiser (1884-1942), 29 May 1941, “New Institute for Services in Malaya”.  
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On the Cusp of Change 
 
Perhaps it was the circumstances of the Great Depression that exposed, rather brutally, 
social distresses that might otherwise be hidden. In Singapore’s colonial society, reluctant as 
it was to proactively provide for the well-being of the less fortunate, there was an opening for 
a decisive organization like the Salvation Army to step in and take charge. The colonial 
government seemed more than happy to allow the Salvation Army to take the lead, as long as 
the latter did not put too heavy a burden on revenue. Singapore society, or at least the 
English-speaking sections of it, also seemed willing to let the Salvation Army bear the 
burden, much to the chagrin of a Singapore Free Press editorial, unimpressed by the speed 
the responsibilities of the prisoner aftercare association were relinquished to the Salvation 
Army. Nor was the author convinced the latter could do much with a “community which 
bothered its head for two minutes about what happens to men when they leave prison....”162 
This is not to say that the Salvation Army was the only organization capable of 
addressing social needs in prewar Singapore. The religious bodies, charitable societies, clans 
and communal association, and other forms of social organizations and groups (such as the 
family) continued to play a significant role tending to various social needs. The Salvation 
Army and the Rotary Club complemented, not supplanted, such work and activity. The 
Salvation Army did collaborate with several of them, such as the Rotary Club, various 
government bodies like the Chinese Protectorate and the prisons service, and the Child 
Welfare Society. But its attempts at reform were not always welcomed. The Anglican Church 
for instance expressed reservations about the implications of the Salvation Army’s work, 
particularly its centralizing tendencies. The Church was perturbed by the suggestion (made by 
an editorial) of a central controlling committee, and preferred a diversity of sources of aid, 
with aid given in small doses to avoid double dipping.163 
Such reservations were perhaps unsurprising given the aggressive pro-activeness of 
the Salvation Army, displayed moreover in a situation where the development of social 
                                                          
162 The Singapore Free Press, 19 June 1935, “Singapore Pilates”. “Pilates” was a reference to Pontius Pilate, the 
Roman governor who supposedly washed his hands in a public attempt to absolve himself of any responsibility 
regarding the trial and crucifixion of Jesus Christ. The editorial was thoroughly scathing of Singapore society, 
and doubted the Salvation Army could do more without more support. 
163 See The Straits Times, 28 June 1935, “Church Opinions on Organisation of Charity”, which was in response 
to an editorial in The Straits Times, 22 June 1935, “Relief Reform”. The editorial had reviewed existing aid 
agencies in Singapore, and called for a committee “in which all data can be centralized and which will meet 
regularly to sift that data”. This would then “avoid overlapping between all these agencies, to prevent abuse of 
charity, and to ensure the widest possible distribution of aid….” The editorial did not mention the assistance, if 
any, provided by communal associations.  
92 
 
 
 
services had until its appearance been uneven and overly reactive. Compared to the Salvation 
Army’s dynamism and broad-based approach that cut across ethnic lines, earlier social 
services and institutions appeared insular and ponderous. The Salvation Army’s attempts to 
address the root causes of social ills, rather than merely treat the symptoms, also give a sense 
of “permanence”, at least relative to the transient nature of Singapore’s migrant society. 
Hence, the presence and work of the Salvation Army and the Rotary Club was significant. 
There is no denying that the sense of crisis, precipitated by a prolonged economic slump, 
amplified their importance in Singapore history. Nevertheless, when contrasted with the 
reluctance of colonial society to assume responsibility for the general well-being of society, 
their broad-based approach was novel. It also provided a suitable model for financial relief, 
youth welfare, and social issues in general. On the eve of the Second World War, the work of 
the Salvation Army and the Rotary Club presented the potential for a coherent and organized 
approach to social services. 
It is interesting to imagine, purely as an academic exercise, the possible trajectory of 
Singapore’s social welfare history had the war not intervened. It is unlikely the Salvation 
Army or the Rotary Club would have made progress in fostering a collective sense of 
responsibility within a society with diverse nationalities and divergent loyalties. There was no 
reason or motivation at all to imagine that individuals in Singapore society – as it was then – 
were beholden to each other. Excess labor, like Augustin Gomez, was repatriated. Others, like 
Valentine Frois, relied on either their families or extended communities for assistance, or like 
Wong, on their own resources. Financial relief, even for domiciled Europeans, was not as 
forthcoming as anticipated. Each community, indeed each individual, had to fend for 
themselves. The absence of war and the accompanying sense of crisis, so necessary for social 
and political change, would have been absent. The impetus for change and a new colonial 
welfare policy came from external sources and circumstances. 
 
Metropolitan Interlude: Colonial Plans for Social Welfare 
 
On 8 December 1941, Japanese troops landed on the beaches of southern Thailand 
and Kota Bahru in Kelantan, Malaya, to begin their invasion of British Malaya. By then, 
British colonial policy had changed significantly. Chapter 1 has provided an overview of the 
circumstances and impetus leading to the new policy of development and welfare. The 
passing of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act during a time when Britain stood alone 
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against the Axis powers was a considerable statement of intent. The fall of Singapore, and the 
humiliation of defeat in the Far East, only served to heighten imperial anxieties and 
quickened the pace of change.  
Planning for postwar Malaya and Singapore began in earnest in 1943, following a 
palpable upturn in fortunes following the military victories, the entrance of new allies, and 
the publication of the Beveridge Plan. In keeping with the mood of the times, there was a 
determination to resist a return to the prewar status quo.164 By 1944, the Colonial Office had 
already decided that after the period of military administration, a new political unit called the 
Malayan Union would replace the disparate politico-administrative units of the Straits 
Settlements, the Federated Malay States, and Unfederated Malay States. Singapore, formerly 
administered together with Penang, Malacca and other smaller territories under the umbrella 
of the Straits Settlements, was to be governed separately as a crown colony.165 
 
Wartime Planning 
 
The Eastern Department of the Colonial Office oversaw the “big picture”, while 
matters concerning post-war administration preoccupied joint War Office-Colonial Office 
planning units.166 To avoid earlier clashes between civil administration and military priorities 
during the fighting in Burma, the War Office created a Civil Affairs directorate to 
differentiate civil from military matters. The directorate oversaw planning units to pave the 
way for a smoother transition to civil administration as well as to take into account colonial 
policy at an early stage.167 The Malayan Planning Unit was one such unit established. It 
began in early 1943 as a series of informal committee meetings between the War and 
Colonial Offices, before it was officially formalized in July of the same year. The Malayan 
Planning Unit was technically part of the War Office, but its staff and overall policy came 
from the colonial service. Ralph Hone was appointed Chief Planner and Chief Civil Affairs 
                                                          
164 A. J. Stockwell, “Colonial planning during World War II: The case of Malaya”. The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History. 1974; 2(3): p. 338. 
165 F. S. V. Donnison, British Military Administration in the Far East 1943-46 (London: H.M.S.O., 1956), p. 
137. See also Albert Lau, The Malayan Union Controversy 1942-1948 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
1990), A. J. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics during the Malayan Union Experiment, 1945-1948 
(Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society Monograph No. 8, 1979); and M. R. Stenson, 
“The Malayan Union and the Historians”. Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1969), pp. 344-
354. 
166 C. M. Turnbull, “British Planning for Post-war Malaya”. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 
(1974), pp. 239-254. 
167 Donnison, British Military Administration, pp. 36-37, and Stockwell, “Colonial Planning”, p. 338. 
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Officer-designate. Hone reported directly to Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied 
Commander, South East Asia Command. Formerly from the colonial legal service in Africa, 
he also had experience working in a military administration in the Middle East. The Malayan 
Planning Unit (later hyphenated with “Civil Affairs”) was in many ways the bureaucratic arm 
of the Colonial Office, responsible for the preparation of post-operations administration as 
well as the implementation of colonial policy.168 
The War and Colonial Offices accepted the responsibility to provide relief. The 
official history of the British Military Administration in the Far East notes that the 
“assumption by … military authorities … of responsibility for the relief of civilians was 
entirely without precedent....”169 Military authorities were under no legal obligation to 
provide relief within their or their allies' territory. But relief was nonetheless deemed 
necessary. They prevented the outbreaks of diseases and social unrest (so that military forces 
would not be diverted from their main task of fighting a war). They also ensured that the 
incoming administrations were seen as better propositions compared to those of the Japanese 
or Japanese-related. Relief was mostly in kind, as it was assumed that the injection of cash 
into a broken economy with few goods and services would be detrimental to postwar 
administration.170 
In November 1943, the British commissioned a working party to calculate the relief 
requirements for Burma, British Borneo, Hong Kong and Malaya.171 The Young Working 
Party, named after its chairman Sir Hubert Young, produced six-monthly estimates for a 
period of two years for the following categories of supplies: food, agricultural supplies, 
medical supplies, soap, clothing and footwear, communal requirements, individual household 
requirements, and newsprint. In their calculations, the working party assumed that “only so 
much of relief requirements should be imported as would prevent disease and unrest”, and 
                                                          
168 In addition to more scholarly examinations, see for personal recollections and insights Oswald Wellington 
Gilmour, With Freedom to Singapore (London: Benn, 1950). Gilmour was a former employee of the Singapore 
Municipal Commission. He managed to leave before Singapore fell to the Japanese. As a member of the MPU, 
he was part of the advance party that reach Singapore in September 1945, tasked to restore and maintain utility 
services (electricity, water, etc.). The Malayan Planning Unit had the following 'Sections' – General 
Administration and Political, Legal and Judicial, Chinese Affairs, Public Health and Medical, Police Prisons and 
Fire-Brigade, Technical Services, Supplies, Rationing, Trade and Industry, Finance, Press and Publicity, 
Custodian of Property, Agricultural, Veterinary and Forestry, Land Mines and Surveys, Education, and Labour 
and Personnel – with many more sub-sections as the Unit expanded. See also Lau’s The Malayan Union for a 
brief overview of the unit’s activities. 
169 Donnison, British Military Administration, p. 237 
170 Donnison, British Military Administration, p. 237 
171 NAS, CO 852/665/1: Relief and Rehabilitation Estimates. CO 852 files are available in the NUS Central 
Library 
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that in the following eighteen months, there should be ample supplies to “restore the normal 
activity of the community and to enable it to take its part in producing for civilian relief and 
the war effort”.172 In other words, planners assumed that administration of reoccupied 
territories would take place while military action continued. This led to a more conservative 
estimation of supplies needed by territories and populations near or within fighting zones, 
which posed challenges for the returning British. 
The greater concern of a military administration was the management of the “human 
debris” of war, in other words the refugees and other people displaced by fighting.173 Hence, 
military planning focused on the establishment and supply of temporary camps to properly 
house and feed refugees, and operations to locate and transport those forcibly displaced by 
the Japanese.174 The singular example here is the mass of humanity forced to work on the 
infamous “Death Railway” in Thailand and Burma. On a smaller but no less significant scale, 
the Javanese in Singapore formed the largest displaced nationality in Southeast Asia during 
the war. The sections set up within military administrations to address such problems were 
usually called Relief and Labour Departments. In Singapore, it was known as the Refugee 
and Displaced Persons Section. The official record shows that the Malayan Planning Unit 
was not immediately concerned with distress relief or social welfare. Rather, its planners 
focused the more urgent tasks of reoccupation. The manner in which the unit was organized 
illustrated this preoccupation, such as Military Government, Finance, Police, Labour, 
Supplies, Medical, Legal and Works.175  
 
Long-term Colonial Policy for Social Welfare 
 
Long-term planning was not neglected. The Malayan Planning Unit drafted a series of 
policy directives in consultation with the Colonial Office. Each directive provided general 
guidelines to restart government, economy, and society, and to guide postwar administration 
in the Malayan Union and Singapore, Hong Kong and British Borneo.176 The social welfare 
                                                          
172 Donnison, British Military Administration, p. 243. 
173 Donnison, British Military Administration, p. 271. The idea of “human debris” was also referred to in the 
first annual report of the Social Welfare Department. 
174 Donnison, British Military Administration, p. 272. 
175 Donnison, British Military Administration, p. 141. See also Gilmour, With Freedom to Singapore, pp. 25-26.  
176 NUSCL, CO 865/18 (Malayan Policy Directives Working Committee). Hone to Gent, 29 October 1943. 
Hone cited the following text: “It was agreed that the Burma and Colonial Offices should provide the War 
Office as soon as possible with directives (political, administrative and economic) on long-term [emphasis in 
text] policy for Burma and Malaya; administration during the military period should so far as possible confirm 
to these directives”. Hone initially listed eighteen areas: Malayan Citizenship; Chinese Policy; Public Services; 
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policy directive for the Malayan Union and Singapore called for the establishment of a Social 
Welfare Advisory Committee made up of government officials and non-government 
representatives. This committee was to stimulate and coordinate social welfare work.177 It 
went on to state that the “Government should appoint a Senior Social Welfare Officer and any 
Welfare Staff should be under his direction”, and that the “efforts of these Officers and 
Committees should be directed towards improving the general well-being of the community 
in its widest sense”. All agencies and organizations, official and unofficial, “should play their 
part” in a “co-operative effort” to coordinate their programs in a “general plan for social 
welfare, based on the ascertained needs of the community and so constructed as to give 
proper weight to the requirements of both urban and rural areas”.178  
The anticipated advisory committee was a “convenient means” of bringing together 
and focusing the efforts of “public spirited members of the community” on social welfare 
work. The directive concluded with further instructions to conduct a census as soon as 
conditions permitted, and to revive and update (for both the Malayan Union and Singapore) 
former Straits Settlements legislation on the protection of women, girls, and children in 
general. It also called attention to memos deemed relevant for social welfare, such as on 
penal administration and nutrition, and a draft report on social welfare (indicated as “Misc. 
504”). Those were to provide “guidance on certain important aspects of social welfare work 
which are not the special interests or concern of other Departments of Government such as 
Education, Medical, Agriculture, Co-operative and Labour”.179 
The earliest drafts, dated late 1943, seemed unable to clearly articulate the scope of 
social welfare work. The entire section on “Scope of Social Welfare” was left blank in a 
second draft.180 Drafters focused on the structures rather than the substance. They focused on 
                                                          
Finance; Rubber; Tin; Primary Production other than Mineral; Lands, Mines and Survey; Social Welfare; 
Medical and Health; Education; Labour and Legislation; Transport; Post and Telecommunications; Electricity; 
Ports and Harbours; Broadcasting; Co-operative Department. Opium was added as the nineteenth item. For 
development of these directives, see also NUSCL, CO 825/47/12 (Far Eastern reconstruction: long term policy 
directives in Malaya); CO 825/47/13 (Far Eastern reconstruction: long term policy in Malaya; organization of 
government departments); CO 825/47/1 (Far Eastern reconstruction: post-war housing in Singapore); CO 
825/47/17 (Long term policy directives in Malaya: social welfare). 
177 I am using the version circulated after the British reoccupied Singapore. NAS, BMA (CH) 27/45 and certain 
folders in NUSCL, CO 273. This version is identical to the latest draft I have located, dated 10 August 1944 in 
CO 825/47/12. The earliest draft found is in CO 825/43/35 (dated November 1943), and versions of latter drafts 
can be found in 825/47/17 and CO 865/18.  
178 Social Welfare Policy Directive.  
179 The Colonial Office memorandums referred to were the United Nations Food Conference and Colonial 
nutrition policy, the Memorandum on modern conceptions of penal administration (prepared for the Controller 
of Development and Welfare in the West Indies), and "Social Security for Colonial Territories" (CM No 5 June 
1944). Except for the final one, I am unable to identify conclusively these memos and the draft report. 
180 NUSCL, CO 825/43/35.  
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establishing committees, to be mindful of existing policies (by reading Colonial Office 
memos and reports), or to revive prewar legislation that was relevant to welfare work. Early 
drafts even included a section on “Town Planning”, which was discarded later.181 The final 
version of the draft indicated that the Colonial Office did not have a concrete idea of what 
social welfare meant. Social welfare became vaguely the “general well being of the 
community in its widest sense”, and specific issues not already dealt with by existing 
government services, such as child welfare, protection of the vulnerable, penal 
administration, physical health (other than treating medical conditions). 
This understanding followed closely Lucy Mair’s description of social welfare in 
Welfare in the British Colonies, as discussed in Chapter 1. The suggestions in the social 
welfare policy directive mirrored related activities elsewhere in the British Empire. In the 
West Indies and African colonies, social welfare advisory committees succeeded the original 
nutrition committees established during the interwar years. By the latter years of the war, 
Social Welfare Officers were active in the West Indies, where committees represented 
different territories. Each was presided over by a Social Welfare Officer and consisted of 
representatives from education, health, labor, and other related social services.182 Africa had 
different concerns, and hence a different set-up. Largely rural except for a few highly-
urbanized centers, the focus was more on the improvement of village life and centered on 
education and health, as well as agricultural matters.183 A similar situation occurred in Ceylon 
(Sri Lanka), where Rural Development Officers took the lead in establishing a variety of 
services crosscutting education, health, and industry.184 There was no equivalent Social 
Welfare Service, like the Education or Health Services. The policy directive fell short of 
creating a social welfare department. Social welfare work in the British Empire was 
conducted primarily through appointed individuals. They took on a supervisory or 
coordinating role (or both), overseeing a committee of representatives to work with 
government departments and organizations that were concerned with social issues. Given the 
absence of precedent, there was little incentive – and resistance even – within the Colonial 
Office to the idea of a stand-alone welfare department in the colonies. 
                                                          
181 NUSCL, CO 825/43/35. There were differences between the policy directives for the Malayan Union and 
Singapore on the one hand, and Hong Kong on the other. The latter focused more on the mui tsai issue, and 
retained a section on town planning. Social welfare work in Hong Kong was also connected to different 
government departments, such as Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, the Urban Council, and the Port Authority. 
182 Mair, Welfare, pp. 103-109. 
183 Mair, Welfare, pp. 109-113. 
184 Mair, Welfare, pp. 113-115. 
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A Social Welfare Department for Singapore? 
 
The mood of the times however did initiate a limited but intense discussion for the 
postwar future of Malaya and Singapore. The first instance that a social welfare department 
was mooted was during wartime discussions concerning future policy for labor.185 On 11 
September 1943, Patrick McKerron of the Malayan Planning Unit (and a Malayan Civil 
Service veteran) suggested that future labor policies should assume a joint government 
department for both Singapore and Malaya. His suggestion provoked a long, cautious, but 
somewhat sympathetic file minute by Leslie Monson, the Principal of the Colonial Office’s 
Eastern Department.186 (Interestingly, this was a moment when the Colonial Office and 
former “men on the ground”, the Malayan Civil Service veterans or officers who had worked 
in Malaya for extended periods, interacted directly on a regular basis).187 
Monson’s minute was primarily an elucidation of labor issues and administration 
before the war. Briefly, prewar colonial administration had managed labor issues along racial 
lines. The Labour Department handled all matters concerning Indian (mostly Tamil) workers, 
while the Chinese Protectorate became the de facto government agency for the Chinese 
community. McKerron’s suggestion moreover dovetailed with prevailing opinions within the 
Colonial Office to plan for a new postwar future for Malaya. Indeed, the idea of a unified 
department paralleled the institutional policy to do away with the divisions that had defined 
Malaya’s and Singapore’s colonial society (and presumably led to the defeat by the 
Japanese).188 A joint government department to combine resources for common objectives 
was hence attractive. Still, Monson remained cautious, preferring a “wait-and-see” policy. 
There were simply not enough officials to allow the proposed military administration to 
function at the prewar level, let alone the civil government that was to take over. Monson was 
also concerned about unanticipated implications, such as the strategic need for labor for 
                                                          
185 NUSCL, CO 825/43/35. See file minutes. Discussion was between W. B. L. Monson, J. J. Paskin, K. W. 
Blaxter, Orde-Brown (Labour Advisor), and Audrey Richards of the Social Services Department. 
186 NUSCL, CO 825/43/35. File minute by W. B. L. Monson, 15 September 1943 
187 Stockwell, “Colonial Planning”.  
188 Even before the war, there had been considerable sentiment to “sweep away” the Chinese Protectorate in 
favor of a unified labor department. Such a tendency was substantial enough that it drew “frequent and 
considered advice” from Shenton Thomas, Governor of the Straits Settlements and the United Kingdom High 
Commissioner to the Federated and Un-Federated Malay States, to keep the Chinese Protectorate. See NUSCL, 
CO 865/47. Minute by E. Gent, 22 June 1943. The suggestion emerged earlier in 1937/38. See CO 
273/50336/37 (no. 26) and CO 273/50336/38 (no. 11). Also noted by Harper, The End of Empire, p. 24. 
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postwar reconstruction, and the political implications of continued reliance on Chinese and 
Indian labor in the postwar period. 
The prospect of a social welfare department emerged when Monson pondered on the 
implications of unifying labor functions under a single department. One was where to house 
the non-labor functions the Protector of Chinese and his Assistant Protectors performed on a 
regular basis, such as the protection of women and children, and other daily taijin duties. 
Monson warned: 
 
One point must not be overlooked – these departments in the past, particularly 
the Chinese Protectorate, dealt with matters not strictly related to the labour 
code, such as, the protection of women and young persons. What is to become 
of this work if a new joint Labour Dept. is formed? It might well be 
convenient for the same Chinese or Tamil speaking officer “in the field” to 
handle both sides of the work. This suggests that the ultimate aim should be a 
joint Department of Social Welfare, covering both labour and other social 
work which would have separate divisions for the formulation of policy on 
Indian or plantation labour, on Chinese labour and on social questions.189 
 
The proposed social welfare department was the suppose endpoint of a process 
bringing together functions and services pertaining to labor matters. Monson’s colleagues in 
the Colonial Office agreed to let the Malayan Planning Unit proceed on the assumption of a 
unified labor department. On the matter of a social welfare department, some of them were 
ambivalent, preferring the wait-and-see approach. The new Social Service Department 
however was less conservative, in particular Dr. Audrey Richards. Richards was an 
anthropologist from the London School of Economics, and had studied the role of women 
and the family in northern Rhodesia.190 Rising through the ranks of the Colonial Office 
because of the war (and its impact on the supply of male staff), Richards was also 
instrumental in the establishment of the Social Welfare Advisory Committee in 1942.191 
Responding to the cautiousness of her male (and more senior) counterparts, Richards 
wondered whether postponing the proposed social welfare department was “perhaps not 
rather reversing the tendency that can be seen in other territories”.192 She observed 
prophetically: 
                                                          
189 NUSCL, CO 825/43/35. Minute by W. B. L. Monson, 15 September 1943 
190 Lewis, Empire State-Building, p. 71. 
191 Lewis, Empire State-Building, p. 75. 
192 NUSCL, CO 825/43/35. Minute by Audrey Richards, 27 September 1943. She might have been overstating 
the case when she mentioned “in other territories”. Her comment drew a response from Orde Browne, the 
Adviser on Colonial Labour to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He indicated his suggestion for 
postponement was only for the “early phase” while fighting was still on-going. 
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[T]he disadvantage of setting up a Labour Department first is that in effect you 
are creating vested interests so that it will be difficult afterwards to introduce 
the wider Social Welfare Department. Labour officers will have in effect to 
take on general welfare duties ... and they may not like being asked to hand 
them over to a Welfare Section later on. Moreover, the personnel selected may 
not be so suitable for handling social welfare problems since it is usually the 
custom to appoint Trade Unionists to such posts and this tends to be rather a 
narrow type of training and one which does not give much practice in planning 
and co-ordinating different welfare movements.193 
 
Richards pleaded, “Would it not be possible to appoint a Social Welfare Advisor now with 
one wing of his future department under him that is the Labour Department? The other wing 
could be added later. This would be somewhat similar to the Palestine set up which has a 
social welfare adviser and a Probation Department and a Welfare Department under him”.194 
Richards was supported by K. W. Blaxter, her immediate superior in the Social Service 
Department. Anticipating that social welfare was to be a key part of metropolitan and colonial 
governments, he commented that it was “very desirable ... that we should consider how to 
bring “social welfare” into the picture in future arrangements for the administration of 
Malaya”.195 He also explained that the draft report on Juvenile Welfare in the Colonies, a 
“document on which we have hinged our approach to Colonial Governments in this matter...” 
contained general principles of social welfare.196 At a later meeting, Blaxter appeared to 
temper his support for a stand-alone welfare department. Instead, he agreed to the 
“employment of welfare officers under the Labour Dept. and attached to special services, 
such as the Railways or the Docks, pending such arrangements as could be made for a 
Welfare Dept. in a more permanent administration”.197  
The discussion ended without any clear resolution, other than agreeing that social 
welfare was necessary (keeping in line with the new colonial policy, and the enthusiasm 
generated by the Beveridge Plan). From a purely administrative viewpoint, the Colonial 
Office’s engagement with social welfare was mainly to deal with the consequences of 
changing the status quo, namely the political futures of Malaya and Singapore, and the place 
                                                          
193 NUSCL, CO 825/43/35. Minute by Audrey Richards, 27 September 1943. 
194 NUSCL, CO 825/43/35. Minute by Audrey Richards, 27 September 1943. This is the only indication I can 
find of a social welfare department in the British Empire during the war. 
195 NUSCL, CO 825/43/35. Minute by K. W. Blaxter to J. J. Paskin, 2 October 1943. 
196 This explains the heavy emphasis on juvenile and youth welfare initiatives by the Singapore Department of 
Social Welfare after the war. See Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this study. 
197 NUSCL, CO 825/43/35. Minute by Monson, 11 October 1943. Blaxter also made a note against Monson’s 
minute to suggest a “Social Welfare Adviser in the Secretariat”. It is not clear what Secretariat he was referring 
to. 
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of the Chinese Protectorate and the Labour Department in those futures. The colonial state, 
unlike during the prewar period, was going to be involved in the provision of welfare 
services. That much was clear. Planners were however unable to clearly articulate a social 
welfare policy beyond a catch-all role of covering functions and services not already 
managed by other government departments. The following chapters will illustrate how 
quickly the British discovered the limits of a vague policy after they returned to Singapore 
and Malaya. 
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CHAPTER 3. WELFARE DURING WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 
The first part of this chapter presents an overview of social conditions during the 
Japanese Occupation (1942 to 1945). After an initial period of confusion, life in Japanese-
occupied Singapore continued. Law and order had to be re-established. Individuals still 
needed to find sources of income to support themselves and their families. Social services 
were needed more than ever, but the circumstances were decidedly more difficult to operate 
in. The second part of the chapter examines early British attempts to implement its new 
colonial policy of social welfare under the British Military Administration. The obstacles the 
returning British encountered significantly altered colonial plans, and (with the benefit of a 
longer perspective) also anticipated the issues to come after the initial period of military 
administration. 
 
Social Welfare during the Japanese Occupation 
 
The sub-heading above may come across as counter-intuitive. The Japanese 
occupation of Singapore has been presented largely as an oppressive and fearful period in 
Singapore history. Atrocities were committed against particular communities in Singapore, 
such as the British, perceived allies of the British (usually those who spoke English), and the 
Chinese. Incidents included the sook ching massacre, the worst known incident involving the 
Japanese military outside the Nanking massacre, and the reprisals against European internees 
and locals who aided them during the “Double Tenth” incident.1 Life in general during the 
occupation was difficult. Singapore’s economy, based very much on its staple port functions 
and entrepôt trade with its neighbors, could not properly function due to the war. This 
exacerbated unemployment, which was already substantial due to reluctance to work for the 
Japanese (unless desperate). 
Attempts were made to restart government services, such as public works and 
education, in a bid to return normalcy to society. But for various reasons, Japanese military 
administration was unsystematic and ineffective, which in turn cultivated a society that 
                                                          
1 sook ching (肃清) in Chinese means “purge through cleansing. The Japanese term for the event translates into 
“great inspection”. See for a visual representation of the event, Liu Kang, Za sui hua ji = Chop suey (Singapore: 
Global Arts & Crafts Pte. Ltd., 2014; originally published in 1946). The “Double Tenth” incident refers to 
Japanese reprisals conducted on 10 October 1943. They were in response to Operation Jaywick, an operation 
carried out by the Allied Intelligence Bureau to destroy and to disrupt shipping in Keppel Harbor. Lee Geok 
Boi, The Syonan Years: Singapore under Japanese Rule 1942-1945 (Singapore: National Archives of 
Singapore; Epigram, c2005), pp. 105-116, and 229-230.  
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functioned on basic survival instincts.2 After they returned, the British attributed the many 
postwar social ills to the consequences of the Japanese military occupation, such as the 
bloating of Singapore’s population with refugees and displaced people, rampant malnutrition 
and diseases, shortages of food and other basic necessities, and a general breakdown in social 
order.3  
There were attempts at restoring some semblance of normalcy and social order after 
the chaos and confusion of battle. The Japanese Central Military Administration, or the 
Gunseikanbu, replaced British colonial administration.4 Throughout the occupation period the 
Japanese tried to keep the economy going by encouraging businesses to open.5 Singapore 
proper was overseen by the Tokubetusi, or municipal administration. Within the Tokubetusi, 
there were various departments including one for social welfare.6 In August 1942, Mamoru 
Shinozaki was designated Singapore’s Chief Welfare Officer. He had been Chief Education 
Officer earlier, but even then, he had spent more time doing “welfare work”, such as 
“receiving petitions, finding jobs for people, finding missing people, helping people back to 
their homes upcountry, distributing rice and sugar to the needy”.7  
 
                                                          
2 Lee, The Syonan Years, p. 287. 
3 The Social Welfare report stated: “War, and the pestilence of the Japanese occupation, left a wake of human 
wreckage in South East Asia”. The Education Department report described the period, “so far as concerned 
child education, was in the main one of suppression or distortion” (p. 2), and attributed “physical and mental 
strain and inevitable weakening” to “years of Japanese oppression”. (p. 5). The Medical Department report 
stated: “[T]here is no doubt that preventive medicine was grossly neglected by the Japanese, while curative 
treatment was continued by the Government Asiatic Staff without adequate assistance from the Enemy 
Occupying Authority” (p. 1). It observed that the 130,382 recorded deaths between 1942 and 1945 far exceeded 
the 59,361 recorded for a similar span (1937 to 1940). In four months alone (July to October 1944), recorded 
deaths “were more than three times as numerous as in the years before the war…” (p. 1). The principal causes of 
death during the Japanese occupation were beri-beri (total from 1943 to 1945: 15,412, compared to 653 in 
1937), infantile convulsions (10,808, to 1,792), pneumonia (8,705, to 1,851), tuberculosis (8,384, to 1,382), 
dysentery (5,156, to 200), malaria (5,337, to 428), and unspecified fevers (8,679 to 706). (p. 2). As a result, 
“The civil population was exceedingly under-nourished, malaria was rampant, beri-beri and other condition due 
to malnutrition affected a considerable number of inhabitants of the Island. Although the Japanese had done a 
certain amount of medical work, a great deal of important preventive and curative treatment had been grossly 
neglected”. (p. 11).  
4 Translated into English as Military Administration Department, or MAD. Lee, The Syonan Years, pp. 138-139. 
5 See Lee, The Syonan Years, pp. 141-152, and Paul H. Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social 
and Economic History (London: C. Hurst, 1998), chapter 6. 
6  The municipal administration included the following bureaus: General Affairs Bureau (Shomu-bu), Bureau of 
Welfare of People (Minsei-bu), Economic Bureau (Keisai-bu), and Undertaking Bureau ((Zigyo-bu). The 
Minsei-bui included the following departments: Promotion of Wellbeing of People (Kohsei-ka), Medical (Iryo-
ka), Education (Kyoiku-ka), Health, (Boeki-ka), and Town Cleansing (Seisoh-ka). See Lee Ah Chai, “Singapore 
under the Japanese, 1942-1945” (Unpublished academic exercise – Dept. of History, University of Malaya, 
1956), p. 8. Lee cited the Syonan Sinbun’s publication The Good Citizen Guide, published in Singapore in 1943. 
See also Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya, chapter 3, and Lee, The Syonan Years, pp. 140-142. 
7 Mamoru Shinozaki, My Wartime Experiences in Singapore (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
1973), p. 53. Before the war, Shinozaki worked in the Japanese embassy in Singapore, and was imprisoned for 
espionage activities. 
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Rationalizing his part in the war three decades after, Shinozaki had an interesting take 
on his role as welfare officer: “The main duty of the welfare department was to look after the 
welfare of the local citizens”.8 This was a Japanese official who not only helped administered 
a conquered territory and its peoples, but had moreover knowingly helped his countrymen 
plan an attack on Singapore in 1940.9 Shinozaki’s humanitarian efforts during the occupation 
have been documented, particularly his rescue of many Chinese during the sook ching 
campaign.10 Shinozaki also persuaded a seventy-two year old Dr. Lim Boon Keng to form 
and lead the Overseas Chinese Association. The Association was organized to “protect the 
Chinese community”, mainly via the rescue of hundreds of detained Chinese and their family 
members on the pretext of staffing the organization.11 Via Shinozaki’s efforts, the Association 
managed to obtain the blessing of senior figures in the Japanese military and the feared 
kempeitai.12 Using his high-level connections (as well as his semi-celebrity status as a former 
prisoner of the British), Shinozaki issued tens of thousands of “protection cards” to whoever 
came to him during the early weeks of the occupation.13 
His duties as welfare officer continued such efforts. They were multifaceted, 
reflecting the chaos and confusion brought about by war, and to some extent mirroring what 
was to follow after 1945. Besides providing assistance in the form of money or advice, 
Shinozaki’s welfare department also aided in the tracing of missing persons (and obtaining 
the release of some), helped people search for work, and also oversaw the “churches, boys’ 
home, girls’ home, convents”.14 Just as he was instrumental in the creation of the Overseas 
Chinese Association, Shinozaki was also involved in the establishment of the Syonan 
Eurasian Welfare Association and similar organizations for the Malay and Indian 
                                                          
8 Shinozaki, Wartime Experiences, p. 59. 
9 For his role, Shinozaki was incarcerated in Changi Prison until invading Japanese forces released him. In 
reading his oral history, we have to take into consideration that interviewee might have been attempting to 
rationalize his past actions for his contemporaries and future audiences. 
10 Shinozaki, Wartime Experiences. His oral history formed the basis of his published memoir, Syonan, My 
Story: The Japanese Occupation of Singapore (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1975).  
11 Shinozaki, Wartime Experiences, p. 29. 
12 The attitude shifted with a change in leadership in March 1942. New military administrators were less 
sympathetic and more demanding. One in particular, a Colonel Watanabe Wataru, demanded a donation of fifty 
million dollars from the Chinese community. Shinozaki also indicated that the “donation” drive might have been 
a follow-up in the search for anti-Japanese elements. From Shinozaki’s point of view, the original intent of the 
OCA was tainted by association in its role in soliciting donations. Shinozaki, Wartime Experiences, p. 26. 
13 Shinozaki, Wartime Experiences, pp. 19-21. 
14 Shinozaki, Wartime Experiences, p. 53. The homes referred to most likely were institutions formerly run by 
the Salvation Army and religious bodies.  
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communities.15 The general purpose for such organizations was to provide the individual 
communities, particularly the Chinese and Eurasians, with care and shelter in the form of an 
umbrella organization. He added that “any matter that did not come under the other 
departments would come under the Welfare Department”.16 
Shinozaki’s approach was part of a broader policy to encourage communities to take 
care of their own, sometimes with a bit of government assistance. The Federation of Christian 
Churches for instance received monthly grants from the Japanese administration starting 
November 1942 to disburse to its collected flock.17 Social welfare was not intended to be the 
exclusive purview of Shinozaki or the Japanese military administration. In 1943, a group of 
five Chinese siang tng (loosely translated as worshipper halls) came together to form the Blue 
Cross.18 Yap Pheng Geck, a banker in prewar Singapore, was present at a siang tng session 
where the medium (in a trance) called for action to help relieve the distress caused by war 
and occupation.19 A Teochew named Lim Soo Siam was also surprised by the medium’s 
urging, as he himself had been urged by Shinozaki to organize some form of relief efforts for 
the people of Singapore.20 The result was the Blue Cross, an organization that pledged to 
“serve the community in works of mercy and the relief of distress”, primarily by pooling the 
resources of the five siang tng.21 
The Blue Cross’ scope of welfare services was broad. It began with the collection of 
dead bodies from streets and their burial. Yap recalled that “quite a number of towkays 
(businessmen)” raised funds to acquire carts, labor and materials to construct makeshift 
coffins. The Blue Cross collected “seven to ten” bodies every day during its early days.22 The 
organization soon expanded its activities to include free food for “the needy and derelicts” via 
                                                          
15 See the oral history of Paglar’s son in NAS OHC, Eric Charles Pemberton Paglar. Japanese Occupation of 
Singapore. Accession Number 000299. Interviewed in 1983. Reels 3 and 4 (of 18), and relevant sections in 
Shinozaki’s memoir and oral interview. 
16 Shinozaki, Wartime Experiences, p. 60. See also Lee, “Singapore under the Japanese”, chapter V. 
17 Earnest Lau, From Mission to Church: The Evolution of the Methodist Church in Singapore and Malaysia, 
1885-1976 (Singapore: Genesis Books, c2008), pp. 161-164. See also Many Faces One Faith (Singapore: 
National Council of Churches of Singapore, 2004). 
18 The five groups were the Siew Teck, Nam Ann, Phoh Kiu, Thong Hong and Thong Teck. Siang tng literally 
translates to “Center of Charity”. Information on Blue Cross derived from Yap Pheng Geck, Scholar, Banker, 
Gentleman Soldier: The Reminiscences of Dr. Yap Pheng Geck; issued under the auspices of the Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore, Singapore: Times Books International, 1982). 
19 Yap, Scholar, Banker, Gentleman Soldier, p. 86. 
20 Yap, Scholar, Banker, Gentleman Soldier, p. 86. 
21 Yap, Scholar, Banker, Gentleman Soldier, p. 86. 
22 Yap, Scholar, Banker, Gentleman Soldier, p. 87-88. An adjunct organization called the Black Cross started 
soon after to take care of funeral and burial arrangements. In contrast to the Blue Cross, the Black Cross 
represented mostly the working class and was led by Chua Ho Ann. 
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mobile kitchens and feeding centers within the city.23 The Blue Cross also acted as a liaison, 
as a coordinating agent between different sections of the public so as to facilitate social 
services. One example was the provision of basic medical care via some “sixty or seventy 
Chinese sinsehs” (medicine men), which worked mainly as an extension of “peace-time 
services [provided by] charitable institutions like the Thong Chai Medical Centre ... and the 
Kwong Wai Shiu Free Hospital....”24 As the war drew to a close and Singapore was once 
again subjected to aerial bombing – this time by Allied aircraft – the Blue Cross also helped 
in organizing fire-fighting teams, emergency feeding and relief, and temporary 
accommodations. Yap recalled that donations and support for the Blue Cross came primarily 
from the public at large. Except for official recognition by the authorities and the freedom to 
conduct its activities, the Blue Cross was careful to avoid subsidies or other forms of support 
from the Japanese.25 
Just as the Second World War was a catalyst for change in British colonial and 
metropolitan social policy, wartime conditions in Singapore similarly encouraged, 
necessitated even, a more consolidated approach to social issues. Yap suggested that the Blue 
Cross initiative was the “first time” a collective effort was made to “relieve distress”, in 
contrast to the comparatively isolated prewar charitable institutions. Another “first” was 
Shinozaki’s role as Chief Welfare Officer. That was the first time a government of Singapore 
– albeit the Japanese version during wartime – assigned an official position for social welfare. 
Shinozaki’s personal interpretation of social welfare work as “any matter that did not come 
under the other departments would come under the Welfare Department”, is also strikingly 
similar to Lucy Mair’s presentation of social welfare work in the British Empire as “those 
aspects of social welfare which are not the special interest or concern of other Departments”. 
 
Life during the Japanese Occupation 
 
The above provides the broad contexts and considerations of war and occupation, 
which undoubtedly had affected the lives of many individuals. Still, an individual’s decisions 
and actions might not always have conformed to expectations or the anticipated narratives of 
                                                          
23 Yap, Scholar, Banker, Gentleman Soldier, p. 88. See also oral histories in NAS OHC of by Chia Kee Huat 
(Japanese Occupation of Singapore, Accession No: 000358, Reels 6 and 8); Lam Joo Chong (Chinese Dialect 
Groups, Accession No: 000989, Reel 17 of 26); and Tey Yan Hoon (Japanese Occupation of Singapore, 
Accession No: 000281, Reel 16).    
24 Yap, Scholar, Banker, Gentleman Soldier, p. 89.  
25 Yap, Scholar, Banker, Gentleman Soldier, p. 89.  
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broader histories. Last seen in Chapter 2, Augustin Gomez, Valentine Frois, and Wong were 
dealing with the fallout of the Great Depression. Gomez had been repatriated back to India in 
1932, but managed to return to Malaya in 1934, resuming work in a plantation estate in 
Pahang. Supported by family, Frois made a quicker recovery, finding employment as a wharf 
clerk for a shipping agency in Singapore. After several years of moving in search of work, 
Wong managed to secure a job working in the British naval base in Singapore. 
Gomez’ experiences during the occupation period were relatively uneventful. Similar 
to how local Malays were elevated to higher positions of responsibility in the absence of the 
British, the internment of the European estate manager meant Gomez ran the entire rubber 
estate. By 1943, he had saved enough from working on the estate as well as dabbling in the 
black market to strike out on his own. He opened a dispensary in Kuala Lumpur, 
notwithstanding his dubious credentials in administering and distributing medicines. When 
that fell through, he worked as a supervisor of a “Japanese-run cultivation project” on the 
outskirts of Kuala Lumpur where he remained until the British returned in September 1945.26 
Frois, on the other hand, did experience firsthand some of the violence the Japanese invasion 
brought to Singapore. He volunteered in an Air Raid Precaution squad to help deal with fires 
caused by incendiary bombs in the city area. He recalled widespread confusion, panicked 
evacuations, and looting in the city. He eventually took refuge in the countryside just before 
Singapore surrendered to the Japanese. After a while, he applied to the now Japanese-
controlled Harbour Board office for a job. What he did was not clear, but after a year, he was 
made a kepala (a headman) in charge of a crew of ten men operating and maintaining a “light 
generating plant” on a small island off Singapore.27 He worked in this capacity for the 
duration of the occupation, and appeared relatively secured of in terms of wages and food. 
Even though he had fallen ill with beriberi, incapacitating him for a time from work, his 
Japanese boss still retained his services. Valentine remained on the small island until the 
British returned. 
Frois’ experiences as a Eurasian were perhaps the exception rather than the norm. The 
Japanese had perceived Eurasians as staunch allies of the British. They spoke English, and 
many served in the Straits Settlements Volunteer Force.28 Other communities, in particular 
                                                          
26 Coelho, “Old Man on Public Assistance”. 
27 Coelho, “Old Man on Public Assistance”, pp. 75-76. The island was identified as Pulau Damar Laut, off 
Jurong in the west of the island 
28 Frois’ Portuguese rather than English or British heritage could have been the differentiating factor. See Lee, 
The Syonan Years, pp. 117-118. 
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the Chinese, also suffered. The harsh treatment meted out to the Chinese community by the 
Japanese has been well-documented, the prime example being the sook ching (or dai kensho) 
campaign that resulted in thousands dead or missing.29 The sook ching campaign had 
occurred early in the occupation period, but the brutality and trauma of the event, along with 
other incidents, such as the infamous “donation” of fifty million dollars, framed Chinese 
perceptions of the Japanese and Japan for years to come.  
Still, when the need to survive was urgent, one took any opportunity that came one’s 
way. Wong lost his job at the naval base as a result of the surrender. He initially kept a safe 
distance from the Japanese, until he needed a job.30 During the early weeks of the occupation, 
Wong resorted again to hawking, this time selling sundries and foodstuffs, such as vegetables, 
salted fish, onions and sundry goods. He also worked for a while with his brother-in-law who 
had a permit to sell rice and flour. The need to protect himself however soon forced Wong to 
ride a trishaw ferrying passengers. Wong had registered with the Japanese military 
administration as a trishaw rider to avoid being press-ganged into overseas labor parties, but 
eventually had to buy an actual trishaw and ride it because of new regulations. Conditions 
soon settled down sufficiently to allow Wong to work as a carpenter helping to build a 
“Japanese military unit” at Farrer Park.31 
Tan Beng Neo’s wartime experiences are also informative. The Salvation Army 
officer recalled being in tears when she heard of Singapore’s surrender. The immediate 
concern then was to ensure the Army’s girls’ home at Oxley Road had sufficient food 
supplies, and more importantly, remained safe from Japanese harassment. This was managed 
to some extent by hoarding money, stockpiling as much food as they could find, and 
obtaining an official Japanese document declaring the Oxley Road premises cleared safe by 
the military. The home continued at Oxley Road for another year and a half after the 
surrender, until Shinozaki moved them all to the premises of the Po Leung Kuk at York Hill.32 
Beng Neo recalled that by that time, nuns from the Order of the Good Shepherd were 
managing the home, though ensuring that the rescued prostitutes were separated from the 
                                                          
29 Lee, The Syonan Years, p. 105. 
30 Chia, “The Place of the Hawker”. 
31 Chia, “The Place of the Hawker”, pp. 6-7. 
32 Beng Neo’s personal recollections of Shinozaki’s efforts to cultivate trust, or at least a working relationship 
between the Japanese and local communities via social services, are interesting. She remembered picnic trips to 
the Japanese shrine in MacRitchie Reservoir, and once even to the Sultan’s palace in Johor. Shinozaki gave 
lectures on Japanese culture, and also once on the rationale for their presence in Singapore. Beng Neo went 
along but did not pay much attention. She was unhappy about having to be in close contact with the Japanese, 
but like others with her, felt she had no choice. 
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nuns’ own charges. The Catholic nuns and their wards were eventually moved out of York 
Hill to Bahau, as part of Shinozaki’s resettlement program for Catholics and Eurasians.33 The 
remaining children and staff were cared for by a Japanese family. Beng Neo had no further 
contact with the Salvation Army after they were moved to the Po Leung Kuk. The Salvation 
Army was, for all sense and purposes, defunct. The Salvation Army’s Caucasian officers were 
all rounded up and interned in Changi or in Sime Road camp.  Beng Neo herself moved 
around in search of food and work. Her recollections of the Japanese Occupation have a 
recurring theme of a constant search for food. After a few months at the Po Leung Kuk, she 
moved to Malacca ostensibly to work on farmable land. When that fell through, she returned 
to Singapore to work as a nurse in the Japanese-ran Kandang Kerbau Hospital.34 
Beng Neo, Wong, Frois, and Gomez were four individuals among thousands of others 
affected by economic slumps, war, occupation and then re-occupation by the British. Their 
individual life histories do not immediately fit conventional narratives of the Japanese 
Occupation of general suffering and deprivation, nor with the supposedly triumphant and 
welcomed return of the victorious British. The latter event was just as disruptive for some. 
Wong lost his wartime carpentry job and reverted to hawking to eke out a living. But unlike 
earlier where hawking was temporary, it was permanent this time as he could not return to 
work at the re-established British naval base.35 Beng Neo on the other hand reconnected with 
her fellow Salvation Army officers, rejoining them in time for the Salvation Army’s part in 
postwar recovery. 
 
Welfare during the British Military Administration 
 
The second atomic bomb, dropped on Nagasaki, and the Soviet Union’s declaration of 
war finally forced Japan to surrender on 15 August 1945. On the same day Emperor Hirohito 
made his radio broadcast publicly announcing Japan’s intent to surrender, the British issued a 
                                                          
33 As food shortages in Singapore worsened, Shinozaki was put in charge of a resettlement program in Johor. 
This was executed primarily through his welfare organizations, the Overseas Chinese Association and the 
Eurasian Welfare Association. By 1944, some 12,000 Chinese settled in Endau, while about 3,000 Eurasians 
(mostly Catholics) settled in Bahau. The Bahau settlement was less successful, claiming over a thousand lives. 
For a recent publication on the Bahau settlement, see Fiona Hodgkins, From Syonan to Fuji-Go: The Story of 
the Catholic Settlement in Bahau in WWII Malaya (Singapore: Select Publishing, 2014). 
34 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reels 10-15. 
35 At least up to the point of the sociological study by Chia Cheong Fook in 1954. Wong blamed the loss of his 
work pass for not being able to return to the naval base to work after the British return. Only former employees 
producing the pass were accepted. 
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proclamation establishing the British Military Administration in Malaya and Singapore.36 In 
doing so, British presence was officially reinstated after an absence of more than forty 
months. It was however a presence established only on paper as the British did not manage to 
return to Malaya and Singapore for another three weeks. The British had been amassing an 
invasion force, but they were caught out by the quick end to the war. As a result, they could 
not return as (re-)conquering heroes and reclaim any martial pride or moral authority lost in 
their ignominious defeat three and a half years before.37 Moreover, in the vacuum that ensued 
after the Japanese laid down their arms, elements of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese 
Army emerged from the jungles and moved into the urban areas before the British could 
return. They asserted a new-found (oft-times violent) authority which portended difficult days 
ahead for the British in Malaya and Singapore.38 
Advanced British units reached Penang on 2 September, Singapore on 5 September, 
and the Malay Peninsula proper on 9 September. The British Military Administration was 
officially established on 12 September after Lord Louis Mountbatten officially received the 
Japanese surrender in Southeast Asia. The British Military Administration was headed by the 
chief planner of the Malayan Planning Unit, Major-General Ralph Hone, who took on the 
designation Chief Civil Affairs Officer. Administrative functions were further divided into 
two divisions, one for Singapore and another for Malaya, each led by a Deputy Chief Civil 
Affairs Officer. 
 
The Social Cost of War and Occupation 
 
Singapore was spared much of the physical destruction and violence of a military re-
conquest when the Japanese surrendered in August 1945. Nevertheless, there was still much 
to do in terms of reconstruction and rehabilitation. Essential services such as water, gas and 
electricity were not completely neglected by the Japanese, but had been limited throughout 
the occupation. Port facilities, railways and roads had to be repaired to transport critical 
supplies, such as food and medicines. Even then, there were simply not enough vehicles.39 
                                                          
36 The Japanese signed the instrument of surrender on 2 September on board the USS Missouri. A copy of the 
proclamation can be found in NUSCL, CO 273/675/50822/56/3. “Military Administration re-occupation of 
Malaya fortnightly reports”. 
37 As noted by Bayly and Harper in Forgotten Wars, p. 12. 
38 See Cheah Boon Kheng’s Red Star over Malaya. The ensuing violence between the Malay and Chinese 
communities served as an indirect prelude to the armed Communist insurgency that began in 1948. 
39 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, p. 229; See also Harper, The End of Empire, pp. 40-41, and for a 
firsthand account, Oswald Wellington Gilmour, With Freedom to Singapore (London: Benn, 1950) 
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Oswald Wellington Gilmour, a member of the Malayan Planning Unit, was one of the 
first to set foot in Singapore on 5 September. A former employee of the Singapore Municipal 
Commissioners before the war, his immediate task was to take over from the Japanese offices 
and buildings so as to start up operations of “essential services” again, such as running water, 
electricity, etc. In a memoir, he recalled that “[o]n September 5th, [Singapore town] had, to 
all appearance been dead and virtually deserted”.40 Gilmour was first met by “two Indians 
and a Chinese boy” near the harbor wharf, who were apparently so dazed they could only 
respond with a “stupefied stare” to his greeting.41 But over the next couple of weeks: 
 
Gradually, the little shops opened…. Similarly, the street hawkers reappeared, 
each with his own peculiar noise-making instrument, a new noise each day 
indicating the revival of another hawking trade. The crowds in the streets got 
bigger and bigger and Singapore’s only remaining transport, the rickshaws and 
tri-shaws, multiplied exceedingly.42 
 
Gilmour recalled the immediate problems the British Military Administration 
confronted in the following weeks and months. There was not enough food, especially rice, 
for everyone in postwar Singapore. He wrote that people were “deplorably thin and hungry”, 
suffering from beriberi and other forms of malnutrition. Supplies of medicines and clothing 
were also insufficient, compounded by the shortages in transportation. The black market 
flourished and crime was rampant. The drastic measure of discontinuing Japanese currency as 
legal tender, while necessary, took its toll as many became paupers overnight.  Postwar 
Singapore also became a transit point for the thousands of refugees and displaced persons 
from Malaya and Southeast Asia. The Javanese in particular formed a substantial number, 
having been press-ganged into labor parties and then cast aside, waiting to be “picked up 
from the streets in a wretched or dying condition”.43 What goodwill liberation brought 
dissipated as dissatisfaction with the British increased. 
The above is extracted from Gilmour’s memoir, a recollection from a government 
official’s point of view of the key problems that vexed postwar Singapore. For contrast, the 
following observations come from a member of the Anglican Church who arrived in 
Singapore in early October 1945. Writing in June 1946, David Rosenthal, Bishop’s 
Commissary and Chaplain to St. Andrew’s Cathedral, identified three “grave injuries” done to 
                                                          
40 Gilmour, With Freedom to Singapore, p. 103. 
41 Gilmour, With Freedom to Singapore, p. 89. 
42 Gilmour, With Freedom to Singapore, p. 103. 
43 Gilmour, With Freedom to Singapore, pp. 139-140. Yap also mentioned scores of “Indonesian” men in the 
streets in his memoir. 
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the people of Singapore by the Japanese occupation. They were interrupted education, 
disruption to family life, and the “demoralisation of young people”. 
 
Interrupted education: There are large numbers of young men and women who 
were at school in 1942 and who should now be wage-earners or well on their 
way to a professional career. Instead, they are either back at school again, or 
working through pressure of family need at unskilled or semi-skilled jobs, 
without future and without scope for their undeveloped talents. This excising 
of three and a half most valuable years from the lives of many promising 
future citizens will have a serious effect on the growing democracy of 
Singapore and Malaya. 
 
Disruption to family life: [T]he saddest part … is the number of fatherless 
children and widows. There is still no accurate count of the men who were 
either slaughtered in Singapore or taken away for forced labour to an exile 
from which they will never return. 
 
Demoralization of youths: have spent their formative years in an atmosphere 
of suspicion, brutality, fear and gross and unashamed bestiality. They cannot 
help being infected with the feeling that these things are commonplace. They 
have to a large extent lost their instinctive disgust and horror of what the 
civilised world calls evil. Their reeducation is by no means hopeless but it is 
going to be difficult.44 
 
Notwithstanding a fair bit of embellishment in the those observations, they do focus our 
attention more on the social cost of war and occupation. Rosenthal’s observations do not 
fundamentally contradict Gilmour’s memories. But they add detail and depth, hence give a 
sense of urgency compared to the more detached listing of problems. For instance, Rosenthal 
narrated an example of a surgeon friend who hesitated to perform emergency surgery, 
because the absence of adequate nutrition enfeebled patients so much that the risks of an 
operation “outweighed the chances of the patient’s recovery without it”.45 
The human condition was probably at its lowest point, suffering as most did from 
malnutrition and physical and mental hardships during the occupation. There was a multitude 
of problems confronting the military government, but most of them could be attributed to the 
general shortage of food and medical supplies, and the lack of ways and means of support. As 
a nurse during the Japanese Occupation, Beng Neo went on rounds giving vitamin B doses 
(either via an intravenous drip or through intramuscular injections) for three hundred 
Japanese dollars per dose. She did not expand on this activity much, but it is likely this was 
                                                          
44 The Malaya Tribune, 1 June 1946, “The Malayan Welfare Council”. 
45 The Malaya Tribune, 1 June 1946, “The Malayan Welfare Council”. 
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done on the side to supplement her income. Beng Neo recalled the condition of a woman she 
encountered:  
 
Well, this woman was eating tapioca skin. I was horrified. She had no rice, no 
money to buy even tapioca. So she went to the dustbins and picked up the 
skin, washed the skin… you know the dark of the skin, scraped it off and 
cooked the rest for food.… She was staying in Amoy Street.… It was a 
slum…. We climbed up the steps. The steps were filthy. But she kept her room 
fairly clean. And there were some planks and things along one side of the wall 
where everybody would sleep. And I think the boys slept on the floor at night. 
There were lots of pillows and blankets and things like that, all piled up. She 
had only that one room. Everyone [a household of eight persons] was in that 
room.46 
 
One British Military Administration file, entitled “Application for Relief”, contained 
numerous letters seeking assistance for a range of problems. These included concerned 
citizens seeking assistance for those they had encountered in the streets. Bujang bin Awang 
for instance requested help for an old Malay beggar woman who was reduced to sleeping on 
the five-foot ways (the pedestrian walkways of shop-houses between the shop and the road) 
near Sultan Mosque. (She had lost her sons in the war).47 Wives of servicemen wrote in 
requesting assistance to locate their husbands lost in the fighting (and some financial 
assistance to help tide them over).48 There were Europeans seeking assistance and even 
redress for war damages. An employee with The Straits Times appealed directly to Ralph 
Hone and unashamedly asked for $5,000 to cover his immediate living expenses and an 
additional $30,000 to replace lost cash (even though he had been reemployed at the re-
launched broadsheet).49 Locals, who were ex-servicemen or had worked for the British 
military services before the war, also wrote in seeking work, back-pay and compensation for 
hardships suffered during the occupation, or for immediate relief from dire circumstances.50 
Notwithstanding the end of hostilities, there was an instance where a Chinese woman was 
refused food rations despite her own exemplary behavior, due to the fact that her Dutch 
husband had aided the Japanese during the occupation.51  
 
 
                                                          
46 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 15. 
47 NAS, BMA HQSD 139/45. Bujang Awang to DCCAO BMA Singapore, 8 November 1945. 
48 NAS, BMA HQSD 139/45. Various. 
49 NAS, BMA HQSD 139/45. Richard Sidney to Ralph Hone, 30 September 1945 
50 NAS, BMA HQSD 139/45. Various. 
51 NAS, BMA HQSD 139/45. 6 December 1945. 
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Introducing Social Welfare: The Malayan Welfare Council 
 
Plans were in motion to address some of the (more reasonable) requests above, and 
overall social needs. One day after Mountbatten received the Japanese surrender, Ralph Hone 
convened a meeting on 13 September 1945 to discuss the “coordination and problems 
regarding the welfare and health of the peoples in Malaya”.52  It included representatives 
from various charitable institutions and welfare organizations in Singapore, including the 
Salvation Army, the various Christian churches and the Blue Cross, government officials, and 
Lady Louis Mountbatten as the representative of the Joint War Organization of the British 
Red Cross and St. John Ambulance Brigade. 
During the meeting, the Bishop of Singapore (Reverend John Leonard Wilson) 
estimated that there were 10,000 to 50,000 persons who needed money and food 
immediately.53  Two Chinese ministers from the Chinese Methodist Church reiterated that the 
British decision to discontinue the Japanese legal tender (commonly known as the banana 
note) was a severe inconvenience to the population.54 Leong Siew Tai, a member of the Red 
Swastika Society, said that about 4,000 people were being attended to every day at six 
medical centers established by the Society.55 He also added that the Japanese currency he 
possessed was useless in supporting the Society’s activities. Hans Schweizer, the delegate of 
the International Red Cross for Malaya, mentioned that there were tens of thousands of 
Chinese who were destitute and in concentration camps.56 Representing the Blue Cross, Yap 
Pheng Geck noted that the health situation needed immediate attention. He also listed the 
following “priority needs”: 
 
(a) Opening of free hospitals. 
(b) A free hospital solely for consumptives. 
(c) Inoculation of the people against outbreaks of diseases which would be 
inevitable at this time (cholera, typhoid, etc.) 
                                                          
52 NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45. Meeting minutes, 13 September 1945. Reported in The Straits Times, 15 
September 1945, “70 Trained Women Welfare Workers”. 
53 He arrived in Singapore from Hong Kong in July 1941 and was Bishop until 1948. An introductory biography 
of Bishop Wilson (1870 to 1970) can be found here: http://www.far-eastern-heroes.org.uk/keeping_the_faith/.  
54 Rev. Goh Hood Keng shared with the meeting that a “large sum of Japanese currency” donated for relief 
purposes was now useless. His compatriot, Rev. Chew Hock Him, stressed the urgent need for currency. NAS, 
BMA HQSD 64/45. Minutes of meeting dated 13 September 1945. 
55 For more information on the Red Swastika Society, see memo in BMA HQSD 64/45, dated September 1945. 
56  Schweizer was the Delegate for the International Committee of the Red Cross to Malaya and 
Singapore.During the sook ching, Chinese were “concentrated” at various locations in the island for screening 
purposes, most times for several days at a stretch. It is not clear if these “camps” continued after the sook ching 
process. See Lee, The Syonan Years. Also mentioned by Shinozaki who called them “concentration centres”, in 
Wartime Experiences, pp. 25-26. 
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(d) Re-organisation of leper hospitals. Lepers had been allowed to go about in 
the streets, mixing with the population and spreading this disease. The 
hospitals should be extended and properly organized so that the victims 
would be encouraged to stay there. The same applied to mental homes. 
(e) Roadside Destitutes – Javanese coolies. These should be collected and 
properly organized. 
(f) Travelling Dispensaries should be formed to help those who need medical 
aid and are unable to reach a centre. 
(g) The services of all the charitable institutions in Singapore should be 
used.57 
 
The conference served as the prelude to the “Social Welfare Advisory Committee”, 
whose formation was anticipated in the social welfare policy (discussed in Chapter 2). The 
directive had envisioned a collaborative effort between government and charitable and 
voluntary organizations, with the latter taking the lead in identifying and addressing social 
problems. On the surface, it would appear that the drafters of the policy directive anticipated 
correctly the need for collaboration. The observations made by Yap, Schweizer, Bishop 
Wilson and others, provide an overview of the social conditions and immediate needs in the 
wake of the Japanese Occupation. The individuals and institutions called to the meeting 
represented Singapore (and Malayan) society at that time. In addition to wartime welfare 
organizations like the Blue Cross, representatives from the Anglican and Methodist Churches, 
the Salvation Army, Indian and Muslim communities were also present. 
Interestingly, welfare organizations connected to the Japanese military government 
were excluded, such as the Overseas Chinese Association or the Eurasian Welfare 
Association. Representing the communities most under threat during the occupation, these 
associations had worked closely with the Japanese, particularly in the resettlement projects in 
Endau and Bahau in Johor.58 After the war, the British attempted to convict the president of 
the Eurasian Welfare Association, Dr. Charles Paglar (born to a British father and Indian 
mother), for treason.59 There was perhaps a slightly vengeful atmosphere introduced by the 
returning British during the immediate postwar period. This was evident during the 13 
September conference, where Yap apparently felt sufficiently self-conscious to state on record 
                                                          
57 NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45. Meeting minutes, 13 September 1945. 
58 See Lee, The Syonan Years. 
59 The trial was eventually adjourned without a verdict after an emotionally charged testimony by Shinozaki 
defending the actions of Paglar and other community leaders implicated by the British for treason. Paglar was 
only acquitted of the treason charge much later. See Denyse Tessensohn, “The British Military Administration's 
Treason Trial of Dr. Charles Joseph Pemberton Paglar, 1946”. (Unpublished MA Thesis, NUS Department of 
History, 2007). Dr. Lim Boon Keng was never persecuted for his role as President of the Overseas Chinese 
Association. 
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that his wartime welfare activities “naturally” puts him under suspicion.60 Such instances 
provide an interesting contrast between social welfare, as understood in general terms, and 
the politics of welfare. An ideally uncomplicated, arguably universal, process of providing 
care and comfort to the needy was unavoidably complicated by perceptions of choices made 
during wartime. 
Politics was obvious during the 13 September meeting. A sign of things to come, 
conference members could not agree on an appropriate person to preside over the council. 
Hone initially suggested a member of his staff be appointed to lead the council. In response, 
Herbert Lord from the Salvation Army preferred a non-government figure instead, and 
suggested the Bishop of Singapore as an alternative. Highlighting that welfare work would 
“concern medical and health problems” (and perhaps not wishing social welfare to be too 
closely connected to religion), a Dr. Hopkins (listed as “Govt. Medical Officer, Singapore”) 
suggested the former Director of Civil Medical Services of the Straits Settlements take the 
position. The recorded minutes stated rather blandly that after “further discussion, it was 
decided” that Hone be appointed as President for “time being”.61 In doing so, the policy 
directive was followed to the letter. But the small disagreement was indicative of conflicts to 
come between government and voluntary societies and charitable organizations. 
The following day on 14 September, the Malayan Welfare Council met for the first 
time. Compared to the gathering the day before, the meeting now included the Young Men 
Christian Association, Young Women Christian Association, the Buddhist Association, the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, representatives from privately-run hospitals and homes as 
well as the Indian community.62 The main agenda for the meeting was to draft and approve a 
charter for the Council’s activities. The charter made it clear it was not an executive body. 
Instead, the Council was to advise the British Military Administration on all matters 
concerning social welfare. The Council could and was empowered by the charter to 
                                                          
60 NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45. 13 September 1945. Yap was in the presence of those who had been interned and 
tortured. For example, Bishop Wilson, the head of the Anglican Church, had been detained and tortured by the 
Kempeitai during the Double Tenth incident in 1943. 
61 NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45. 13 September 1945. 
62 The full list is as follows (spelling as in document): Salvation Army & Children’s Aid Society (represented by 
Commissioner H. A. Lord); Chinese Chamber of Commerce (represented by Richard Lim), “Kho Su Lim” 
(Buddhist Association) (Koh Toon Hor), Tong Shui Hospital (Ng Seng Peng), Kwong Wai Siu Free Hospital 
(Hong Peng Shing), World Red Swastika Society (Leon Siew Tai and Loh Seng Tak), Indian Relief (Dr J. T. P. 
Handy), YMCA (Rev. John Handy and Rosalind Foo), Municipal Infant Welfare Dept., Convents & The Sisters 
of the Poor (Dr. Mary Tan), Blue Cross Workers (Chinese Charitable Institutions Union) (Yap Pheng Geck), 
International Red Cross (Hans Schweizer), YWCA (Jean Begg and Nancy Russell), Red Cross (Enid 
Fernandes), The Home for the Destitute (Chinese) (Shao Ching Yuan), Red Cross Co-ordination (Commissioner 
McConchie). See NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45.   
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“formulate and inaugurate” new welfare schemes as it saw fit. But the postwar situation and 
the lack of resources meant that the Council and its executive committees relied heavily on 
the British Military Administration. This was despite the latter’s position of not taking on 
long-term the burden of social welfare on its own. Indeed, it was recorded in the charter that 
voluntary effort should be “fostered and encouraged” so as to eventually relax “Government 
control and financial assistance”.63 In the meantime however, it was recognized that 
Government, in the form of the British Military Administration, would have to take the lead. 
Postwar society in general was in no shape to respond substantially to appeals for assistance 
or donations. At the behest of the Council, Hone made a direct appeal to the War and Colonial 
Offices in London for start-up funds to establish a Malayan Relief and Welfare Fund, and to 
also help contact Malayan Associations around the world for donations.64 
The Malayan Welfare Council was short-lived. It met for a sum total of ten times in a 
period of eight months (between September 1945 and May 1946).65 The Council functioned 
more effectively as the umbrella organization for Regional Executive Committees established 
throughout British Malaya. As the British reasserted control in Malaya, more regional 
committees were formed.66 Those committees focused on relieving postwar distress, 
soliciting assistance (monetary or in kind) on a Pan-Malayan platform, and distributing 
received aid to identified needs. These included relief supplies (mostly food and clothing) 
from various Red Cross organizations and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Agency, organizing a fund-raising event in early 1946, and the management of the Malayan 
Welfare and Relief Fund. Social issues with longer-term ramifications and their possible 
solutions were also discussed during meetings, laying the foundations for Singapore and 
Malaya’s postwar social policy. The Council endorsed broad policy initiatives either from its 
regional committees or the British Military Administration, namely to address malnutrition, 
to introduce initiatives for youth development, and to restart the rehabilitation of child 
prostitutes. The Council provided money to establish Singapore’s first youth clubs as well as 
a training school to house former child prostitutes. Victor Purcell, in his capacity as the 
                                                          
63 NUSCL, CO 273/677/7 (50957). Malayan Welfare Council Charter. 
64 See correspondence in NUSCL, CO 273/677/8 (50957/1). The British Treasury gave a grant of £1,000 and the 
Colonial Office helped contact various Malayan Associations around the world. See also NAS, BMA HQSD 
64/45, 3 Oct 1945 meeting. 
65 Minutes of MWC meetings can be found in BMA HQSD 64/45 (first meeting: 14 Sept; second: 3 Oct; third: 8 
Oct), BMA HQSD 34/46 (eighth: 11 March 1946, and ninth: 29 March 1946), and Colonial Secretary Office 
(CSO) 1142/46 (tenth: 27 May 1946).  
66 No direct information. By the end of 1945, committees were formed for Penang and Kedah, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malacca and Seremban, and Ipoh. NAS BMA HQSD 64/1945. Committees for the states of Selangor, Pahang, 
Perak, Kedah, Penang, Kelantan, and Johore were formed by January 1946. NAS, BMA HQSD 34/46. 
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administration’s Adviser for Chinese Affairs, urged both the Council and the British Military 
Administration to provide the resources for a home to protect and rehabilitate child 
prostitutes.67 The status of the Council was affected by the political separation of Singapore 
from the Malayan Union in April 1946. Singapore had been administered as part of the 
Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements until 1942. Although there was substantial lobbying 
for the Pan-Malayan approach to continue, the official standpoint that the Council should be 
split to better reflect the two different administrations held.68 The Malayan Welfare Council 
officially ended on 27 May 1946 at its tenth meeting. 
 
Implementing Social Welfare: The Singapore Executive 
 
One week after the first meeting of the Malayan Welfare Council, the Regional 
Executive Committee for Singapore (hereafter Singapore Executive) met for the first time in 
the evening of 18 September 1945.69 Very little is recorded of the Singapore Executive’s 
activities. The organization’s archival record is scattered and newspaper reports on its 
activities are scanty and at time confusing. The one public record of the Singapore 
Executive’s activities is an article published in The Malaya Tribune on 1 June 1946. Its 
author, David Rosenthal, was the Singapore Executive’s organizing secretary. In broadly 
sketching the postwar social problems and some of its remedies, Rosenthal noted most of the 
work was done through sub-committees for Medical, Relief, Education, and Youth.  
Through those sub-committees, the Singapore Executive was responsible for starting 
a feeding scheme for infants and under-nourished schoolchildren, providing financial 
assistance, and also helped locals to continue or further their studies in British or overseas 
universities. For youths, Rosenthal also claimed the Singapore Executive made the initial 
proposals to establish a juvenile court and a supporting probationary system. To help with 
social rehabilitation, the Singapore Executive also started a couple of boys’ clubs and made 
plans to assist young women and girls pressed into prostitution during the occupation 
                                                          
67 As the BMA Adviser for Chinese Affairs, Victor Purcell noted the urgency of a home for the “protection and 
rehabilitation of child prostitutes” and that “girls of 10-25 [years of age] are suffering from venereal disease. 
NAS, BMA HQSD 34/46. Memo to CCAO, HQ BMA(S), Kuala Lumpur, 25 March 1946. 
68 NAS, BMA HQSD 34/46. Minutes of meeting dated 11 March 1946 and 29 March 1946. Decision to split 
was taken at latter meeting. The regional executive committees were divided over the question of a single or two 
welfare councils to replace the Malayan Welfare Council. Singapore Social Welfare Council inaugurated in July 
1946, while the Malaya counterpart, the Central Welfare Council, was inaugurated in June 1946. Reported as 
“Malayan Central Welfare Council” in The Straits Times, 25 June 1946.  
69 Minutes of meetings can be found in BMA CH (Chinese Affairs) 27/45 (18 Sept and one undated), BMA 
HQSD 64/45 and BMA HQSD 34/46. 
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period.70 The Singapore Executive was a microcosm of the Malayan Welfare Council. It was 
similarly constituted, which was a mix of government officials, representatives from 
voluntary and welfare organizations, and officials from prewar government departments (in 
particular those concerning public health).71 The Singapore Executive was active throughout 
the military administration period and during the early months of the civil administration. The 
first and subsequent two meetings were originally chaired by the Bishop of Singapore. From 
October 1945, the Singapore Executive was chaired by Dr. William John Vickers until the 
committee’s dissolution in 1946.72 
Vickers was appointed by the British Military Administration and the specific choice 
of Patrick McKerron, the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer for Singapore.73 To be sure, a 
medical doctor was preferred to lead the Malayan Welfare Council as welfare work was 
generally associated with “medical and health problems”.74 The issues that dominated the 
Singapore Executive’s first meeting reflected the rationale for the government’s choice of 
chairman. There were thousands of refugees, displaced individuals, freed internees and 
prisoners of war (arriving from elsewhere in Southeast Asia and Asia), most if not all 
suffering from malnutrition and in urgent need of medical care. Hospital space, medicines 
and medical staff were at a premium. This raised real concerns about the unchecked spread of 
diseases and a consequent breakdown in social order.75 The British Military Administration’s 
primary objective – at least in the area of social welfare – was to ensure “that nobody within 
Singapore Island actually starved, and in getting destitutes off the streets into homes and 
hospitals where they could be fed and looked after”.76 Still, the decision to have a 
government official lead the Singapore Executive was made somewhat covertly.77 It was 
never overtly stated the Council or its equivalent should be government-controlled, only that 
                                                          
70 The Malaya Tribune, 1 June 1946, “The Malayan Welfare Council”. 
71 List (as recorded): Col. R. Walkingshaw (CASM?); Dr Mary Tan (Municipal Health); John Eber; Col JW 
Scharf (HQBMA) Loh Seng Tak (Red Swastika); Richard Lim Chuan Hoe; Maj. BR Madden; Lt. Col. HA Lord 
(Salvation Army); Paul Samy; Rev. JTN Handy; Bishop Wilson; Rev. Olcamendy; Hans Schweizer; Enid 
Fernandes; Major J Pickering (BMA); Lt. Col. Matthews. 
72 Vickers was formerly with the Malayan Medical Service, serving in the Malay states from 1925 to the 1930s. 
He left Malaya before the Second World War, serving in Palestine and the West Indies overseeing development 
and welfare matters (in particular nutrition). He arrived in Singapore in October 1945 with the BMA and later 
became the Director for Medical Services in the civil administration from April 1946. 
73 NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45. File minutes. McKerron was formerly from the Malayan Civil Service. He was 
based in Trengganu in the 1920s as District Officer and acted as Resident in Brunei in the 1930s. Information 
taken from Awang Goneng, Growing up in Trengganu (Monsoon, 2007), p. 182.  
74 As stated during the preliminary meeting on 13 September. In NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45. 
75 NAS, BMA CH 27/45. 
76 NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45. Pickering (SO2 Refugees and Displaced Persons Branch) to DCCAO, 26 Sept 
1945 
77 NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45. File minutes. 
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a “Social Welfare Officer” be appointed to coordinate welfare work between government and 
society. Leading members from non-government organizations, such as Lord from the 
Salvation Army, were also eager to have one of their own lead the Malayan Welfare Council. 
The failure to come to a consensus led to Hone, the highest authority in the British Military 
Administration, assuming the position of President instead. Vickers’ appointment to the 
Singapore Executive reflected two issues: the welfare work urgently needed, and political 
expedience in managing the expectations of a mixed committee.  
After the Singapore Executive’s second meeting, a memo addressed to McKerron 
hinted at brewing tensions with the British Military Administration.78 The memo noted 
“general criticism of the Government regarding the lack of action in concern with relief to 
families whose menfolk were killed or displaced during the Japanese regime, persons who are 
unemployable through ill health of old age....”79 Inquiries were also made regarding 
compensation for property and items looted by the Japanese. Emotions were sufficiently 
charged for McKerron to personally attend the next meeting on 2 October. During the 
meeting, the government, represented by McKerron, was to address the claims of volunteers, 
members from irregular military units, and “passive defence” service personnel. It was 
observed that “the issue of an allowance to Resistance Army personnel” (from the Malayan 
Anti-Japanese People’s Army) had caused “a lot of dissatisfaction”. McKerron could only 
reassure the gathering that the matter was being handled. He also drew a distinction between 
his responsibility over civil affairs and military matters, and referred inquiries regarding relief 
for volunteers and their dependents to the military authorities.80 
Although not raised again in subsequent Singapore Executive meetings, the matter of 
claims by non-military personnel dragged on beyond the committee and 1945. It became one 
of several postwar instances that gradually removed the shine of liberation and victory, 
widening the gap between British and non-British, between colonizer and the colonized.81 
Within a month of its establishment, the British Military Administration’s authority was 
forcefully questioned, and not entirely without reason either. What appeared to be an 
                                                          
78 NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45. Pickering (SO2 Refugees and Displaced Persons Branch) to DCCAO, 26 Sept 
1945. Minutes of the second meeting of the Singapore Executive (dated 25 September 1945) cannot be found at 
time of writing to corroborate. 
79 NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45. Pickering (SO2 Refugees and Displaced Persons Branch) to DCCAO, 26 Sept 
1945. 
80 NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45. Minutes of meeting 2 October. 
81 As gleaned by a brief scan of newspapers reporting on the issue. In 1946: The Straits Times, 21 May 1946, 
Page 4 “The Burning Question of Asiatic Back Pay”; The Straits Times, 21 July 1947, Page 4 “Another 
Disgusted Britisher On Burning Questions”; The Singapore Free Press, SEPT 20, 1947. “After Two Years”. 
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uncomplicated issue of basic relief suddenly became political, going by McKerron’s personal 
intervention in a Singapore Executive meeting. At that point in time, the Singapore Executive 
was chaired, albeit on temporary basis, by Bishop Wilson. The British Military 
Administration ensured his successor was a government official. That might have been 
coincidental and Dr. Vickers was genuinely thought to be the right person for the job. But it is 
also interesting how quickly a plea for compensation for services rendered during the defense 
of Singapore became a perceived challenge to the authority of the British. 
 
Meeting Immediate Needs 
 
Tensions and politics aside, the Singapore Executive did move quickly to address 
various social problems. Within days of its first meeting, a Citizen’s Advice Bureau was set 
up at the Old Supreme Court, modeled after similar bureaus established in Britain at the 
beginning of the Second World War.82 The Bureau’s purpose was twofold. First to register 
and organize the inquiries of anxious families attempting to locate loved ones who had gone 
missing during the occupation period.83 Second, to act as a point of contact between 
government and society so as to pass on advice and information as needed. It was managed 
first by Yap Pheng Geck, and was later absorbed into the government’s Refugee and 
Displaced Persons Branch.84 The Citizen’s Advice Bureau was one of many initiatives 
conceptualized and implemented by the Singapore Executive. Sub-committees were 
eventually established, each reflecting the social issues that urgently needed attention. 
Following Refugees and Displaced Persons, sub-committees for Medical, Education, Relief, 
Youth and Finance soon followed. 
The work of the Singapore Executive was an interesting mix of short- and long-term 
initiatives. The short-term objectives primarily involved keeping on top of medical and public 
health concerns. Shortages in medical supplies were further compounded by shortages in 
food, transportation and medical personnel. The British’s drastic policy of doing away with 
the Japanese currency also severely affected capabilities to provide aid, such as the Blue 
Cross had to cut back on its operations for a shelter for destitutes.85 The increasing numbers 
                                                          
82 The Straits Times, 1 October 1945, “Tracing the Missing”. The Citizen’s Advice Bureau first appeared in 
Britain and can be traced to Betterton Report on Public Assistance in 1924. See 
http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/index/aboutus/factsheets/ourhistory.htm. Accessed 16 January 2015. 
83 The scale and implications of the sook ching massacres were not known in the immediate aftermath of war. 
84 See final report of BMA Refugee and Displaced Persons Branch in NAS, BMA 294/45. 
85 NAS, BMA CH 27/45. Singapore Executive first meeting – 18 September 1945 
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of refugees and others transiting Singapore was also not immediately met by a corresponding 
increase in space to accommodate them. In September 1945, it was estimated that there were 
roughly 1,200 hospital beds in total to cater to the entire civilian population.86 
By October 1945, the Singapore Executive had identified food shortages as a key 
cause of malnutrition and other diseases.87 The Relief Sub-Committee originally planned to 
open “soup kitchens” throughout the city to feed the hungry population, encouraged by the 
British Military Administration’s promise of “abundant” food supplies. In its eagerness 
perhaps to begin welfare work, the position of government representatives during sub-
committee meetings was apparently misrepresented. The British Military Administration felt 
the food scheme was “dangerous” as it was still uncertain about the level of food stocks. The 
official in question, a Major Wright, pleaded that he was “badly misquoted” in the minutes of 
the meeting.88 Receiving the bad news, the Singapore Executive shelved the “soup kitchen” 
plan until such time that the “Government is ready to support it and make it a success”.89 
The Medical Sub-Committee, a mix of representatives from the British Military 
Administration and voluntary organizations, was only marginally more successful in 
establishing a free feeding scheme for infants and school-going children. In late November 
1945, the Singapore Executive, in collaboration with the government’s Medical and 
Education Departments, publicly announced a limited feeding program for children and 
infants attending three public schools and three municipal clinics.90 From its inception to the 
end of British Military Administration on 31 March 1946, the scheme provided close to a 
quarter of a million free meals, feeding on average over 2,000 children each day.91 
Clean statistics however hide a more complex tale of official reluctance and social 
pressures. Food and monetary grants, to the tune of $10,000 for the first month and thereafter 
$25,000 for each recurring month (matching equal amounts from private sources), were to be 
provided by the British Military Administration. But upon learning of the scheme’s recurring 
costs, the administrators balked. It vetoed the continuation of the scheme beyond December 
1945, giving reasons of inadequate supplies of rice, sugar and salt, and the “unwillingness to 
commit Civil Government” to such a scheme – unless the Colonial Office in London 
                                                          
86 NAS, BMA CH 27/45. The beds were in the following hospitals: Tan Tock Seng, Kandang Kerbau, St. 
Andrew’s and Middle Road. The General Hospital was primarily for transiting POWs and Internees. 
87 See for overview of health conditions in Malaya overall (including Singapore), Kratoska, The Japanese 
Occupation of Malaya, pp.319-324.  
88 NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45. File minute dated October 1945. 
89 NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45. Minutes of meetings on 6 and 13 November 1945. 
90 The Straits Times, 30 November 1945, “Scheme to Feed Singapore Children”. 
91 The Straits Times, 31 July 1946, “Feeding Scheme to be enlarged”. 
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concurred. That mainland Malaya would also wish for such a scheme and hence driving up 
recurring expenses was also a contributory factor.92 The Singapore Executive – both official 
and non-government members – was outraged. The committee drafted, in the presence of its 
representatives, a strongly worded statement criticizing the actions of the British Military 
Administration:  
 
This Committee views with the greatest apprehension the statement of the 
B.M.A. that it is unable to provide either rice, sugar or salt for the emergency 
feeding scheme now in operation, and that approval of financial assistance 
would probably be so long delayed as to make continuance of this scheme 
impossible in any circumstances. With the greatest regret, therefore, this 
Committee is compelled to abandon the scheme already started.93 
 
Privately, personal appeals were made to higher authority. Vickers followed up the 
Singapore Executive’s statement with a semi-official memo addressed to McKerron. The 
former observed that “mal-nutrition in Singapore Island is a prime cause of much of the 
sickness and disease now prevalent....” He warned of an “inevitable rise in the sickness rate” 
should the scheme be discontinued along with the cuts in rice rations.94 At the same time, a 
Colonial Office representative overseeing nutritional matters in Malaya, William M. Clyde, 
disputed the official reason for not wanting to burden succeeding civil government. He noted 
that quite to the contrary, the Colonial Office’s policy was to encourage such schemes.95 A 
parliamentarian from the British Labour Party also got involved. Having seen the scheme in 
operation firsthand in Singapore, Harold Davis petitioned the Secretary of State for War to 
intervene in a local matter, warning of a potential “medical and political disaster”.96 
Commissioner Herbert Lord of the Salvation Army stated the value of the scheme was 
“incontestable”. It would help deal with “chronic and wide-spread” malnutrition, and would 
also help reinforce public opinion in the context of falling rice rations. Lord noted the 
scheme’s political value, observing that “members of the Leftist groups” were “greatly 
                                                          
92 NAS, BMA HQSD 432/45. 10 December 1945. Controller of Finance and Accounts to DCCAO, BMA HQ 
Singapore Division. 
93 NAS, BMA HQSD 64/45. 11 December 1945. 
94 NAS, BMA HQSD 432/45. Vickers to McKerron, 13 December 1945.  
95 NAS, BMA HQSD 432/45. Clyde to McKerron, 27 December 1945. 
96 NAS, BMA HQSD 432/45. Undated cable telegram from Harold Davis to Secretary of State for War. Cable 
read: “Learn with dismay decision requiring BMA discontinue expenditure free meals school children from 
public funds. Troopers 130247 refers. Having personally seen present arrangements consider discontinuance 
medical and political disaster present circumstances. Understand decision contrary Colonial Office policy other 
colonies. Request immediate reconsideration in consultation Colonial Office enable present limited scheme at 
least continue”. 
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impressed” with the scheme.97 Public opinion was strongly in favor of the scheme. A Straits 
Times reporter also informed an official that “The people are saying, “We have had a lot of 
promises but here is the B.M.A. really doing something for us at last!”98 
The response from the Singapore Executive caught the government’s attention 
immediately. As 1945 drew to a close, the shine had definitely come off British liberation. 
Sections of the population felt their contributions during the war had gone unacknowledged. 
Already made penniless overnight by the drastic measure in discontinuing Japanese currency, 
the entire population was asked to expect further cuts in rice rations, which would eventually 
plunge to a point lower than during the Japanese occupation. Set up for wartime 
administration, the military government was not adequately prepared to govern in peacetime 
conditions and hence did not gain the long-term confidence of a suffering populace. The 
subsequent absence of an enemy to fight and a coherent mission led to idle troops and minds, 
helping the government earn its well-deserved nickname “Black Market Administration”. The 
British Military Administration worked feverishly to prevent a public relations disaster on the 
matter of children’s nutrition. On 29 December, BMA HQ in Malaya sought clarification 
from London, particularly the Colonial Office, on how to proceed. Again, it reiterated that the 
scheme could “be in practice impossible for civil governments” to continue in view of 
predicted large deficits in 1946.99 McKerron also cabled London directly on 31 January. His 
cable is noteworthy for highlighting the “existing difficult situation here [Singapore] 
aggravated by strikes”, and that “it would be politically most inopportune [to] discontinue 
present limited experimental scheme….”100  
London finally replied on 18 February. The Colonial Office agreed that the scheme 
should continue, but emphasized that it was a “temporary measure”, that “arrangements must 
however be kept under periodical review so that they can be terminated as soon as conditions 
return [to] normal”.101 The Colonial Office and the Treasury in London hoped that in 
“stressing temporary and emergency nature … it will be possible to avoid committing civil 
govts [sic] to continuing schemes indefinitely”.102 With that, the scheme plodded on into 
                                                          
97 NAS, BMA HQSD 432/45. Undated memo summarizing brief history and developments of free feeding 
scheme by Herbert A. Lord. 
98 NAS, BMA HQSD 432/45. 23 January 1946. Memo on School Feeding by D Roper (Education Officer, BMA 
Singapore). Emphasis in source. 
99 NAS, BMA HQSD 432/45. 29 December 1945. HQ BMA (M) KL to “Troopers for CA” (Colonial Office / 
London) 
100 NAS, BMA HQSD 432/45. 31 January 1946 
101 NAS, BMA HQSD 432/45. 31 January 1946 
102 NAS, BMA HQSD 432/45. 31 January 1946 
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1946 and into the civil government era. It was sustained in part by strong medical opinion, 
official support from government officials such as Vickers and Clyde – who went on to work 
in the office of the Special Commissioner for South-East Asia on food matters, and a group of 
lady volunteers willing and able to ensure the scheme remained viable. (That part of the story 
is taken up in Chapter 5). 
In retrospect, it is somewhat amazing that government cautiousness did not result in a 
public outcry. Even before the end of military administration, the British had already been 
forced into certain repressive measures. Sensing an anti-establishment connection to 
industrial unrest in late 1945, it censored and controlled the media, broke up labor strikes and 
detained their leaders.103 By January, the British came to the conclusion that while economic 
and social conditions were the foundations of unrest, the disturbances were becoming more 
political in nature.104 Warnings of potential political fallout were not unfounded. The strong 
statement by the Singapore Executive was not reported by any of the English-language 
newspapers. The efforts to keep the scheme running were only made public in July 1946, and 
only briefly alluded to.105 Part of the reason could be that there was a strong official presence 
in both the main and sub-committees of the Singapore Executive, tempering potential anti-
British or anti-colonial sentiments. 
 
Long-term Plans: Youth 
 
Far from being bogged down with urgent but temporary needs, the Singapore 
Executive kept its eyes firmly on the horizon, carrying out plans for a longer-term social 
policy. The committee was responsible for the establishment of the first youth clubs as well 
as the first juvenile court in Singapore (and Malaya). The idea for the former came as early as 
the first Singapore Executive meeting in September 1945. Bishop Wilson noted that in the 
wake of war and occupation, schools and other youth organizations, such as Scouts, Boys’  
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Brigade etc., would take a while to get up and running.106 Such conditions, it was feared, 
would lead to juvenile delinquency. A Straits Times article captured succinctly the situation:  
 
All organisations that normally provide outlets for boys of the ages of 12 to 18 
were closed down. Abnormal economic conditions, as instanced in the black-
market, resulted in resort to the quest for more means of securing food and 
disposing of property. Forced labour at a very young age, and association with 
older men of a type boys would not normally have met until they had arrived 
at a more balanced maturity, developed a precocity that must be recognised. 
Many youngsters have got completely out of hand. They have embarked upon 
black-market activity to obtain food and clothing for themselves and their 
needy families, to obtain money for entertainment and self-indulgence. The 
three and a half years of unrestricted evil tendencies contributed greatly to the 
growth of armed and gang robberies. There has been created a class of lad who 
has lost hope, who entertains no ambition with regard to the future, and 
accepts it as a fact that there is nothing worth trying for. Here then, is fertile 
ground for the political agitator.107 
 
The brewing unrest from end 1945 to January 1946 was multifaceted in its causes and 
evolution. Genuinely poor postwar social and economic conditions were not only exacerbated 
by an ill-prepared military government, but also manipulated for political ends by a very 
organized Malayan Communist Party and its affiliate groups. Young boys and girls were the 
natural targets of the “political agitator”, whether or not the youths themselves believed in 
propagated political aims. But having survived the war, youths emerged with more 
responsibility as most of them became the main breadwinners in the absence of parents or 
guardians. Fundamental basic needs (and their lack of) coupled with the natural instinct to 
survive could lead to alliances the British wished to prevent. McKerron publicly described 
the “youth problem” as the “biggest single social problem we have inherited from the 
Japanese occupation”.108 From early 1946, the government became more visibly interested in 
the youths of Singapore and Malaya. In February, it announced – rather prematurely – that a 
boys’ club had been formed at Queens Street.109 Shackled by various difficulties in acquiring 
the requisite resources, the Queens Street Boys’ Club would not open until April – after the 
BMA period. Even then, public appeals were still being made for books, furniture and 
donations.110 When started, the club aimed for a membership of a hundred boys, of ages 
between twelve and eighteen “who do not attend school”. The club provided facilities for 
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sport, recreational activities, as well as vocational and educational training.111 Before the 
official establishment of the Social Welfare Department in June 1946, two other clubs were 
opened or in the process of being opened in the Singapore Harbour Board and Katong areas. 
The Singapore Executive’s original plan was to establish youth clubs to occupy the 
time and attention of children who were waiting for schools to re-open. When the situation 
became more settled, community organizations such as the Young Men's Christian 
Association, Young Women's Christian Association, the Rotary Club, and Toc H could then 
take over the running of the clubs.112 However, the Singapore Executive did not make any 
meaningful progress in this area since Bishop Wilson first made the suggestion. Having 
firsthand experience, the Singapore Executive and its members could provide the moral 
argument. But in the immediate postwar period, the military administration was perhaps the 
only institution powerful enough to summon and provide the necessary resources, such as 
additional funds and physical spaces, to support the moral argument. Confronted with the 
specter of social unrest, government was not going to stand idly by. 
In February 1946, the British Military Administration informed the public that a 
juvenile court was to be established as part of an overall plan to tackle the youth problem. 
This was not a new idea as the Salvation Army had earlier proposed something similar before 
the war. In 1940, Miss Sarah E. Nicoll-Jones was invited by the Straits Settlements 
government to investigate the problem of prostitution in Singapore.113 A trained policewoman 
originally from Liverpool, Nicoll-Jones had worked extensively in Burma between 1926 and 
1938 to eradicate the trafficking of women and children.114 In a talk on tackling social evils 
delivered to the Singapore Rotary Club in 1941, she suggested that a juvenile court stood as a 
“symbol signifying that the State stands in loco parentis to its child, [as] a refuge to the 
harassed parent, it corrects, advises, and admonishes, and most of all it stands in the way of 
the exploiter”. She went on to state that “A wisely-governed country does not want criminals 
to fill its courts. It has its young people’s court to prevent the creation of criminals”.115 To 
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attain such a goal, her final report to the Straits Settlements government recommended the 
establishment of a juvenile court and supporting institutions to reform young delinquents 
without prison incarceration, such as trade schools and a probation system. 
The youthfulness of criminal offenses in the immediate postwar period caught the 
attention. For instance, in January 1946, three boys, ages fifteen and sixteen, were convicted 
in a police court for attempted armed robbery. The boys were found with a pistol and six 
rounds of ammunition, in possession moreover of a stolen trishaw. They were sentenced to 
two and a half years of imprisonment.116 Behind the scenes, plans were afoot to tackle the 
“youth problem”. In a memo dated 22 February 1946, most likely drafted in response to 
Singapore Executive proposals for youth development, government support was encouraged 
for private initiatives to set up clubs, camps and similar institutes.117 The memo noted that 
“dubious political parties have already got ahead of us in this matter [the youth problem], but 
if we are prepared to spend enough money we can quickly make up the lost ground and 
attract young men away from organisations like the Youth New Democratic League which 
have no intention or desire to do their members any good”.118 The official also warned that 
the youth organizations “will undoubtedly be invaded by the Communists and their 
propaganda”, and that even if kept out, they should expect “organised opposition from the 
outside ... [aimed] at discrediting the scheme”.119 
On 27 March 1946, the juvenile court convened its first sitting in Singapore. Mr. L. C. 
Goh acted as the Presiding Officer, with members of the Singapore Executive present as 
advisers, such as Herbert Lord from the Salvation Army and Yap Pheng Geck.120 The 
Salvation Army also provided a temporary Probation Officer – a Captain Foo – to support the 
proceedings. The first sitting dealt with four cases, three of which were for cigarette offenses 
(selling above controlled prices), and one of an alleged theft of a military vehicle by a 
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thirteen year old.121 Within a month, Goh was dealing with an average of twenty cases every 
day, ranging from boys picked up from sleeping in five-foot ways and public spaces, to boys 
arrested for theft and other offenses.122 As far as possible, offenders were placed under the 
care of their parents and the probation officer, though “in some cases poor parents are anxious 
to have their sons sent to a place where they would be taught some trade”.123 The only 
institution opened at that time was the Salvation Army Boys’ Home, where boys stayed on 
average for three months and learned a vocation. “Sordid poverty and neglect” were the main 
themes of many of the boys’ plight. It was also candidly noted that those “youths are not 
particular about the way they get their money”, referencing their innovative if illegal methods 
in eking out a living.124 Even when caught, wily youths attempted to bamboozle the system in 
a time before identity cards and accurate record-keeping. A Chua Beng Kiam was arrested for 
a theft of a purse in March 1946 and managed to drag his case out till July. He initially said 
he was fifteen, but when transferred to the juvenile court, he changed his age to nineteen. 
Chua changed his age for a third and fourth time before the judge finally took his age to be 
eighteen and sentenced him to fourteen weeks in prison.125 
 
Tensions and Conflict 
 
It is difficult to ascertain with any real accuracy the role and the effectiveness of the 
Singapore Executive and the Malayan Welfare Council in addressing the youth problem. 
David Rosenthal did, on behalf of the Singapore Executive, claim credit for the establishment 
of the juvenile court and the boys’ clubs.126 Records of the Singapore Executive however are 
scanty, and those available are incomplete. At best, the available evidence shows that other 
than Bishop Wilson’s suggestion in the first meeting, the Singapore Executive focused more 
on urgent matters of food and nutrition for the remainder of 1945. Archival records used 
originated from and were filed by the British Military Administration, hence providing a 
particular perspective. Public sources such as newspapers also give the impression that it was 
the government that took the lead in addressing the youth issue. Tensions present in the child 
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feeding issue also appeared when addressing the youth problem. The relevant file minutes 
hinted at increasing friction between government officials, and between the British Military 
Administration and the Malayan Welfare Council and the Singapore Executive. An 
unidentified government official was extremely unhappy with views expressed by Victor 
Purcell in his capacity as Adviser for Chinese Affairs. The former also protested the tone of a 
request by the Malayan Welfare Council, suggesting that government should support its 
initiatives without interference. The response was scathing in its query whether “… the 
Malayan Welfare Council [was] going to do anything – or just pass the buck and take the 
credit?”127 
The Singapore Executive had its last meeting on 4 June 1946, a little over two months 
into the civil government period. The committee’s final months, at least from available 
meeting minutes, were uneventful. The child feeding scheme continued – albeit on a monthly 
basis. The Singapore Executive was looking to add a couple more clubs to the functioning 
Queens Street Boys’ Club, and efforts continued in vain to establish a home for child 
prostitutes.128 Between the Singapore Executive and the military and later civil government, 
the final months were fraught with difficulties and acrimony. As a result of the political split 
between Singapore and the Malayan Union, the Malayan Welfare Council ceased to function 
on a Pan-Malayan basis. A Central Welfare Council took over the coordination of social 
welfare for the Malayan Union, while Singapore was to have its own council, preferably 
drawn from the ranks of the Singapore Executive.129 
After the Singapore Executive’s final meeting on 4 June 1946, Vickers wrote to 
McKerron in his capacity as chair of the committee. His letter was indicative of brewing 
tensions between government and the committee. The former had intervened – with some 
success – in the drafting of the charter for Singapore’s new welfare council. Members of the 
Singapore Executive had wanted full autonomy over finances raised by the new welfare 
council, excluding those from government. The government demurred and Vickers was 
tasked to get agreement from the Singapore Executive. He attempted “to force this issue”, but 
was met “with a dismal failure” as the Singapore Executive sought the independence to 
solicit and to manage its own funds.130 Vickers expressed regret at the “somewhat unhappy 
ending” especially in view of the “excellent work” done by the organization over a “long and 
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difficult period”.131 The new Director of Medical Services also suggested an “oblique 
approach” for controversial matters in the future, commenting that “Public Welfare bodies are 
usually enthusiastic and often difficult”. 
A general history of the Malayan Welfare Council and the Singapore Executive in 
their nine months of existence (from September 1945 to May and June 1946) remains largely 
unwritten. A primary contributory factor is the rather haphazard collection and organization 
of the Council’s records, if any. In the National Archives of Singapore, Council and 
Singapore Executive records are scattered across several files, namely BMA 27/45, BMA 
64/45, BMA 34/46, and CSO 1142/46. Even then, the creating agency is not always 
immediately clear: were the records filed by BMA HQ (Singapore Division) or the BMA 
Chinese Affairs Department. The manner in which records are collected and archived does 
illustrate to some extent the chaotic and confusing situation during the British Military 
Administration, which in turn probably affected the maintenance of records then.  
The Singapore Executive and the Malayan Welfare Council began on a hopeful note 
and a fair amount of optimism. They were quickly dashed by limited resources as well as 
official reluctance to spare the necessary resources to start large-scale schemes, such as mass 
feeding from “soup kitchens”. Money had to be pried from the government, not only for the 
child feeding scheme, but also for a home for child prostitutes to replace the prewar Po Leung 
Kuk. The former was almost discontinued, while the latter was only resolved after “a lot of 
hesitation and doubt”.132 On the other hand, when a potential threat emerged, such as the 
youth problem, the government found its voice and adequate resources to help establish the 
juvenile court and one youth club. It was however at the cost of aggravating its supposed 
partners, the Singapore Executive, in either doing too little, demanding too much, and/or 
taking credit.  
 
Policy Adjusted: Demands for the “Dole” 
 
The British Military Administration was responsible for the introduction of another 
welfare initiative, one which preceded the Singapore Executive. On 17 September 1945, a 
day before the Singapore Executive first met, the government announced the formation of an 
Emergency Relief Committee to oversee and distribute cash to the needy and destitute. The 
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committee was chaired by McKerron, and included key government officials, Bishop Wilson, 
Commissioner Lord from the Salvation Army, and representatives from the Chinese 
community, including the former anti-Japanese guerrilla groups. A relief center was set up at 
Victoria Memorial Hall. Operations, such as investigations, were primarily managed by 
Commissioner Lord and his deputy Captain Frank Bainbridge. The government contributed 
the money and bureaucratic expertise. The decision to dole out cash was not taken lightly. It 
came about after the military government encountered considerable organized pressure to do 
more to relieve the distress of the people in Singapore. 
On 10 September, seven days before the opening of the relief center, the British began 
distributing free rice, sugar and salt. However, the relatively peaceful nature of the British 
return meant food was not as urgently needed as it might have been in a battlefield situation. 
Instead, in peacetime conditions, money was sought after more, even more so after the British 
discontinued the Japanese currency.133 After a day of relief in kind, it was clear to the public, 
to the business community, and the government that this method of relief was not terribly 
effective, nor was it sustainable for trade and economic recovery. Prices had moreover 
skyrocketed, such as from thirty-five cents to thirty dollars for pork, and shops remained 
closed.134  
The next day on 11 September, a “relief demonstration” took place outside the 
Chinese Secretariat building (formerly known as the Chinese Protectorate) along Havelock 
Road. The relevant file – entitled “Demonstration in front of the Chinese Secretariat for 
urgent adoption of relief measures” – unfortunately does not tell us much as it carries only 
two documents concerning this incident. The first was a list of handwritten names in English 
and Mandarin, and the second a typewritten version of that list (in English) entitled “List of 
Community Leaders at meeting convened by Brigadier P.A.B. McKerron C.M.G. held at 
Chinese Secretariat Building on 11 September 1945”.135 There is a curious discrepancy 
between the titles of the file and the documents within. Was the meeting convened by 
McKerron and the list compiled by him and his staff; or was he forced to take the meeting by 
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members of the Chinese community demonstrating in front of a government building? There 
is evidence to suggest that by the evening of 10 September, the British was already 
considering distribution of cash. This decision however was taken in the context of 
circulating hard currency to jump-start the economy and controlling food prices.136 In a press 
conference, Hone indicated that “unofficial committees” would be set up by his deputy 
McKerron in “various parts of the town”, so as to “bring to his notice cases of extreme 
indigence in order to provide such relief as may be necessary”. Hone also stated that “these 
committees will be asked to investigate cases of hardship [and] will be fully representative of 
all races and all interests....”137 Hone however did not explicitly say that relief would be in 
cash. The tone of his statements indicate that relief would be in kind, such as rice, rather than 
in cash. 
The British was not given the time to execute their plans. 12 September marked the 
official surrender ceremony at City Hall. It also marked the occasion of another meeting, the 
follow-up to the “relief demonstration” the day before, between the British and organized 
elements of the Chinese community. The Chinese Affairs Department met with 
representatives from former anti-Japanese groups. Some of them had been present at the 
previous day's meeting, but this time they were joined by representatives from another forty 
organizations that were apparently involved in anti-Japanese activities during the 
occupation.138 The representatives stressed that “there are people now who have been able to 
buy no food for a week, and they cannot wait many more days”.139 Cash relief must begin 
immediately. They recommended the creation of an organization for such a purpose, and 
informed the British that their organizations were ready and able to administer the 
investigation and distribution of relief. They demonstrated their readiness by presenting a 
plan for the establishment of nine centers located at strategic points around the island,140 the 
staff to work in those centers, and a list of five expected groups of people requiring 
immediate relief.141 All they needed was an estimated budget of $3,000,000 to begin. 
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Interestingly, representatives from commercial and business interests were absent from the 12 
September meeting. In addition to the relief proposals, the British authorities were also 
requested to endorse the eight principles drawn up by the Malayan Communist Party and to 
destroy remaining Japanese currency.142 In response, the official informed the meeting that a 
relief committee had been already put together by McKerron and that it included two 
representatives from their ranks, Lee Kiu from The Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army 
Backing-up Society and Lee Soong from The Singapore Overseas Chinese All Circles Anti-
Japanese League. Up until then, the British seemed to receive such petitions only from the 
Chinese community.143 There is no recorded evidence that the other communities in 
Singapore made similar representations. Nonetheless, they were included in the relief 
committee and letters of invitation were mailed to the leading figures of the Muslim, Indian 
and Eurasian communities.144 
In view of concerted pressure exerted on 11 and 12 September, the British had to 
respond. While the relief committee was being formed, the Federation of Christian Churches 
announced on 15 September (Friday) via The Straits Times that it would be distributing cash 
relief at four locations. The Federation most likely drew on cash advances from the British, 
given to organizations deemed to be friendlier.145 On 17 September, the British Military 
Administration made its public announcement and the Emergency Relief Committee met 
officially for the first time at Victoria Memorial Hall.146 In contrast to the Singapore 
Executive, the committee was chaired by McKerron, the highest authority on Singapore 
Island. Other important positions were filled by the government official in charge of finance 
and accounts, and natural allies, such as Bishop Wilson and the Salvation Army. Opening the 
meeting, McKerron stated that the British fulfilled its promise of ensuring the relief center 
opened on time.147 
It was likely McKerron was sending a message to the non-government, mostly 
Chinese, representatives on the committee, that the British would live up to other promises 
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made throughout the period of military administration. The events leading up to the creation 
of the relief committee is one more example of the loss of British prestige and pride in the 
eyes of the local populace. Through circumstances beyond their control, the British had not 
returned as triumphant heroes, rescuing their colonial charges from the Japanese. “The world 
has changed”, as one Communist leader observed of a victory procession in Malaya where 
the “poor people” like her, were leading the towkays of a former era.148 The British were, 
even more visibly than before, just one of several groups jostling for a leading role in 
Singapore and Malayan society. From then on, the making and implementation of social 
policy in Singapore had to be shared with other interested parties. 
Interestingly, the provision of relief, in cash or in kind to individuals, is not discussed 
much in the official records (and if so, usually only in passing or in broad general terms).149 It 
is also not fully acknowledged in historical scholarship.150 Perhaps the significance of relief 
measures (or perceptions of their significance) pales in comparison to other pressing post-war 
issues, such as re-establishment of law and order, economic rehabilitation and reconstruction, 
ensuring the inflow of food and other necessities, and the emergence of anti-colonial 
nationalistic fervor. But as others have noted, the provision of relief in Malaya and Singapore 
by itself was entirely “novel within a colonial context”.151 The mere existence of the relief 
committee and its work are historically significant. The British had a new colonial policy. But 
financial relief was an unanticipated outcome of that policy. It was the result of local 
pressures from Chinese groups which were at the forefront of anti-Japanese resistance during 
the occupation. 
The British could not return for three weeks after the Japanese had laid down arms, 
allowing organized forces already on the ground in Malaya and Singapore to impose their 
authority in the ensuing power vacuum. Elements of the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese 
Army moved into the urban areas from the jungles where they had fought a guerrilla war for 
the past three and a half years. The tragic communal and retaliatory violence during the 
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interregnum has been well-documented.152 What is less discussed, or discussed only within 
the paradigm of competing socio-political discourses, were the Communists' attempts at the 
provision of relief during this period and after the British returned. It is highly probable, in 
light of the lack of concrete British plans for relief and the readiness of the communist-led 
elements to assert their authority, the latter forced the former to constitute relief measures in a 
manner not planned for or even anticipated. 
  
Administering the “Dole”  
  
In contrast to the Singapore Executive, McKerron himself, the head of the Singapore 
division of the British Military Administration, chaired the first and most of the subsequent 
meetings of the Emergency Relief committee. This was probably due to the given political 
situation concerning the organized Communist-influenced groups. But there were also 
administrative considerations. Former Protectors of Chinese might have some experience 
dealing with personal issues in prewar Singapore, but they never had to ascertain need and 
distribute cash accordingly. The British moreover inherited a peacetime population that was 
not substantially displaced, hence did not require support from the temporary shelters the 
Refugee and Displaced Persons Department would construct. The Labour Department did 
provide support in finding work for those who were able to do so. But its effectiveness was 
limited by the amount of jobs available, the amount of new Malayan currency to replace the 
discontinued Japanese military script, and as well as adequate supplies of food and other 
goods to spend the money on. Relief distribution was moreover not a straightforward 
transaction of providing cash relief to those who completed an application form. There had to 
be a staff to process the applications, interviewers to assess the information given in the 
application forms, investigators to authenticate the applicant's need for relief, and a fit and 
proper structure to handle and distribute the cash. Without the requisite administrative and 
financial support, the Malayan Welfare Council and the Singapore Executive were never in a 
position to initiate or take over emergency relief. 
The structure of the committee reflected the concerns and considerations discussed 
above. The Deputy Controller for Finance and Accounts was designated as the Deputy 
Chairman of the committee, and liaisons from the Labour, Chinese Affairs and Displaced 
Persons departments were invited to sit in the meetings. Money for cash relief was to be 
                                                          
152 See for instance Cheah Boon Kheng’s Red Star Over Malaya. 
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provided by the “Government, in the shape of the … British Military Administration”, the 
actual work of investigation and distribution was shared with, if not delegated fully to the 
non-government organizations. It was indeed policy to “make the fullest possible use of all 
existing charitable and relief organizations, and the voluntary societies which exist in this 
island, some of which have done much needed work during the Japanese occupation”.153 The 
Salvation Army, St. John Ambulance Brigade, religious institutions such as the Anglican and 
Roman Catholic churches, and the various Chinese anti-Japanese army groups were such 
examples. Local initiatives such as the Blue Cross and Black Cross organizations also 
provided much needed expertise in the provision of social services during emergencies, and 
was in demand during the immediate post-liberation period. 
Expertise in relief work was provided mainly by the Salvation Army. It had extensive 
experience before the war managing the Silver Jubilee Fund and the unemployment funds. 
Commissioner Lord acted as Secretary/Treasurer of the relief committee, and his deputy 
Frank Bainbridge was designated supervisor of the relief center at Victoria Memorial Hall.154 
The relief center was staffed by former Straits Settlements Civil Service officers (mostly 
local-born and Chinese) from the prewar War Tax Department, providing administrative 
experience in managing large-scale bureaucratic processes.155 Bishop Wilson represented the 
Anglican Church and affiliated Protestant churches, and also acted as the chair of the 
executive arm of the relief committee.156 The remainder of the relief committee comprised of 
local leaders within Singapore society. It was no surprise to see seven Chinese representatives 
in the committee, given their organized agitation for relief measures well before relief 
operations were officially constituted. The members were from a cross-section of the Chinese 
community, ranging from business and banking interests (and with a track record of social 
service to the colonial government), to those affiliated with the anti-Japanese resistance 
groups.157 Three persons representing the ethnic-religious groups in Singapore completed the  
 
 
                                                          
153 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. 17 September 1945 meeting. 
154 For a brief biography of Frank Bainbridge, see Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 1 January 
1938. He was also the “Relieving Officer” of the Silver Jubilee Fund established in 1935/6.   
155 Those officers included a future Minister for Finance and Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore (Goh Keng 
Swee), a future Permanent Secretary responsible for Jurong Industrial Estate (Woon Wah Siang), and an 
understated stalwart in Singapore’s Legal Service (Monie Sundram). 
156 Sparse meetings minutes of executive arm can be found in NAS, BMA HQSD 115/45.  
157 The original Chinese committee members were Mr. Tan Lark Sye, Mr. Ong Piah Teng, Mr. Lim Bok Kee, 
Mr. Tsai Kui Shing, Mr. Leong Wan Sing, Mr. Lee Soong, and Miss Lee Kow (aka Lee Kiu). 
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relief committee, one each from the Muslim (indicated as “Mohammedan”), Indian and 
Eurasian communities.158 
McKerron stated that the purpose of the relief committee “was to ensure an 
organisation for the immediate relief of those on Singapore Island who were in distress either 
on account of the currency situation, unemployment or any other reason”.159 Relief was to be 
given to those who, in the opinion of the investigating officers, “have no means of 
sustenance”.160 He warned that “it is in no way our purpose to inaugurate any form of 
unemployment relief or the dole”.161 Relief in this particular instance was seen to address an 
“emergency”, the temporary needs of a population and an economy recovering from the 
exigencies of war. Hence, it was decided that relief should be given in the form of cash to 
complement relief in kind, so as to help circulate the newly-minted Malayan dollar back into 
the economy. Initial relief rates were $2.50 per head of a family, and up to $5.00 per family 
depending on its size, despite concerns by the committee that such rates were on the low 
side.162 
In the first week of distributing emergency relief, 1,300 cases were “dealt with”, and 
that number excluded another two hundred or so cases seeking advice in general.163 Over a 
hundred bags of rice (ninety), sugar (fifteen), and salt (five) were distributed, and a total of 
$2,228 was distributed. (This seemed to have kept to the principle of mixing financial relief 
with relief in kind established by the Salvation Army before the war). After one month, the 
relief committee had more than twenty thousand cases on relief with more than $200,000 
worth of cash disbursed.164 Relief operations were also decentralized considerably after the 
first week. In addition to the relief center at Victoria Memorial Hall, there were - at their peak 
- over twenty relief centers located throughout the populated areas of the island. Those 
centers were operated by various non-governmental groups, such as the Roman Catholic 
Church, the Federation of Christian Churches, the Silver Jubilee Fund, the Sam Min Cho Yiu 
                                                          
158 The first non-Chinese representatives were E. R. Koek (Lawyer, Eurasian), P. Sammy (Lawyer, Indian), Dr. 
H. S. Moonshi (Singapore Muslim Advisory Board, Municipal Commissioner, medical practitioner). There was 
no overt 'Malay' representation until the Malay Union wrote in to offer help, though there was no evidence of a 
follow-up. NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. “Letter from The Malay Union (c/o TP Jumat, Supreme Court) to 
DCCAO (PAB McKerron, Municipal Building), dated 4 October 1945. 
159 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. 24 September 1945, minutes of second meeting. 
160 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. 17 September 1945, minutes of first meeting. 
161 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. 17 September 1945, minutes of first meeting. 
162 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. 17 September 1945, minutes of first meeting (Draft version). Those were much 
lower than the rates given out by the Silver Jubilee Fund before the war. No rationale for the rates are found in 
the file. 
163 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. 24 September 1945, minutes of second meeting. 
164 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. Summary of Statistics up to 18th October, 1945. 
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Youth Corps – an off-shoot of the Kuomintang branch in Singapore, and a Chinese temple 
organization called the Nanyang Sacred Union.165 The plurality of the centers – eight of them 
– belonged to what was termed the “Chinese Resistance Army”, likely remnants of the former 
anti-Japanese army. By the end of 1945, after three and a half months of relief operations, 
almost $900,000 in cash relief was distributed to over 40,000 cases. To put that number into 
perspective, the amount of cash relief distributed for the Malayan mainland came up to just 
$850,000.166 
 
Influencing Policy: The Anti-Japanese Army 
 
The number of cases put on emergency relief in the first few weeks were still much 
lower than what was projected by members of the Chinese Resistance Army. One of them 
was Lee Kiu, a twenty-six-year-old propagandist for the anti-Japanese army during the 
occupation (described as possessing a “neo-Jacobin toilette”).167 She was also a relief 
committee member representing the “People's Resistance Army Back-Up Society”, and 
ensured that information was shared with the general public. She used the postwar press 
corps to great effect, taking advantage of the relatively liberal approach adopted by the 
British upon their return.168 Piqued by what appeared to her as a “dilly-dally approach” to the 
relief problems of “hunger, unemployment, destitution and death”, she gave an interview to 
the Sin Chew Jit Poh on 26 September – about a week after emergency relief began in 
earnest. Lee Kiu did not hold back. She stated there were at least “700,000 refugees” in 
Singapore who need immediate relief, and yet the “Relief Committee in the Victoria 
Memorial Hall is giving relief each day to only about 300-400 persons”.169 She went on to 
state that her organization had registered over 30,000 “refugees [within three days] and that 
this was done by dividing the work throughout [nine] districts in the town, each of which 
carried on its work of registration simultaneously and separately”. She noted that the 
                                                          
165 The Nanyang Union traces its history to the 1930s, when a group of immigrants from Foochow, China 
pooled resources to purchase a space for temple rites. Information taken from 
http://chinesetemples.blogspot.com/2005/10/12-nanyang-sacred-union.html.  
166  Donnison, British Military Administration, p. 286. Burma was even lesser, just over 400,000 pounds: “It was 
considered that relief in cash would merely add to the already strong inflationary tendencies, and that as relief 
had never been given in this form even in peace-time, it would be both undesirable and administratively 
impracticable to introduce in post-war conditions a system that had been unsuitable in peace”. 
167 Observation made by Victor Purcell, quoted in Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars, p. 118. Lee Kiu led the 
Singapore branch of a Pan-Malayan Women’s Federation. 
168 See Harper, The End of Empire, chapter on Malayan Spring. 
169 Sin Chew Jit Poh, 26 September 1945. A translated version of article can be found in NAS, BMA HQSD 
48/45. 1,300 cases were officially recorded for the first week. 
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“authorities regarding relief” had not given a “clear-cut” answer to her organization's offer of 
aid by delegating relief work to centers other than at Victoria Memorial Hall. Any delay, she 
warned, would not reflect well on the relief committee and her own organization. 
The newspaper report had the desired result. In the third committee meeting, the 
committee not only approved the establishment of an additional fourteen relief centers, it also 
approved a new scale of relief rates.170 With effect from 1 October – just about two weeks 
after the start of relief operations, each male member of the household would now receive 
$5.00 in cash – a one hundred percent increase from the previous rate, and new rates for 
every female ($4.00) and for every child ($2.00), with a maximum of $20.00 per month for 
each household – a four hundred percent increase from the previous maximum of $5.00 per 
household.171 
The “authorities regarding relief” no doubt referred to McKerron, government 
officials and perhaps even the organizations usually associated with the British (such as the 
churches and the Salvation Army) – all of which were quickly discovering they were in the 
middle of a public relations war. The seemingly straightforward process of providing material 
assistance to relieve distress had taken on severe political overtones. In the particular case of 
Singapore and Malaya, the British, whose reputation was already so damaged in the eyes of 
the local populace, could ill-afford another public failure on the scale of the surrender of 
Singapore to the Japanese in 1942. We have seen their response to near public relations 
disasters when dealing with the Singapore Executive on the child feeding and other social 
issues. In many ways, the Singapore Executive let the government off the hook by not 
publicizing disagreements. The former resistance groups, battle-hardened and comparatively 
more organized during those early days, had no such qualms in making public perceived 
government failures. 
To help fight the public relations battle, the military government had within its arsenal 
a publishing and printing unit, and by early 1946, published some 140,000 posters and 
notices of a “political nature”.172 The relief committee ensured that the new relief rates and 
information about the relief sub-centers were sent to “Publicity and Printing” for broadcasting 
and publishing.173 Before the end of relief operations, the committee would make several 
                                                          
170 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. Minutes of third meeting. 
171 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. Memorandum B circulated at third committee meeting. 
172 Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars, pp. 113-114. 
173 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. Minute note stated: “3 copies to sent [sic] priority 1, to Publicity and Printing at 
1615hrs 1/10/45, for Broadcasting on 1/10/45, and Publishing on 2/10/45”. 
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more press statements to keep the public abreast of developments or changes in relief 
operations. Certain individuals from the Chinese Resistance Army also instigated a minor 
altercation outside the main relief center at Victoria Memorial Hall. On the afternoon of 30 
October, Bainbridge was forced to hold a meeting with three young Chinese claiming to 
represent a group of people unable to receive cash from the “Resistance Army / Anti-Japanese 
Union” relief centers. According to Bainbridge, the three Chinese appeared to have been 
coerced to act as representatives as they “endeavoured to convey the impression that they had 
been compelled by the people waiting outside to make representation”.174 As soon as the 
meeting began, it was clear that their stated intention was a front for other demands, in 
particular the reversal of the relief committee's policy to not provide relief to “able-bodied 
young labourers” if there was employment available.175  
Herbert Lord arrived midway through the meeting and upon entering the relief center, 
he witnessed those who had gathered and waited outside the center chanting and shouting, led 
by someone he called a “professional agitator”.176 Lord stood his ground in the face of the 
demands but did make one concession. Fifty percent of relief due could be given to able-
bodied laborers even if there was work available, as long as evidence was presented to show 
that they and their families were in dire need. The representatives took the offer back to the 
waiting crowd who rejected outright Lord's concessions and demanded a hundred percent 
relief instead. Although they had arrived at an impasse, the representatives were surprisingly 
amicable (at least to Lord) as they left smiling after shaking hands. The crowd outside also 
dispersed peacefully, transported away in orderly fashion by waiting trucks. 
Lord observed that the agitators were not so much engaged in relief work as they were 
involved in the strike called in October by the General Labour Union, a front organization for 
the Communists.177 If he had acceded to the representatives' demands, it would have meant 
relief money was being used against the British Military Administration to support the 
strikers while they were not working. This was not only illogical for the military government, 
but broadly speaking, such an action also went against the philosophical underpinnings of the 
emergency relief provided. It was constituted to address urgent temporary needs in the 
                                                          
174 NAS, BMA HQSD 139/45. Memo re meeting with various representatives of Resistance Army Centres. 
175 NAS, BMA HQSD 139/45. Demands and grievances were, as reported in the memo, relief for those fit for 
work, logistical issues in getting to the Labour Department, the transportation of cash to the relief centers, and a 
request for medical aid at the centers. 
176 NAS BMA HQSD 139/45. Memo re Meeting with various representatives of Resistance Army Centres. 
177 Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars, p. 123. See also Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, Gamba, The 
origins of trade unionism in Malaya, Yeo, Political developments in Singapore,   
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aftermath of war and not meant to act as unemployment dole. Lord felt threatened enough by 
the onset of organized pressure to seek (and did receive) police protection for the relief 
center.178 The incident was discussed the next time the Emergency Relief Committee met on 
5 November, where Lord reported that most of the demands had been settled and a limited 
additional rice ration would be given to the staff of the Chinese Resistance Army centers.179 
In a Machiavellian move, Lee Kiu was co-opted into the executive arm of the Emergency 
Relief committee as well. Following this, there were no other incidents reported.180 
 
Making Sense of Relief Work: The Salvation Army Redux  
 
The political ramifications of relief provision were just one of several issues 
confronting the relief committee, perhaps not even the most pressing one. Relief provision on 
this scale and in the manner of cash distribution was never attempted before in Singapore. 
From the beginning, the emergency relief committee was working without precedent, evident 
by the major adjustments made merely after the first couple of weeks of relief operations. 
There was also more than a hint of organized chaos during the initial days as the relief 
workers attempted to make sense of what they had to do.  
Tan Beng Neo rejoined her Salvation Army comrades at the relief center, working as 
an investigator to ascertain whether applicants for relief were genuinely in need of help. Beng 
Neo recalled that along with cash relief, “a lot of food were [distributed] to the local people” 
at the back of Victoria Memorial Hall.181 She remembered that the people “just came and 
queued up. There were clothing, [there was] sugar. Big tins of lard. So we had to open those 
tins and took it out in small packets and gave it to them. And knitting needles, wool galore, 
mosquito netting, cloth, pajamas, tinned food of every kind, shoes”. The food and other 
goods arrived in “lorry loads”, and that in the beginning, they were given out more or less 
arbitrarily and freely, because to the best of Beng Neo’s recollection, there was just so much 
food.182 Beng Neo's memories provide an invaluable sense of the work processes of the relief 
center. She remembered applicants arriving at the “front part” of Victoria Memorial Hall to 
                                                          
178 NAS, BMA HQSD 139/45. Memo re meeting with various representatives of Resistance Army Centres. 
179 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. 5 November 1945 meeting. 
180 The records do not show any more conflict between the BMA and would-be antagonists. Indeed, Lee Kiu did 
present a token of appreciation to Lord in January 1946 for his efforts in emergency relief work. See NAS, 
BMA HQSD 115/45, 14 January 1946 meeting. 
181 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 16. 
182 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 16. There was wastage as well. Tan recalled having to dispose of fifty bags 
of sugar, each weighing roughly about fifty pounds, because they had been tainted by kerosene. 
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register, to complete forms that captured information about “the number of people in the 
house. The number of the house, where they came from, how many people and so on, you 
know. And anybody working and also parts of it”.183 Beng Neo recalled vividly several cases, 
including a woman who had to take care of her children as well as those of her brother's, and 
a family which had lost all of its male members: 
 
The grandmother had daughters, daughters-in-law. I think there were about 
four or five women with more than a dozen children. Some were about 
thirteen, fourteen.... And some were about six, seven. And all the men were 
gone. Grandfather was taken away. Uncles, fathers, young men, not married, I 
think, they had lost about five or six men in that family. They had no means of 
support whatsoever. I remember they were living somewhere in Whitley Road, 
in one of the attap houses during that time.184 
 
After the applications were completed, she would “go round to find out, see where 
their living conditions and so on and made my remarks and my recommendations whether 
they needed any relief or not”.185 It was not easy to look for the addresses written down in 
those application forms, for the simple reason that the numbers of houses were not in running 
order. So a supposedly well-prepared investigation officer, with his or her applications 
arranged in order, would have been bamboozled by disorderly housing. The investigator’s 
senses were assaulted by a variety of sights and smells. Beng Neo vividly remembered the 
stench of pig farms, the wretchedness of destitution and poverty, and the heartbreaking sight 
of families mourning the loss of their loved ones.186 
Through Beng Neo, Commissioner Lord, Captain Bainbridge, and others, the 
Salvation Army was represented at key positions in the relief organization. Lord was the 
Secretary-cum-Treasurer of the relief committee, while Bainbridge was supervisor of the 
main relief center at Victoria Memorial Hall. The inclusion of their expertise went some way 
in making up for the experience the government and the rest of the committee lacked in relief 
work. The Salvation Army had managed the Silver Jubilee Fund before the war and its 
officers were experienced in deciding how relief should be distributed. The file on emergency 
relief included “analysis of the most frequently recurring types of applications for assistance” 
and four pages from what was presumably an instruction manual on how applications were to 
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be processed and investigated by the fund's committee of management.187 It is not 
immediately clear if this document was circulated before the inaugural meeting of the relief 
committee. But it contained information as to the different categories of need the Silver 
Jubilee Fund usually assisted with, and if circulated, would have provided some idea of the 
types of needs the relief committee could expect.188 
The days and weeks after 17 September demonstrated the expertise and worth of the 
Salvation Army and Commissioner Lord in particular to relief operations. Within two days, 
Lord drew up a list of thirteen types of applications to the relief center which could be 
referred to other relevant government departments for proper assistance – a list which was 
later extended to twenty-six types by the second committee meeting on 24 September.189 
Perceived with a more cynical eye, the rather deliberate manner in which applications were 
“disposed” of in the name of efficiency could have given the impression that the British were 
not serious about relieving distress – which could have led to, as seen above, Lee Kiu 
resorting to public pressure. 
While opinions differed over the distribution of relief, there was a genuine underlying 
attempt to help those in need. At the second committee meeting, Lord acknowledged 
criticism of low relief rates and submitted a “cost of living” statement to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the current rates.190 By the third meeting, the increased relief rates were 
approved, along with the new relief sub-centers.191 Lord also understood the public relations 
game well. He personally drafted several press statements on behalf of the relief committee, 
and even noted on one occasion that those would bring “good publicity for what the BMA has 
done for relief”.192 He also queried during one committee meeting as to the whereabouts of 
the Publicity Department liaison after a prolonged absence.193 
Commissioner Lord and the Salvation Army played an influential role in the manner 
in which emergency relief work evolved. After almost a month of relief operations, Lord, 
using statistical data, pointed out that the main cause of destitution, or more succinctly, the 
                                                          
187 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. Most likely from Salvation Army’s own records in dealing with applications to the 
Silver Jubilee Fund before the war. 
188 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. The memo also provided and described twelve general categories and guidance on 
alternate sources of help for each. 
189 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. It also highlighted how keen Lord was to ensure relief was tied to work, that is 
employable persons must find work with the help of the Labour Department. 
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191 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. 1 October 1945 meeting. 
192 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. 19 October 1945 note to McKerron. 
193 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. 29 October 1945 meeting. 
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chief factor for providing relief, was unemployment.194 This led to concerns that despite 
initial pronouncements, emergency relief was turning into unemployment dole. Lord, in a 
press statement on behalf of the committee, urged “all people in Singapore, whether locally 
domiciled or here with the Services or in any capacity at all, to employ as many people as 
possible, either in their personal households or in offices, businesses etc.”.195 Lord went 
further, suggesting that 
 
overtime of any sort should be discouraged and where there is too much work 
for one person to do in the allotted time, it would be a direct contribution to 
the rehabilitation of the city if two persons were employed. If every person 
capable of employing labour were to make an effort to increase their staff by 
even two or three, a very considerable improvement in the present 
unemployment situation would be noticeable.196  
 
This was a significant expansion of the scope of relief services. It was moving beyond the 
mere transaction of cash or assistance in kind to an attempt to influence other spheres of 
activities, such as policy-making (for the Labour Department) and business/commercial 
decisions. It also demonstrated graphically the connections of relief, welfare and social 
services to other aspects of human activity, that is what was perceived as unnecessary welfare 
(in the form of cash relief for example) could also have been due to broader socio-economic 
or even political considerations. 
Statistics on the amount of relief disbursed and the number of relief cases was 
circulated at almost every committee meeting. In claiming unemployment was the main cause 
for relief, Lord began a gradual process of streamlining relief work to make it more efficient. 
On 22 October, he produced a memo recommending that while emergency relief should still 
continue into November, new applications should be directed to and processed at the main 
center at Victoria Memorial Hall. The branch centers would no longer accept new 
applications.197 Lord put this down to an improvement in the “currency situation”, as well as 
a general feeling “that those who have been able to carry on for the first six weeks of the new 
British regime [were] not emergency cases to be considered by the Emergency Relief 
organisation”.198 Lord went on to differentiate relief cases roughly into two types: the 
unemployed but able to work, and those who were unable to work due to more permanent or 
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197 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. Commissioner Lord, Memorandum re Emergency Relief, dated 19 October 1945. 
198 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. Commissioner Lord, Memorandum re Emergency Relief, dated 19 October 1945. 
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semi-permanent reasons. He suggested that the Silver Jubilee Fund be reconstituted to take 
care of the latter group, while emergency relief would continue for the former until conditions 
stabilized.199 Lord’s recommendations can be viewed in a couple of ways. First, and rather 
cynically, his recommendations were meant to curb the influence of the Chinese Resistance 
Army relief centers that had formed a plurality. In his memorandum, Lord noted that by end 
October, fifty thousand cases representing a “much larger number of individuals” would be 
assisted. He went on to observe that “this ... is in excess of the number that the 
representatives of the Anti-Japanese Union suggested was the number requiring relief”.200  
When first introduced on 22 October, Lord's recommendations were not immediately 
accepted by the Emergency Relief committee. It was not until two meetings later on 5 
November that there was tacit acceptance. Even then, it is not immediately clear from 
meeting minutes whether there was outright support or dissension. The one slight hint of 
possible dissension came during the 29 October meeting. Probably in response to queries 
about continuing hardship, it was “stressed” during the meeting “that no hardship need be 
caused to individual cases [as a result of the changes], which could be reported to the Central 
Office”.201 It might have been a coincidence, but the very next day on 30 October, agitators 
ostensibly from the Chinese Resistance Army relief centers gathered and demonstrated in 
front of Victoria Memorial Hall. Another way of understanding Lord’s proposals is in the 
context of BMA policy that emergency relief was always meant to be form of relief given 
only during emergencies. This was stated very clearly and forcefully by McKerron during the 
first meeting of the Emergency Relief committee. Seen this way, the proposals to stop 
accepting new applications after October and to scale back cash relief were in line with the 
policy of temporary aid.  
 
Towards a Social Welfare Department  
 
Once introduced however, the government could not control the very striking 
perception of a government giving people cash assistance, particularly when contrasted with 
the inaction of prewar administrations. A Straits Times editorial highlighted the significance 
of emergency relief, “The British Military Administration has done what the Malayan Civil 
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Service stubbornly refused to do: it has given Singapore the dole....”202 And why not, the 
author(s) asked. It went on to provide a brief historical overview:  
 
For many years past the bureaucracy and plutocracy of Malaya has spoke [sic] 
of “The Dole” as if it were the ultimate social menace. Alarmed by the steady 
advance of social legislation in Great Britain, and the ever-widening 
acceptance throughout the civilised world of the principle that a man willing to 
work but unable to find work because of the faulty functioning of the 
economic system was entitled to at least a minimum of State support.... The 
first timorous beginnings of organised poor relief were made during the world 
slump of 1931-33, but the greatest importance was attached to the principle of 
giving relief in kind, not in cash.203 
 
The historical significance of introducing relief in cash, within the context of 
Singapore, was not lost. The editorial criticized McKerron’s “stout declaration” that 
emergency relief was not the dole as “an authentic echo of pre-war Malaya”. But the 
author(s) observed that “new times demand new methods”. It gave in evidence the depressing 
sight of “miserable people” queuing up behind Victoria Memorial Hall “every morning, 
waiting for free rice, sugar and salt”, and asked “why should they be submitted to that public 
humiliation”. Though the “new family allowance” given was the bare minimum, it would still 
allow the “unemployed breadwinner to go to the shop like a normal, self-respecting citizen 
and buy his own supplies”. The editorial ended on a hopeful note, calling emergency relief 
“the thin end of the wedge of a modern and enlightened policy of poor relief in Malaya”.  
Internally, Lord's recommendations initiated a reorganization of the emergency relief 
structure. On 12 November, at the ninth meeting of the relief committee, it was suggested 
(unclear by whom) that the “BMA Relief should be turned into a more regularly organised 
civilian form”, the first local indication perhaps of the intention towards a government 
welfare department.204 By then, the relief committee had accrued sufficient data to present 
relief recipients into three categories: the “decrepits – unemployables both permanent and 
semi-permanent”, “war victims resulting in the loss of their bread-earners”, and “permanent 
unemployment (able-bodied)”.205 It was also suggested that emergency relief should only be 
used to help the able-bodied unemployed while the Silver Jubilee Fund and the Malaya 
Welfare Council Relief Sub-Committee would assist the other categories. On 19 November, 
McKerron introduced Reverend John T. N. Handy as the government appointee to “make a 
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thorough investigation into the possibility for coordinating the work of the Relief Centres and 
Labour departments”.206 The primary purpose of the investigation was to achieve “greater 
efficiency” by “reducing the number of Relief Centres and employing a smaller staff on a 
regular paid basis”.207 It would appear that Lord's position was accepted. Emergency 
conditions had subsided by November 1945 and the number of applications for relief had 
reached a peak. It was now time to think beyond the military administration. Handy presented 
his report to the Emergency Relief committee on 3 December. His remit was to make 
recommendations based on the assumption of “a permanent or semi-permanent Government 
set-up in liaison with the Malayan Welfare Council to deal with social distress on the 
Island”.208  
Handy's recommendations were informed by the philosophy that no able-bodied, 
employable person should be given relief without ascertaining whether they could find work 
instead. Echoing Lord's suggestions, Handy identified three categories of applicants for 
assistance: the “unemployables whether due to old age, decrepitude, widows or any other 
disability”, war victims (made destitute by deaths of primary wage-earners, reduced income 
due to war injuries, because of physical incapacitation), and the able-bodied but unemployed 
due to “absence of suitable work”.209 He recommended that these categories should be 
“treated according to their category” and should be assisted “from funds available for their 
particular need”.210 He proposed that the Central or Head Office at Victoria Memorial Hall 
remain the headquarters for relief operations, and to have six centers replace the existing 
nineteen. Four of the six centers would be located in existing Labour branch offices to allow 
for easier coordination between relief workers and labor officials, and they were moreover 
chosen because of their proximity to nearby clinics operated by the Medical Department.211 
The rest of the proposal was devoted to administrative and budgetary considerations, and a 
description of the ideal coordinated operation in providing relief, employment information 
and medical support (where necessary) to applications for help. The changes were scheduled 
to take effect from 1 January 1946. No objections or dissension were recorded in the final 
version of the minutes. One might expect a response from the Resistance Army groups, 
                                                          
206 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45.19 November 1945 meeting. Background to Handy: The Straits Times, 3 October 
1950, “Hon. Priest For Seven Years”. 
207 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45.19 November 1945 meeting. 
208 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. Proposal for the Reorganisation of Emergency Relief, dated 28 November 1945. 
209 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. Proposal for the Reorganisation of Emergency Relief, dated 28 November 1945. 
210 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. Proposal for the Reorganisation of Emergency Relief, dated 28 November 1945. 
Proposals were similar to Lord's suggestions during committee discussions. 
211 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. Proposal for the Reorganisation of Emergency Relief, dated 28 November 1945. 
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especially to a change that meant removing an effective means of accessing the general 
public. What was ultimately recorded instead were the grateful thanks and appreciation of the 
committee of the “excellent services” provided by the Resistance Army relief centers.212 
Handy's proposals demonstrated how much overlap there was in taking a broad 
approach to distress relief. The responsibility had to be shared, either between government 
departments and non-government organizations (such as Labour Department and the 
Salvation Army), or within government itself (such as Emergency Relief committee, and the 
Labour and Medical Departments). There was the need to coordinate with both Labour and 
Medical Departments because of the complexities of any given individual’s situation. 
Unemployment was perceived to be the foremost cause of destitution during the military 
administration period. The broader goal was to create employment, as Lord himself had urged 
the “people of Singapore” to do. Medical care was also necessary so as to keep someone 
healthy and fit for work (and hence getting them off relief). In an analysis of the applicants 
for relief from three centers, Lord concluded that while one-third of applicants were able-
bodied employable persons, more than half of the remaining two-thirds could not work 
because after suffering from malnutrition for three and a half years, they were simply not 
healthy enough to do so.213 
The Emergency Relief committee did not limit itself to just cash relief. On 5 
November, a sub-committee was formed to explore the “ways and means” of starting a 
feeding scheme at relief centers, school-going children and then the general population.214 
Though no further action was taken due to insufficient resources, the amount of time given to 
the matter as well as the willingness to try something new belies the supposedly narrow 
“emergency” scope of the relief committee.215 The Emergency Relief committee also 
recommended that the children of “destitute persons” should not pay school fees. They 
persuaded McKerron to take this up with the Education Department and successfully 
obtained a concession for the children to pay half the fees.216  
By December 1945, the number of new applications for emergency relief had 
stabilized. From January 1946, the weekly committee meetings became monthly, an 
                                                          
212 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. 3 December meeting. Lord also thanked the Church groups. Interestingly enough, 
similar thanks were also recorded after the 30 October demonstration outside the Central Office at Victoria 
Memorial Hall and again on 7 January meeting.  
213 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. 5 November 1945 meeting. 
214 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. 5 November 1945 meeting. 
215 NAS, BMA HQSD 115/45. See minutes of 8 November 1945 meeting of the Executive Committee of the 
Emergency Relief committee. 
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indication of a more stable environment, accentuated by a discussion whether relief should be 
given to those from a formerly “better social position”.217 On 17 June 1946, at the final 
meeting of the Emergency Relief committee, Percy McNeice was introduced as the Secretary 
for Social Welfare, the head of a new Social Welfare Department. Handy did not recommend 
the creation of a social welfare department, but he did observe that it was “conceivable that a 
Welfare Department should, by gradual process, absorb all forms of social welfare within the 
Island and the staff involved be trained in general Social Welfare work”.218 This is the earliest 
recorded acknowledgment, within Singapore at least, that a social welfare department was 
likely to be established. 
The military administration period in Singapore and Malaya is understood historically 
as a transitional period to civil government, and less favorably as a period of corruption and 
inefficiency. But as Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper have shown, it was a period very 
much in flux, with new policies and ideas being tested out, one of which was social welfare. 
To be sure, the state, in the form of the British Military Administration, did not always 
assume that responsibility comfortably or willingly, as illustrated by the frustrations of the 
Singapore Executive. But when official authority was threatened, it acted decisively, 
outflanking a well-organized opponent by distributing cash relief directly to the people for the 
first time in Singapore’s colonial history. The military government might not have planned 
for emergency relief, and was indeed wary of introducing permanent welfare schemes. But 
once introduced, it had little control over how they would eventually evolve. The foundations 
of a new approach to colonial governance, via a policy of development and welfare, had been 
laid during the six months of military administration. Postwar social policy would be 
complicated further by the various layers and processes of decolonization. But there would be 
no turning back from the colonial state’s assumption of responsibility for the well-being of 
Singapore society.  
 
                                                          
217 NAS, BMA HQSD 48/45. 11 March 1946 meeting. 
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CHAPTER 4. INTRODUCING THE SOCIAL WELFARE STATE 
 
This chapter is the first of a two-part history of the introduction and the impact of an 
official presence in social welfare in late colonial Singapore. It focuses on the early history of 
the Social Welfare Department, and examines the attempts to establish social welfare as an 
indispensable part of government by proving its utility during periods of crisis and in 
formulating long-term social policy. The Singapore Department of Social Welfare came into 
being in June 1946, two months after civil government succeeded the British Military 
Administration.1 The new department collected under one administrative roof the following: 
(1) emergency functions overseen by the British Military Administration, such as emergency 
relief and services for refugees and displaced persons; (2) initiatives introduced by the 
Singapore Executive, such as the Citizens’ Advice Bureau, the Juvenile Court, development 
of youth clubs, and at a later date, nutritional feeding for children; and (3) prewar Chinese 
Protectorate functions, such as the care and protection of women and girls, and care for 
juvenile prostitutes. Accordingly, the Social Welfare Department took over or established 
several homes and institutions, including: Bushey Park Camp for refugees and the destitute,2 
an orphanage at Mount Emily, a home at Pasir Panjang for rescued prostitutes, an Approved 
School for boys (on the premises of the prewar Reformatory, along present-day Clementi 
Road, and a place of refuge for at-risk girls (to replace the prewar Po Leung Kuk at York 
Hill). All of them remained the core of the Social Welfare Department during the colonial 
period (and well into the post-colonial period). They provided for thousands of individuals 
during times of sickness and unemployment, and also gave refuge from some of the worst 
abuses in society. Taken together, they are one aspect of a new social welfare state that one 
could turn to in times of need. Even so, they only addressed a minute part of the adverse 
social conditions experience by the majority of Singapore society. The latter part of this 
chapter gives an overview of those social conditions, which demonstrate both the benefits and 
limits of the Social Welfare Department.  
 
 
                                                          
1 The government agency began as the “Singapore Department of Social Welfare”. From 1950, the Department 
was presented simply as the “Social Welfare Department” in official publications, or had its title abbreviated to 
“SWD”. 
2 Formerly located near the junction of Kampong Bahru Road and Keppel Road. The road itself, Bushey Park, 
does not exist anymore. The entire area is now the present site of a container terminal (Keppel Terminal 
overseen by the Port of Singapore Authority). 
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Social Welfare as a Government Function 
 
A separate department for social welfare had not been provided for in the social 
welfare policy directive issued from London. Ground conditions in postwar Singapore and 
Malaya probably persuaded the British to establish a stronger, more visible government 
presence than originally anticipated. Potential alternatives to British rule emerged forcefully 
after the war. One instance was Malay resistance, effectively organized for the first time 
against the British Malayan Union plan. As seen in Chapter 3, Communist elements from the 
former Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army, had forced the military government to dole 
out financial relief. Singapore and Malaya were the earliest British colonial territories to have 
a social welfare department. Hong Kong did not have one until much later, while individual 
social welfare officers and advisory committees were the norm elsewhere in the British 
Empire of the postwar era. 
Consequently, there were considerable early efforts to establish a place for social 
welfare in Singapore’s postwar government. The first three departmental annual reports were 
not mere recounts of key accomplishments and activities of the previous twelve months. 
Compared to the reports of the more established departments, such as Medical, Labour, or 
Education, the reports for the Social Welfare Department were arguments for the 
Department’s, and for social welfare’s, continued presence in late colonial Singapore. The 
first report, entitled Beginnings, stated unambiguously that social welfare has been 
recognized as an “identifiable function of Government”.3 One possible reason for the rather 
brash announcement was underlying resistance to such a notion:  
 
In the beginning we have found many who wonder whether “social welfare” is 
a function of Government. Some acknowledge it a necessary Government 
service only temporarily, in an emergency post-war period; others cleave to 
the notion that those functions which are not already assigned to existing 
Government Departments are best performed by religious and voluntary 
organisations and by private charity.4 
 
The report highlighted three areas the Department was an asset. First, the Social Welfare 
Department was a “skilled agency equipped and able to deal at short notice and on a universal 
basis with certain social emergencies....” Second, the Department was an “instrument capable 
                                                          
3 Singapore Department of Social Welfare, Beginnings: The First Report of the Singapore Dept. of Social 
Welfare, June-Dec. 1946. (Singapore, 1947), p. 2. Hereafter Beginnings. 
4 Beginnings, p. 46. 
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of co-ordinating the efforts of...non-government and government agencies” concerned with 
people’s well-being. Third, the Department assumed “responsibility for the whole or part of 
those public welfare services which are not, and conveniently be, or which are only partly, 
the specific responsibility of established Government Departments”.5 
On the surface, those stated functions seemingly consign the new Social Welfare 
Department to a “minor or negative role in the machinery of Government”. It would be no 
more than a government agency established merely for emergency response, in contrast to 
say the Education or Medical Departments, who would have heavier and longer-term 
responsibilities; or none established for the sole purpose of housing functions and 
responsibilities other departments did not want. The author(s) of Beginnings recognized this, 
and their rationalizations hence are interesting. The entire passage is quoted below: 
 
The modern approach to the problems of delinquency, leisure, and want, 
involves the employment of new methods. The operation of these methods 
calls for a new kind of instrument. This instrument must be at all times be 
equally at the disposal of the whole community and so may be best be a 
government department dedicated to the social welfare of all the people whom 
it serves. In this context, the vague expression “social welfare” begins to 
acquire shape and meaning. It is seen as part of the obligation of the 
community, as the State, to the community, as individual citizens. [Social 
welfare] sheds all traces of palliation and transience, of casual or 
sanctimonious benevolence, and it stands out as an essential public service 
developing a continuing dynamic on its own.6 
 
The term “modern” indicated a contrast to “traditional” modes of governance. Before 
the war, colonial governance in Singapore and elsewhere was, bluntly put, done on the cheap. 
Unless pressured into action, not much was done in terms of ensuring the well-being of 
colonial society. After the war, government was positioned, most famously by the Beveridge 
Report, as the ideal institution to ensure equality, to provide for the benefit of “all the people” 
or the “whole community”. This was in contrast to social services established and provided 
along differentiated lines, such as ethnicity, language, place of origin or religion etc. The 
“modern” approach was one that cut across such differences. It aimed at social welfare that 
went beyond temporary and superficial assistance, but also welfare that was free of judgment 
and stigma. The above explanation also mirrored Furnivall’s “cure” for the ills of the colonial 
plural society, which was to use a “modern” approach to governance in an attempt to bring 
                                                          
5 Beginnings, pp. 46-47. 
6 Beginnings, p. 47. 
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together both “State” and “individual citizens” into a united community.7 In a raw 
fundamental sense, this was nation-building, not in the sense of establishing a political entity, 
but rather a cohesive community with a common sense of responsibility to each other. 
Government, via the Social Welfare Department, was the metaphorical glue holding together 
a new type of society. 
Percy McNeice and Tom Eames Hughes, the first two Secretaries for Social Welfare, 
attempted to accomplish those lofty objectives by legitimatizing and finding a permanent 
relevance for social welfare in Singapore. In doing so, the Department’s early years, roughly 
from June 1946 to the early 1950s, witnessed rapid and aggressive expansion of state-
provided welfare. This included the expansion and consolidation of former British Military 
Administration and Singapore Executive welfare functions, an aggressive but short-lived 
colony-wide feeding program between 1946 and 1948, and the conceptualization and 
execution of two social surveys in 1947 and 1953/4 respectively. The establishment and 
subsequent development of two sections, for Food and Social Research, reflected the initial 
intent and shifting fortunes of the Social Welfare Department.  
 
Utility: Food Section 
 
The first major task of the Social Welfare Department was to help alleviate a critical 
food shortage. In 1946, Singapore and the world was plagued by critical shortages in rice and 
other staple foods. In Singapore, a black market had already been in existence since the 
occupation period; the food shortages ensured it persisted after the war. Mindful of potential 
political and social fallout, particularly in the face of an increasingly hostile labor class, a 
communal feeding program was introduced to ensure affordable meals at inexpensive prices. 
The genesis of this program can be traced to the recommendations of the Wages and Cost of 
Living Committee. In May 1946, an inquiry was commissioned to review the wages of the 
clerical and laboring class in the light of rising costs of living, in particular the price of food. 
After hearing the urgent and at times desperate conditions of workers via personal 
testimonies, the committee made several interim recommendations, which included 
temporary cash allowances, a ceiling on food prices, the establishment of canteens by 
government departments and “large employers”, and to open “in all large urban areas” public 
                                                          
7 See Furnivall, Progress and Welfare, in particular sections on how nationalism can repair the plural society 
(pp. 48-49). See also Harper, The End of Empire, pp. 58-62. 
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restaurants “on the lines of British Restaurants in the United Kingdom”.8 The committee also 
recommended that the canteens and restaurants “should not be operated under contract but 
should be run directly by a division of the Welfare Department”.9  
The British concept of state feeding originated at the turn of the twentieth century. A 
nascent social consciousness, fermented by the labor movement, “social and nutritional 
scientists, medics, architects, industrial designers, teachers”, not only made it “technically 
possible for the state to assume responsibility for feeding new groups … but required them to 
do so, by showing the necessity for such intervention”.10 State responsibility for providing 
food to prisoners and the poor evolved into school and factory canteens for children and 
workers. This was accompanied by alarming reports of malnutrition, particularly during the 
Boer War where the physical condition of British soldiers was found to be poor.11 Wartime 
conditions, leading to food rationing, were also a catalyst for community restaurants, known 
as National Kitchens and British Restaurants during the Great War and Second World War 
respectively.12 The communal feeding program in Singapore comprised of the People’s 
Restaurants, People’s Kitchens (for mass catering), Sponsored and Approved Restaurants.  
On 29 June 1946, the Social Welfare Department opened its first People's Restaurant 
in a converted godown at Telok Ayer.13 Beng Neo described the restaurant as an “attap shack 
with barbed wire fencing” and recalled that they managed to sell two to three thousand meals 
in two hours.14 The first meal consisted of “rice, pork and vegetables, or rice and fish curry 
for Muslims, and a mug of iced water”.15 Still part of the Salvation Army then, Beng Neo 
assisted in managing the operations of a couple of restaurants within the city. She recalled 
that, as a result of the occupation and postwar food shortages, people then always felt hungry: 
 
Because you see when people start working in the office…, they cannot afford 
$3, $4, $5 for a meal…. And rice, of course was on ration. And people wanted  
 
                                                          
8 The Straits Times, 27 June 1946, “Malayan Cost of Living Report”. Full report available in this issue. See also 
Malayan Union and Singapore – The Wages and Cost of Living Committee, The interim report of the Wages 
and Cost of Living Committee (Singapore: Govt. Print. Off., 1946). 
9 The Straits Times, 27 June 1946, “Malayan Cost of Living Report”. Quoting directly from The Interim Report. 
10 James Vernon, Hunger: A Modern History (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2007), pp. 160-1. 
11 Vernon, Hunger, p. 91, and chapter 4 in general for the impact of scientific approach to nutrition and social 
policy in Britain. See also Fraser, British Welfare State, p. 177. 
12 Vernon, Hunger, pp. 181, 187. 
13 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 17. See also Wong Hong Suen, Wartime Kitchen: Food and Eating in 
Singapore, 1942-1950 (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet and National Museum of Singapore, 2009), p. 8. 
“Godown” means “warehouse”, and comes from Portuguese, Tamil, Malayalam, and Kannada linguistic origins. 
14 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 17. 
15 The Straits Times, 29 June 1946, “Cheap Lunch from Today”. 
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rice. They’re always hungry. Well, we were always hungry during the 
Japanese time. And this sort of carried over…. You always felt hungry during 
those days.16 
 
Each meal was sold at the extremely low price of thirty-five cents. The Social Welfare 
Department acquired the services of nutrition experts from the King Edward VII College of 
Medicine to ensure that each meal provided about seven hundred calories, or a third of daily 
nutritional needs.17 Beginnings describes the process of buying lunch:  
 
The customer enters by one of perhaps several lanes leading to a ticket box. 
He buys his ticket and passes on to a long serving counter where the complete 
meal is handed to him in a mess tin (or an enamel plate) by a server in 
exchange for his ticket. On his way to his table he passes other counters where 
he can pick up his spoon and his mug, and dip them in a sterilizer; where he 
can collect his iced water or his tea and coffee, and additional flavoring 
according to his own taste. When he has finished his meal he goes out by 
another door, passing on his way the washing up section, where he leaves his 
plate, spoon and mug, and then files past yet another counter where 
occasionally he will find on sale things like fruit, tinned provisions and 
cigarettes, which otherwise he could only get at inflated prices from 
profiteering street hawkers, agents for the most part of the black market.18 
 
By the end of 1946, ten People's Restaurants were opened, located in a variety of 
sites, such as “reconstructed godowns” (warehouses), as part of existing buildings and 
structures, and even one in the “boxing arena of an Amusement Park”.19 The Food Section 
expanded the feeding program to reach out to more people in a more effective manner. Aimed 
at the lunchtime working crowd, the People's Restaurants were located primarily within the 
city, and hence could not serve factories and workshops in “isolated localities”. Hence, the 
Social Welfare Department worked with the Labour Office to sponsor factory canteens, “with 
the latter arranging permits for the supply of controlled foodstuffs and the former provided 
the expertise and resources to get the canteens going”.20 This scheme established about sixty 
Sponsored Restaurants between July and December 1946. Centralized People's Kitchens were 
also created, with the aim of supplying “any number of ready-cooked meals in bulk to any 
                                                          
16 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 17. 
17 Beginnings, p. 22. This roughly translated into 700 calories, or “2 to 3 ounces (before cooking) of rice or (as 
an occasional substitute) six ounces of noodles, or 3 1/2 ounces of macaroni or vermicelli; 2 to 5 ounces of 
potatoes (according to the amount of rice used); 3 to 4 ounces of meat, game or fish; and 4 to 5 ounces of 
vegetables, usually fresh and including at least one green leaf vegetable”. 
18 Beginnings, pp. 23-24. 
19 Beginnings, pp. 23, 51. The locations included Telok Ayer, Seng Poh Road, Queen Street, Handy Road, 
Happy World, Katong Kitchen/N[ew] World, Maxwell Road, and Harbour Board. 
20 Beginnings, p. 24. 
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unit anywhere in the Colony which could make its own transport and distribution 
arrangements”.21 Via the People's Kitchens, the Social Welfare Department served “factories, 
newspaper offices, banks, shops, Government House, a Trade Union, official Departments 
and many schools….”22 At the peak of the feeding schemes in October 1946, the Department 
served on average nearly forty thousand lunches per day. In six months, the Food Section 
cooked over one million meals.23  
Attempts were also made to work with existing restaurants. The Department started an 
Approved Restaurants scheme, where successful applicants could buy controlled foodstuffs 
on the condition that the cooked meals were sold at pre-determined prices. Although close to 
two hundred applications were received, only a minority were deemed suitable.24 These 
schemes catered primarily to the working population. They were also there to, in McNeice's 
own words, to “counteract the black market”.25 It was not enough to provide cheap meals. 
The word had to be gotten out to the general public that food, cooked and uncooked, was and 
could be available at inexpensive prices. To do this, the Social Welfare Department and the 
colonial government made effective use of the print media. 
The interim recommendations of the Wage and Cost of Living Committee were 
announced on 27 June 1946.26 The next day on 28 June, The Straits Times published an 
announcement that the thirty-five cent lunch was a “reality” – one day before the first 
People's Restaurant actually opened on 29 June.27 Lending significance to the event and 
program, the Governor of Singapore and senior members of the colonial government sat 
down to lunch at Telok Ayer on the restaurant’s opening day, with the image duly reproduced 
in The Straits Times.28 In the same article, under the sub-heading of “Killing Black Market”, 
McNeice was quoted as saying, “Our main purpose is to reduce prices and to put a stop to the 
black market”.29 Rumors began circulating that the cheap meals were only possible because 
of government subsidies.30 The following month in July, McNeice gave an interview to The 
Straits Times, detailing how the thirty-five cent meal was put together and making public the 
                                                          
21 Beginnings, p. 26. 
22 Beginnings, p. 26. 
23 Beginnings, p. 24. 
24 Beginnings, p. 24. 
25 NAS OHC, Percy McNeice, reel 11. 
26 The Singapore Free Press, 27 June 1946, “Living Cost Allowance Proposed”. 
27 The Straits Times, 28 June 1946, “35-Cent Lunch is a Reality”.  
28 The Straits Times, 30 June 1946, “Governor Eats and Likes 35-Cent Lunch”. 
29 The Straits Times, 30 June 1946, “Governor Eats and Likes 35-Cent Lunch”. 
30 The Straits Times, 13 July 1946, “Alarm in the Black Market”. 
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prices of the various foodstuffs purchased.31 McNeice declared that all food purchases had 
been made in the open market (at government controlled-prices), and even after taking into 
consideration the salaries of the cooks and necessary staff, the feeding program was still able 
to make a small profit selling each meal so cheaply. He observed that people were still paying 
too much for food even considering the “high government-controlled prices”, and threw 
down the gauntlet to the black market by offering his services to help any restaurateur willing 
to sell meals at the Department's prices. 
The feeding schemes, particularly the People’s Restaurants, were popular. While 
difficult to assess accurately their impact on the black market and profiteering, they did seem 
to exert pressure on existing restaurants to give better value for meals. The Singapore Free 
Press investigated a particular restaurant that had consistently flouted the maximum 
controlled price of three dollars per meal.32 Although prices at that restaurant did not fall, the 
meal portions served were much improved.33 The Sponsored Restaurants scheme also helped 
carry the message that cheap meals were possible, with more than sixty local companies 
joining the scheme. For instance, on 19 July 1946, the owners of Singapore's leading Chinese 
newspaper, the Sin Chew Jit Poh, opened a canteen for its staff that sold meals at only ten 
cents.34 
The People's Restaurants and other feeding schemes were in the news regularly for 
the rest of 1946 and early 1947. Between September 1946 and May 1947, announcements 
under the heading “Today's Menu” were regularly published in The Straits Times informing 
the public of the meal of the day.35 The high volume of human traffic patronizing the People's 
Restaurants was given much publicity, as did the opening of new restaurants, Department-
operated or under the Sponsored Restaurants scheme, with suitable images of people 
enjoying their inexpensive meals. A rather subliminal method of inferring the success of the 
mass feeding schemes can be found in a two-panel illustration published in The Straits Times. 
The first panel depicts a queue of hungry and skinny customers waiting to enter a People's 
Restaurant. The second panel shows them emerging after their meal physically bigger, visibly 
                                                          
31 The Straits Times, 12 July 1946, “All Restaurants Can Sell 35-Cent Meal – Welfare Officer Shows How It 
Can Be Done”. 
32 The Singapore Free Press, 16 July 1946, Untitled. The author noted that $3 per meal was too high, 
particularly when one could get a meal at $2 in The Savoy in London. 
33 The Singapore Free Press, 16 July 1946, Untitled. 
34 The Singapore Free Press, 19 July 1946, “Chinese Press Runs 10-Cent Canteen”. 
35 Mostly in The Straits Times and in English. Cursory scan of other newspapers, such as Singapore Free Press, 
Malayan Tribune and selected Chinese newspapers, indicates no similar announcements on a regular basis. 
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flushed with confidence and energy, ready to take on the rest of the day.36 Editorials were 
mostly positive about the impact of the feeding schemes, with one claiming that “Singapore 
Did Not Starve” due to the Social Welfare Department.37 It was even suggested that the 
feeding schemes be part of a coordinated approach to address food shortages in Southeast 
Asia.38 
Public opinion, in the form of letters to the press, was more mixed. Some were 
pleased with the Department's initiative and asked for similar restaurants to be opened nearer 
to their vicinity. One asked for bigger portions and suggested a forty-cent meal to 
complement the cheaper meal.39 Others voiced their suspicions about profiteering.40 They 
pointed out the differences between a government agency buying in bulk, and hence at more 
competitive prices, and an individual being subjected to the whims of the open market.41 
Perhaps of more help and interest to the Department, several letters also pointed out gaps in 
service, such as a persistent group of women and children loitering around the restaurants and 
the limits of the initial workers-only objective of the People's Restaurants.42 
By April 1947, the Social Welfare Department felt confident enough to announce the 
success of its feeding schemes.43 In June 1947, fifty-cent lunches were introduced, in addition 
to the thirty-five-cent version, to meet increasing demand for meals with larger quantities and 
better ingredients as the general economic situation eased.44 It was taken as a signal that the 
hungry customer with additional means wanted more than the cheaper and sparse meal. The 
demand for the Department's meals fell throughout 1947. For instance, 1,321,115 meals were 
cooked and served from the People's Restaurants and People's Kitchens between June and 
December 1946, while the corresponding number of meals for the whole of 1947 was only 
                                                          
36 The Straits Times, 27 July 1946. Illustration by T. H. Peng. 
37 “Singapore Did Not Starve”, by Oscar Fernandez, The Singapore Free Press, 12 March 1947. See also The 
Straits Times, 21 Oct 1946, “Ikan Bilis on the Menu”. 
38 Beginnings, p. 29. It was reported that the Department received inquiries on its feeding schemes from China, 
Hong Kong, India, Borneo, Sarawak and the Malaya Union. See also The Straits Times, 31 Jan 1947, “S. E. Asia 
Winning War On Famine”. This put colonial Singapore’s efforts on the world map as part of a global fight 
against food shortages in the immediate post-war era. See also Paul H. Kratoska, “The Post-1945 Food Shortage 
in British Malaya”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1998), pp. 27-47, and for an insight into 
food shortages and British attempts at regional leadership, see Tilman Remme, Britain and Regional 
Cooperation in South-East Asia, 1945-49 (London: New York; 1995), chapter 3 (pp. 44-53), and Nicholas 
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39 The Straits Times, 15 Aug 1946, “Forty-Cent Plate?”. 
40 The Straits Times, 17 Oct 1946, “Cheaper Meals Can Be Cheaper Still”. 
41 The Straits Times, 24 Aug 1946, “First Hand Experience”. 
42 The Straits Times, 2 Aug 1946, “His Wife Was Right!”, and 28 Aug 1946, “35 Cent Rush”. 
43 The Straits Times, 27 April 1947, “4½ Million Meals Sold in S'pore – Feeding Schemes Big Success”. 
44 Singapore Department of Social Welfare, The Second Report of the Singapore Department of Social Welfare 
1947, p, 30. Hereafter The Second Report. 
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1,575,640, with the daily average falling from 6,000 meals in January to about 4,000 in 
December.45 
With the needs of the working population tended to, attention was turned to those who 
could not even afford the thirty-five-cent meal. It was recognized early on that the thirty-five-
cent meal was not often “within the reach of the poor, the old, the unemployable and the 
many-progenied [sic]”.46 In December 1946, the first Family Restaurant was opened at 
Maxwell Road, selling lunch at only eight cents per meal. Benefiting from the bulk purchase 
of Army foodstuffs, the eight-cent meal had more or less similar portions and nutritional 
value as the thirty-five cent meal.47 Demand for the eight-cent meal was sufficiently high – 
all 2,500 meals were sold out on the first day – to convert three existing People's Restaurants 
into Family Restaurant before the end of the month.48 The declining demand for the Social 
Welfare Department's cheap meals throughout 1947 however meant that it was no longer 
cost-effective to continue the feeding program. In August 1948, the last of the People's 
Restaurants were officially closed and other department-operated feeding schemes 
discontinued.49 Over two years, close to three and half million meals were served via the 
People's Restaurants and the People's Kitchens.50 
It is difficult to say conclusively that the feeding schemes broke the back of the black 
market or improved living conditions substantially. When asked, a local who survived the 
occupation thought things did not improve much: 
 
I don’t know. I don’t think it improved much. To certain people who are daring 
to risk black market, this and that, they do make money. But for the working 
people, I think it’s difficult to get work. And things [were] getting expensive. 
Salary cannot catch up.51  
 
The black market that began during the Japanese Occupation continued after the war, abetted 
by unscrupulous members of the British Military Administration.52 James Desmond Howard 
Neill recollected the ill-repute of the military government: 
                                                          
45 The Second Report, p. 29. 
46 Beginnings, p. 28. 
47 Beginnings, p. 28. The bulk purchase also allowed the Social Welfare Department to reduce the price of each 
meal from thirty-five to thirty cents for most of 1947. 
48 The Straits Times, 19 December 1946, “Big Rush for 8-Cents Meal”. 
49 The Straits Times, 12 August 1948, “Restaurants to Close”. 
50 Singapore Department of Social Welfare, Social Welfare Singapore 1948: The Third Annual Report of the 
Department of Social Welfare (Singapore: Government Printing Office), p. 34. Hereafter The Third Report. 
51 NAS OHC, Tan Wah Meng. Japanese Occupation of Singapore. Accession Number 000306. Interviewed in 
1987. Reel 17 (of 17). 
52 A substantial number of BMA officials were not military personnel, but rather civilians given military rank 
(and with substantive business and commercial interests in Singapore). See Lee, The Syonan Years, pp. 287-288. 
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The cynics called [that] “the black market association” because there were 
quite a number of people who came out in civilian capacity under special 
license, under special authority from the War Office. People who’d been in the 
trading community before the war – expatriates that is. And they were there to 
make a quick buck and some of their activities were not above board. And 
they of course went for some local speculators and dealers who were taking 
advantage of shortages.53 
 
Neill had worked in the Food Control Division, working with various organizations to ensure 
sufficient supplies of basic goods. He remembered being “horrified” when he found out that 
instead of passing it on to its members, an entire consignment of cloth was sold off by a 
worker’s union for enormous profit.54 
As shortages in basic necessities continued to meet demand, the black market was 
easily defeated. Moreover, the high volume of customers during the initial stages of the 
feeding program in the last six months of 1946 (and large numbers turned away from the 
People's Restaurants if they came late) did not necessarily indicate the popularity of the 
feeding scheme. It could have been a case of not having enough food, in particular rice. A rice 
shortage had been threatening since the beginning of 1946 and by August had deteriorated 
into a full-blown crisis.55 The local rice crisis and a global food shortage did put publicity 
efforts by the Department and the colonial government in a different light. Partly aggravated 
by cuts in rations, at one point even lower than they were during the Japanese Occupation, 
strikes in Singapore and Malayan Union reached a peak towards the end of 1946 and at the 
beginning of 1947.56 As publicity efforts visibly petered off by the middle of 1947, the initial 
slew of positive news and announcements seemed a deliberate attempt to placate the 
population with semi-good news or the sight of government doing something to prevent 
unrest. 
Anecdotal evidence did show that the feeding program forced food prices down. On 
the last day of the People’s Restaurants, the Social Welfare Department observed that the cost 
of a plate of rice and curry had gone from a dollar fifty down to fifty cents.57 The wide 
                                                          
53 NAS OHC, James Desmond Howard Neill. The Public Service – A Retrospection. Accession Number 
000114. Interviewed in 1981. Reel 2 (of 13). Neill was an officer in the British Military Administration and later 
the Malayan Civil Service. He later became the General Manager and Director of Fraser & Neave Pte. Ltd, one 
of the oldest food and beverages companies in Singapore. 
54 NAS OHC, James Neill, reel 2. 
55 See Kratoska, “Post-1945 Food Shortage in British Malaya”, and Remme, British and Regional Cooperation, 
and Tarling, Regionalism. See also Paul Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya, chapter 11. 
56 Michael R. Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the Communist Revolt of 1948 (London, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 105. See also Gamba, Trade Unionism. 
57 The Straits Times, 14 August 1946, “3,500.000 Meals in 2 Years”. 
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proliferation of Sponsored Restaurants – over sixty restaurants were still operating after the 
official end of the program – was also indicative of a continuing social need. At the very 
least, the feeding schemes kept the peace during a period of severe rice shortage by acting as 
a pressure-relief valve. In providing a cheap food alternative, the feeding schemes helped 
ensure no major social disturbances occurred. Seen this way, the Social Welfare Department’s 
place within government was valuable, at least as a ready-made response mechanism to 
emergencies. Over a longer term, the feeding program also marked the beginning of a more 
involved role by the state in late colonial Singapore.58 
 
Supporting Social Policy: Social Research Section 
  
A more involved state however does not immediately indicate acceptance of a social 
welfare department or state-directed welfare. The communal feeding schemes were 
temporary measures, designed to arrest potential social fallout due to food shortages. On their 
own, they give less the impression of a social welfare department than a government agency 
that proved useful during times of urgent need. The Food Section was scaled back 
considerably after the end of the feeding program, maintaining only one centralized kitchen 
for smaller-scale activities and potential emergencies. Moreover, the functions the Social 
Welfare Department inherited from pre- and postwar governments also marked it as a “catch-
all” agency, rather than a proactive institution formulating social policy.59 
In contrast, the planning, execution and implications of a social survey demonstrated 
longer term ambitions. As early as September 1946, the Social Welfare Department proposed 
to “institute enquiry into local social conditions by the social survey method”. The need for 
an informed social policy was urgent, the survey report argued, as “social policy in Singapore 
... had hitherto been evolved in conditions of poor visibility, where strong currents and 
dominant land-marks were discernible, but where much of the significant detail of the social 
                                                          
58 The current Ministry of Social and Family Development cites the feeding schemes as the first “milestone” in 
its history. Reported in The Straits Times, 30 June 2006, “MCYS marks 60 years of serving S'pore”. 
59 Social policy, seen broadly, is about “the analysis of access to life-enhancing and life-sustaining resources so 
that criminal justice or environmental policies are as relevant as wages or housing policies in its consequences 
for the lives of citizens. Social policy is concerned with the State organisation of social provision”. In a more 
restricted sense, social policy refers to a “welfare regime” for the purpose of ameliorating the needs of citizens, 
in times of difficulty and through no fault of their own”. Lian Kwen Fee, “Is There a Social Policy in 
Singapore”, in Lian Kwen Fee and Tong Chee Kiong (eds.), Social Policy in Post-Industrial Singapore (Boston: 
Brill, 2008), pp. 21-22.  
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landscape was sensed rather than seen”.60 There were prewar social investigations into 
housing and cost of living, but nothing compared to the comprehensive scale of the proposed 
social survey.61 The first departmental report expressed the hope that the “Survey will provide 
a reliable basis of ascertained fact upon which future social policy in Singapore may be 
planned in a scientific way”.62 It also explained that:  
 
Most surveys elsewhere have not had to take account of as large a floating 
element in the population (due to immigrant labour), and this element is not 
only largely illiterate but also composed of groups with widely differing 
traditions, religions, and habits of life. The existence of these complex 
conditions and the fact that they are at present known, if at all, in a vague and 
unscientific way often clouded with prejudice, is … one of the main reasons 
why the Survey is necessary.63 
 
Governments since the beginning of time have been collecting data about the societies 
they administer, namely the census. The social survey, as understood in 1947, was a by-
product of responses to industrialization, urbanization, and global economic depressions.64 At 
the turn of the twentieth century, individuals with the means and advocating social change 
conducted investigations into social conditions and urban life. They hoped to uncover the 
causes and incidence of poverty, and in doing so, to encourage social reform and political 
action.65 In contrast, the social survey conducted by government was more “to inform rather 
than prescribe” and aspired to be part of the discipline of “social science”.66  
Prior to the Second World War, the British government did not utilize the social 
survey method for policymaking due to the lack of expertise, a lack of consensus over 
methodology and validity of the social science method, and generally speaking, a lack of an 
                                                          
60 Singapore Department of Social Welfare, A Social Survey of Singapore: A Preliminary Study of Some Aspects 
of Social Conditions in The Municipal Area of Singapore, December, 1947 (Singapore: Dept. of Social Welfare, 
1948), p. 1. Hereafter Social Survey 1947. 
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63 Beginnings, p. 42. 
64 Martin Bulmer, Kevin Bales, and Kathryn Kish Sklar (eds.), The Social Survey in Historical Perspective, 
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66 Bulmer, Bales, and Sklar (eds.), The Social Survey, p. 42. 
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over-riding social purpose.67 But the outbreak of war changed that attitude. In 1940, it created 
the War-time Social Survey Unit primarily to “determine ... to what extent and in what 
direction curtailment of civilian consumption could be carried out without impairing factors 
like public morale and health....”68 It proved so successful in aiding government to measure 
the impact of its publicity campaigns and consequently public opinion, the social survey was 
recognized as an “essential tool in social policy” and retained as part of government 
machinery after the war.69 
Postwar Britain and Singapore shared similar concerns, such as food shortages and 
social and economic dislocation. In Singapore, colonial authority was moreover threatened by 
a potential alternative in the form of the Communists.70 There was hence a real need to gauge 
and to understand public opinion. The Social Welfare Department’s varied functions, as well 
as a general enthusiasm to establish a strong presence, created an urgent need for information 
to support social policy. The published survey report asserted: 
 
The Department was a new one and its duty was to deal with certain aspects of 
the problems of want, of delinquency and of leisure, which had not hitherto 
been handled by a Government agency specially deputized for the purpose. It 
became quickly aware that it wanted more facts about the problems with 
which it had to deal in order to plan its work comprehensively and 
economically, in order to avoid the pitfall of being merely a purveyor of 
palliatives, and in order to establish its true position as a primary and 
necessary instrument of good government.71 
 
Social policy in colonial Singapore had hitherto been more reactive rather than proactive. 
Previously, it took years and considerable effort to get government to respond to social 
problems, such as public health, housing or labor protection. The 1947 social survey was 
arguably the first instance where Singapore's colonial government attempted to get ahead of 
the curve, moving beyond a mere “purveyor of palliatives” to proactively identifying and 
redressing social ills. 
Planning and preparations were meticulous and thorough. A social survey committee 
was formed. It was chaired by the Secretary for Social Welfare and included a twenty-six-
                                                          
67 Roger Davidson, “The Social Survey in Historical Perspective: A Governmental Perspective”, in Bulmer, 
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year-old Goh Keng Swee.72 Destined to become Singapore’s principal social and economic 
architect,73 Goh was responsible for “most of the spadework at the planning stages, the 
training of enumerators, the organization of the final survey, and most of the preparation” of 
the published report. His meticulousness, in many ways, anticipated his approach as a future 
cabinet minister.74 The preparatory stages between October 1946 and December 1947 
covered a series of pilot surveys, including a major “pre-testing” survey in July and August 
1947 covering about five hundred households.75 By then, a new Social Research Section had 
been set up to manage the survey. Approval was received to proceed with the survey in June, 
and the survey was finally conducted in the final two weeks of 1947. A report on the survey 
was published in November 1948. At that time, the social survey was the first of its kind in 
Singapore and in the British Empire.76 
The social survey covered close to 5,000 households residing in the Singapore 
Municipality area. It obtained and collated data on an extensive list of issues, ranging from 
the various types of households and housing, the occupation and education levels of wage-
earners, to the education of their children and migrant ties to their respective homelands. The 
survey was more a broad “extensive” collection of social data, rather than an “intensive” 
investigation of particular social issues, such as the working class' income levels and 
incidence of poverty.77 The original draft plan noted that while data on income and 
                                                          
72 The committee included, George Thomson, the government’s Information (or Public Relations) Officer, Dr. 
C. J. Oliveiro, Acting Professor of Bio-Chemistry at Kind Edward VII College of Medicine, Thomas Silcock, 
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expenditure habits of working class households could be collected, their value would be 
rendered temporary by Singapore's fluid economic situation. In late 1946, when Singapore 
and Southeast Asia were threatened with famine, Singapore's “price and income structures” 
were still “in the process of being adjusted”, and hence data collected during that particular 
abnormal period could not be usefully used for future comparison.78 It was also feared that 
adopting a particular focus for the survey might be too premature as very little was known 
about the overall social context. The decision was thus taken to involve all “categories of 
households” and to design the survey to arrive at a “construction of a general picture of the 
habits, environment, family structure, etc. of the population within the sample universe”.79 
The survey yielded a broad range of data and information, some of which encouraged 
a reassessment of Singapore society. For instance, the survey disabused earlier perceptions 
that local-born Chinese were supposedly more assimilated into colonial society in terms of 
language, type of occupation and socio-economic status – and like the traditional Straits 
Chinese community, more loyal to the British Empire.80 However, more than half of surveyed 
local-born Chinese workers were holding manual labor jobs, rather than the presumed clerical 
or professional positions.81  
Mindful of the migrant foundations of Singapore’s colonial society, the survey 
included questions on “ties with the homeland”. Surveyors inquired into the number of times 
the respondent returned home and the number of times s/he remitted money home.82 The 
findings were startling. They showed that the majority of a supposedly transitory group had 
not returned to their homelands since they first arrived.83 Moreover, the vast majority of 
immigrants also had not remitted any money back home.84 For the first time, a statistical 
basis was given to show that Singapore's supposedly transient society was gradually more 
settled. The implications for social policy were substantial. The immigrant, theoretically at 
least, lacked the familial ties and hence close support in times of need. While extended or 
adopted families, as well as groupings and institutions based on place of origin, vocation, 
ethnicity and religion did exist, the effects of war had compromised, during the initial years 
of recovery, society's capabilities to fend for itself. 
                                                          
78 NUSCL, CO 927/79/2. 
79 NUSCL, CO 927/79/2. “Original Draft Plan”. 
80 The Straits Times, 25 November 1948, “The Chinese”.  
81 Social Survey 1947, pp. 52-53. 
82 Social Survey 1947, p. 109. 
83 Social Survey 1947, p. 112. Breakdown per ethnic group was: Chinese: 72%; Indians: 64%; Malaysians: 83%. 
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The survey brought more clearly to light the various problems – existing and potential 
– confronting individuals and families. 27% of surveyed households were single-person 
households, theoretically living on their own and hence might not have access to familial or 
community sources of social support.85 Compared to similar surveys conducted in Britain, the 
Singapore survey also found a substantially high percentage of households that had no adult 
male wage-earner, which meant that the household was supported primarily by the female or 
a juvenile. This report moreover warned that the figure, about 12% of surveyed households, 
was a minimum. “Juvenile” in Singapore was defined as sixteen years and below, compared 
to the British standard of twenty- one years and below.86 Illiteracy was prevalent. Of the 
7,000 heads of household surveyed, 46% had less than three years of education and were 
deemed illiterate (under the survey standard). 27% had elementary vernacular education and 
about 10% had elementary and secondary education in English.87 The survey also found that 
more than a third of school-age children (defined as seven to fifteen years) were not attending 
school, of which more than half were girls. This statistic did not moreover include households 
that sent only some of their children to school, meaning that the proportion of children not 
attending schools was decidedly much higher.88 
That inadequate housing and overcrowded living conditions were urgent problems 
were known long before the war.89 The main survey finding confirmed in stark (statistical) 
terms the deplorable overcrowded housing conditions the majority of Singapore’s population 
were enduring, providing a scientific (read: “not subjective”) basis for public outrage. The 
front page of the 11 November edition of The Straits Times screamed “Three-Fourths of City 
Overcrowded”. A further four pages of the newspaper were dedicated to the survey report, 
including a full-page article entitled “Is There a Conscience in Singapore”, authored by 
Thomas Silcock, Professor of Economics in Raffles College.90 Referring to the report as “a 
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tale of squalor and ignorance and degradation”, Silcock's article in many ways represented 
the moral indignation the social survey could not have in order to retain its scientific 
objectivity. Recounted in “cold, factual, moderate prose”, Silcock wrote, the report was a 
“tale to shock and shame any who live here, and who are content to let these things be”, and 
that the “white heat of public opinion [demanded] that finance shall be provided and action 
taken” to right “intolerable wrongs”. 
The survey findings moreover gave an edge to the increasing number of strikes by 
organized labor and the tensed political situation then. Singapore and the Federation of 
Malaya (which had replaced the Malayan Union in January 1948) had been under a State of 
Emergency since June 1948. Though primarily a jungle war, the Communist insurgency was 
also a battle for the hearts and minds of the people.91 The survey findings lent a fair bit of 
urgency to addressing social problems. During a time when “Communist propaganda is 
exaggerating every defect of Malayan society”, Silcock thought the report was evidence of an 
“administration willing to face facts frankly, however unpleasant and even discreditable they 
may be….”92 
Silcock’s comments were echoed in London by the Colonial Office. In 1949, a British 
parliamentarian – from the British Communist Party– used the survey findings to question the 
Colonial Office and its intentions to respond.93 He reiterated that the social survey was an 
“earnest sign of the Administration’s determination, in spite of the emergency, to improve 
conditions in the Colony”.94 The survey provided a scientific, objective basis not just for 
arguments for social change, but also fueled colonial anxiety. Poor living conditions give rise 
to legitimate grievances, and could lead to potential unrest (as happened in the West Indies 
during the 1930s). A substantial section of Singapore society was not as assimilated as earlier 
presumed, and hence susceptible to alternative modes of society and authority.95 All of these 
views informed and drove colonial efforts to build, or at least attempt to, a postwar society 
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more resilient than the one that fell to the Japanese in 1942.96 The social survey vindicated 
McNeice's efforts to establish social research as a necessary basis for social welfare work and 
social policy, which in turn consolidated social welfare as an essential government function. 
Singapore had taken the lead in “colonial scientific social survey work”, McNeice boasted, 
adding that its accomplishments had not escaped the attention of the Colonial Social Science 
Research Council. The pioneering work of Maurice Freedman and Judith Djamour, on the 
Chinese and Malay family respectively, resulted directly from the Council acknowledging the 
potential for further research.97 
The Colonial Office was initially not confident of Singapore’s abilities to conduct the 
survey. When informed in early 1947 of the survey, doubt was expressed by a member of the 
Colonial Social Science Research Council as to whether the “zealous but amateurish” Social 
Welfare Department could make sense of the data derived from the survey without 
guidance.98 Vague inquiries were also made as to whether a qualified person could step in to 
assist.99 In addition, the Chief Social Welfare Officer for the Malayan Union was skeptical of 
the utility of a social survey “in respect of the changing picture in social conditions” and 
raised the practical issue of having sufficient trained personnel to carry out surveys.100 The 
final survey report was in contrast well-received.101 Phyllis Deane, then a research officer in 
the Colonial Office (and a future Professor of Economic History at Cambridge University), 
thought the survey’s limited scope sensible and declared the methodology “soundly based”.102 
She suggested that the report should be endorsed by the Colonial Office as an example of an 
urban survey and copies forwarded to relevant bodies to emulate.103 Creech Jones expounded 
on his parliamentary comments in a personal note to Governor Gimson, acknowledging the 
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survey as the “first serious and extensive attempt to undertake an urban social survey in the 
Colonial Empire….”104 
The defensive and slightly strained language in the final survey report and the Social 
Welfare Department's annual reports reflected the initial lack of enthusiasm and support for 
the social survey. The annual report for 1947 went as far as to say that even if the levels of 
available knowledge were higher, “it would still be necessary to measure changes in social 
behaviour and the social environment as they occur and to tabulate the current habits and 
attitudes of the people in order to keep policy abreast of its times”.105 The annual report for 
1948 boasted that: “The survey also proved what some had been inclined to doubt, namely 
the applicability of the social survey method, properly used, in the conditions of 
Singapore”.106 It also highlighted the that “the idea was first conceived in the Department” 
and that it was the agency of the department's “own officers” that had carried out “this 
considerable piece of social research....”107 In contrast to the People's Restaurants and other 
feeding schemes, the social survey posited a more permanent role for the Social Welfare 
Department and for social welfare generally. For one, the social survey demonstrated the 
department's longer-term intentions, and not wishing to become and remain a “purveyor of 
temporary palliatives”.  
It is unfortunate that the published survey report did not include more intimate details 
of the surveyed households, discarded perhaps in the bid to present Singapore’s postwar 
social condition objectively (and hence to be taken seriously). It did however inspire a mini-
survey by a Straits Times reporter. He found four households of twenty Chinese living in an 
“attap compound house in the suburbs” on $420 a month. The house had three rooms, one 
large room partitioned into two to accommodate all four households: “the chief tenant, a 
woman, her husband and child, her two sisters…, their husbands, and six children, and her 
brother Robert, his wife and four children”.108 Robert worked as a cashier, earning about 
$120 per month. He lamented the change in fortunes. He recalled that before the war: 
 
I earned $80 a month and with one child could afford a servant and save $50 a 
month. I smoked cigars, drank brandy and went to the cinema, once a week. 
Now I am in debt, never go [to] the pictures and must work 15 hours a day.109 
                                                          
104 NUSCL, CO 953/4/8. Creech Jones to Gimson, 9 January 1950. 
105 My emphasis. The Second Report, p. 6. This statement is an example of the marked change in the colonial 
state’s approach to social issues in Singapore 
106 The Third Report, p. 48. 
107 The Third Report, p. 49. 
108 The Straits Times, 14 November 1948, “A clerk remembers cigar & brandy days”. 
109 The Straits Times, 14 November 1948, “A clerk remembers cigar & brandy days”. 
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Robert’s family was not by any means deprived or in desperate poverty. Robert was educated 
and had a Senior Cambridge certificate. Rent of the room was $10 every month. The family 
had access to fresh food, and could afford to send two children to school (at a cost of $4 each 
a month). The main difficulty apparently stemmed from failing to hold down a job and 
ensuring a stable family life. In two years, Robert had six different jobs, five of them in 
“adjacent countries”, and had moved his whole family once to their current lodgings. 
The living conditions of Robert’s and the other households mirrored some of the 
survey’s key findings. They were living in overcrowded conditions. Robert’s “12 ft. x 8 ft. x 9 
ft.” room was “home” to seven persons, his family and a sister-in-law from Sarawak. He, his 
wife and son slept on a “sleeping bench”, while the sister-in-law shared a bed with three 
daughters. All four households shared one bathroom, and cooking had to be done in shed next 
to the attap house. The reporter’s survey also unearthed a noteworthy factor in the change of 
Robert’s fortunes. While the war and occupation were disruptive, the large family sizes also 
affected each household’s ability to make ends meet. Robert could enjoy certain luxuries, 
including a servant, when his household was just three individuals. But without a stable and 
regular source of income, and with a bigger household to support (an additional three 
children and a relative), Robert had to adjust. He could not afford a more spacious flat 
because of the higher rent, and had to work longer hours, often coming home after his family 
was fast asleep. 
Such issues and others confronting individuals and families are placed in sharp relief 
by the social survey, posing questions for social policy to address. For instance, what happens 
when an individual exhausts the charity and goodwill of their family and friend? How can 
they improve their living conditions, such as raising a family in a small room located within a 
“red-light” district? How do large families cope when the breadwinner loses his or her job, 
due to sickness, injury or old age? What happens to the children and other dependents? What, 
or indeed how many, options do they have to ward off destitution and to eke out a living?  
 
Social Welfare Ratified: 1947 Social Welfare Conference 
 
To be sure, the Social Welfare Department did not and could not completely address 
all the social contingencies described above. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1940s, the 
Department was firmly established as the colonial government’s first line of response to 
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identified social problems. W. H. Chinn, the Colonial Office’s Social Welfare Advisor, was 
suitably impressed by the Social Welfare Department when he visited in 1948: “Singapore 
may indeed become not only a model of urban social welfare organisation but the training 
center for welfare in the Far East”.110 However, and despite the efforts of its senior staff, the 
Social Welfare Department did not attain the influential position some might have envisioned 
for the department (and state-directed social welfare). Put mildly, the Secretary for Social 
Welfare, Percy McNeice, and his deputy, Tom Eames Hughes, were forceful – aggressive 
even – in making the case for the state’s involvement in social welfare.111  As leaders of the 
Social Welfare Department, even if they were not the authors, they would still have been 
responsible for the strong language in the first two departmental reports.  
These arguments were tabled, discussed, and ratified during an international 
conference for social welfare held in August 1947. The conference was hosted in Singapore 
and organized by the Special Commission’s Office that was based in Cathay building. The 
Special Commission was a scion of the British Foreign Office and a by-product of British 
efforts to establish regional leadership in Southeast Asia.112 The conference agenda indicated 
what it meant to do social welfare work from the point of view of government. The agenda 
included items on postwar emergencies, human trafficking, juvenile delinquency, social 
research, and more pertinently, the role of government in social welfare and the implications 
of state-directed social welfare on existing social services.113 The latter points went against 
the conventional understanding of social welfare work was best done by voluntary, non-
government groups. The Special Commissioner noted the shift in conventions in his opening 
remarks: 
In many parts of the world the outlook on social welfare has gradually 
undergone a radical change. At one time all social welfare was considered a 
matter for voluntary agencies carrying out benevolent work by charitable 
subscriptions. When charity supports the hospitals, educates the children of the 
poor and feeds those in want, then this is social welfare for the people. But 
                                                          
110 Full report in NAS, CSO 2031/49. Quoted also in The Third Report, p. 2 
111 Tom Eames Hughes joined the colonial service in 1930s and was in Penang in 1938. He spent the war years 
in Gibraltar, and arrived in Singapore early 1946. He was transferred to Malaya in 1950 (education), and 
returned to Singapore in 1965. Information taken from article in The Straits Times, 18 December 1976. 
112 Established in January 1946, the initial purpose of the Special Commission was to coordinate efforts to deal 
with the regional and global food shortage. But the lessons of war and embarrassing defeats had affected British 
strategic thought, in particular impressing upon them the need for central coordination over disparate entities. 
The Special Commission was a Foreign Office initiative, and the Special Commissioner reported directly to the 
Foreign Secretary. The first (and only) Special Commissioner was a seasoned diplomat, Lord Killearn (Miles 
Wedderburn Lampson), former Ambassador to Egypt and High Commissioner for the Sudan. See Tarling, 
Regionalism in Southeast Asia, and Remme, Britain and Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia. 
113 Copies full agenda and listing of papers can be found in CO 859/157/4, FO 371-63514, and SCA 5/47: CO 
and SCA files in NAS, while NUS Central Library has FO 371 records 
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when it becomes accepted that the care of the sick, the education of the 
children and an adequate diet are the right of all, then these matters become 
the functions and duty of Government.114   
 
The reference in the above quote to the “the right of all” to medical care, education and basic 
nutrition, referenced postwar sentiments in Britain, where the welfare state was being 
established. The language was not exactly Beveridge-esque, but nor might a Beveridge-type 
approach be deemed appropriate for a colonial society with divergent interests and loyalties. 
Nonetheless, the idea of granting colonial subjects access by right to medical care, education 
and food, through government, illustrated proactive attempts to reverse prewar colonial 
policy and practice. 
McNeice and Hughes had considerable input in the setting of the agenda, and perhaps 
even in drafting remarks for the Special Commissioner.115 Both led a Singapore delegation 
that submitted the second highest number of papers - seven out of thirty-three submitted in 
total (and one less than the French Indochinese delegation).116 Singapore’s submissions 
moreover were the only ones that actively made recommendations, most of which pressed for 
– at times rather clumsily – the acknowledgment of social welfare as a government 
                                                          
114 NAS, CO 859/157/3. Conference Opening Address. My emphasis. Lord Killearn's opening address for the 
social welfare conference moreover included language that would be familiar to students of Southeast Asian 
history and historiography. He observed that there was a “certain resemblance” in the various social welfare 
enterprises within the region, “since the countries of South East Asia have much in common”. He continued, 
noting that “the diet of their populations has rice as its staple cereal. The clothing, the social way of life, the 
dwellings, and such to do with the health of the people are, at least loosely, connected. Agriculture and fishing 
are the main pursuits. From fishing came travel and the populations absorbed something of each other. In fine, 
the territories are socially interlinked and it is proper that they should move forward together for progress and 
development” (Conference Minutes). Such language is remarkably similar to that used by Anthony Reid in his 
introduction to Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce: Land Below the Winds, pp. 5-6, and 11: common 
features partly explained by environment, waterways leading to maritime travel, a human unit connected 
linguistically, by diet, use of building materials, betel chewing, and the role of women. The one (albeit tenuous) 
connection Reid has to the conference was through Victor Purcell, whom Reid studied under at Cambridge. 
Purcell was formerly with the Malayan Civil Service and the British Military Administration involved with 
Chinese Affairs work. He attended Social Welfare Conference as a representative of ESCAFE. Interestingly, 
Purcell’s later scholarship shows no evidence of a regional approach during academic career, though his work 
on Chinese migration could be seen as an integrative factor or a shared regional experience. Reid indicated to 
author (through personal communication) that Purcell did not pursue the idea of regionalism in his scholarship. 
115 The Special Commissioner and his staff were career diplomats and colonial officials, including technical 
experts on food and nutrition hired by the Foreign Office. McNeice and his deputy Tom Eames Hughes were 
credited publicly and in official correspondences. See NUSCL, FO 371/63512. Killearn's Closing Address: “We 
are much indebted to Mr. McNiece [sic] and Mr. Hughes of the Singapore Social Welfare Department for 
assistance in drafting the Agenda”. 
116 Singapore and the Malayan Union were the only territories within the British Far Eastern territories to have a 
social welfare department. Hong Kong had one only in the 1950s. The French Indo-Chinese delegation had a 
National Social Welfare Service; New Zealand and the United States did not have a social welfare department, 
but had national social security frameworks. 
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function.117 A social welfare department, as part of overall government machinery, was “far 
better able to operate social welfare services on a universal basis, in which all benefits are 
actually available to all citizens....”118 Moreover, “Government” was in a position to serve the 
needs of all, as opposed to the “generally more localized” efforts of voluntary organizations 
or even Municipal bodies.119 A unified national government could also deal with problems 
that transcended “national boundaries”, such as human trafficking and food scarcity.120 
Responses to Singapore’s arguments were lukewarm, even hostile. At one point in 
conference proceedings, McNeice grew impatient with his fellow delegates’ reluctance to 
define social welfare. He challenged them, stating that it was the duty of conference delegates 
to “attempt to define the field of Social Welfare work, and if they shirked it very little would 
be achieved at this Conference”.121 McNeice’s comments were unappreciated to say the least. 
Exchanges became testy, and included an American observation that Singapore’s 
recommendations were akin to “interdepartmental Empire-Building”.122 Representatives from 
voluntary agencies and charitable organizations likewise were uncomfortable with the 
Singapore delegation’s position. They were offended after hearing the work they do 
described as “haphazard”, “localized”, “improvisations”, or “surrounded by an aura of 
sanctity and benevolence”.123 Miss Scott-Moncrieff, the secretary of the Hong Kong Social 
Welfare Council, was unconvinced by Singapore’s proposals for state involvement in social 
welfare. Noting that Singapore’s proposed approach covered “such a wide field that it is 
bound to be a little totalitarian in its outlook”, she reminded everyone that “freedom of 
association is one of the fundamental bases of democracy”. She added, rather pointedly, that 
“all the British social measures were not given to them from above by a benevolent 
government, but had been fought for by the people”.124 Another delegate likened a paper, 
                                                          
117  The Department’s arguments were especially plain and direct in three papers: “Social Welfare as a Function 
of Government”, “Economic Aspects of Social Welfare Services”, and “Some Considerations relating to Social 
Research in South East Asia”. These can be found in NAS, SCA 5/47. No copies available in CO 859 or FO 371 
records in Singapore collections. 
118 NAS, SCA 5/47. My emphasis. 
119 NAS, SCA 5/47. 
120 NAS, SCA 5/47. 
121 NAS, CO 859/157/3. Conference Minutes. 
122 The East Indonesian representative queried the need for separate Social Welfare and Labour departments. 
The Chief Social Welfare Officer for the Malayan Union thought that it was “impossible to give a definition of 
social welfare work which would fit all conditions in all places and at all times”. The American and New 
Zealand observers thought it was premature to come up with definitions. The latter highlighted the smooth 
running of welfare work despite the absence of a social welfare department in New Zealand, which at that point 
in time was a leader in social security policies. NAS, CO 859/157/3. Conference Minutes. 
123 NAS, CO 859/157/3. Conference Minutes. 
124 NAS, CO 859/157/3. Conference Minutes. 
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which suggested concentrating the aged, sick and incapacitated in dedicated centers and 
homes, to Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf.125 The conference did end with resolutions ratifying a 
role for government in social welfare, but it was highly unlikely that detractors were 
sufficiently convinced to bother adhering to those resolutions in their home countries. 
With the benefit of distance, it could have very well been a case of the Singapore 
delegation’s bark being worse than its bite. The proposals put forward for social welfare vis-
à-vis government and the functions proscribed were residual in essence rather than overly 
interventionist or totalitarian. Despite the rhetoric about the limitations of non-governmental 
agencies, the idea of partnership – as espoused in the social welfare policy directive – was 
never discarded.126 What fueled Singapore’s proposals was perhaps less British earnestness, 
and more British insecurity in the wake of the Second World War. Seen this way, social 
policy, or at least the promise of social reforms, became “an exercise in the reorientation and 
preservation of colonial power”.127  
 
Social Welfare for the Long Term 
 
Still, the idea of a new approach for the postwar period appealed to sections of 
Singapore society. A Straits Times editorial remarked that the war had given the British 
administration “a fresh start”, to “crystallise and co-ordinate” the prewar welfare activities 
operated by a disparate group of government and municipal departments and private 
agencies.128 The same article also noted that the Social Welfare Department represented the 
“most significant departure from the old order”. It promised a “New Deal” – in a hat-tip to 
Franklin Roosevelt’s introduction of Social Security in the United States – for the people of 
Malaya and Singapore who had suffered for three and a half years under the Japanese. The 
article warned that the remnants of “Old Malaya” had not gone away, as evidenced by a 
planned meeting to “save the privileged classes of Malaya from paying income tax to finance 
social services for the under-privileged classes”. Still there was hope, as the “addition of 
                                                          
125 NAS, SCA 5/47. Responding to a section in paper entitled “Economic Aspects of Social Welfare Services”: 
“First then, it is wasteful and inefficient that persons who fall into these categories [the aged, the sick and the 
incapacitated] should be maintained in separate households all over the country; it is likely that they need 
regular treatment or at any rate periodical medical inspection. It is surely a waste of national resources if doctors 
and nurses have to make visits for this purpose to the homes where the persons live. Concentration into centres, 
homes, institutions or hospitals would lead to greater economies when the matter is viewed from the angle of the 
country rather than of the individuals”. 
126 See also Harper, The End of Empire, p. 60. 
127 Harper, The End of Empire, p. 62 
128 The Straits Times, 19 August 1947, “More Talk at the Cathay”. 
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Social Welfare to the recognised functions of Government” was a social gain from the 
“catastrophic break in the continuity of Malayan history”.129As noted earlier, social welfare 
presented itself as a useful “soft power” option during a period of nationalism and 
decolonization in Southeast Asia. The social welfare conference took place in the midst of 
hostile industrial action, food shortages, a dislocated society, and the emergence of the 
Communists and nationalist groups vying to replace the British.130 Reporting the publication 
of the first official report of the Social Welfare Department, The Straits Times observed that 
Singapore’s best defense against the “propaganda of the Communist Party” was not the 
“political branch of the police, but Social Welfare in the spirit in which it is now conceived 
and administered as a function of Government”.131 It also observed that the Department was 
the “one department where Government becomes human to the ordinary citizen, where the 
humblest caller can be sure of a patient, sympathetic, helpful hearing”.132  
Seen this way, the postwar Social Welfare Department had replaced the prewar 
Chinese Protectorate as the government agency to turn to in times of need. Social welfare 
officers investigated appeals for help, provided financial relief, acted as probation officers, 
managed youth clubs and hostels, took care of the aged and incapacitated, orphans, and gave 
protection to at-risk children. In each of those capacities, they listened, provided information 
and counsel, and attempted to resolve problems brought to them in a manner not very 
different from that of the Chinese Protectorate. Compared to the colony-wide impact of the 
feeding schemes or the social survey, such work was in contrast a less exciting and more 
mundane daily grind. But their significance was not any less. Together, they formed the basis 
of social welfare work as done by the late colonial government, a foundation that continued 
well into the post-colonial period. The Food and Social Research sections were respectively 
discontinued by the early 1950s and detached from the Social Welfare Department in 1958. 
On the other hand, departmental sections like Relief (later Public Assistance), Settlements, 
Women and Girls, Children and Young Persons, Youth, and Counselling and Advice 
persisted – albeit in different forms – throughout the Social Welfare Department’s history.133 
                                                          
129 The Straits Times, 19 August 1947, “More Talk at the Cathay”. 
130 Conference also took place in regional nationalism and global decolonization. In 1947, Indonesia and 
Vietnam were in the process of being, fighting the Indonesian National Revolution (1945 to 1949) and the First 
Indochina War (1945-1954) respectively. In April, a general election was held after Burma reached agreement 
with Britain, and became an independent state in January 1948. A week before the conference, India and 
Pakistan had also attained independence. 
131 The Straits Times, 23 August 1947, “Beginnings in Singapore”. 
132 The Straits Times, 23 August 1947, “Beginnings in Singapore”. 
133 See various annual reports of the Social Welfare Department (SWDAR) for changes to departmental sections 
and functions. 
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Social welfare was part of the late colonial government’s effort at a coherent social 
policy. Preparations for long-term plans for education, healthcare, housing and social welfare 
began as early as 1947.134 By1948, the shadow of the Communist insurgency loomed large in 
the government planning. The Governor of Singapore felt obliged to give reassurances that 
the various plans made by his government would not remain “schemes on paper”. He 
observed that “Communism makes the spurious claim that it alone cares for the welfare of the 
masses and also claims that this welfare is ignored by so-called capitalist governments”, and 
warned that “the Government must not lay itself open to criticisms that due attention has not 
been paid to the welfare of the common man”.135 
A Five-Year plan for social welfare was published in July 1949 and approved in 
principle by the Legislative Council at the end of the year.136 In real terms, the plan was 
predominantly a building project, such as buildings and other physical structures, to support 
social welfare activities. The immediate goal was to expand and develop youth welfare 
services. In 1949, the Social Welfare Department was directly managing an orphanage, a 
home each for at-risk girls and juvenile prostitutes, an Approved School for boys, three boys’ 
clubs and one hostel, and over a dozen child feeding centers ran by volunteers. By 1953, the 
child feeding centers were to be converted into eighteen permanent children social centers 
(for those between infancy and six years of age). The plan also aimed to have a total of 
nineteen boys' clubs, six girls' clubs, sixteen hostels (eleven for boys and five for girls,) and 
several camps and camping grounds for youths – most if not all to be housed in new 
buildings. New facilities and buildings were also planned for destitute children, for children 
with physical and mental disabilities, a Junior Approved School to complement the existing 
Approved School, a permanent site for juvenile prostitutes, and a new remand home to 
segregate the juvenile delinquent from the orphaned or homeless child. A formal probation 
service, with trained staff, was also to be established.137  
                                                          
134 These included the Singapore Housing Committee’s Report of the housing committee Singapore, 1947 
(Singapore: Govt. Print. Off., (1948), the Education Department’s Singapore Department of Education ten-year 
progranme: data & interim proposals (1949) (Singapore: The Dept., 1949), and the Medical Department’s The 
Medical Plan for Singapore (Singapore: Printed at the Govt. Print. Off., 1948). 
135 The Singapore Free Press, 19 Oct 1948, “They won’t be paper plans only”. See also The Straits Times, 16 
Feb 1949, “Improve the People’s Welfare – Gimson Tells Council”. 
136 The Straits Times, 20 Oct 1949, “Unanimous Support for 5-Year Welfare Plan”. Before approved by the 
Governor, the plan was vetted by a select committee in the Legislative Council. The Select Committee agreed 
with most of the recommendations, and recommended government acceptance of plan. See NAS, CSO (Colonial 
Secretary Office) 5735/49, “Report of the Select Committee on the Social Welfare Five-Year Plan” Council 
Paper No. 80 of 1949.   
137 Singapore Department of Social Welfare, Department of Social Welfare - Five-Year Plan (Singapore: 
Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 5-8. 
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A longer-term objective was to rationalize social assistance, which had developed in 
an ad hoc manner during the British Military Administration period. This included 
Emergency Relief and two settlements for the destitute and the invalid (usually victims of the 
war). Social assistance was defined in the Five-Year Plan as “the active intervention of 
Government to aid its citizens in any circumstances in which such assistance may be 
needed”.138 Such assistance however should not be permanent, “except in cases of old age 
and permanent disability”, and should moreover be given with the “explicit purpose of 
restoring a person’s capability of being a productive element in the community”.139 The 
benefit in doing so was preventive, as in preventing poverty and reducing costs over the 
longer term.140 The plan called for a rational system of disbursing financial relief to 
individuals in genuine need, and to create a “rural settlement” to house the “permanently 
destitute and homeless persons”.141  
 The saying about best laid plans is an apt description for the slow progress after the 
Five-Year Plan was approved. The 1950 departmental report lamented the “hinderances [sic] 
and alterations” that caused building delays, and more tellingly, the “considerations which 
tended to place Social Welfare Department projects at a low level of priority”.142 By 1951, 
though some progress was made, the focus had shifted to one of “consolidation and 
improvement of already existing activities....” The plan was not even mentioned at all in the 
departmental reports for 1952 and 1953, the latter supposedly the end-point for the Five-Year 
Plan.143 The rapid expansion of the Social Welfare Department witnessed earlier had stalled. 
Various reasons contributed to this, not least instability due to staff movement and political 
developments, the “distraction” of the Communist insurgency, and being saddled with 
residual functions as feared earlier.144 After McNeice and Hughes departed in 1949 and in 
1950 respectively, there were at least four different Secretaries in a space of about three 
                                                          
138 Five-Year Plan, p. 9. 
139 Five-Year Plan, p. 9.  
140 Five-Year Plan, p. 9. 
141 Five-Year Plan, pp. 9-10. 
142 Report of the Social Welfare Department 1950 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1951). Hereafter 
SWDAR (Social Welfare Department Annual Report). 
143 There was an attempt to follow-up with a second Five-Year Plan sometime in 1953 or 1954. This is 
elaborated in Chapter 6. See NAS, SWD 328/55. This was not publicized, probably overtaken by constitutional 
developments. 
144 The National Archives of the UK (TNA), Cab 129/76, “Report on Colonial Security”, 23 April 1955. 
Templar devoted one section to the conflict between welfare and law and order. He observed that the “large 
sums” spent on welfare could have been directed to improving law and order first: “Improving economic 
conditions do not always mean political tranquility; on the contrary, the desire to see improvement accelerated is 
a potent source of unrest”.  
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years.145 Staff movement at the lower levels also hindered social welfare work. For instance, 
the Social Research section was only fully active whenever Goh Keng Swee was free from 
his studies in London. Political and constitutional developments moreover could and did 
complicate government work. The various Secretaries for Social Welfare answered directly to 
the Colonial Secretary (also known as the Officer Administrating the Government), and hence 
had plenty of latitude for independent action. When the Rendel Constitution came into effect 
in 1955 (which provided for limited self-government in Singapore), the position of Secretary 
was “downgraded” to a position that reported to a Minister via two senior civil servants.146 
The Communist insurgency also impeded social welfare expansion. Governor Gimson 
forewarned of such a situation, observing that it was “tragic” that resources had to be 
channeled to internal security measures during a time when social reforms were badly 
needed. But until “security of the individual from oppression” exists, “measures for social 
improvement, however great their priority, must take a second place”.147 As the Communist 
insurgency escalated, the Social Welfare Department was saddled with new, more urgent, 
functions. Genuine threats from the Communists and a policy of community-building via 
mass adult education (as community development was understood in Malaya and British 
Africa) meant new duties for an already short-staffed department.148 Against the backdrop of 
Communist agitation, youth welfare accelerated, mainly via the establishment of more youth 
clubs throughout the 1950s.149  
Still, if seen over the long term, such moments were mere ripples, the histoire 
événementielle or “episodic history” so to speak.150 They crashed furiously into view at 
particular moments, demanding attention because of their immediate severity. But eventually 
they dissipate, breaking up on the breakwater that are the “everyday” structures and needs of 
                                                          
145 Also noted by WH Chinn, the Colonial Office’s Social Welfare Advisor. See NAS, CSO 2031/49. 
146 The Labour Front, led by lawyer David Marshall, won a plurality of seats in the new Legislative Assembly. 
See for an introductory overview of political developments leading to 1955, Yeo Kim Wah, Political 
Development in Singapore, 1945-55 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1973). 
147 The Singapore Free Press, 19 Oct 1948, “They won’t be paper plans only”. 
148 Community Development first appeared as a social welfare function in 1950 (See SWDAR for 1950), and as 
part of Civil Defence thereafter. Community Development was a relatively new government function. Initially 
known as mass adult education, at its broadest, “Community development … was about involving people in a 
community in educating themselves to improve the circumstances of their lives through health, agriculture, civic 
education and mass literacy schemes”. For a historical overview of its origins and development, see Rosaleen 
Smyth, “The Roots of Community Development in Colonial Office Policy and Practice in Africa”. Social Policy 
& Administration. Vol. 38, No. 4 (2004), pp. 418-436.  
149 The number of youth clubs increased substantially, from eight clubs in 1948 to a peak of thirty-six in 1955. 
Reporting on the youth clubs became less detailed after 1955. 
150 This draws on Immanuel Wallerstein’s translation of Fernand Braudel’s concepts in “History and the Social 
Sciences: The Longue Durée”. Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 32, No. 2 (2009), pp. 171-203. 
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social life. The scope and reach of social welfare, as envisioned in the Five-Year Plan, were 
undeniably curtailed, but not drastically affected by political developments and imperatives. 
Decolonization, the political struggles, and eventual independence did not fundamentally 
change the core structure and functions of the Social Welfare Department, such as the care 
and protection of women and girls, children and young persons, the destitute and the 
homeless. Constitutional developments did not change the fact that people continued to fall 
sick, grow old, or sometimes meet unfortunate accidents, getting injured and becoming 
unemployed. They did not prevent marital issues, child care worries, bread-and-butter 
concerns, or any other mundane but important day-to-day living concerns. In such moments, 
individuals and families may need information or guidance navigating through such 
moments, and if necessary, relief in kind or otherwise. And if for one reason or another they 
were unable to turn to their families and communities for help, the Social Welfare 
Department and its officers were present. Financial relief from the state was available for 
those in need. Though not placed on a statutory basis, Emergency Relief was formalized as 
Public Assistance from 1951 with clearly delineated categories of need.151 Concurrently, the 
Social Welfare Department also distributed other forms of financial relief, including 
allowances specifically for tuberculosis (from 1949), allowances for sickness in general, and 
grants from the revived Silver Jubilee Fund.152 A Poor Man’s Lawyer service was established 
as part of the Department’s Counselling and Advice section in mid-1952.153  This succeeded 
the earlier taijin sessions of the Chinese Protectorate. Social welfare officers at one time or 
another had to counsel or give guidance on personal matters, such as advising on the number 
of children, on finances, on medical problems, on underage sex consoling the abused and 
harassed, chiding errant spouses (of both genders), mediating family disputes over marital 
and/or financial problems; and moreover, not all the time successfully.154 
 
 
                                                          
151 The categories of need were: the aged, persons suffering from advanced tuberculosis, widows and orphans, 
the disabled (permanently or temporarily), and the unemployed. Until 1 August 1951, relief rates still adhered to 
the BMA emergency relief standard, which were $5 for a male adult, $4 for the female adult, $2 for each child 
under sixteen years of age. The new rates allowed up to $10 or $15 per month for head of household, and a 
corresponding $4 or $5 for each dependent. To qualify, the applicants must have resided in Singapore for at 
least three years. See SWDAR for 1951, pp. 35-36. 
152 SWDAR for 1951, pp. 37-40. The Social Welfare Department also managed two other relief funds, The Far 
Eastern Relief Fund and The Malaya War Distress Fund. See SWDAR for 1951, pp. 40-42. 
153 SWDAR for 1952, pp. 4-5. 
154 Extracted and abridged from the oral histories of Chia Cheong Fook, Janet Yee, Cecilia Nayar, and Ann 
Wee. See Chapter 6 for fuller elucidation of their experiences. 
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The Benefits and Limits of the Social Welfare State 
 
The intent of the colonial state to provide social welfare, manifesting in the creation 
of a Social Welfare Department, meant a new experience for individuals who came into 
contact with the prewar colonial state. Augustin Gomez for instance had been repatriated to 
India during the Great Depression. He survived the war and returned to his prewar job as 
estate manager in Malaya. But a conflict ensued with his boss, and he resigned in 1948. By 
then, he was fifty-three years of age. Employment opportunities were few and gradually 
limited by younger, more energetic (and far less expensive to hire) workers. He was thereafter 
unable to find permanent employment. In 1949, an illness depleted his meager savings and 
exhausted the goodwill of friends and family in Kuala Lumpur. The following year in 1950, 
he moved to Singapore to seek help from his daughter (who had earlier moved to Singapore 
from India).  
Family assistance however was limited. Still suffering from a chronic medical 
condition (arthritis), Gomez’ situation was brought to the attention of an almoner (a medical 
social worker), who helped with his application to the Social Welfare Department for 
financial assistance. In 1952, he received nineteen dollars under the Public Assistance 
scheme, which was later increased to thirty. At that time of the research study (in 1958), he 
was still receiving Public Assistance. He was staying with his daughter’s family, who was 
also having its own difficulties making ends meet. They lived in a “two-roomed wooden and 
corrugated iron structure” in the middle of an “undeveloped squatter area off Jalan Eunos”. 
There was no running water, and they had to share a “common-pit latrine” with several other 
households. Gomez’ own prognosis was poor. It was highly unlikely he ever returned home to 
India, nor had he particularly wished to do so – in order to continue receiving financial from 
the social welfare state.155  
After liberation, Valentine Frois’s work life was punctuated by bouts of illnesses 
(beriberi and a persistent stomach ailment), probably caused by malnutrition during the 
Japanese Occupation. Frois found work with several shipping agencies but ill health ensured 
he could not stay long in any one position. He was diagnosed with tuberculosis in 1954. His 
then employer paid his medical bills for the first three months, but eventually asked him to 
leave with a month’s pay. Frois continued looking for work, but his advanced age (fifty-eight 
                                                          
155 Coelho, “Old Man on Public Assistance”. Augustin’s treatment at the General Hospital, which included 
medicines and a short hospital stay, was apparently free of charge. 
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years old in 1954) was against him and he grew increasingly dependent on his family and his 
Catholic parish. After the latter was unable to help him regularly, he finally took his priest’s 
advice and reluctantly applied to the Social Welfare Department for aid. Starting in 1955, 
fifty-nine-year-old Frois received fifteen dollars every month. Even so, in 1958, he still kept 
active, taking advantage of a clean bill of health after recovering from tuberculosis. To repay 
his friends, Frois helped out with odd jobs to supplement his monthly Public Assistance, and 
kept an eye out for more permanent work. He did not expect much though, as prospective 
employers simply shrugged him off after hearing his advanced age. Though healthy, Frois 
expected to depend more on his family and friends, community, and the state for the 
remainder of his years.156 
Public Assistance was also given out at the other end of the age spectrum, children in 
or near poverty. When M. Subramaniam was five or six years old, his father suddenly died 
from tuberculosis (either in 1948 or 1949). As the entire family of five (mother and four 
children) had lost its only breadwinner, they were placed on Public Assistance, “given social 
assistance” as he recalled, by the Social Welfare Department. On turning sixteen, his elder 
brother left school to work and help support the family. The Social Welfare Department again 
stepped in to assist when that brother fell sick with tuberculosis. It was not easy growing up 
in deprived circumstances, as the entire family had to survive on twelve dollars every month. 
Most of the time, they were eating rice with only dried fish (ikan bilis). (He recalled a bowl 
of rice with a piece of dried fish cost about twenty cents. This would have been during the 
late 1940s and early 1950s). At age thirteen, Subramaniam took on part-time work to 
supplement the family’s meager income.157 Things took a turn for the worse when 
Subramaniam’s brother-in-law was killed in an industrial accident in 1963. Suddenly, his 
pregnant sister became a widow, and her other three children fatherless. They moved in with 
Subramaniam, who was already supporting his mother and elder brother, who was recovering 
from tuberculosis. At twenty years of age, saddled with additional responsibilities, 
Subramaniam started work as a proof reader in the Government Printing Office.158   
                                                          
156 Coelho, “Old Man on Public Assistance”. 
157 NAS OHC, M. Subramaniam. The Public Service – A Retrospection. Accession Number 003036. 
Interviewed in 2006. Reel 2 (of 6).  
158 He played a significant (if understated) supporting role in Singapore’s sudden independence on 9 August 
1965, as part of the team that printed the documents proclaiming Singapore as an independent republic. To 
prevent leaks, his team was kept under lock and key on 8 August (Sunday) until the Singapore government was 
ready to make the announcement the following day on 9 August 1965. See Lee, The Singapore Story, p. 645. 
Hear also Eddie Barker’s OHC interview in NAS: Political History in Singapore 1945-1965. Accession Number 
000193. Interviewed in 1982. Reels 1 and 2 (of 3). 
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The above examples demonstrate how a social welfare state assisted individuals and 
their families during times of need. They also illustrate the limits of the Social Welfare 
Department. The Social Welfare Department only assisted with specific categories of need, 
usually those near or already past the point of destitution. The cases above were complex, 
such as health concerns, overcrowded living conditions, and weakened family and 
community support, all not easily solved with the mere provision of cash. For Gomez and 
Frois, the war had been extremely disruptive. Though they survived, they came out of it less 
healthy, to say the least. They were also older workers in a postwar colonial situation, which 
might have been more sympathetic to their plight, but at the same time did not provide many 
employment opportunities. As novel as it was, the Social Welfare Department could not 
create jobs, did not have the mandate to build houses to ease overcrowding, nor could it treat 
or cure disease. Social conditions in postwar Singapore were daunting, and much of it was 
beyond the Department’s scope of functions and services. 
 
Overcrowded Living Conditions 
 
Singapore’s population swelled from a prewar estimate of 600,000 to almost a million 
in 1946, mainly as a result of the influx of refugees and other transients during and after the 
war. The increase in physical numbers exacerbated food shortages, worsened overcrowding 
and poor living conditions (predominantly within the city limits), and tested British 
capabilities to prevent a breakdown in law and social order. Singapore’s flourishing entrepôt 
trade economy came to a virtual standstill during the war. Time was needed to get it up and 
running again, which also depended on restarting the estates, mines and other industries up 
north in the Malaya peninsula. The necessary recovery time led to a shortage of jobs, which 
in turn limited the flow of hard currency to bolster the economy. Moreover, in the midst of 
food shortages, the black market thrived, abetted by unscrupulous members of the military 
government, who had no enemy to fight and plenty of time (and incentive) to loot and profit.  
Such circumstances only added to despairing individuals and families attempting to 
just get by from day to day, while living in “almost inhuman” conditions. For much of the 
postwar years, the majority of Singapore’s population lived within the city itself, near the hub 
of economic activity. In November 1946, a Singapore Free Press reporter wrote: 
 
Today Chinatown is congested – over-congested, it might be said. Masses of 
humanity are crammed into it. Chinatown is full – but more are coming into 
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it.... “Almost inhuman” was the description given by a prominent Singapore 
Health Officer to the conditions under which a large part of the city’s cubicle 
dwellers existed. The situation is worse today. Where formerly a tiny cubicle 
in Chinatown housed a man, his wife and an annually growing family, today, 
in many instances, it holds a portion of some other family as well.159 
 
The same report also noted that “Singapore’s slums have become “slummier”, the 
increasingly congested living spaces led to fears of a “great increase in the incidence of 
tuberculosis and pneumonia”.160 
The 1947 social survey found that close to two-thirds of surveyed households lived in 
overcrowded conditions,161 21%  lived in “Acutely Overcrowded” conditions,162 while 
another 15%  lived in what was categorized as “spaces”, a category that refers to a living 
environment that was “grossly overcrowded”, which was one stage worse even than ... 
“acutely overcrowded”.163 The incidence of households living in “spaces” gets higher 
(between 16% and 26%) when limited to households living within the “Inner City” wards.164 
It was a problem with no geographic distinction. The incidence of overcrowding in the 
“Outer City” wards was not as acute, but still stood at more than 50%.165 The most damning 
statistic was that 80% of households lived in accommodation consisting of only one room or 
less.166 The percentages given above are in terms of households. In terms of individual 
persons (the survey covered over 19,000 persons), 74% of them were living in overcrowded 
conditions, of which 7% were living in “spaces”.167 Most of them belonged to medium and 
                                                          
159 The Singapore Free Press, 16 May 1946, “House Shortage in Singapore Slums”. 
160 The Singapore Free Press, 16 May 1946, “House Shortage in Singapore Slums”. 
161 Social Survey 1947, p. 78. 
162 Social Survey 1947, pp. 77-78. "Acutely Overcrowded" meant that there were more than four adults per room 
or more than three and a half adults per cubicle, going by a Municipal Standard of 350 cubic feet of space per 
adult. The survey report warned the standard was "lax in the extreme as it would permit a man and wife and four 
children under ten, or four adults of different sexes to occupy one room without being graded as overcrowded". 
Page 78. 
163 Social Survey 1947, p. 79. The "space" category "covers households whose sole habitation consisted of 
places like bunks in passage ways, the tiered bed lofts common in Singapore, sleeping shelves under or over 
staircases, sleeping arrangements in five-foot ways, kitchens and backyards and other places used for sleeping 
without ordinary enclosures or partitions. Parts of places used for sleeping which during the day-time was used 
for other purposes such as shops, factories, offices, etc. were also classified as "spaces"”.Social Survey 1947, p. 
70. 
164 The Inner City area stretches from Keppel Road in the west to the end of Victoria Street in the east, 
demarcated by New Bridge Road and Serangoon Road to the north. The Outer City wards include areas in and 
around Tiong Bahru Road, Havelock Road, River Valley Road, parts of Alexandra Road, Bukit Timah Road 
(until Coronation Road), Balestier, Serangoon Road, Macpherson Road, Paya Lebar Road and Geylang Road 
(until Siglap Road). 
165 Social Survey 1947, pp. 71, 78-79. 
166 Social Survey 1947, p. 75. 
167 Social Survey 1947, p. 81. 
185 
 
 
 
large households (four persons and more).168 In plain numbers, that meant each of some 
fourteen thousand people was living together with at least four other persons in a single room. 
In 1948, a newspaper report on Singapore slums presented a reporter’s personal 
encounters with such dwellings in more graphic detail: 
 
Built of rotting pieces of salvaged wood, a one-roomed shack (I hesitate over 
the word “room” – “enclosure” would probably be more appropriate) with, at 
the most an over-all floor space of not more than 25 square yards, and 
containing no facilities for sanitation or ablutions, was the average dwelling I 
visited the other day.... It was almost impossible to approach within a stone’s 
throw of these awful, decrepit looking huts without - after first taking the 
precaution of rolling my trousers to the knees - wadding through pools of 
stagnant water and picking my way over stinking rubbish dumps. Presently, 
after balancing precariously on “stepping-stones” of discarded bits of rusting 
metal. I managed to reach the squalid piles of pots and pans, broken boxes and 
drunken structures of wood which, incredible as it may seem, were the homes 
of human beings. I took considerable risk that afternoon, from T.B., dysentery 
and most other diseases which abound and breed in the stinking mires of filth 
where these homes are situated. Yet, people live there! They eat whatever food 
they can manage to forage from the society which allows such a squalid 
existence to be possible. They bring up their luckless children in this same 
horrible and disgusting environment.169 
 
In November and December 1951, The Straits Times published a series of articles 
featuring the various plights of children in Singapore and the Federation of Malaya. The first, 
“Their Playground is the Gutter”, described a common-sight living space in Chinatown – in 
the author’s words, a “hovel”: 
 
We pass through the narrow street doorway into a dank passage. At the far end 
lies the tiny communal kitchen which serves 60 people. At one side there is a 
line of charcoal fire places, and the steam from the inferior rice bubbling in 
pots mingles with lines of dripping washing hanging from the ceiling – if the 
rotting, broken boards partly open to the sky can be called by such a name. 
Outside is a lavatory, and a Shanghai jar. It is not a pleasant place for, like the 
kitchen, it serves 60 people. We have to climb an almost vertical ladder to 
reach the living quarters. Another passage runs across the top, too narrow for 
two persons to walk abreast. It is lined with splintered shelves holding bundles 
of pots and pans, sacking, and a few piles of garments, for this is store room, 
pantry, wardrobe and dumping place. Eight “rooms” lead off the passage. We 
don’t need to knock at any door for most of the tenants are around us 
wondering why we have disturbed their privacy. After all, it practically the 
only thing they have left – privacy from outsiders that is – for they certainly 
have none of their own. We go through the first door into a three-yard-square 
                                                          
168 Social Survey 1947, p. 28. 24.4% of total households had six persons and more. 
169 The Singapore Free Press, 19 January 1948, “Singapore's Slums”. Authored by Eric Mitchell. 
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space; smaller than our bathrooms at home. Four people live here, mother, son 
and two daughters. A wide board jutting out of the wall and taking up half the 
room is their bed. A length of oil cloth tacked over it gives some protection 
from the bare wood, but we do not see any covers. They hardly need them for 
there is no window, and the only fresh air flows sluggishly over the gaps 
between the ceiling and wall tops. These people do not even have walled-in 
rooms. They are cubicles, not affording the privacy of a horse box. They 
cannot know the luxury of a private family quarrel. Nothing is secret, not even 
marital relationship, which above all things a man and his wife have a right to 
keep to themselves.170 
 
When the visitors finally left the dank, overcrowded dwelling, they became aware of a 
“burning sensation” around their elbows. They discovered a “mass of large white bug bites”, 
the consequence of coming into contact with the lice-infested walls in the interior of the 
house.171  
Still, despite the squalor, they found the people living within were “as clean as it is 
possible for them....” For some, albeit brief, respite from such conditions, the residents spent 
much of their time outside their homes. Similarly, samsui women spent most of their 
evenings along the five-foot ways below their lodgings, partly for leisure and other forms of 
social interaction, but also to escape the stifling confines of poorly ventilated living spaces.172 
Even so, leaving the confined space might have not brought much-needed relief, and perhaps 
even more danger. The visiting party noted that the absence of amenities, such as parks or 
playgrounds, meant that the children it encountered played “on the streets” near the dwelling, 
streets that were “bordered by monsoon ditches – ditches filled with floating, sodden 
debris....”173 
Physical dangers were not the only concern. Since he could not return to his prewar 
job at the British naval base, Wong resorted (again) to hawking fruits to make a living. In 
1951, he was living with his wife and four children (an elder daughter from a previous 
marriage and three sons) in a back room of a two-story bricked terrace house, renting the 14' 
                                                          
170 The Straits Times, 4 November 1951, “Their Playground is The Gutter”. 
171 The Straits Times, 4 November 1951, “Their Playground is The Gutter”. 
172 Information taken from Tang Chee Hong, “The Cantonese women building labourers: a study of a group of 
Sam-Sui women in the building trade”. (Unpublished academic exercise--Dept. of Social Studies, University of 
Malaya, 1961), pp. 50-52. The samsui women are female laborers from the Sanshui district of Guangdong 
province in southern China. They are identified by their distinctive red-colored headscarf. For a recent 
sociological study on the samsui women, see Kelvin E. Y. Low, Remembering the Samsui women: migration 
and social memory in Singapore and China (Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press, 2014).  
173 The Straits Times, 4 November 1951, “Their Playground is The Gutter”. 
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x 12' x 10' space (168 square feet) for thirty-five dollars a month.174 Wong’s family shared 
the second floor with two other sub-tenants who occupied two front rooms, and all shared the 
same bathroom, W.C. and kitchen. The ground floor was a laundry-shop. For a family of six, 
the bedroom was small and cramped. There was space for only one bed, which the wife and 
youngest son occupied at night. The rest slept on mats on the floor. Space was however not 
Wong’s major concern. The terrace house was located along a major “thoroughfare” that cut 
through a known prostitute haunt. The street bustled with activity towards the evening and 
well past midnight. Wong preferred to stay elsewhere for the welfare of his family, but could 
not afford the higher rent of a Singapore Improvement Trust apartment. He was extremely 
uncomfortable with his fellow sub-tenants, as he suspected one of them was grooming two 
very young girls (aged eleven and four) for prostitution.175  
Singapore’s housing problems remained relatively consistent throughout the 1950s 
and into the early 1960s. For various reasons, not much headway was made to alleviate 
overcrowding despite surveys and plans made by the British colonial government via the 
Singapore Improvement Trust, the colony’s de facto housing authority after the war.176 
Cramped living conditions, and the accompanying concerns for public health and safety and 
general social well-being, remained fairly consistent throughout the 1950s.  The findings of a 
social survey conducted in 1953-4 by the Social Welfare Department and a sociological study 
conducted between 1954 and 1956 of residents in a particular Chinatown locale further 
confirmed an unchanged, and in some instances, worsening, situation.177 Housing in 
                                                          
174 She had eloped with a seaman against her father’s wishes. Chia Cheong Fook recorded the story in an 
appendix to the diploma thesis. See Chia, “The place of the hawker”, Appendix. 
175 Wong did not want to say much about the other sub-tenants. Chia noted Chinese prostitutes and their “amah” 
pimps plied their trade nearby, and the extended surrounding area was a major “red lights” district. It was also 
frequented by Malay, Indian and Eurasian prostitutes. He mentioned in his oral interview that the hawker 
worked in the Jalan Besar area. NAS OHC, Chia Cheong Fook, reel 2. 
176 The Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) was established in 1927. Its initial mandate over the maintenance of 
the back-lanes of houses within municipal limits and general improvements to living conditions was only 
expanded to include the construction of low-cost housing in 1932. The official report that led to the 
establishment of the SIT is the Proceedings and Report of the Singapore Commission Appointed to Inquire into 
the Cause of the Present Housing Difficulties in Singapore and the Steps which should be Taken to Remedy 
Such Difficulties (Singapore: Govt. Print. Off., 1918). Prewar shackles remained after the war, obstructing and 
undermining SIT efforts to expand house-building activities. See Singapore Housing Committee, Report of the 
Housing Committee Singapore, 1947 (Singapore: Govt. Print. Off., [1948]). In Squatters into Citizens, Loh Kah 
Seng presents an aspect of housing history in in Singapore via the Bukit Ho Swee fire of 1961. See also Brenda 
Yeoh’s Contesting Space, for a perspective of the SIT via the context of colonial management of prewar urban 
Singapore, and Chua Beng Huat’s Political Legitimacy and Housing: Stakeholding in Singapore and 
Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, for the role of housing in social engineering.  
177 See Goh Keng Swee, Urban Incomes & Housing: A Report on the Social Survey of Singapore, 1953-54 
(Singapore: Dept. of Social Welfare, 1956), and Barrington Kaye, Upper Nankin Street, Singapore: A 
Sociological Study of Chinese Households Living in a Densely Populated Area (Singapore: University of 
Malaya, 1956). 
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Singapore was only addressed in a concerted fashion with the establishment of the Housing 
and Development Board in 1960 by the People’s Action Party government. Even then, it was 
merely a beginning rather than a miraculous overnight transformation. Until then, thousands 
of families lived in overcrowded conditions that exposed them to various threats, ranging 
from structures or objects that might injure, poor sanitation, air- and water-borne diseases, to 
fires and floods.178  
 
Social Dislocations 
 
Adding to an overcrowded and rough physical environment, Singapore society was 
severely, and in some cases permanently, dislocated by war and occupation. Some cases 
could be as straightforward as the loss of a limb or suffering a major injury, incapacitating the 
individual and rendering him or her unable to work. Other more tragic instances involved the 
death or prolonged absence of the main breadwinner, usually male. All of which placed 
tremendous stress on the remaining members of the family, on the surviving widow or 
widower and their children. The following case, heard in the Juvenile Court in December 
1946 and described in full in the newspaper report, gives a good illustration: 
 
Next was Soon Nah, a 12-year-old lad who wore a tattered blue smock. The 
charge was read out “In Rochore [sic] Road he was caught trying to hawk 100 
packets of Players cigarettes without a licence during a raid on hawkers”. 
 
I admit the offence, he said in a whisper. A basket with a pink label attached 
with the cigarettes inside was produced as Exhibit A. 
 
How old are you? said Captain Chua [The presiding magistrate]. 
Twelve years old, sir. 
Why did you sell the cigarettes? 
I have no money, Sir, and I have a mother but no father. 
Where is your father? 
He died in the Jap occupation. 
What does your mother do? 
Washes clothes for people. 
 
The magistrate asked if she was in court, and she stepped forward, looking sad 
and bewildered, to stand beside her son. 
 
 
                                                          
178 See Loh Kah Seng’s Squatters into Citizens for an overview of the impact of fires in squatter areas on 
housing policy. 
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Why do you send your son to sell cigarettes? 
We have not enough money to live on now that father is dead. 
Does your son go to school? 
I can’t afford to send him. 
How many other children are in your family? 
One daughter, 9, and one boy, 6. This one is the eldest. 
 
Again the magistrate conferred with the unfortunate couple, and then he said: 
“As this is a first offence I bind the mother over in the sum of $100 to see that 
the boy does not sell cigarettes in the next twelve months. Case dismissed”.179 
 
After Soon Nah, The Juvenile Court heard three other cases. One was for eleven-year 
old Ah Tee, who was caught stealing cloth and apparently gave the police force “considerable 
trouble” before being arrested. Another was a tough-looking, “large-framed lad” charged 
with theft. He claimed trial at the Juvenile Court as he told the police his age was under 
sixteen years. Suspicious, the Court ordered him to be sent for a medical examination to 
determine his age. Finally, there was Kow Tow, a “veteran” of two previous convictions of 
pick-pocketing and a former resident of the Salvation Army Boys’ Home. He was part of a 
gang who had robbed and assaulted (with a bicycle tire) a man for his milk tins. Kow Tow 
was only ten years old, and the gang he was with had “three other little boys” of similar 
ages.180 
The cases above reflected the deprived postwar conditions and the consequent 
desperation of individuals and families. As the eldest son, Soon Nah shared the burden of 
supporting his mother and siblings by selling cigarettes (illegally). Ah Tee, Kow Tow and his 
gang, were not pulling off grand robberies, but thefts of common, everyday necessities, like 
cloth and milk. They also reflected the criminal path some Singapore youths were already on. 
War and occupation interrupted the lives of Singapore’s youths. Their education was 
disrupted. Some had their families torn apart. Others were forced to relocate from familiar 
surroundings. The basic instinct to survive required children, who otherwise would be 
attending schools and leading active social lives, to find work to support themselves and their 
families. When gainful employment was scarce, they turned to illegal activities to find the 
income they and their families needed. The occupation period also exposed the Singapore 
youth to the raw and violent use of power. Those old enough would have witnessed firsthand 
the humiliating defeat by the Japanese of the supposedly invincible British. Those less 
fortunate might have also experienced at close quarters acts of wanton brutality by the 
                                                          
179 The Singapore Free Press, 20 December 1946, “Dead End Kids of Singapore”. 
180 The Singapore Free Press, 20 December 1946, “Dead End Kids of Singapore”. 
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Japanese soldier. Hence, the Singapore youth came through a wartime society where might 
makes right and previous societal norms were meaningless.  
Understanding this context brings into sharper relief the Singapore Executive’s 
emphasis on youth welfare, on restarting schools, prewar youth organizations, and 
establishing new youth clubs. The emergence of nationalistic fervor for the competing 
Nationalist and Communist factions in China further complicated matters, particularly when 
sentiments turned inwards and against the British in the form of anti-colonialism. The 
observation that the youth problem was the “biggest social problem” confronting Singapore 
was rather perceptive.181 Students and youths were at the epicenter (or near it) of several 
significant moments in Singapore’s history during the 1950s and 1960s.182 
Pressures on caregivers and breadwinners took their toll on families in other ways, 
sometimes in more tragic fashion. In November 1946, The Straits Times published a story on 
unwanted babies abandoned at the Sisters of the Convent of the Holy Infant Jesus. The 
convent had been taking in on average about four to five babies every night, almost always at 
night as the mothers did not want to be seen. It reached a point where two sisters had to be 
stationed at the gates all day and night. This was to quickly claim and care for the newborns, 
as they arrived usually “wrapped in old rags or newspapers, so undernourished and so ill they 
have little chance of survival”.183 The convent had been taking in unwanted babies since 
before the war, and received public support mostly in the form of food, clothing and toys for 
the children. After the war, such support decreased while the number of unwanted babies at 
the convent’s doorstep increased. It took in ninety-six babies between October and November 
1946 alone. The Reverend Mother informed the reporter that about 90% of the babies die. 
Some almost immediately, others after a few days or months despite medical care. Very few 
survived to grow up strong and healthy. The convent took care for life those who grew up 
“crippled, blind and dumb”. The unwanted babies were all girls and all Chinese. The reporter 
observed: 
 
These babies are doomed before they are born. Their mothers are 
undernourished, ignorant and often syphilitic. At birth they have no trained 
                                                          
181 The Straits Times, 14 April 1946, “Social Welfare Department for Singapore”. 
182 See for example Loh Kah Seng ... [et al.], The University Socialist Club and the contest for Malaya: tangled 
strands of modernity (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), Tan Jing Quee, Tan Kok Chiang & 
Hong Lysa (eds.), The May 13 Generation: The Chinese middle schools student movement and Singapore 
politics in the 1950s (Selangor: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, c2011), and Poh Soo 
Kai, Tan Jing Quee, Koh Kay Yew (eds.), The Fajar Generation: The University Socialist Club and the politics 
of postwar Malaya and Singapore (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: SIRD, 2010). 
183 The Straits Times, 14 November 1946, “Tragedy of Singapore's Unwanted Babies”. 
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midwife, no proper care, and the babies are often injured. Most of them are 
covered in sores and many are deformed at birth. Many are brought in tetanus 
of the umbilical cord because they were severed from their mothers with 
ordinary unsterilized knives. I saw an ashen-grey baby of a few months, its 
tiny frame contorted with convulsions and its lungs wrestling with pneumonia. 
Sister St. Angela said this baby would certainly die during the day.184 
 
It was highly probable that several if not most of the babies under the convent’s care 
belonged to mothers who were prostitutes. By the 1950s, prostitution was well established in 
Singapore, feeding on to some extent the nature of the colonial economy and the society it 
fostered.185 Recollecting his time in the Women and Girls Section of the Social Welfare 
Department, Chia Cheong Fook observed that some of the prostitutes he encountered had 
“hardened” perspectives on life.  
 
Some prostitutes, they are hardened themselves. They don’t feel that they… 
[Recounting a conversation from memory]: Why did you go into prostitution? 
What else have you got to do? You got no money; nobody to support me. 
Somebody asked me to work, I work.186 
 
He came across brothels of varying types. There were the well-kept establishments he 
remembered along River Valley Road, while those in the Jalan Besar area were, in his words, 
“revolting”;  
 
47 Desker Road – I remember this because it was such a dump! The 
prostitutes were fairly mature, old – forty-seven, fifty years old. Visited by 
these sailors, white British seamen and all…. The first thing, they’d head [to] 
one of these brothels…. It’s not a brothel, it’s a hovel. Two or three beds, 
three of these bunks piled together.187 
 
Recounting another incident: 
 
I knew of a case who had come to us for some help…. There’s a pretty girl 
who was under sixteen… We raided the place because we heard that this 
lorong [Malay for lane or road] something that she was offered to a rich man 
who wanted a [virgin]…. There’s a superstition that if you are an old man and 
you want to be reinvigorated, you get one of these virgin girls.188 
 
                                                          
184 The Straits Times, 14 November 1946, “Tragedy of Singapore's Unwanted Babies”. 
185 For history of prostitution in prewar Singapore, see Warren, Ah ku and Karayuki-san. 
186 NAS OHC, Chia Cheong Fook, reel 3. 
187 NAS OHC, Chia Cheong Fook, reel 3. 
188 NAS OHC, Chia Cheong Fook, reel 3. In Mandarin, the term for a virgin girl was kai bao (开包). 
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The second article of The Straits Times feature on children focused on juvenile 
prostitution and human trafficking. It introduced a girl named Ah Meng. Ah Meng was the 
eighth child born to an extremely poor family living in the Federation of Malaya. Her father 
realized he could not afford to keep and raise her. In time, a neighbor stepped forward and 
took in the girl, seeing in Ah Meng a potential bride for her own son in the future. Ah Meng 
received no education and when she was older, about fourteen years of age, she worked as a 
seamstress. But it was not enough for her “foster mother” who was looking for payback on 
her “investment”. One day, Ah Meng was taken with a “parcel of clothes” to a friend of the 
“foster mother”. The child was led to believe that the lady friend would teach her to dance so 
as to work as a dance hostess.  
Ah Meng arrived in Singapore the next day, and was immediately handed to another 
woman. The ease in which this was done illustrated a well-established chain of child 
traffickers. In this manner, “poor, bewildered little Ah Meng changes hands five times for the 
sum of $1,500 before she at last reaches her destination – a room in a brothel”.189 Ah Meng 
tried to escape that very first night. But she was “in a strange city and has nowhere to go….” 
She did not know to whom or where to go to for help. She was caught before she got far, and 
was bundled back into the brothel.190 Ah Meng endured for a few more months, servicing on 
average six to seven men per day. Her basic needs, such as food, accommodation and 
clothing, were well-provided for. But she never received a cut of her earnings from her pimp. 
Ah Meng made a second, more successful, escape attempt, and found her way (via a friend) 
to the Social Welfare Department seeking shelter and protection.  
The feature reporter, Kathleen Hickley, confirmed with sources from the Social 
Welfare Department that Ah Meng’s story was a familiar one. Hickley had begun the article 
innocently enough. She noted that the sparse paragraphs of news articles, such as “A woman 
who used her 14-year-old daughter for the purpose of prostitution was sentenced by the Muar 
magistrate to six months’ simple imprisonment”, or “The anti-vice squad discovered a seven-
year-old girl in a house of ill-fame in the company of two men…”, could easily go unnoticed. 
But “those few words tucked away in the news pages are indicative of more drama, more 
horrifying situations, than the most pungent book you can find in any library”. Hickley also 
laid out in stark terms the long-term implications of allowing such situations to go 
unchecked. “Beneath [those words] lies yet another story of our children, the children of 
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Malaya, who will soon be parents of a new generation. Will this second generation have to 
face the same iniquitous life as their parents did?”191 
 
Disease 
 
Hickley and The Straits Times published several more articles on the plight of 
children, each more hard-hitting than the last. In “An Invisible Menace”, she discussed 
tuberculosis, one of many unwanted and unavoidable consequences of living in overcrowded 
conditions with poor sanitation.192 She introduced to her readers a family of eight. The eldest 
boy, fifteen-year old Lee Song, had taken ill and was diagnosed with the disease. Mother was 
worried and asked the clinic doctor, “What can she do?” Her options were despairingly 
limited. Hospitals were meant only for the seriously ill, and there was no guarantee of getting 
treatment in time. Lee Song would have to go back to the clinic for injections and other 
treatment. “How long would this treatment take?” It was difficult to say. It could take three 
months or two years. Much would depend on providing proper care, in the form of good 
nutrition, rest and isolated from the rest of the family. The former would be provided by the 
clinic, but Mother was concerned. How can she isolate Lee Song from the rest of the family 
living in a “three-square-yard” room in Chinatown?  
 
And the doctors have no answer to give her. No-one is more aware than 
they of Lee Song’s need. They know that he will most probably infect 
those six other people sharing his room. They know, too, that in turn, 
those six others may pass the disease on to the family in the next cubicle, 
and that Lee Song is a menace to all the inhabitants of that crowded 
house. Inhabitants that number between 50 and 60.193 
 
Lee Song was only one of many afflicted with the disease. Three-quarters of the 
population were packed into city, enduring overcrowded living conditions. The incidence of 
tuberculosis rose sharply “in crowded, ill-ventilated rooms. It flourishes on lack of 
wholesome food. It conquers weakened bodies”.194 Earlier, the authorities’ attention was 
focused on the control and prevention of infectious diseases as well as reversing the ill-effect 
of malnutrition. The main causes of recorded deaths throughout the occupation had been 
malaria, beriberi, infantile convulsions (due to malnutrition), respiratory ailments, and water-
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borne diseases (such as typhoid and dysentery).195 But by 1947, tuberculosis began to receive 
public attention.196 The Medical Department admitted that: 
 
Tuberculosis did not receive anything like the public attention in this part of 
the world before the war that it does to-day although the position was serious 
enough. The expenditure in this direction will go over the million dollar mark 
during the coming year [1949] for the first time, while the beds available (404) 
have been steadily stepped up since the re-occupation to over five times the 
pre-war total with a steadily expanding clinic. A clear cut Tuberculosis Policy 
Scheme … was tabled in the Legislative Council during the year … A 
Government Tuberculosis Advisory Board has been formed to work along 
these lines with the Social Welfare Department and the Singapore Anti-
Tuberculosis Association, and a further committee under the auspices of the 
Secretary for Social Welfare will control the expenditure offered to cover 
domiciliary aid.197 
 
The detailed efforts taken to control and prevent tuberculosis are discussed more 
extensively elsewhere.198 Briefly, the high incidence of the disease raised sufficient public 
consternation for some members of society to form the Singapore Anti-Tuberculosis 
Association (SATA) in 1947.199 As noted in the above excerpt, plans were by 1948 in motion 
                                                          
195 Annual Report / Medical Department for 1947 (Singapore: Government Printing Office), p. 21. [Hereafter 
abbreviated as MDAR]. In 1945, 6,055 deaths by malaria (and unspecified fever) were recorded, 6,683 from 
beriberi, 5,752 from bronchitis, pneumonia, and T.B. of respiratory system, 3,118 from infantile convulsions, 
and 2,811 from typhoid, dysentery, diarrhea, and enteritis. In 1946, the numbers for each category respectively 
were: 1,929, 786, 3,868, 1,751, and 908, demonstrating on paper at least control of the public health situation. 
196 A small war of words erupted between the government and members of the public (in particular medical 
practitioners and the press) aghast at the lack of action by the former. See for an overview of opinions and 
editorials, The Straits Times, 13 January 1947, “Govt. Attitude to TB 'Defeatist”, The Straits Times, 18 January 
1947, “Tuberculosis and Hypocrisy”, The Straits Times, 18 July 1947, “It can and must be done”. There was no 
mention of tuberculosis in the MDAR for 1946, and only a cursory mention in the MDAR for 1947, that 
pulmonary tuberculosis was receiving more attention from the public. The Medical Plan, the first version 
published in 1947, was not keen on expanding beyond the planned for 300 beds at Tan Tock Seng Hospital set 
aside for TB patients (an increase of 100), as “essential services” (such as increasing hospital accommodation 
and related infrastructure and personnel) needed to be tended to first. See Singapore Director of Medical 
Services. The Medical Plan for Singapore (Singapore: Printed at the Govt. Print. Off., 1948). (Command paper / 
Singapore. Legislative Council; cmd. 4 of 1948), pp. 3-4, and 9-10. 
197 MDAR for 1948, p. 5. 
198 See sections on tuberculosis in various MDARs, including sections on Tan Tock Seng Hospital, the 
designated hospital for TB patients. For a contemporaneous overview of treatment measures, see Lim Syn Neo, 
“Measures for the Treatment and Prevention of Tuberculosis in Singapore: A Description and Assessment with 
Special Reference to their Social Aspects” (Unpublished academic exercise – Dept. of Social Studies, 
University of Malaya, 1955).  
199 A brief overview of the organization’s history can be found on its website: “Our History”, 
http://www.sata.com.sg/about_us/our-history/. Accessed 9 December 2015. Information can also be found in 
commemorative publications, such as SATA CommHealth, The SATA story: celebrating 65 years of caring for 
the community (Singapore: SATA CommHealth, 2012), and Lim Kay Tong and Mary Lee, Fighting TB: the 
SATA story (1947-1997) (Singapore: Singapore Anti-Tuberculosis Association, 1997). See also Mirabelle 
Chang, “Shoulders to the Wheels: The Singapore Anti-Tuberculosis Association's Role in Combating the 
'Second Brother' (1946–1958)” (Unpublished academic exercise – Dept. of History, National University of 
Singapore, 2014). For a personal account of the fight against tuberculosis, hear oral history of Gupta, N. C. Sen 
(Dr.). Medical Services in Singapore, Accession Number 002087. 6 Reels. 
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to treat and to arrest the spread of tuberculosis. As far as limited resources would permit, 
medical facilities were boosted to combat tuberculosis.200 In addition, TB treatment 
allowances for recovering patients and their families were introduced by legislation and 
managed by the Social Welfare Department.201 By 1951, the number of recorded deaths by 
tuberculosis was on the decline.202 Still, the numbers infected and being treated for the 
disease were increasing. While this could have been due to more people being aware and 
seeking treatment, this in turn exposed gaps in existing approaches that treated the disease 
more as a clinical condition and less a social problem.203 Tuberculosis was associated with 
poverty, which manifested primarily in overcrowded living conditions, poor sanitation, and 
few means to treat the disease. In her article, Hickley expanded on the plight of a homeless 
fifty-year old man, begging for a living, and walked miles to the SATA clinic for treatment. 
She contrasted his situation with that of a discharged criminal or a destitute person, observing 
that “if he was a discharged criminal he could apply for aid. If he were destitute Social 
Welfare would come forward to help him, but because he tubercular he has nowhere to go”. 
He would be better served in a “T.B. colony”, instead of living on the streets or in 
overcrowded conditions. They would receive better medical care and attention, segregated 
from the healthier sections of the population.  
                                                          
200 Measures included the BCG immunization for children introduced in 1949, expanding the number of beds for 
TB patients in Tan Tock Seng Hospital, the establishment of a TB sanatorium for recovering TB patients, and 
increased funding for hospital treatment and treatment allowances. See for an overview, The Straits Times, 26 
August 1948, “A Singapore Sanatorium”; The Straits Times, 5 October 1948, “Govt. To Spend $1 Million On 
TB in '49, Says Gimson”; The Straits Times, 9 January 1949, “Rest as We Pay TB Victim Plan”; The Straits 
Times, 30 April 1949, “Colony May Undertake B.C.G. Immunisation”; The Straits Times, 3 September 1949, 
“Million a Year to Fight T.B.”; The Straits Times, 12 September 1949, $1,400,000 Plan to Extend Hospital”; 
The Straits Times, 12 November 1951, “$2 million a year war on TB is planned”; The Straits Times, 23 
November 1951, “South Winds Hotel Plan”. 
201 The T.B. Treatment Allowance scheme started in April 1949, and provided “relatively high rates of relief to 
persons suffering from tuberculosis who have a reasonable chance of recovery if they can obtain rest and good 
food. Persons receiving relief under this scheme are required to cease work during the period of treatment and 
payment of allowance”. (SWDAR for 1951, p. 37). Financial relief was substantial to cover the loss of income. 
There were different rates paid to the head of household, the wife, and their dependents. Until the 1960s, 
additional assistance was also given for rent and living allowance. The average number of payments made per 
month went from 120 in 1949, to 2,644 in 1959, with a corresponding increase in expenditure annually from 
$100,468 to $$2,770,668. (SWDAR for 1959). This scheme was first mooted in public by Lim Yew Hock in 
1948, then nominated Legislative Councilor, as part of an overall motion requesting government to look into 
social security measures for the Colony of Singapore. See The Singapore Free Press, 27 October 1948, 
“Councillor asks aid for T.B. Patients”, and The Straits Times, 28 October 1948, T.B. Grants Suggested”.  
202 Lim, “Measures”, p. 5. (Table 5). 
203 See section on tuberculosis in various MDARs. For personal accounts of treating TB patients, hear oral 
histories of medical social workers in Tan Tock Seng Hospital in the 1950s. Chen Swee Soo (Mrs.). Medical 
Services in Singapore, Accession Number 002251. Interviewed in 2000. 7 Reels, and Cecilia M Nayar (Mrs). 
Medical Services in Singapore, Accession Number 002312. Interviewed in 2000. 7 Reels. 
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Moving on from juvenile crime, disease and human vice, Hickley then focused on the 
more personal (and violent) in her penultimate feature piece, “The Wicked Parents”. Having 
established the physical living environment, the despair of poverty and large families, and the 
disease one could catch from overcrowded conditions, she delved deeper into the family and 
exposed unseen cruelty.  
 
A young boy clad in a piece of sacking sat on a dirty heap in the compound 
near his house. His shoulders were hunched, his eyes vacant, his whole 
bearing one of hopelessness and despair. He had not eaten for three days and 
his stomach was crying out for food. At last he got to his feet and walked 
stiffly over to the house. His body was a mass of purple bruises and septic 
wounds. He opened the door cautiously and peeped inside. The room was 
empty. He could hear footsteps in the kitchen. Quickly, he darted over to the 
table where a small pile of money lay. He gathered it up, and left the house as 
quietly as he had entered it. But he was not swift enough for the woman in the 
kitchen. As he limped down the steps she opened the door and rushed after 
him. His small body weakened by privation was no match for hers, and 
whimpering and begging for mercy the child was dragged into the house by 
his tormentor. Minutes later, neighbours heard the boy’s agonised cries as he 
was beaten on the hands and nails with a heavy, iron-headed hammer. That 
night, the boy slept in the yard with a pillow of rags under his bruised and 
aching head, and a gunny sack covering his pitiful body. This is not a story of 
London in Dicken’s day, nor the tale of a wretched African slave child. The 
locale is Singapore, the time, the present. It is one of many stories that the 
Social Welfare Officers hear, on the average of once a week. How many other 
incidents of cruelty occur that no-one ever discovers, we can only guess.204 
 
Consulting case files from the Social Welfare Department, Hickley observed that the abused 
children were often either adopted or mui tsai.205 At times, tragically, it was their own parents 
who were responsible for willful neglect and “ghastly actions” that included: 
 
[B]abies...found undernourished to the point of total blindness, and sometimes 
death. Older children are admitted to hospital with running wounds as the 
results frequent canings [sic], swollen fingers and horrifying contusions of the 
eye. There was one child whose body was smeared with honey and covered 
with ants, and another, whose parents gave full reign to their sadistic impulses 
by rubbing chillies [sic] over the tender flesh of their son.206 
 
Such acts moreover did not always occur in conditions of wretched poverty, though desperate 
conditions might have contributed to unchecked frustrations on the part of parents and 
caregivers. 
                                                          
204 The Straits Times, 9 December 1951, “The Wicked Parents”. 
205 Directly translated from the Cantonese as “little sister”. As explained in Chapter 2 of this study, pp. 23-24.  
206 The Straits Times, 9 December 1951, “The Wicked Parents”. 
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A Teeming Mass of Humanity 
 
One fairly consistent underlying theme tying the above together were the large sizes 
of families that formed the teeming mass of humanity in postwar Singapore. In addition to the 
absence of urban planning and proper housing, large families also contributed to 
overcrowding and its ill consequences. 34% of surveyed households in the 1947 and 1953-4 
social surveys were considered to be of medium-size and above (five or more persons).207 In 
1947, about 80% of surveyed medium- and large-sized households were living in 
overcrowded and acutely overcrowded conditions.208 The 1953-4 survey showed a 
deterioration of housing conditions since 1947, with a general increase in room density 
particularly for large-sized households.209 With natural increase, lowering death rates and 
substantial migration from Peninsular Malaya, Singapore’s population increased an average 
of 4.5% annually between 1947 and 1957, with the crude birth rate reaching a high of forty-
three per thousand individuals in 1957.210 In 1961, the State of Singapore Development Plan 
identified the high population growth rate as the aggravating factor for much-needed social 
and economic development.211 High population growth strained social services and other 
infrastructure required to support life. For instance, a nurse recalled: 
 
The number of deliveries in KKH [Kandang Kerbau Hospital] was at its peak, 
with an average of 100 deliveries per day. The number of beds available then 
fell far short of demand, and many deliveries were conducted with patients 
lying on the floor on mackintoshes or on transport trolleys. Patients in the 
early stages of labour sat for long hours on hard wooden benches waiting for a 
bed.212 
 
In 1965, on average, a baby was delivered every eleven minutes in Singapore. The following 
year, in 1966, the maternity hospital at Kandang Kerbau entered the Guinness Book of World 
                                                          
207 Goh, Urban Incomes and Housing, p. 46: Single-Person household, Small (2-4 persons); Medium (5-7); 
Large (8 and above). 
208 Social Survey 1947, p. 80, Table XXXII. 
209 Goh, Urban Incomes and Housing, p. 70. 
210 Saw Swee Hock, The Population of Singapore (Singapore: ISEAS Pub., 2012, 3rd ed.), pp. 14-15. See also 
Saw Swee Hock, “Population Growth and Control”, in Ernest C. T. Chew and Edwin Lee, A History of 
Singapore (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 223-224. 
211 Singapore Ministry of Finance, State of Singapore development plan, 1961-1964 (Singapore: [s.n.], 1961). 
212 Paulin Koh, "History of Midwifery and O&G Nursing in Singapore" in Tan Kok Hian and Tay Eng Hseon 
(eds.), The History of Obstetrics & Gynaecology in Singapore (Singapore: ARMOUR Publishing Pte Ltd, 
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http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/article/family-planning. Accessed 10 December 2015. 
198 
 
 
 
Records for delivering 39,835 births - a record that stood for the next ten years. Measures to 
reverse population growth would only take hold in Singapore after 1970.213 
Simply put, large families posed social problems, particularly for households with 
already limited means. Kathleen Hickley observed that Ah Meng might not have been given 
away if she was the second rather than the eighth child. Lee Song would also receive better 
care and recover faster if he need not squeeze in a small room with seven other persons.214 
The absence of one or both parents also exposed the children to various risks. A research 
study conducted in 1958-9 of twenty-six large families (having at least ten children) found 
that almost all of the Chinese families had given away at least one child to a relative or close 
friend. All the surveyed families had also lost at least one child to natural causes at various 
stages in their family history. There were also concerns about the mother’s health, the 
physical and educational well-being of the children, and the ability provide for everyone in 
the family.215 The Straits Times articles do not represent entirely the state of Singapore 
postwar society. What they offer instead are detailed, personal, and at times uncomfortable, 
glimpses into the living conditions and social needs of postwar Singapore, not only of the 
children but also of their families.  
In doing so, they give a vivid idea of the scale of the task confronting the Social 
Welfare Department and the colonial policy of social welfare. The war and occupation had 
severely dislocated the lives of the individual and his or her family. Singapore society, during 
and immediately after the war, for all sense and purpose broke down to basic survival 
instincts. Access to food, medicine, jobs (and income) was limited. At the same time, 
incidences of crime and disease increased. The breakdown in social order exacerbated 
existing problems, such as the loss of adult breadwinners, overcrowding, poor public hygiene, 
and general poverty. It is little wonder then that social welfare activities during the 
occupation period and immediately after focused mainly on basic needs, such as food, 
individual medical care and public health, and measures to repair damage done to society, 
such as youth development and restarting schools. In addition, postwar Singapore was 
fundamentally different from before. The high population growth rates between 1947 and 
1957 resulted mainly from natural increase rather than immigration. This trend indicated a 
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more settled society, in contrast to its transient counterpart Singapore’s entrepôt economy 
encouraged before the Second World War. As the efforts of the British demonstrated, the 
dislocation of war and occupation made more urgent the redressing of social ills and 
problems. At the same time, an increasingly settled society exponentially increases 
responsibility for society’s well-being, whether on the part of the state or society in general.  
Anti-colonial nationalism and the accompanying complications of decolonization 
gave social welfare an additional edge. Aspiring nationalists seeking independence or at the 
very least self-determination, would need to demonstrate the ability – if not necessarily the 
compassion – to care and cater to the welfare of the people they sought to lead. The Social 
Welfare Department was regularly called upon to help victims of fires and floods that were 
commonplace in 1950s and 1960s Singapore. Such emergencies took on a sharper edge 
during periods of political change. Just as communist elements attempted to steal a march on 
the British Military Administration in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese surrender, 
rival political parties and organizations saw value in taking a keen interest in the welfare of 
the people they sought to lead into a post-colonial future and beyond.216  
 
The Potential of a Social Welfare State 
 
Social welfare by the state, as conceptualized and developed in late colonial 
Singapore, was political as well as social. The former directly influenced its scope and 
meaning. For the colonial government and its supporters (and successors), social welfare was 
a useful arrow to have in the quiver, either to win the “hearts and minds” of the people in the 
fight against the Malayan Communist Party and its elements, or as a relief valve for pent-up 
frustration and dissatisfaction with authority, or both. Over the long run however, it was the 
everyday mundane social needs that remained the primary cause of personal hardship. This 
kept the core functions of the Social Welfare Department relevant through different periods in 
Singapore’s history. The Social Welfare Department continued well into the post-colonial 
period. It operated as a distinct agency within various ministries from 1955 until 1979, 
                                                          
216 One of David Marshall’s first acts as Chief Minister was to institute a Meet the People Session, where people 
could see him personally to seek assistance. Groups affiliated with the Communists organized relief efforts for 
victims of floods and fires See Lee Ting Hui, The Open United Front: The Communist Struggle in Singapore 
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Bukit Ho Swee fire. See NAS OHC, Goh Sin Tub. The Public Service – A Retrospection. Interviewed in 1993. 
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surviving along the way the formation of and then separation from Malaysia in 1963 and 
1965 respectively.217 Even when after the Social Welfare Department ceased operations after 
1979, its core functions were absorbed into a new Ministry of Community Development in 
the early 1980s. They still exist in updated forms in present-day Singapore, residing in the 
Ministry of Social and Family Development since 2012. 
Historically, the Social Welfare Department was one symbol of a colonial government 
acknowledging colonial society as its own and assuming the responsibilities for some aspects 
of its well-being. For colonial society in Singapore, which had been more familiar with 
family and community support rather extensive state social services, the Social Welfare 
Department was an additional, and relatively more stable, source of help. It reflected a new 
type of colonial state, one with the broader objective of uniting the divergent interests and 
loyalties of a plural society. Social welfare by the state altered the perception of transience in 
a mere location to the permanence of a possible home. In doing so, it affected the lives of a 
broad spectrum of individuals as basic social needs remained relatively constant, though 
punctuated by emergencies that in turn aggravated the urgency of such needs. The Social 
Welfare Department helped many an individual and his or her family during such times. 
Gomez, Frois, Subramaniam, Ah Meng, Kow Tow, Soon Hock and countless others came 
into contact with the various structures of a nascent social welfare state as represented by the 
Social Welfare Department.  
There was much value, political and social, in providing, or at least appearing to 
provide social welfare. For instance, Subramaniam felt a sense of gratitude for the earlier help 
given to him and his family. In 1970, he joined the Ministry of Social Affairs. His innate 
sense of gratitude led to a forty-year career in the Social Welfare Department, beginning in 
the Children and Young Persons Section. He “wanted to give back to society what I gained 
from it … I was thankful that I was given an opportunity to pay back”.218 This personal 
statement exemplifies the raw potential of social welfare to build and buttress a cohesive 
community via positive relationships between individuals and their government.  
                                                          
217 After the Ministry of Labour and Welfare (1955-1959), the department was part of the Ministry of Labour 
and Law, Ministry of Labour, and finally the Ministry of Social Affairs.  
218 NAS OHC, M. Subramaniam, reel 2. 
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CHAPTER 5. REALIZING THE SOCIAL WELFARE STATE 
 
This chapter discusses the impact of an official state presence in social welfare in 
Singapore. It highlights and examines the needs of an effective social welfare policy, 
specifically training programs to do social welfare work and forming community 
partnerships, and from there, the varied outcomes from its implementation. The 
implementation of social welfare was uneven. This meant social welfare policy did not 
happen simply because it was so ordered. There were many variables, anticipated and 
unanticipated, to navigate, negotiate, and to resolve. How they were eventually resolved 
shaped the social welfare state in late colonial Singapore and thereafter. 
 
Knowledge and Expertise: Professional Social Work 
 
Before the Social Welfare Department, the closest Singapore had to social work was 
the work done by the Protectors of Chinese, officers from the Labour Department (dealing 
with Indian laborers), and District Officers providing assistance on a personal basis. Outside 
of government, the Salvation Army was perhaps the only organization which had adopted an 
organized, holistic approach to social issues before the war. Even then, the “soldiers” of the 
Salvation Army were not professional social workers. Tan Beng Neo for instance first learned 
midwifery as a skill, and the rest on the job, such as institutional care and managing 
juveniles. 
Hence, the relevant knowledge and expertise were absent and needed to carry out 
social welfare work. The Social Welfare Department took seriously the training of social 
welfare officers from its inception. One of its first public announcements made was a call for 
applications for three scholarships via the Colonial Development and Welfare fund.1 In 1946, 
three locals, including one already working in the Social Welfare Department, were sent the 
United Kingdom, followed by another three in 1948.2 Others periodically follow in 
subsequent years as and when other scholarships were available, and when the Department 
could afford to let them go. Most of the officers sent graduated from the prewar Raffles 
                                                          
1 The Straits Times, 17 June 1946, “Training in Welfare Work”. The ad was one of the earliest announcements 
of the existence of a new social welfare department. 
2 The first batch of students included Tan Kay Hai, a former RAF reconnaissance pilot and POW after being 
shot down flying over Normandy in 1944, Seah Yun Khong, and Nellie Chen. In the following years, the Social 
Welfare Department, via various scholarships, sponsored the studies of Carl de Souza (1947), Kismet Fung 
(1949), Goh Keng Swee (1948), Monie Sundram (1948), Woon Wah Siang, and Tan Beng Neo, amongst others. 
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College, or had a basic degree or certificate. So depending on their individual qualifications 
and/or work experience, they were either studying for an honors degree or a postgraduate 
diploma. Students sent by the Social Welfare Department usually attended a two-year 
diploma course, Colonial Social Science and Administration, at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science. One of the first to be sent overseas was Carl de Souza, a 
former prisoner-of-war who survived working on the Burma-Siam “death railway”. 
Interviewed after he returned, de Souza outlined the course: 
 
The course covered colonial administration, social administration, sociology, 
psychology and economics. The section on social administration included a 
study of the history of British social security from the Poor Laws to the 
present “cradle to the grave” system….3 
 
Their two years in Britain were not all theory, and also included study trips and attachments 
to relevant social welfare institutions, such as Approved Schools, Borstal institutions, 
probation courses etc.4 Certain individuals did full degree courses, like Goh Keng Swee in 
economics and statistics, and Monie Sundram in law. There was a discernible emphasis on 
achieving a good academic record as well as a basic foundation of relevant field experience. 
Sending two or three at a time every year, meant taking away (two years at a time) 
valuable human resource from a fledgling Social Welfare Department dealing with a broad 
range of tasks and responsibilities. Goh Keng Swee and Monie Sundram for instance could 
have gone to London a year earlier, but were held back because of their participation in the 
1947 social survey. The Social Welfare Department did make an early attempt to organize 
some form of local training. For six weeks from October to December 1947, it organized a 
“Departmental Training School” hosted in the Juvenile Court room. The “School” was less a 
training program for potential social workers and more a series of lectures to introduce the 
new social welfare department. The lectures covered a general introduction of the Social 
Welfare Department and its various sections, and key social functions and issues, such as the 
protection of women and girls, juvenile delinquency and treatment, social research, child 
feeding, social assistance and insurance, and destitution.5 
Rather, at that early stage of the Social Welfare Department, the “School” served 
primarily as a broad introduction of the Department and its various sections to the audience, 
                                                          
3 The Straits Times, 6 May 1951, “A young man who is going places”. Article was a write-up on de Souza and 
his time in the Social Welfare Department since its inception in 1946. 
4 The Straits Times, 28 August 1947, “Malaya Students Visit Continent”. 
5 The Second Report, Appendix K. 
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usually made up of officials from other branches of government, members from voluntary 
organizations, and the general public. Department staff presented their work in, supposedly, 
five to ten minute talks, and questions and discussion were encouraged. One objective was 
“to oblige heads of sections to take critical stock of themselves”, and to “acquaint 
[themselves] with work ... going on outside their own sections”.6 After 1947, specific 
“training” courses were arranged periodically, such as for probation.7 
 
Almoner Training 
 
The Medical Department was the first to bring professional social work to Singapore, 
beating the Social Welfare Department to that distinction. The ten-year medical plan called 
for the creation of an Almoner’s Department (within the Medical Department), so as to “look 
after the social, economic and health problems of needy hospital patients and dependents”.8 
The almoner, literally a person who gives alms, was the antecedent of the professional social 
worker in Singapore. He or she (predominantly the latter) was a key point of contact in the 
hospital setting for social problems related to health matters.  
In 1948, Nora Tanburn arrived in Singapore to survey and to report on the prospects 
for an Almoner’s Department. She was a trained and experienced social worker, with a social 
studies diploma from the University of London, and worked for twelve years in a London 
hospital.9 The following year in 1949, Kathleen Joy “Mollie” Eastaugh arrived in Singapore 
to take up the position of almoner in the Singapore General Hospital. Other almoners from 
Britain soon followed, taking up almoner positions in the other hospitals, such as Tan Tock 
Seng, Kandang Kerbau, and Trafalgar House (not a hospital as such, but a home for leprosy 
patients). By 1953, there were at least five almoners working in the Singapore hospitals, 
overseeing a team of student almoners, investigators and clerks.  
 
                                                          
6 The Second Report, Appendix K. 
7 The Singapore Free Press, 18 August 1951, “Welfare Dept. exam results”. 
8 The Straits Times, 28 May 1948, “The Minimum: $50,000,000”. The initial Medical Plan only hinted at an 
almoner’s department, primarily in the area of providing a “social service” to the very poor in Singapore society. 
I was acknowledged that social services, without further elucidation, had been available in the “field of venereal, 
of mental and infectious disease, and perhaps in infant welfare work”. (MDAR for 1946, pp. 49-50). An 
almoner’s department was mentioned for the first time in 1948 as part of a set of modifications to the original 
medical plan. “An Almoners Department is now looked upon as an integral part of any hospital: it investigates 
the economic standing of the patients who enter it and “follows up” the cases needing its assistance after they 
leave”. (MDAR for 1947, p. 78). 
9 The Straits Times, 28 May 1948, “Almoner's Dept. For Singapore”. 
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Sometime in 1949 or 1950, just before she graduated with a degree from the new 
University of Malaya, Daisy Vaithilingam listened to a talk given by Kathleen Eastaugh on 
medical social work. Twenty-five-year-old Daisy was “very fascinated” by the description 
given, and made a second appointment with the almoner to discuss a possible after-
graduation job. In 1950, she officially joined as a “student almoner” at the General Hospital, 
working under the senior almoner. At that time, local training for potential almoners was done 
in-house, on the job, and in between daily tasks – at times, riding on training for medical 
students. Daisy recalled the training regime: 
 
I used to go with the medical students on their visits to places like the 
sewerage system and their field visits. One of the things they had to learn to do 
was how to build lavatories. Actually dig a hole and make it so that they could 
help some rural people. You also had to learn how to make wells so that they 
could get water. None of the medical students now have to do that. Then I 
attended a course in psychology run by the naval unit. So I had one lecturer to 
myself and he was the psychologist. And I went to one of the senior lawyers to 
do law lectures. And then I did my actual field work in the hospital.10 
 
Daisy also remembered one of the first tasks she had was to solicit donations for walking 
aids, and how surprised she was at the easy generosity of strangers. 
 
One of the first thing I did was to write to people just using the telephone 
book. To write to people to ask them to help out patients who needed 
orthopedic appliances. That means, like crutches or calipers. Some appliances 
to help them to learn to walk. Many of them were people who had been 
affected by polio.... Every time I opened a letter there would be a check. 
People we didn’t know. We just looked through the telephone book, [wrote] to 
companies and said that we had a child, can you help with so much. That was 
the first time I saw how generous the people in Singapore were, because we 
would always get checks to help the children.11 
 
By 1951, almoner training had become more formalized.12 A call for prospective 
student almoners was advertised, calling for applications to a fifteen-month training course 
beginning later in October. The course would include “lectures and theoretical work on social 
medicine, administrative law and psychology; studying social significances and backgrounds 
of illnesses and the implications of different diseases on individuals, families and 
                                                          
10 NAS OHC, Daisy Vaithilingam, Women Through the Years: Economic & Family Lives. Accession Number 
000621. Interviewed in 1993. Reel 2 (of 17). (Reels 12 to 17 embargoed). She passed away in 2011, and in 2014 
was inducted in the Singapore Women’s Hall of Fame.  
11 NAS OHC, Daisy Vaithilingam, reel 2. 
12 The Singapore Free Press, 11 May 1951, “S'pore short of almoners, too”.  
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communities living in the city and rural areas”. Applicants moreover had to fulfill specific 
prerequisites, such as Economics, and possess a university degree or a diploma from the old 
Raffles College.13 This particular advertisement noted that it would be the second such course 
to be held and there were four vacancies. The first one was held the year before in 1950, and 
had only one student almoner, most probably Daisy Vaithilingam. In 1952, Daisy was sent to 
England for further studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science and the 
Institute of Almoners. By the time she returned to Singapore sometime in 1954, the colony 
was also welcoming its first batch of graduates from the University of Malaya, purposefully 
educated and trained for social work. 
 
Social Studies Diploma 
 
Social work, as a subject taught in the university, was first proposed in the 1948 Carr-
Saunders Commission Report on university education in Malaya.14 In identifying subjects 
that could produce and support vocations useful for self-government, the Commission 
thought from social work could “come many vocations, including industrial welfare, labour 
management, probation work, hospital social service, club management, youth 
leadership….”15 At that time, the prewar Raffles College and the King Edward VII College of 
Medicine was in the midst of becoming the University of Malaya, which was eventually 
established in Singapore in 1949. The Commission recommended a certificate course in 
social work for the new university, “under the auspices of the department of economics”, 
modeled on similar courses offered in Britain. Such courses, usually called “social studies” or 
“social science”, covered a range of topics that might include “elementary economics, social 
and economic history, social philosophy … a study of social structure and social legislation; 
social psychology and … elementary statistics”.16 The Commission also placed a premium on 
understanding local social and economic conditions, observing that the course should be 
practical as well as theoretical. 
                                                          
13 The Singapore Free Press, 11 May 1951, “S'pore short of almoners, too”. Other details include a $225 
monthly salary, that could be increased to $300 or $400 on completion of course and appointment to almoner. 
14 Commission on University Education in Malaya (Great Britain), Report of the Commission on University 
Education in Malaya / [chairman, Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders] (Kuala Lumpur: Govt. Press, 1948), pp. 32-33. 
Hereafter Carr-Saunders Commission Report. See also The Straits Times, 1 May 1948, “University at Johore 
Bahru: Carr-Saunders Commission Issues Report”. 
15 Carr-Saunders Commission Report, p. 33. The other subjects were Public Administration, Industry and 
Commerce, Accountancy, Education, Law, Architecture, Engineering, Agriculture, and Veterinary Science, 
Forestry and Fisheries. 
16 Carr-Saunders Commission Report, p. 33.  
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For various reasons, a social work department or program did not materialize until 
1952. Thomas Silcock, then head of the Economics Department, and for a time Dean and 
Acting Vice-Chancellor, felt the delay was due to his assuming the latter positions during the 
initial stages of transition. Any attempt to implement the recommendations during that 
particular period would have further antagonized academics whose feathers were already 
ruffled. Briefly, a key recommendation by the Commission envisioned a substantial 
expansion of the Economics Department in the name of allied social sciences, which would 
in turn have the outcome of a more influential Economics Department (at the expense of the 
Arts).17 This provoked resistance to what was perceived as the wholesale adoption of the 
London School of Economics model.18 There was good reason to follow that model, as the 
school from 1943 was running a “special course in colonial social studies leading to a 
colonial social policy”.19  
Things were put into motion only when Silcock reverted to head of the Economics 
Department. He made a tour of relevant universities and courses in England, Scotland and 
Wales, and convened a search for a suitable program convener.20 They found Jean Robertson 
(1908-1974), a strong-willed Scot with extensive experience in both government and 
academia.21 Educated in Scotland (with a Master in Arts and then a Diploma in Social 
Studies), she worked and taught in England and Australia, (holding the post of Chief Woman 
Officer in the former National Council of Social Service), before heading on to New Zealand 
in 1949 to take up a position in a new School of Social Science in the old University of New 
Zealand. Arriving in Singapore in 1952, one of Robertson’s first acts was to change the 
course accreditation from a certificate to a diploma. She met resistance initially as there were 
concerns a diploma would be seen as the equivalent of an honors degree, hence pricing the 
social studies graduate out of the market with expected higher salaries. A compromise was 
reached by presenting the diploma as a “post-graduate qualification” following a basic pass 
degree or its equivalent. This allowed for more mature students – who have had their 
                                                          
17 Carr-Saunders Commission Report, pp. 46-47. 
18 Thomas Silcock, A History of Economics Teaching and Graduates in Singapore, Department of Economics 
and Statistics (National University of Singapore, 1985), p. 139. See also NAS OHC, Thomas Silcock, Education 
in Singapore (Part 1: English). Accession Number 000180. Reel 17 (of 19). 
19 Carr-Saunders Commission Report, p. 33. 
20 Silcock, A History of Economics Teaching, pp. 114 and 138. 
21 Her arrival and the pending inauguration of the social studies course was announced to the Social Welfare 
Council in December 1951. NAS, SCA 12/51, 14 December 1951. The Social Welfare Department was 
anticipating the new course with relish, as it would increase “the flow of trained social workers into Government 
service, industry and unofficial welfare organisations”. It also anticipated that all senior officers in the 
Department would hold the Diploma or its equivalent. See SWDAR 1951, p. 3. 
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education interrupted by the war or had a basic level of education – to join if they had a 
minimum of five years of practical experience and was not less than twenty-four years of age 
(the usual age a student then would take an honors degree).22  
Advertisements calling for applications to the new diploma course started appearing 
in March 1952, for classes beginning in October the same year.23 Silcock and Robertson also 
personally appealed to the voluntary organizations represented on the Social Welfare Council 
to send potential students.24 The course was full-time and took two years. It required students 
to take classes, a minimum of twenty weeks (ten weeks each year) of practical work through 
attachments with relevant social service agencies, and to conduct individual field research 
and complete a 20,000-word research paper.25 The entry requirements for the non-graduate, 
mature student included a special exam, a compulsory oral examination in colloquial Malay, 
and an interview.26 The first hires included Beryl Wright, seconded from Australia for a year 
to teach psychology, and two part-time lecturers, Ahmad Ibrahim and Ann Elizabeth Wee.27 
Ahmad Ibrahim was a lawyer in government service, and became independent Singapore’s 
first Attorney-General. Described by Silcock as an “English anthropologist”, Ann Wee 
arrived in Singapore from England in May 1950. She majored in Economics and Sociology at 
the London School of Economics, and studied anthropology under Raymond Firth as a 
graduate student.28  
The first batch of diploma students included the first locally trained almoners (Cecilia 
Nayar and Chen Swee Soo), a future Permanent Secretary and Ambassador (Chia Cheong 
Fook), and a future President of the Republic of Singapore (S. R. Nathan). In 1952, Nathan 
was a “mature” twenty-eight-year-old trade unionist working for the Johore state government. 
He was accepted into the course with a bursary from Shell Company. Chia Cheong Fook was 
a year younger than Nathan, and had been working in the Social Welfare Department as an 
assessor or investigator for the relief section. Chia had topped the Departmental Training 
                                                          
22 Jean Robertson, “Social Work Education in Singapore and Malaysia”, in Peter Hodge (ed.), Community 
Problems and Social Work in Southeast Asia: The Hong Kong and Singapore Experience (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 1980), p. 77. See also Silcock, A History of Economics Teaching, pp. 140-141. 
23 The Straits Times, 20 March 1952, “New Varsity Course for Welfare Workers”. 
24 The Singapore Free Press, 21 March 1952, “Dean Wants Support for Social Studies”. 
25 NAS, SCA 190/52. 
26 A wide command of local languages was considered advantageous. Those included Cantonese, Hokkien, 
Kuoyu (Mandarin Chinese), Teochew, Hindi, Tamil, Telegu. The entrance exam had three parts: a General 
paper, an English paper, and a Social Studies paper (covering “recent public affairs in Malaya especially those 
of social significance, such as education, public health, social welfare, labour and trade unions, the emergency, 
constitutional developments, public revenue and expenditure and rural development”. NAS, SCA 190/52. 
27 As recalled by Silcock in A History of Economics Teaching, p. 141. 
28 NAS OHC, Ann Wee. Reel 2 (of 8). 
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Course the year before. Nathan and Chia were examples of the mid-career individuals with 
relevant work experience the course targeted.  
At the other end of the scale were the fresh graduates from a basic degree course, like 
Cecilia Nayar. In 1952, Cecilia was a twenty-two-year-old who decided, after meeting 
Eastaugh on the advice on her doctor-brother, to switch her academic interest from education 
to social work. She, along with another student almoner, were awarded scholarships by the 
Medical Department to pursue their studies.29 By then, the fifteen-month almoner training 
course had been combined with the diploma course. This meant, as she recalls, an extremely 
packed two-year schedule of classes, lectures, and practical work.30 Even throughout the long 
vacation periods, she remembers having to attend “a lot of” lectures and doing “extra 
placements” at various hospitals. Much like Daisy Vaithilingam had done earlier, but now 
with the coursework and practical attachments as required by the course. While comfortable 
with the academic and theoretical portions of the course, Cecilia was less at ease with the 
practical aspects. “I was as lost … lost at sea. I had no clue how to go about anything. Yes 
there were the clients, but what to do about their problems”.31 A self-described natural 
introvert, she found it difficult to speak freely in social situations, resulting in amusing 
moments during her field attachments. One such incident happened when she was attached to 
the Women and Girls Section of the Social Welfare Department. Much of the placement 
involved mere observation, but even that mortified Cecilia as she was taken aback by the 
range of social and personal problems a young girl could have, some of which she never 
heard of before. After a period of observation, her supervisor, Carl de Souza, asked her to 
interview a young couple who was brought in after an anti-vice raid. 
 
I didn’t know… I was petrified. I thought to myself, “My god, what am I 
going to say? Where do I begin?” So he left me, with this young couple, 
young girl and boy you know…. And I sat there … I just didn’t know what to 
say. So I gave an excuse, I said “excuse me a while”, and I went across [to an 
experienced investigator who had taken her under her wing]. So I went up to 
her, “Pauline, what do I say?” She looked at me, as if to say, “I don’t believe 
this” … “Ask them if they have slept together”. So I never heard of the phrase 
[before], I don’t know all these things… So I just asked them the question. 
And from there it took off….32 
 
                                                          
29 Her colleague was Mrs. Chen Swee Soo, who also recorded an oral history with NAS OHC. See Chen Swee 
Soo (Mrs.). Medical Services in Singapore, Accession Number 002251. Interviewed in 2000. 7 Reels. 
30 NAS OHC, Cecilia M. Nayar (Mrs) (nee Lopez). Medical Services in Singapore, Accession Number 002312. 
Interviewed in 2000. Reel 2 (of 7). 
31 NAS OHC, Cecilia Nayar, reel 2. 
32 NAS OHC, Cecilia Nayar, reel 2. 
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Fresh graduates had similar experiences in following cohorts. Thung Syn Neo, from the 
second batch of diploma students, recalls a particularly unsettling moment for one of her 
classmates during a hospital visit: 
 
Well, I know that one of my classmates … just went to visit kids in the 
orthopedic hospital.... And she really felt quite sick just seeing these kids you 
know. At that time there was a lot of T. B. and post-polio cases, and to see 
these children stretched out on these frames made her rather sick, and so she 
gave up after that…. It is rather a bit of a shock…. I think perhaps … [we] 
were not exposed to all this, and so when we first see children like that, it does 
tug at your heart strings I think. 
 
For the more outgoing student, like Syn Neo, such moments spurred them “to want to 
do it more than ever, because we feel that you have something to perhaps … make things a 
bit better for people or children….”33 Driven by a similar sense of social justice, Janet Yee 
took no-pay leave from her duties as an assistant youth officer at the Social Welfare 
Department to attend the diploma course in 1957.34 She remembers the diploma course and 
her teachers fondly, and thought the curriculum “very balanced and focused”. Janet did her 
practical placements in Singapore with the Singapore Children Society and the Family 
Planning Association, and in Kuala Lumpur with the Social Welfare Department and the 
General Hospital. Each student had to complete at least ten weeks of practical placements per 
year. In those early years, voluntary organizations provided a much-needed avenue for 
practical experience. The Singapore Children’s Society for instance was the first voluntary 
organization to create a dedicated casework agency. Its establishment dovetailed nicely with 
the commencement of the diploma course in 1952, developing what Jean Robertson called a 
“symbiotic relationship” as both “grew up” together. The cases the society handled were a 
fertile training ground for students to gain practical experience in managing the multifaceted 
problems of a family. Jean Robertson stated the benefits factually: 
 
The Society provided the laboratory where many experiments took place: In 
the use of the group; extension of individual relationship in diagnosis and 
treatment; in work with severely disturbed children; with their families;  
 
 
                                                          
33 NAS OHC, Thung Syn Neo. Social Sector. Accession Number 003270. Interviewed in 2008. Reel 3 (of 10). 
Syn Neo remembers a similar experience when one of her students fainting while on hospital rounds, but 
managed to carry on and finished the course. 
34 NAS OHC, Janet Yee Keng Luan. Social Sector, Accession Number 003251. Interviewed in 2007. Reels 2 
and 3 (of 9). She was initially successful in her application for an almoner’s scholarship to attend the course. But 
the scholarship was withdrawn on account of her marriage.  
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underachievers; as a base for the study of children at school; as an opportunity 
to reach out to parents through play of the children....35 
 
Rendered more personally: 
 
Let us take as an example a typical family whose father or mother might well 
come to the Society for help: the father is unemployed; the mother has had a 
pregnancy nearly every year of her marriage and her health is seriously 
impaired as a result; the home is an overcrowded, insanitary, airless cubicle; 
the younger of the six children are undernourished and anaemic; the 
adolescent ones have left school at a low grade and have failed hopelessly to 
find jobs and so are rapidly becoming delinquents; one child of ten was not 
registered for school at the right age and has therefore missed his chance of 
free entry and there is no money for fees; what little money there is in the 
household is ill-spent as far as diet is concerned on foods which are filling but 
of little nutritive value..... The list is endless, but it is easy to see that a case of 
this nature concerning in the first place an under-nourished child or a problem 
child is in fact six cases all rolled into one.36 
 
From the above example, one can discern medical needs for mother and child, employment 
assistance for the father, support for the children’s education, possible probation for 
delinquent behavior, and perhaps a need to guide the adults in managing their household 
expenses and family needs. There was not only the “social work” aspect to resolve, but also 
the need to be aware of the legal and social structures those problems would come into 
contact with, such as legislation regarding juvenile crime, employment assistance and relief 
from the Labour and Social Welfare Departments, medical care from the hospitals, and 
support from schools.  
Janet Yee’s practical placement exposed her to family dynamics, in particular the 
position of the woman, and then the impetus to research family disputes.37 She noted that 
most disputes stemmed from issues concerning money, in-laws, and spousal abuse. She 
commented that “last time the woman got no option, as they were for the most part 
economically dependent on men. Hence, she knew of women who felt they had no choice but 
to return to their husbands, even if the latter had been physical abusive or worse: 
 
Sometimes they bring prostitute to the house. Some of them was too much, 
and ask the wife to get out of the room to use. That one I really encourage her 
                                                          
35 Jean Robertson, “Social Work Education”, pp. 75-76. 
36 NAS, PRO (Public Relations Office) 46/55. The Children’s Society’s Sixth Annual Report 1957. The 
Society’s private records (such as meeting minutes and annual reports) are available at the National Archives of 
Singapore. 
37 Janet Yee Keng-luan, “Disputes among Singapore Chinese families” (Unpublished academic exercise - Dept. 
of Social Studies, University of Malaya, 1959). 
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[to leave]. In the end she made good. She went and find job as a cashier. She 
would cry, worry about her daughters. Eventually, when she on her own, 
eventually the daughters went looking for her. So you don’t have to subject 
yourself to the humiliation and punishment and get beaten, when you [have] 
economic independence.38  
 
The diploma course structure attempted to weld theory to the practical. For those who 
had prior experience, the former helped made sense of the latter. Chia Cheong Fook for 
instance found familiar the practical application of casework principles in relation to his work 
as a relief investigator: 
 
Basically, we learned about the principles of casework, that is – how do we 
deal with individuals, what sort of attitudes we should take towards them and 
how we should win their confidence so that they will be telling us some truths 
rather than try to shield away, thinking that if you don’t give them the right 
answers, they will not get the assistance they want. So how to win their 
confidence and then elicit as much genuine information from them, without 
being threatening also at the same time…. For instance, in Public Assistance, 
if a person applied for monetary assistance, how do you go about it….39 
 
S. R. Nathan initially could not see the relevance of learning economic and social histories 
that were centered on British and European experiences. But later, in the context of 
Singapore’s attempts to industrialize and labor issues, he understood how: 
 
[P]roblems of poverty, injustice and cruelty in British society led to important 
social reforms, including the Beveridge Report of late 1941, which attempted 
to address some of the effects of large-scale unemployment and other social 
ills, and laid the foundations of the modern welfare state. Learning about the 
Industrial Revolution and its consequences gave me a better understanding of 
militant trade unions and the causes for which they agitated.40 
 
Jean Robertson led the way during the early years, teaching the class on social 
casework. The class anchored a course structure that asked the student to understand the 
myriad aspects of society by studying relevant aspects of economics, statistics, psychology, 
philosophy, history, geography, law, and medicine. Cecilia Nayar recalls: 
 
Social casework is actually the process … in fact, that’s our tool we use in 
helping patients…. We deal with patients on an individual basis. We deal with 
their problems by making an analysis of their background, the personality – 
that’s where the psychology comes in, their background in the sense of their 
                                                          
38 NAS OHC, Janet Yee, reel 2 
39 NAS OHC, Chia Cheong Fook, reel 2. 
40 S.R. Nathan, An Unexpected Journey: Path to the Presidency / with Timothy Auger (Singapore: Editions 
Didier Millet, c2011), p. 147.  
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relationship with their family, their home, their school, or the workplace, their 
employment place…. So it is a process by which … which includes things like 
interviewing techniques, and then you are able to find out their problems, and 
then assist them on a one-to-one basis. So that is roughly [social casework].41 
 
She also remembers fairly vividly the utility of understanding developmental and behavioral 
psychology, as taught by Beryl Wright in the first year of the diploma course:  
 
Developmental psychology…, that means the development of the human 
being from birth, you know from the child as they developed, the toddler and 
so on, so as the child develops, then behavioral psychology. Because we have 
to understand people. And you will be dealing actually…. You see, the thing 
about social work of course you deal with people of all ages from birth to 
death. So we have to understand the psychology … of the people at these 
various points in time: the youth, the teenagers, the children, the middle-aged, 
the adults ... and so on…. [E]ssentially we had to understand the psychology 
of people … human development, at these various periods…. We can’t handle 
people’s problems without understanding [behavioral patterns] ….42 
 
Those behavioral patterns were placed in the theoretical context and in real-life. The theory 
was provided by classes in law, which covered the “set-up of the legal system” in Singapore 
and its relation to social issues, classes in ethics and philosophy, which introduced 
discussions of morality, and in social medicine, which focused on human physiology, various 
kind of illnesses, and their impact on the individual and families.43 The diploma program 
employed trained sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists – all of which preceded actual 
university departments in sociology, psychology, and even law.44 The diploma course also 
covered economics, including elementary economics, labor economics (possibly as part of a 
                                                          
41 NAS OHC, Cecilia Nayar, reel 2. 
42 NAS OHC, Cecilia Nayar, reel 2. 
43 Two notable figures from the teaching staff were Ahmad Ibrahim (b. 1916) and Dr. Ivan Polunin (b. 1920). 
The former taught law. He was a Queens Scholar, a former Municipal Commissioner, and taught at the 
University of Malaya since its inception, becoming Dean of the Law Faculty in 1972 (in Malaysia). He was also 
Singapore’s first State Advocate-General in 1959 and later first non-British Attorney-General in 1966, and a 
former Ambassador. (His brother, Cal Bellini, was an actor who appeared in American-produced TV shows and 
films). Polunin, a medical doctor, taught at the university’s Department of Social Medicine and Public Health. 
He also “moonlighted” as an ethnographer and documentary cinematographer. He amassed a substantial 
collection of imagery and film footage (in color) of 1950s and 1960s Singapore, its environment, flora and 
fauna, as well as social life. Most of this collection has been archived at the National Library of Singapore and 
the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Library – the latter including his lecture notes. Other lecturers 
included A. F. Wells, the first full-time hire after Jean Robertson. An English sociologist who had worked with 
William Beveridge on aspects of the British welfare state, Wells had research experience in the West Indies and 
was part of the resettlement process in Malaya during the Communist insurgency. 
44 A Department of Sociology was created in 1966 and another for Psychology in 2006. (The latter had been a 
distinct program within the Department of Social Work and Psychology in 1986). A Department of Law was 
established in 1956, and became a Faculty in 1959. 
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class on social history and policy), and rural poverty in Malaya.45 The composition of the 
lecturers changed over time, but the core structures remained. For instance, after Beryl 
Wright left, psychology classes were taught by a group of part-timers drawn from the 
expatriate community.46 Cecilia Nayar graduated from the diploma course with the distinct 
impression that she was learning about life in general as well as its various aspects.47 
Essentially, the program was a bona fide interdisciplinary social science course, testing 
students’ abilities to adapt to knowledge ranging from the technicalities of compiling reliable 
statistics, to philosophical discussions on ethics, to comprehending Singapore and Malaya’s 
social and constitutional structures, and finally, to apply them in practice. In 1956, the 
program became a full-fledged university department, and in the following year, the course 
was extended another year to meet the training requirements of the almoner.48 
The presence of the diploma program in 1952, and its subsequent development into a 
university department, reflected the needs of a Singapore and Malaya that was anticipated to 
be at least self-governing. The early graduates all went on to work in various parts of 
government and society. Chia Cheong Fook and Janet Yee for instance returned to the Social 
Welfare Department after graduation. Cecilia Nayar, Thung Syn Neo and other newly-
qualified almoners took up positions in the hospitals to assist with the pressing needs of 
patients and their families. Other graduates joined voluntary organizations full-time, such as 
Singapore Children’s Society which created a bursary scheme for potential students. S. R. 
Nathan graduated with a distinction to go along with the diploma. He began work as an 
almoner in 1955 (possibly the first male almoner). In 1956, he was appointed the first local 
Seaman’s Welfare Officer, at the personal request of the Labour Front government.49 Nathan 
went on to be a key figure in the governments formed by the People’s Action Party after 
                                                          
45 Information on economic lecturers taken and summarized from Nathan, An Unexpected Journey, and Cecilia 
Nayar’s oral interviews (Reels 2 and 3). See also K. V. Veloo, Life and Times of a Social Worker: A Personal 
Memoir (Singapore: Wee Kim Wee Centre, Singapore Management University; Singapore Indian Association, 
2014), pp. 76-81 (for recollections of various lecturers), and 84-95 (for his practicum experiences). 
46 Sudha Nair (ed.), Ebb and flow: 60 years of social work education in Singapore (Singapore: National 
University of Singapore, 2012), p. 15. 
47 NAS OHC, Cecilia Nayar, reels 2 and 3. 
48 The additional year became known as the Diploma in Social Studies Part II, and the general course for the 
first two years, Diploma in Social Studies Part I – an unfortunate nomenclature that gave the impression of 
incompleteness. See Nair (ed.), Ebb and Flow, pp. 16-17. Hear also oral history of Jean Mary Marshall, who 
joined the university in 1957 to help with Part II of the course. NAS OHC, Jean Mary Marshall. Women 
Through the Years: Economic & Family Lives. Accession Number 001622. Interviewed in 1995. Reel 3 (of 9). 
49 His time as a seaman welfare officer is narrated in S. R. Nathan, Why Am I Here? Overcoming Hardships of 
Local Seafarers / [edited by Bernard T.G. Tan & Wee Seo Lay] (Singapore: Centre for Maritime Studies, 
National University of Singapore, c2010).  
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1959, all the while maintaining a close connection to his social work roots.50 The work of the 
diploma graduates was significant in the context of decolonization. As social welfare officers 
and social workers, they continued the intimate engagement with the myriad social needs and 
dimensions of Singapore society inculcated during the diploma program. In doing so, they 
facilitated an emerging sense of community in Singapore and laid the foundations of 
professional social work in Singapore, ensuring its continued relevance in post-colonial 
Singapore. The almoners had earlier organized themselves into a Malayan Association of 
Almoners in 1954, which became the Singapore Association of Medical Social Workers - one 
of the many consequences of the political separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. 
Encouraged by Jean Robertson, diploma graduates formed the School of Social Studies 
Association in 1956, which then became the Association of Professional Social Workers in 
1960. In 1971, professional social work was brought under one banner, the Singapore 
Association of Social Workers, which continues in the present-day as the representative and 
regulating body for social workers in Singapore. 
In 1966, the Department of Social Studies became the Department of Social Work and 
Social Administration, a nomenclature that acknowledged more directly the LSE influence on 
local developments of professional social work.51 In addition, an undergraduate degree course 
was offered for the first time.52 In 1967, Jean Robertson departed to take up a Professorship 
in the University of Hong Kong.53 She was succeeded by another stalwart of the diploma 
program, Ann Wee. Ann had been with the diploma program since its inception in 1952, 
                                                          
50 He became Honorary Secretary of the Singapore Council of Social Service sometime in 1960. Concurrently, 
he also assisted the PAP government in labor issues, helping to set up the Labour Research Unit. See S. R. 
Nathan, Winning Against the Odds: The Labour Research Unit in NTUC's Founding (Singapore: Straits Times 
Press, c2011). 
51 The present-day Department of Social Policy has its roots in the Department of Social Sciences and 
Administration, first founded in 1912 and became the Department of Social Administration after the Second 
World War. LSE, “Social Policy - Pioneers of the Social Sciences”. 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/PioneersOfTheSocialSciences/socialPolicy.aspx. Accessed 12 July 
2015. 
52 The degree was in Applied Social Studies. An honors degree only came about in 1985 (for students 
graduating in 1989). See Nair (ed.), Ebb and Flow, pp. 21-22. 
53 Jean Robertson stayed in Singapore for fifteen years, before moving on to the University of Hong Kong in 
1967 as Professor of Social Work. Those years saw extensive participation in Singapore’s community and the 
making of social policy. Besides leading and teaching the social studies course, Robertson was also a Juvenile 
Court magistrate, chairman of the Singapore Children’s Society and the Singapore Society for Mentally 
Retarded Children, member of the Social Welfare Council, and then vice-president of the Singapore Council of 
Social Service, and a member of government commissions on various social issues, such as social security and 
prisons. In recognition of her public and academic service, Robertson was awarded the C.M.G. in 1966 and an 
honorary Doctor of Laws in 1967 – the latter being the first time a woman was awarded the honor by the 
University of Singapore. Information taken from Hodge (ed.), Community Problems, pp. 1-3. She retired in 
1972 and died two years later in a car accident in France. See also online biography 
http://www.universitystory.gla.ac.uk/biography/?id=WH3026&type=P. Accessed 7 July 2015. 
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serving first as part-time lecturer, then taking on a full-time position from 1957. In between, 
she worked in the Social Welfare Department, first as a Training Officer and later in the 
Counselling (sic) and Advice Section. Ann recalls her first responsibilities in the diploma 
program: 
 
I took responsibility for organizing the field practice which again was a 
wonderful way of getting to know what was going on. Because it brought me 
in touch with… there weren’t that many voluntary agencies then, but it 
brought me in touch with what was going on. Well, we used some very 
unorthodox placements. I can remember the Personnel Manager of what was 
then the Harbour Board for instance used to take students.... And we worked 
with nuns, various nuns who took students for placements.54 
 
She also taught classes on family, social services and social history: 
 
I was also doing a course on a kind of family and culture. [There] was almost 
nothing published then. So it was very much an issue of getting students to do 
their own case studies and discuss them because Maurice Freedman’s work 
was not out, Judith’s [Djamour] work was not out at that time. It was almost 
nothing published so it was very much a kind of discussion seminar.... I also 
built up a little social history course for which I am happy to acknowledge my 
debt to a number of History Department academic exercises on the Chinese 
Secretariat or Chinese Protectorate, and then one on the immigration of 
women being done by an honors student, and another on the history of the 
Medical Department. I think all of those had been done by 1957 and were 
good sources for a social history course.55 
 
Ann’s focus on local history was illustrative of the nature and scope of the social 
studies diploma program. Along with its sister program in the University of Hong Kong 
(started in 1950), the University of Malaya course was seen as “truly indigenous and 
designed to meet local needs”.56 That comment was made in the context of the difficulties 
social work education had in India. Particularly in the immediate postwar period, the apparent 
strong influence of American “social and political values” led to a growing disconnect in 
Indian social work education from the “reality of the situations of local practice....”57 Even 
before, the dependence on “foreign material” led to “comparative neglect of the study of the 
                                                          
54 NAS OHC, Ann Wee, reel 2. 
55 NAS OHC, Ann Wee, reel 2. Freedman completed his study of the Chinese family and kinship in 1953, and 
published it in 1957. Djamour completed research in 1953, and published her work on the Malay family in 1965. 
56 Hodge, Community Problems, p. 68. 
57 Hodge, Community Problems, p. 67. Hodge quoted from two articles: P. T. Thomas, “Problems of social work 
education in India”. The Indian Journal of Social Work, 28, no. 1 (April 1967), pp. 41-53, and Hans Nagpaul, 
“The diffusion of American social work education to India: problems and issues”. International Social Work, 
15, no. 1 (1972), pp. 3-17. 
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history of regional social reform movements, ... research into the application of the foreign 
theory to local practice ... [and] prolonged the absence of indigenous study material from the 
curricula, based on Asian cultural, social, economic and political conditions”.58 
In Singapore and Malaya, the lack of published materials did hinder teaching, and as 
some of the diploma students recalled, content – though indirectly relevant – was based on 
European experiences. In 1952, the only publication directly related to Singapore society was 
the 1947 social survey and census reports. Prior to the diploma program, there had been no 
deliberate and organized studies of Singapore society. The predominantly transient society 
perhaps largely precluded such a need. After the war, the situation changed. Singapore society 
was found to be more settled and with a more balanced gender ratio. Coupled with the 
promise of self-government and the presence of an actual social policy, the need for social 
data, for policymaking as well as teaching, became more pronounced. From the start, Jean 
Robertson observed that that was a “move to indigenise” in terms of teaching staff as well as 
local social workers.59 She also noted that she and her staff “were determined to make the 
course, as far as we could, meet the needs of this country”.60 Hence, they began “obtaining 
Malayan teaching material and developed a system of student dissertations embodying 
material from direct field studies of social phenomena not previously undertaken”.61 From its 
inception to its end in 1974, the diploma program produced over a hundred of such 
dissertations. They illustrated the scholarly assumptions and methods adopted at that time. 
Driven by the need for information on local conditions, the dissertations were predominantly 
ethnographical, mirroring the approaches of, for instance, Freedman and Djamour’s study of 
the Chinese and Malay communities in Singapore.  
Taken together, the dissertations give an overview of postwar Singapore society and 
economy. Singapore society then was a kaleidoscope of Straits Chinese, Jews, Malayalees, 
Ceylon Tamils, Arabs, Javanese, Bhutanese, the various Chinese linguistic groups, and 
communities from Malay-speaking regions. They lived in urban dwellings, in rural kampungs 
(villages), in a settlement of houses on stilts, or in the southern islands. They were part of an 
economy that was supported by a variety of vocations, such as seaman, fishermen, kelong-
makers (kelongs are off-shore wooden structures mainly for fishing purposes), soya bean 
sauce makers, farmers, amahs (female, usually elderly, domestic workers), samsui female 
                                                          
58 Hodge, Community Problems, p. 67. 
59 Robertson, “Social Work Education”, pp. 72-73. She was told to expect to stay “for about ten years”. 
60 Robertson, “Social Work Education”, p. 74. 
61 Hodge, Community Problems, p. 68. 
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construction laborers (hailing from the Sanshui district in Guangdong, China), lighterage 
laborers (referring to those transferring cargo from lighter barges), paper boys, hawkers and 
peddlers, trishaw riders, letter-writers, and jaga keratas (a kind of syndicate that charges 
parking fees, usually illicitly). 
For leisure, they listened to opera singers and musicians, news readers, or story-
tellers, browsed cheap comic books, or simply gathered with neighbors and friends along the 
five-footways to escape the dank air of their claustrophobic quarters. The more religious 
congregated and worshipped at churches, mosques, and temples, located in both urban and 
rural areas. They moreover provided various forms of social support during times of need. 
Social support was also available within lineage villages, youth clubs, community centers, or 
specific voluntary welfare organizations, such as the Chinese benevolent associations and the 
Society of the St. Vincent de Paul. When sick, some of them did not go to hospitals but 
preferred to consult the Chinese sinseh or the Malay bomoh. The chronically ill and dying, 
mostly single and without the nearness of family, were received at “sick houses” in 
Chinatown or at community hospitals.  
Historically speaking, the dissertations are primary indicators of social issues that 
arrested the attention of society then (as represented by the student and the supervising 
teacher). They also reflected the drive to collect more local knowledge and data. Indeed, they 
were the earliest organized attempts to document and understand aspects of Singapore 
society. As a result, early dissertations were mostly foundational. They were either 
ethnographical studies of particular communities and local traditions, or overviews of 
existing social services or of institutions that provided social support. Over time the topics 
evolved, keeping pace with the activities of the Social Welfare Department and overall 
developments in Singapore. Students explored specific issues concerning tuberculosis 
treatment, opium addiction, probation and rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents, social 
services for the elderly and indigent, the social and economic impact of blindness, deafness 
and other disabilities, begging and vagrancy, abandoned children, and (as Singapore’s public 
housing program expanded) the impact of rehousing and resettlement on social relationships. 
In doing so, they highlight some of the fundamental social concerns of an individual or 
household living in Singapore (or Malaya), such as family, housing, health, and employment. 
For instance, the current study’s juxtaposition of the experiences of the migrant and 
domiciled worker in Singapore (respectively Augustin Gomez and Valentine Frois) comes 
from a dissertation on elderly Public Assistance recipients. Similarly, personal concerns over 
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postwar housing, employment, living conditions, and their impact on family, were drawn 
from Chia Cheong Fook’s study of hawker “Wong” and hawkers in general. 
The dissertations also engaged, directly and indirectly, with the measures and 
programs that emerged to address such concerns. From there, the dissertations provided a 
basis to assess the viability and limits of existing policies and services. The correlation 
between the dissertations and social policy was not always obvious nor was it direct. One 
notable exception was S. R. Nathan’s study of the welfare of seamen in Singapore, which 
uncovered systemic abuses by owners of seamen lodging houses and led to the creation of a 
registry. Even so, the Labour Front Government might not have been aware (or inclined to 
take action), had Jean Robertson not brought it to the attention of then Chief Minister David 
Marshall.62 To be sure, the Social Studies diploma program was not created to inform social 
policy, at least not directly. Its primary objective was to prepare students to execute the 
myriad aspects of social welfare work. It filled a gap in knowledge and expertise, meeting an 
immediate need by producing graduates to work in the Social Welfare Department, the 
Almoner Department (within the Medical Department), and private voluntary welfare 
organizations. Its dissertations moreover provided the first detailed and deliberate 
examinations of Singapore’s postwar society. In identifying local aspects of society to study, 
the diploma program delineated a “Singapore” space of sorts, indirectly contributing to a 
nascent sense of community in late colonial Singapore. These were further augmented by the 
work the diploma graduates carried out in their professional careers as a social welfare 
officer, almoner, or social worker, giving coherency and meaning to the social welfare state. 
 
Partnerships: The Singapore Social Welfare Council (1946 to 1958) 
 
The Social Welfare Department was most assuredly not the only organization able and 
willing to provide social welfare in late colonial Singapore, nor did it sought to be. As stated 
in the directive, it was policy to form partnerships with the wider community. In any case, the 
Social Welfare Department did not have exclusivity in providing social services. It was the 
“new kid on the block”, joining the ranks of religious organizations and community 
associations, as well as family networks, which had been providing basic welfare services 
                                                          
62 The anecdote goes that Robertson waved Nathan’s dissertation in front of Marshall during a meeting, 
exclaiming “You should be ashamed!” Personal communication to author from Ann Wee. Two years after 
graduation in 1956, S. R. Nathan took on the position of Seaman Welfare Officer in David Marshall’s Labour 
Front government. 
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since the early days of the British settlement. The Second World War drastically affected 
community sources of welfare, which were dependent on contributions from the community, 
such as religious contributions in the form of tithes or zakat, subscriptions to mutual aid 
associations, or one-time charitable donations. The dislocation of economy and society 
caused by the war and occupation affected, at least for a time, society’s ability to help its less 
fortunate members.  
Welfare services nonetheless continued as best as they could. The major institutions, 
such as the Salvation Army, the various Christian churches, and community associations, 
were integral participants in the Singapore Executive of the Malayan Welfare Council during 
the British Military Administration. Various representatives pushed for urgent, immediate as 
well as long-term social reforms, such as food and money, basic welfare for the destitute, and 
youth development. Individual organizations also resumed or continued their welfare 
activities after the war. The wartime Blue Cross Charitable Institution continued providing 
much-needed medical and other welfare services for the poor and needy.63 Religious 
organizations also resumed basic care and welfare services as best as they could. The Sikh 
community for instance used one of its temples to care for survivors and victims of the war. 
Seva Singh, a former official at the Silat Road Sikh Temple, recollected the temple was 
“turned into a haven for the widows and orphans”. They were given food, and for those who 
wanted to go home, travel expenses.64 
In addition to assisting the British Military Administration and the civil government, 
the Salvation Army resumed its own activities in Singapore and Malaya after its enforced 
hiatus during the occupation. Tan Beng Neo rejoined the organization and helped out with 
Emergency Relief and later the People’s Restaurants. She was then sent up-country to Ipoh to 
run a girls’ home before returning to Singapore in 1947. The Salvation Army was given two 
properties along Oxley Road (numbers 26 and 30 – the former had been a brothel during the 
                                                          
63 As stated in the society’s rule and regulations (circa 1947): “The main object of this Institution shall be to 
relieve the poor and the distressed. It shall carry out the following activities: (a) To give free medical treatment, 
to give monetary relief, to give free congee and tea, to provide free coffins and to give free clothing; (b) to assist 
in the carrying out of any international charitable enterprise; (c) to foster co-operation among the members and 
to cultivate closer friendship among them; and (d) to worship the TAI HONG [sic] patron saint, to pay respects 
to the BUDDHA [sic] and to study Buddhist doctrine”. It also described the banner (logo): “The banner of the 
institution shall consist of a "Blue Cross" on a white background with red hemming, the idea being to follow the 
ideal of the "Red Cross" which is to relieve the needy and save the wounded and that of the "Black Cross" 
which is to collect the dead and give them free burials. The objects of the "Blue Cross" being the amalgamation 
of the ideals of the two sister societies mentioned above are therefore to give relief and to provide free coffins 
for burials. The red hemming signifies a sincere heart and unity”. (NAS, microfilm number NA 541). 
64 NAS OHC, Seva Singh. Communities of Singapore (Part 2). Accession Number 000418. Interviewed in 1984. 
Reel 17 (of 22).  
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occupation), and refurbished them into a church and a girls’ home.65 It also established a 
Boys’ Home along Thomson Road (near the junction with Moulmein Road), which was 
before the war and for a short time after the only remand institution for male juveniles in 
Singapore.  
Postwar circumstances converged with late colonial policy to give a sense of urgency 
to redressing social problems to help shore up an ailing empire. Colonial social policy, as 
well-intended and/or self-serving as it might have been, still lacked the knowledge, expertise, 
and in some instances the resources, to carry out social welfare work. Hence, there were 
sustained attempts throughout the late colonial period to work with existing voluntary 
organizations. Those attempts initially produced the Pan-Malayan Welfare Council, and the 
Singapore Executive on the island itself for the duration of the British Military 
Administration. From April 1946, with the creation of two new colonial territories, the 
Malayan Union and the crown colony of Singapore, the Malayan Welfare Council was 
replaced two separate welfare councils. In June 1946, the Singapore Executive had its final 
meeting, ending its short but eventful tenure with some acrimony. The following month in 
July, a new Social Welfare Council was inaugurated by the Governor of Singapore.66 A key 
difference this time was the presence of a fully functioning Social Welfare Department, which 
was busy operating the communal feeding schemes and in the midst of taking over former 
Singapore Executive initiatives, such as youth clubs and child feeding. Another significant 
difference was the appointment of the Secretary for Social Welfare as the Chairman of the 
Council, whereas earlier, members of the Singapore Executive had elected the first chairman. 
The intimate involvement of the state could be perceived as a literal interpretation of 
the social welfare policy directive, a copy of which was circulated at the Council’s first 
meeting.67 The direct appointment of the Secretary of Social Welfare to lead the new council, 
including an additional five government officials and four Governor-nominees, reflected the 
probable attempt to avoid earlier tensions.68 From the start, it seemed clear that the Council 
was an extension of state apparatus for social welfare. The “society” portion of the Council 
was not very different from that of the Singapore Executive, with representatives from the 
                                                          
65 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 16. 
66 The Straits Times, 27 July 1946, “Welfare Council Inaugurated”, and The Singapore Free Press, 27 July 
1946, “Singapore Welfare Council Inaugurated”. See NAS, BMA CH 27/45 for text of speeches and minutes of 
meeting. 
67 NAS, BMA CH 27/45. Social Welfare Policy Directive. 
68 Official representation came from the Medical, Education, Co-operation and Labour Departments, the 
Chinese Secretariat, and the Municipality. See Appendix A in Beginnings for a full list of members in 1946. 
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Anglican and Catholic churches, the Salvation Army, the Blue Cross, the World Red Swastika 
Society, and the Young Men and Women Christian Associations.69 The religious bodies and 
voluntary organizations were invited to join, and they were hardly an accurate representation 
of Singapore’s diverse society at the time.  
Governor Gimson reiterated the intent of the policy directive in his address 
inaugurating the Social Welfare Council. The Council existed to utilize “local knowledge and 
experience” of the communities, and as a platform for “expressing opinions, and making 
suggestions” on anything connected to social welfare.70 The Council, like the Singapore 
Executive, did not have executive or fund-raising powers. Unlike the Singapore Executive 
however, the Council had far less room to maneuver. The former operated in a context of 
rapid flux and hence had substantially more leeway in introducing and executing welfare 
plans. Activities by the Council were comparatively much more restrained, non-existent even, 
with fewer initiatives driven by the organization. The presence of an operational Social 
Welfare Department was a considerable contributory factor, as it performed the welfare work 
the Council could have done. In the initial stages, the Social Welfare Council met monthly. 
For each meeting, the Social Welfare Department circulated a report of the department’s 
activities and progress of the previous month for council members to peruse. In the early 
years, roughly from 1946 to 1953, the substantial amount of social welfare activity provided 
focal points for council meetings, such as People’s Restaurants, care and protection of 
vulnerable sections of society, the social survey, the social welfare conference, and the Five-
Year Plan. Several Council members were also members of the former Singapore Executive. 
They retained a keen interest in developments in youth and infant welfare, public health and 
nutrition, and the care of displaced persons and the destitute.71 
Not all members agreed with the leading role taken by the Social Welfare Department. 
Hints of dissent were recorded in the minutes of the early meetings. One of them was before 
the 1947 conference, specifically over the role of the state in social welfare.72 McNeice 
pushed strongly for a consensus from all Council members. In response, Reverend Kinross 
Nicholson, representing the Bishop of Singapore, warned that government intervention could 
                                                          
69 Later expanded to include representatives from the Methodist Mission, the Singapore Buddhist Association, 
and the Ramakrishna Mission. See appendices of various SWDARs for annual listing of member organizations. 
70 NAS, BMA CH 27/45. Full speech included in minutes of inaugural meeting. Also reported in The Straits 
Times, 27 July 1946, “Welfare Council Inaugurated”, and The Singapore Free Press, 27 July 1946, “Singapore 
Welfare Council Inaugurated”. 
71 Sub-committees were formed for Women and Girls, Youth and others. No records found of their proceedings, 
but usually reported and minuted during council meetings. 
72 NAS, SCA 5/47. 9 August 1947. 
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easily “undermine the foundations in society by destroying people’s sense of personal 
responsibility”. He referred to the child feeding scheme as an example of government 
prolonging an essentially temporary measure. Instead, “[what] Social Welfare should aim at 
was placing a family in a position to which it could earn enough to support itself”.73 The 
“central function of the state” should be limited to the “administration of justice”.74 If there 
was support for Nicholson, it was not recorded.75 Yap Pheng Geck disagreed, and stated that 
social welfare should not merely be a concern but a duty of government. His view was 
supported by the representatives of the Salvation Army and the World Red Swastika, 
allowing McNeice to claim “full support” from the Social Welfare Council for the arguments 
made in the conference papers.76  
Yap Pheng Geck, as Vice-Chairman, suggested the Council “should have a long term 
plan” similar to the long-term plans by various government departments. Inspired by the 
social welfare conference and an International Labor Organization conference on social 
security and social policy, Yap felt that the Council “should not only consider problems as 
they arose, but plan ahead, towards improving general welfare and better conditions”.77 Yap’s 
proposal was superseded by the Social Welfare Department’s preparations for the Five-Year 
Plan, which in turn obstructed meaningful follow-up by the Council. A preliminary draft of 
the Five-Year Plan was circulated to council members, which led to Nicholson wondering 
about the Council’s position”.78 He pointed out the difference between the Council “advising 
Government” and the Council considering a “memorandum which had apparently been 
adopted”.79 The Chairman’s plea of time constraint due to a pressing deadline was an 
indication of the unfortunate static role of the Council vis-à-vis the Social Welfare 
Department and social welfare in Singapore. The Council became an extension of the Social 
Welfare Department and by relation, the state. Meeting discussions focused almost 
exclusively at times on clarifying and/or critiquing the Social Welfare Department’s progress 
                                                          
73 NAS, SCA 5/47. 9 August 1947. 
74 NAS, SCA 5/47. 9 August 1947. 
75 There is no clear evidence of dissent from the filed minutes of Social Welfare Council meetings. There were 
recorded instances of queries that do suggest some suspicion of official intentions and their implications for 
voluntary and non-governmental services. The Bishop of Singapore once queried whether the Council was an 
“official” body given that 60% of its members were from the government. See NAS, SCA 5/47, 9 May 1947. 
76 It should be noted that the final date recorded in the filed minutes was 30 August 1947, six days after the end 
of the Conference. 
77 NAS SCA 5/47. 9 August 1947 
78 NAS, SCA 6/48. Minutes January 1948 
79 NAS, SCA 6/48. Minutes January 1948. 
223 
 
 
 
and activities.80 Beyond one-off events organized by member organizations, which were rare 
as the Council had no executive or fund-raising powers, there was little to no actual 
coordination of social welfare activities. Such a development was not anticipated by the 
original social welfare policy directive. 
After July 1953, council meetings went from monthly to quarterly. The change was 
supposedly due to a more stable social situation, hence necessitating fewer official 
meetings.81 But perhaps more accurately, council meetings were not always well-attended 
and became “almost entirely a body for the Secretary for Social Welfare to talk to....”82 Such 
a situation was predicted to some extent by external observers. In 1948, W. H. Chinn, the 
social welfare adviser to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, had thought it “preferable 
that [the Social Welfare Council] should be presided over by a Chairman with no particular 
departmental or sectional interests”.83 His comments were only acted on much later, 
coinciding with the arrival of Tom Cromwell, a more dynamic Secretary for Social Welfare 
similar to McNeice and Hughes. From late 1954, discussions began in earnest to replace the 
Social Welfare Council with a new organization along the lines of social service councils 
operating or soon to be in operation in the Federation of Malaya and Hong Kong.84 Those 
councils had fully elected executive bodies. State presence was restricted to an observer role.  
An inert Social Welfare Council, as well as constitutional developments in Singapore 
(which did complicate the standing of the Social Welfare Department vis-à-vis the Council), 
meant progress was slow. The idea for a new national body overseeing social service was first 
mooted during a council meeting in October 1954. Not much headway was made in 1955 
despite Cromwell’s repeated efforts to cajole council members into action. The Social 
Welfare Department was forced to take the lead, in framing the discussion and undertaking 
                                                          
80 This put representatives from the Social Welfare Department and other government departments in an 
awkward position, as they were expected to defend state policy. An instance of a break in ranks took place in 
1949, when Tom Eames Hughes, concurrently Secretary for Social Welfare and Council Chairman, supported a 
council resolution that viewed with “grave concern” the delay in filling staff vacancies. (NAS, SCA 4/49, 8 Dec 
1949). This provoked a stiff response from senior officials in the Colonial Secretary Office, one of whom 
thought that the problem had been presented in “undesirable language” and outside the remit of the Council. 
(NAS, CSO 921/49. File minutes). 
81 NAS, SCA 2/53. 16 June 1953. 
82 NUSCL, CO 1030/274. Observation was made by Tom Cromwell, Secretary, then Director, for Social 
Welfare from 1953 to 1957. Cromwell to Chinn, 9 November 1954. 
83 NUSCL, CO 1030/274. Chinn to Cromwell, December 1954. Chinn quoted from his report made in 1948 after 
his visit to Singapore.  
84 NAS, SCA 159/53 and 2/55. 8 October 1954, 21 January 1955, and 15 April 1955. Cromwell referenced the 
pending council of social service to be formed in the Federation of Malaya, and the Hong Kong Council of 
Social Service. The former did not materialize, remaining as the Central Welfare Council (since its inception in 
1946), while the latter (first established in 1947) was a statutory board since 1951. 
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the spadework, so as to break the inertia. In 1956, it circulated a memo to forty-eight 
voluntary organizations in Singapore. The memo spelled out the rationale for a national social 
service council independent of government and sought feedback (and tacit approval).85 
Slightly over half responded (twenty-seven), with a clear majority assenting to the proposed 
change. A sub-committee within the Council was formed to draft a new constitution.86 After a 
year-long discussion, the constitution was finally approved in principle in October 1957 by 
the Council.87 
 
The Singapore Council of Social Service 
 
The Singapore Council of Social Service was inaugurated on 22 December 1958, and 
held its first general meeting in March 1959.88 Lee Kong Chian, rubber and pineapple tycoon-
cum-philanthropist, served as founding President until his retirement for health reasons in 
1964.89 The new organization could not be more different from the Social Welfare Council. It 
had a fully elected executive committee, was empowered to initiate relief schemes, to raise 
funds and then distribute financial aid. State presence was reduced to observers from relevant 
government departments, or at the very least, was absorbed into a more inclusive decision-
making process.  
The inauguration event made a mockery of the Social Welfare Council’s limited scope 
and representation. Representatives from over sixty different organizations attended, the vast 
majority voluntary and non-governmental.90 Freed from earlier shackles, the new council was 
much more active than its predecessor. It raised and helped distribute financial relief to 
victims of fires and floods, almost immediately after the inaugural meeting.91 The new 
                                                          
85 NAS, SCA 16/56, 20 April 1956. 
86 NAS, SCA 16/56, 20 July 1956. The subcommittee comprised Harry Wee (representing the Singapore Youth 
Council), R. Boswell from the Rural Board, and Woon Wah Siang from the Social Welfare Department. 
87 NAS, SCA 10/57, 25 October 1957. There was a dissenting opinion (by Harry Wee) over membership. His 
opinion was not fully elucidated in the council minutes, but it stemmed from membership and organizational 
control of the new council. NAS, SWD 33/56 may contain more details and correspondence on the matter. 
88 Minutes of inauguration and general meetings are filed in NAS, SCA 83/59 and MLW (Ministry of Labour 
and Welfare) 35/59 respectively. See public announcements in The Singapore Free Press, 29 July 1958, “They 
Will Link Welfare Groups in Singapore”, and The Straits Times, 23 December 1958, “New welfare council 
launched by Lim”. 
89 Lee died three years later in 1967, leaving behind – via the Lee Foundation – a strong legacy in philanthropy. 
He was succeeded by Ee Peng Liang, a former Social Welfare Council member who represented the Catholic 
Church.  
90 NAS, SCA 83/56. File includes records of inaugural meeting, invited organizations and actual attendees. 
91 The interim committee was called into action almost immediately, distributing relief for victims of a big fire 
in Tiong Bahru in 1959. See The Straits Times, 5 February 1959, “Council to Co-ordinate Flood and Fire Relief 
Measures” and The Singapore Free Press, 14 February 1959, “Firemen still there after all-night watch”. 
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council made a genuine attempt to coordinate social welfare work in Singapore. Its key 
activities included publishing on a semi-regular basis a directory of social services and 
organizing fund-raising events in the form of “welfare exhibitions”.92 In its latter years, 
particularly during the 1970s, it also commissioned and published research studies on various 
social issues confronting individuals and families.93 The nature and scope of the Singapore 
Council of Social Service would change over the years.94 But its establishment in 1958 and 
subsequent development symbolized to some extent a more involved Singapore society 
(whether it might have wanted it or not) in addressing social problems of the day. There were 
always concerns about institutional independence, not just from the state, but also from each 
other. During a meeting to discuss a near-final draft of the new constitution, “great 
satisfaction” was expressed by all members when informed that, other than membership 
subscription, the new council would not collect and centralize funds of individual 
organizations.95 A centralized relief fund, controlled by the Social Welfare Council, never 
materialized less because of state interference, and more due to the absence of a consensus 
between non-official council members. Even for some, independence from the state was not 
entirely undesirable. A Social Welfare Council member, admittedly not from a voluntary 
organization, actually questioned the assumption that a government official should not 
continue head the new social welfare body.96 Needless to say, his opinion did not carry much 
weight with both government and non-government council members.  
In terms of substantive contributions, the Social Welfare Council is admittedly less 
significant historically compared to the Social Welfare Department or individual voluntary 
                                                          
92 Singapore Council of Social Service, The Helping Hand: Singapore Council of Social Service Directory of 
Voluntary Welfare Organisations (Singapore: The Council, 1961). Other editions were published by SCSS in 
1970, 1985, and 1988. The National Council of Social Service published similar directories after 1992. 
93 At least one study led to the introduction of a new assistance scheme in the early 1980s, the Rent and Utilities 
Assistance Scheme, for families in need renting one- and two-room HDB flats. See Singapore Council of Social 
Service Research Committee, The Social and Welfare Needs of Families Living in one- and two-room HDB flats 
(Singapore: The Council, 1980). A list of research studies (as at 1983) can be found in Singapore Council of 
Social Service, Twenty Five Years of Social Service: Silver Jubilee Publication of the Singapore Council of 
Social Service (Singapore: Singapore Council Social Service, 1983), pp. 32-33. 
94 The SCSS was made a statutory body in 1968, and reconstituted as the National Council of Social Service 
(NCSS) in 1992. It was also responsible for establishing the Community Chest, a centralized fund-raiser to help 
voluntary organizations focus more on provision of services. Its website provides an overview of the range of 
services and activities it provides. National Council of Social Service, https://www.ncss.gov.sg/. Accessed 21 
June 2015. For overviews of SCSS’ activities, see For all we care: 50 years of social service in Singapore, 
1958-2008 (Singapore: National Council of Social Service, 2008), and Tan Siew Sang, “Social welfare services 
in Singapore with special focus on the Singapore Council of Social Service 1959-1980” (Unpublished academic 
exercise--Dept. of History, Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, 1983). 
95 NAS, SCA 10/57. 25 January 1957. 
96 NAS, SCA 159/53. 8 October 1954. The member’s point was based on the premise that most if not all of the 
Social Welfare Council’s initiatives had originated from the government.  
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organizations. Still, and though mostly inspired or encouraged by state officials, some of its 
work were path-breaking and did lay the foundations for future development in Singapore’s 
social services. The Singapore Youth Council for instance originated from Council 
deliberations about youth welfare (and continues today as the National Youth Council).97 
Council meetings moreover are a valuable record of the process of shaping the boundaries 
and nature of social welfare work in Singapore, such as Yap Pheng Geck shoring up support 
for the Social Welfare Department before the 1947 social welfare conference, members 
raising concerns about staffing issues in the Social Welfare Department, or Constance Goh 
defending the child feeding scheme (see following section). Council members also pointed 
out gaps in services to individuals with special needs.98 Though rebuffed every time, several 
Council members also kept alive the discussion for a centralized relief fund, called a 
“Community Chest”, to respond quickly to and more effectively organize donations for civil 
disasters.99 On a broader level, the origins and (arrested) development of the Social Welfare 
Council also inform a history of social policy in late colonial Singapore. From the state’s 
perspective, an inert Social Welfare Council illustrated that a policy of coordination and 
cooperation could not succeed just because it was so ordered. In many areas, it was the Social 
Welfare Department that had to take the first step. 
 
Postwar Developments in Social Services 
 
Nonetheless, an inert Social Welfare Council was not illustrative of an inert Singapore 
society, taking action only when prodded or led by the state. The postwar period witnessed 
                                                          
97 Due to the social dislocation caused by war and occupation, youth welfare had always been a concern since 
the return of the British. Proposal for a youth council was first raised in 1947 (NAS, SCA 5/47), and formally 
established in 1948. (The Straits Times, 7 February 1948, “Singapore Youth Council Formed”). A record of its 
genesis can also be found in NAS, CSO 584/48. “Proposal for Youth Council”. 
98 Special needs here refer to care for those with physical and mental disabilities (or handicaps as used then). 
There were council discussions in 1951 to set up a home dedicated for juvenile “mental defectives” those under 
sixteen years of age, as well as “mental decrepits” for which no amount of medical assistance was of further use. 
(NAS, SCA 12/51. July, October and November meetings).  
99 As early as 1946 and 1947, discussions had taken place on the viability of a centralized relief organization or 
fund to help victims of civil disasters and other emergencies, or to initiate schemes independent of government. 
But no progress was made due to disagreements within the Council. Matter was raised again in August 1951 in 
response to a fire in Kampong Bugis (NAS, SCA 12/51), but with no results. Though the Social Welfare 
Department did participate in the creation of a Singapore Joint Relief Organisation in October 1951, the Council 
itself was not involved. (Some overview of the SJRO’s activities, which went beyond financial relief and for a 
time into providing emergency housing can be found in Loh Kah Seng’s unpublished doctoral dissertation “The 
1961 Kampong Bukit Ho Swee Fire and the Making of Modern Singapore”). In October 1954, discussions took 
place but also again with little outcome. By 1955, the issue had been, in the words of a head of the Social 
Welfare Department, “battered to and fro like a well beaten shuttlecock”. (NAS, SCA 2/55. 24 August 1955). 
An actual Community Chest fund would not come about until 1983. 
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some of Singapore’s more vibrant (and at times violent) years, partly a result of the 
emergence of a plethora of social organizations. In 1961, the Singapore Council of Social 
Service published a directory, The Helping Hand, which recorded sixty social service 
agencies - and these were only the ones that had responded and agreed to be part of the 
published directory. Taken together, they provided a broad range of services for youths, 
women, the elderly, persons with disabilities and others in need, covering a variety of social 
needs at different stages in life as well as unexpected emergencies.  
Some of the organizations managed to maintain activities carried out before and 
during the war. Many others were not recorded, as the social and welfare services provided 
might have been ad hoc or on a non-statutory basis, such as family and personal relations, or 
assistance derived from community mutual aid associations, kongsi houses (clan halls), and 
places of worship.100 As best as they can, they resumed their welfare activities after the war, 
meeting urgent needs of oftentimes desperate people. As mentioned earlier, the convent home 
for abandoned babies for instance became so busy and crowded, so much so nuns had to be 
stationed at the convent gates round the clock. Medical needs were even more pronounced 
after war and occupation, due to the spread of infectious diseases like tuberculosis. Urgent 
needs were moreover not the only concern. The “everyday” mundane needs of people at 
different stages in their lives would require care and assistance.  
For instance, the Kwong Wai Siu Free Hospital not only provided medical care, but 
also an important but understated service to Cantonese and other Chinese migrants who had 
little or no family or community support. The free hospital, supported primarily by the 
Cantonese community, was part of a network of fellow community hospitals, religious 
institutions, and the smaller, purpose-built “sick-receiving houses” or “death houses”, which 
provided a basic service for those near the end of their lives or chronically ill. They provided 
accommodation, basic medical care, and burial services for the impoverished and chronically 
ill.101 Case studies collected in the late 1950s provide a depressing tale of the chronically ill 
and the dying. Those individuals were elderly (usually fifty years and above) and 
predominantly from the working class. The majority of case studies were of those afflicted 
                                                          
100 Information on these social institutions can be found in Majorie Topley, Cantonese Society in Hong Kong 
and Singapore: Gender, Religion, Medicine and Money / Essays by Marjorie Topley; edited and introduced by 
Jean DeBernardi (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011), and the early sociological studies by Maurice Freedman and 
Judith Djamour of the Chinese and Malay communities. Studies of such services can also be found in 
dissertations produced by the Social Studies Diploma program, later Department of Social Studies.  
101 Lim Teck Seng, “The chronic sick and the dying in Singapore” (Unpublished academic exercise - Dept. of 
Social Studies, University of Malaya, 1959). 
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with tuberculosis or chest-related ailments, and were unable to work to support themselves. 
The males usually had family in Singapore, Malaya or in China, but for various reasons were 
unable to call on them for support. The females were for the most part on their own or 
widowed. They would have visited doctors until no further help could be given. They then 
turned to community hospitals and sick receiving houses (facilities that admitted the 
chronically ill or dying with a view to give them a proper burial upon death) that would give 
them, as and when space permitted, a bed and care until they passed on.102 The state’s 
involvement was in the form of monetary assistance to the individual or grants to the 
institution via the Social Welfare Department. 
The majority of the social service agencies recorded in the 1961 directory were 
established after the war. To some extent, their presence was indicative of particularly urgent 
social issues that were not fully addressed by the state or society at large. The Social Welfare 
Department was merely one of many providing social and welfare services in postwar 
Singapore, and even then, meeting needs that were more general than specific. The 
department did play the role of facilitator in pulling together support for certain specific 
needs. For instance, it had a direct hand in the genesis of associations to aid the blind, and the 
“deaf and dumb”, established in 1951 and 1955 respectively.103 In other areas, individuals 
from Singapore society stepped up. Tuberculosis was considered a public menace in the 
immediate postwar years. Predominantly through the efforts of the Rotary Club of Singapore, 
the Singapore Anti-Tuberculosis Association (SATA) was formally established in 1947.104 It 
raised funds for its first clinic with x-ray facilities, opened in 1948 within a building that also 
housed the St. Andrews’ Mission Hospital in Tanjong Pagar.105 The multiplicity and depth of 
                                                          
102 Lim, “The chronic sick”, pp. 142-146. 
103 Basic background information published in The Helping Hand. The Social Welfare Department was partly 
involved in the genesis of these associations, both of which have continued to this present-day. The Society for 
the Deaf and Dumb (known today as the Singapore Association for the Deaf) was established in August 1955, 
mainly via the efforts of the Red Cross and the Rotary, while the Association for the Blind (known today as the 
Singapore Association for the Visually Handicapped) came about in 1951 almost directly via the efforts of the 
Social Welfare Department finding a sponsor to convene the organization. See various meeting minutes of the 
Social Welfare Council between 1950 and 1956 for brief overview of developments. 
104 The Straits Times, 3 June 1947, “Anti-T.B. Meeting Today”. Brief overview of organization’s history can be 
found in Lim Kay Tong and Mary Lee, Fighting TB: the SATA story (1947-1997) (Singapore: Singapore Anti-
Tuberculosis Association, 1997), and on its website at http://www.sata.com.sg/about_us/our-history/ (Accessed 
4 July 2015), and The SATA Story: Celebrating 65 Years of Caring for the Community. Available online: 
http://www.sata.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/SATA-e-book_v7_9Oct12_FINAL.pdf (Accessed 4 July 
2015). In 1954, Lee Kong Chian donated his massive South Winds resort in the West Coast area for a TB 
settlement for patients to recover, while G. Uttamram donated land in Upper Changi for a additional clinic. 
105 The Singapore Free Press, 1 December 1948, “SATA Makes a Good Start”. For efforts to raise funds and 
obstacles, see also The Straits Times, 19 June 1947, “Rotary T.B. Clinic Suggested”; The Straits Times, 7 
August 1947, “T.B. Fund”; The Straits Times, 26 July 1947, “Dr. Vickers & discouraged T.B. Patients”. 
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postwar social needs also transformed familiar sources of welfare and social services. 
Between 1954 and 1958, with support from the USA-based Catholic Relief Services, Catholic 
Welfare Services Singapore (later Catholic Welfare Society) provided aid in kind and 
monetary grants to Catholic and non-Catholic individuals and organizations.106 
Somewhat curiously, the 1961 directory did not include organizations established by 
women providing services for women and their families. Before the Emergency in 1948 made 
them illegal, war survivors, victims and their dependents, were the focus of several 
associations related to the former Anti-Japanese Army and the Malayan Communist Party, 
such as the Pan-Malayan Women’s Federation and the Singapore Women’s Mutual Aid 
Association of Victims' Families. Malay and Muslim women were also especially active in 
responding to their brethren’s needs. In 1947, Che Zahara binte Noor Mohamed formed the 
Malay Women’s Welfare Association, the first Malay organization to focus exclusively on 
women. The association began with the simple aim of soliciting donations to maintain a place 
of shelter for orphans, widows, and destitute and impoverished Malay women, later 
expanding its services to meet their educational, social, and professional needs.107 In 1952, 
Khatijun Nissa Siraj, along with other Muslim women, formed the Young Women’s Muslim 
Association (also known today as the Persatuan Permudi Islam Singapura or PPIS).108 Its 
main objective was to establish a family court to protect Muslim women and children from 
errant husbands and fathers.109 In the same year, against the backdrop of polygamy, spousal 
abuse, and exploitation, a group of women led by Shirin Fodzer, Che Zahara and others, 
formally inaugurated the Singapore Council of Women. Throughout the 1950s, council 
members advocated legislative change to protect the rights of women in marriage and in 
society, efforts that eventually culminated in the passing of the Women’s Charter in 1961.110  
                                                          
106 Originally known War Relief Services (an agency of the National in 1943, it officially became the Catholic 
Relief Services in 1955, helping to distribute US aid internationally. A brief history is available online at 
Catholic Relief Services History, http://www.crs.org/about/history/. Accessed 3 July 2015. A detailed study of 
the work of a Catholic charitable organization can be found in Lau Sun Leong. “The society of Saint Vincent de 
Paul in Singapore: a study of the social welfare services provided by a Roman Catholic charitable organization” 
(Unpublished academic exercise - Dept. of Social Studies, University of Malaya, 1959).  
107 See also The Straits Times, 16 October 1950, “Women Say: Abolish Child Marriage”. 
108 NAS OHC, Mohamed Siraj (Mrs) @ Khatijun Nissa Siraj. Women Through the Years: Economic & Family 
Lives. Accession No. 001663. Interviewed in 1995 and 1996. Reels 16, 17, and 18 (of 36). 
109 Calls for a Muslim court came about in the wake of the Maria Hertogh unrest in 1950. Early plans did not 
come to fruition. A bill was drafted in 1955 and was passed in 1957 with the passing of the Muslim Ordinance. 
Judith Djamour, The Muslim matrimonial court in Singapore (London: University of London, Athlone Press, 
1966). See also The Straits Times, 12 February 1955, “Women want a voice in war on divorce”, and The Straits 
Times, 7 September 1955, “A Voice for Muslim Women”. 
110 The genesis of the SCW took place in the year before in 1951. See Chew, “The Singapore Council of Women 
and the Women's Movement”. 
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The history of Singapore’s postwar women’s movement has been developed 
elsewhere. What is relevant here is how the emergence of women organizations highlighted 
deeper structural issues within Singapore society that lay outside the immediate scope of the 
Social Welfare Department. The Straits Times’ feature articles on children in Singapore and 
Malaya mentioned above had a clear objective. The graphic descriptions of overcrowding, 
disease, physical abuse, child trafficking and the spread of other illicit activities were 
precursors to the formation of a new Singapore Children’s Society in April 1952.111 Formed 
to counter and to raise awareness about child abuse and neglect, the society was one of the 
first social service agencies in Singapore to actively use casework to inquire into the needs of 
a family so as to help their children.112 Within a year of its inception, the society secured 
financial support from the Lee Foundation to sponsor the study of professional social work.113 
In 1953, it hired one of earliest professional social workers in Singapore (the first by a 
voluntary organization), an Ethel Barbara Kinna (nee Paglar), who had trained in London and 
Sydney previously. 
The genesis of the Singapore Children Society did provoke a small controversy that 
unfolded in letters to The Straits Times. Banker Tan Chin Tuan questioned the wisdom of 
creating a society that potentially duplicated work already done by the Social Welfare 
Department.114 The response was fast and furious, the salient point being that officialdom was 
limited by what they knew (or what was reported to them), whereas the “general public could 
see more”, and hence theoretically could respond more effectively.115 The clash in views 
raised a point about the place of the Social Welfare Department in postwar Singapore. The 
Singapore Children’s Society was welcomed by the Social Welfare Department, with 
promises of cooperation.116 In doing so, the latter also implicitly recognized its limits in 
carrying out welfare work, at least from its vantage point. In fact, the encouragement, 
                                                          
111 One of the initial names suggested was the Society of Prevention of Cruelty to Children. See The Straits 
Times, 5 February 1952, “Society to protect the children”, 25 February 1952, “End Cruelty to Children Aim”, 
and 26 February 1952, “70 Could Not Agree on a Name”. Eventually agreed on organization name in April: The 
Straits Times, 17 April 1952, “Children's Society”. 
112 For an overview of her activities, see The Straits Times, 16 October 1952, “These 12 will investigate child 
welfare”; 2 April 1954, “Her job: to help poor families”; 6 April 1954, “Children's Society is tackling the 
problem”; 19 August 1954, “Uproar can't halt her work of mercy” 
113 The Straits Times, 18 October 1953, “University Girl Gets Bursary”. 
114 The Straits Times, 9 February 1952, “Mr. Tan Chin Tuan and The Children”. 
115 The Straits Times, 14 February 1952, “Case of The Adopted Child”, and 16 February 1952, “Thinking about 
the Colony's children”. 
116 The Singapore Free Press, 29 December 1951, “Department Welcomes Welfare Move”, and The Straits 
Times, 18 April 1952, “Children's Society: Social Welfare Will Co-operate”. The then Secretary for Social 
Welfare offered the new organization a desk in its offices to be in touch with the Women and Children’s section. 
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deliberate or otherwise, of voluntary work had always been an underlying objective of the 
Department. Situated within the wider representation of interests of the Singapore Council of 
Social Service, the Social Welfare Department was merely one of many in a community 
actively working to right social wrongs, and in doing so, began to cultivate some sense of 
ownership and responsibility for a broader purpose. This movement was not necessarily 
Singaporean or Malayan in its essence. But in stepping forward to take some form of 
ownership over social issues, the foundations of a community began to be formed. 
 
Unintended Outcomes: Child Nutrition to Family Planning 
 
This sense of taking responsibility was prevalent in the formation of the Singapore 
Family Planning Association in 1949. Its history reflected more than a mere narrative of 
plugging gaps left by the Social Welfare Department. The establishment of the Association 
has roots in the child feeding scheme that was introduced by the Singapore Executive and 
then managed by the Social Welfare Department. Moreover, if the Social Welfare Council’s 
transition to the Singapore Council of Social Service was partly the result of state policy, the 
Family Planning Association was an unintended outcome of a state policy to address child 
malnutrition.  
 
The Child Feeding Scheme 
 
The child feeding scheme, created under the auspices of the Singapore Executive, had 
the ambitious objective of providing all children at least one nutritious meal per day. But it 
started off and remained small. The child feeding sub-committee survived the demise of the 
Singapore Executive. Led by W. J. Vickers, former chair of the Singapore Executive and the 
civil government’s Director for Medical Services, the committee made plans to ensure the 
scheme continued under civil government. The scheme covered three main age-groups, 
infants under two years of age, children between two and six years, and school-going children 
of six years and above. The Education Department was responsible for the third group, while 
the first two groups had come under the Municipal Health Department. In June 1946, the 
committee recommended the new Social Welfare Department be responsible for children of 
school-going age as well as those who could not be fed anymore by the Municipal Infant 
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Welfare Service, referring to children over two years of age.117 The Secretary for Social 
Welfare rebuffed this initial attempt to share responsibility. McNeice communicated, through 
the Colonial Secretary, rather tersely that “at [that early] stage of [the Social Welfare 
Department’s] development it has the work it can cope with”.118 He also gave instructions to 
his deputy, Hughes, to avoid accepting any “major commitments” on this matter during 
committee meetings. The committee then attempted to persuade the Municipal 
Commissioners to take up the scheme, building on the Municipal Health Department’s Infant 
Welfare Services’ earlier experiences in child feeding.119 But the Municipal Commissioners 
begged off, citing insufficient physical space in their two infant welfare clinics (for a 
potential 3,000 meals per day), the absence of staff and organization to operate the scheme on 
top of the clinic’s regular duties.120 
In view of this setback, McNeice, possibly at the urging of Hughes, agreed to assume 
responsibility of the feeding of children between two and six years of age. In September 
1946, The committee made available roughly $120,000 for the Social Welfare Department to 
start off the scheme for the remaining four months of 1946, riding on the on-going communal 
feeding program then. But uncertainty over government approval of funds delayed the 
opening of the first child feeding center in November 1946.121 The government eventually 
undertook to provide $360,000 for the whole of 1947 to provide free meals to about 40,000 
children.122 This amount was still not enough to cover all children (within designated age-
group) in Singapore, and hence it was decided to give priority to children of families 
receiving financial relief from the Social Welfare Department. Even then, money for staff and 
other organizational needs were only one part of the equation. Physical sites also had to be 
located and procured, staff recruited to run the centers and manage the children. It was only 
on 2 January 1947 that the scheme began in the child crèches in Victoria Street and New 
Market Road. Child feeding centers on new premises could only open later in the month.123  
 
                                                          
117 NAS, BMA HQSD 432/45. 20 June 1946. 
118 NAS, BMA HQSD 432/45. 12 July 1946. 
119 For a brief background, see Lee Y. K., “The origins of the municipal health department, Singapore”, in 
Singapore medical journal, 09/1977, Volume 18, Issue 3. For the municipal health department’s activities, see 
also Brenda Yeoh, Contesting Space, Lenore Manderson, Sickness and the State; and The Straits Times, 22 July 
1937, “Babies Born in Cubicles”. 
120 NAS, BMA HQSD 432/45. 28 August 1946. 
121 The Straits Times, 23 November 1946, “Lack of Money for Child Feeding Plan”. See also The Singapore 
Free Press, 27 November 1946, “Baby in a Dust Bin”.   
122 The Second Report, p. 33. Also announced in The Singapore Free Press, 30 December 1946, “New Feeding 
Scheme Starts Jan. 2”. 
123 NAS, BMA HQSD 432/45. 30 December1946. 
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Once it started going however, the scheme expanded quickly. By February, nine 
additional centers were opened. By the end of the year, twenty-three were operational, 
serving a total of 810,000 meals for a daily average of some 4,000 meals for the whole 
year.124 Meals were cooked at a central kitchen located at the General Hospital, and then 
distributed to the centers or via mobile canteens. Here, the advantages of an agency capable 
of large-scale feeding operations compared to a committee with well-intended goals but 
diverse priorities and little operational power. Despite some common ground in the health and 
general well-being of children, the Medical and Education Departments were structured for 
different objectives and hence had different work processes.125 The feeding program for 
school-going children were discontinued in 1947, with the Education Department deciding to 
leverage on the Social Welfare Department’s child feeding program instead.126 The Medical 
Department on the other hand, with Vickers providing a connection to the early child feeding 
experiments, continued to provide nutritional and medical expertise for the child feeding 
program. Moreover, as the incidence of tuberculosis among children increased from 1947, the 
Medical Department became more proactive.127 In 1949, a small feeding program was created 
for a limited number of children diagnosed with tuberculosis.128  
Money, similar to food, was tight and the postwar rehabilitation of Singapore was 
costly, particularly with the creation of new government departments and services.129 On the 
other hand, the tried and tested machinery the Social Welfare Department had built up for its 
communal feeding program was easily expanded to include child feeding quickly and more 
efficiently. A Singapore Free Press correspondent described the scene at a child feeding 
center, located behind an infant welfare clinic at Prinsep Street: 
 
At nine o'clock in the morning children began gathering outside the gates of 
the Centre. At 9.30 the gates are opened by a burly Sikh who lets the children 
run into the Centre in small groups. The rest of the children play outside or 
pacify their smaller brothers and sisters until their turn comes to file into the 
                                                          
124 The Second Report, p. 36. 
125 The Singapore Free Press, 17 July 1946, “Mr Attlee Ordered Free Meals for S'pore”. 
126 Annual Report / Department of Education, Colony of Singapore (Singapore: The Department). [EDAR] for 
1947, p. 60, and EDAR for 1949, p. 97. School-going children did not benefit directly from the Social Welfare 
Department’s feeding programs. See The Singapore Free Press, 10 December 1946, “Money Before Food”. 
127 MDAR for 1947, pp. 22-23, 49-50.  
128 MDAR for 1949, pp. 59-60. The same report observed that by 1949 the rationale for child feeding had 
changed from the earlier need to alleviate hunger and address malnutrition (and disease) to feeding for higher 
health standards. See MDAR for 1949, pp. 65. 
129 Towards the end of 1946, the heavy expenditure by the government, particularly on new government 
departments and services, was criticized by a member of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce. The Straits 
Times, 6 September 1946 “Heavy Expenditure Criticised – Cost of New Singapore Departments”. See also 
various newspaper articles from September to December 1946 on the advent of the income tax in Singapore. 
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weighing room. Each child is weighed at regular intervals before going into 
the dining room and the records are sent to Dr. Oliveiro, head of the Nutrition 
Unit of the King Edward VII College of Medicine. After being weighed the 
children file past a window where their cards are endorsed for each meal and 
they are each given a metal disc entitling them to one meal. Once they have 
passed the window, all their orderly quietness deserts them – they race down 
the passage shouting to their friends and pushing to get ahead of one another at 
the serving counter. The metal disc drop into a mug and they pick up their 
mess tins and mugs and make straight for the table they chose to sit at.130 
 
The meal of the day was rice, greens, salmon, and some gravy. The lady correspondent also 
observed that the “Centre is something of a social club for these small children. They walk 
between the tables wondering with whom they will sit and the older children chat and laugh 
as they shovel food into the babies' mouths”.131 She emphasized the cleanliness of the center, 
the orderliness of the whole process, and expressed surprise at how well-behaved the children 
were. The imagery of order and cleanliness, meticulous planning, the presence of science, and 
a volunteer spirit, were all critical tools against malnutrition and child poverty. Each meal 
was scientifically “prepared according to the specifications provided by the Professor of Bio-
Chemistry of the College of Medicine”.132 That usually translated to a plate of rice, ikan bilis 
(anchovies, usually fried), green vegetables, eggs, and some meat or fish if available, plus 
milk and fresh fruit.133 The children’s health was monitored regularly. All centers were visited 
by a team of two female medical doctors. From a sample of about 4,000 children examined 
upon joining the scheme in 1947, the vast majority were found to be underweight and in poor 
physical condition. Almost all of them suffered from more than one ailment, including 
decayed teeth, swollen gums and anemia.134 A similar survey the following year in 1948 
showed slight improvement in addressing malnutrition, but more success in improving the 
general physical condition of each child.135 
Health problems were only the tip of a larger social problem. The lady correspondent 
also observed how several elder siblings managed to eat half, if not all, of their younger 
                                                          
130 The Singapore Free Press, 3 February 1947, “S'pore's Children Get Fed”. 
131 The Singapore Free Press, 3 February 1947, “S'pore's Children Get Fed”. 
132 The Second Report, p. 34. Each meal should ideally supply “the daily requirements of Vitamin A and Iron, 
3/4 of the Riboflavin requirement, a little less than 1/2 of the Thiamin (B1) and about 1/3 of the daily 
requirements of Protein, Calcium, and Vitamin C”.  
133 The Second Report, p. 34. The specifications given were: 1 oz. lightly milled rice, 1 oz. kachang hijau (green 
peas), 1 oz. fresh ikan bilis (salted tiny fish), 1 oz. green leaf vegetable, 1/4 oz. of oil (containing Red Palm Oil), 
and 1/6 oz. of salt. Every child was also provided with 5 fluid ounces of milk and 3-4 ounces of fresh fruit daily. 
134 The Second Report, p. 37. Two medical doctors volunteered their services full-time: Dr. (Mrs.) Gladys Hu 
and Dr. (Mrs.) Helen Wodak. 
135 The Third Report, p. 7. 
235 
 
 
 
siblings' meals. Lady McNeice (nee Loke Yuen Peng), wife of Percy McNeice and a 
volunteer at the Mount Erskine feeding center, recalled “the older brothers and sisters used to 
come along the centers and look longingly at what was being done for the younger 
children”.136 There were incidents reported of older children becoming unruly and causing 
disturbances at certain feeding centers after being denied entry and a meal.137 Even the term 
“centers” is a little misleading. The majority of the feeding “centers” were usually no more 
than gathering points, such as the courtyard or a shed within the premises of someone’s 
home. The larger centers were usually extensions of existing structures such as schools, 
clinics, and a former motor workshop. In 1947, there were four “static” centers, which 
increased to sixteen at the end of 1948. Limited funds meant that only children found to be 
malnourished and from families receiving financial relief or found to be in dire straits were 
given the meal. Even then, only one child from those families was eligible. Limited resources 
also meant that the feeding and managing of roughly two hundred children per center rested 
heavily on volunteers. 
The rapid expansion of the child feeding scheme, in the face of such obstacles, was 
mainly due to a group of volunteers. The volunteers were predominantly female and hailed 
from different communities.138 The core group, which was eventually organized into a semi-
official voluntary workers’ association, was made up of the spouses of British government 
officials (which included the Governor and Colonial Secretary of Singapore) and the elite of 
Singapore society. It was initially led by Lady Dorothy Gimson, wife of the Governor of 
Singapore. Volunteers also came from other sections of Singapore society. Chinese groups 
came forward offering physical premises, usually part of a school, to help with child feeding. 
The Singapore Chinese Women’s Association operated a feeding center at No. 51 Armenian 
Street (next to the present day Substation and Peranakan Museum).139 The Singapore branch 
of the Women’s Federation, a 3,000-strong organization by mid-1947, opened a feeding 
                                                          
136 Born in 1917 in Kuala Lumpur, Lady McNeice was the youngest daughter of Loke Yew, a prominent 
businessman and philanthropist in Singapore and Malaya, and the sister of Loke Wan Tho, founder of Cathay 
Organization. She married McNeice in 1947, and took a keen interest in Singapore’s nature conservation and 
social life. She died in 2012 in Singapore. NAS OHC, Lady Yuen-Peng McNeice. Pioneers of Singapore, 
Accession Number 000190. Interviewed in 1982. Reel 4 (of 4). 
137 NAS, SCA 5/47. Paper No. 3C “Children’s Meal’s and Children’s Clubs”. The Second Report (p. 21) cited 
disturbances by unruly children at some of the centers. Other volunteers recalled the children not attending 
schools and “running all over the road”, (NAS OHC, Gnanasundram Thevathasan, reel 15), and some thought 
they were like “wild animals” (Huston quoting Constance Goh Kok Kee in Motherhood by Choice, p. 59). 
138 The Third Report, p. 4. “About 200 women of all races in Singapore: Chinese, Malay, Indian, Eurasian, Arab, 
Russian, Filippino [sic], American, French, Welsh, Irish, Scots, English, Swedish, Czech, Dutch, Persian....”  
139 The Singapore Free Press, 11 September 1947, “Another Child Feeding Centre”. 
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center on the school premises in Ching Guan village, located off Thomson Road,140 and the 
Singapore Women’s Mutual Aid Association of Victims' Families similarly used part of the 
premises of Yook Yin School at Sims Avenue.141 Members of the Malay community also 
stepped forward, opening up to seven feeding centers that were usually located within their 
home compounds.142 The presence of the volunteers introduced a dynamic that was not easily 
managed by the Social Welfare Department. For instance, two of the Chinese women 
associations were affiliated with the former Anti-Japanese Army and/or the Malayan 
Communist Party. In June 1948, the Yook Yin School at Sims Avenue was in danger of 
“disintegration” after its leaders fled (probably as a result of the Emergency), leaving the 
women’s organization and the feeding center in disarray. The Social Welfare and Education 
Departments were forced to step in to ensure the feeding center and the school continued 
running for the time being.143 
There were more positive outcomes. Unburdened by government bureaucracy and the 
need to adhere to state policy, the core group of lady volunteers proactively adjusted the 
approach in the child feeding centers and to the child feeding policy itself. In mid-1947, some 
feeding centers were already incorporating additional activities to keep the children occupied. 
They provided lessons in Chinese, English, Malay, sewing, knitting, carpentry, laundry-work, 
book-binding, arithmetic, physical training, simple hygiene and first aid.144 Volunteers at 
certain centers even installed shower baths and raised funds for new clothes. By then, there 
was sufficient pressure on the government to release more funds for additional cooked meals 
for children outside the original target group.145 In 1948, the change was made official, and 
                                                          
140 The Singapore Women’s Federation opened a center next to a Chinese school it was running in Ching Guan 
village (off Thomson Road) (The Straits Times, 16 July 1947, “Feeding Centre”). See also The Straits Times, 24 
June 1947, “War Has Changed S'pore Women”. 
141  The Straits Times, 9 August 1947, “Feeding Centre”. The association was set up to support the dependents 
and children of war victims, and had interest in the war crimes trials. 
142 There were at least seven centers ran by the Malay community. See The Singapore Free Press, 23 October 
1947, “Volunteers Run Feeding Centres”. Three of these centers were identified specifically. See The Straits 
Times, 19 April 1947, “Geylang Children Get Free Meals” (center in Geylang Serai); 2 July 1947, “Children's 
Centre Opened” (center at junction of Buona Vista and West Coast Roads); 6 July 1947, “New Child Feeding 
Centre at Geylang” (center at Lorong 33, Geylang). For additional information on Geylang Serai center, see The 
Singapore Free Press, 25 June 1947, “Malays flock to feeding centre”. The center was located in the home of 
Ungku Fatimah binte Tungku Abdullah, the granddaughter of “Sultan Ali of Singapore”. Most likely meant 
Sultan Ali of Johor, a descendant of Temenggong Ibrahim. This center was closed in May 1949. (NAS, SCA 
4/49. 13 May 1949). 
143 NAS, SCA 6/48. 10 September 1948. 
144 The Singapore Free Press, 23 October 1947, “Volunteers Run Feeding Centres”. See also NAS, SCA 5/47. 
Paper No. 3C “Children’s Meal’s and Children’s Clubs” 
145 Up to 25% of registered children at each center. See The Singapore Free Press, 5 July 1947, “Singapore's 
Child Problem”. See also NAS, SCA 5/47. Secretary for Social Welfare to Colonial Secretary, 30 May 1947. 
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all feeding centers became known as Children Social Centres.146 Rather than the Social 
Welfare Department, it was Lady Gimson and her fellow lady volunteers who initiated the 
change. In fact, most if not all of the additional center activities were supported by fund-
raisers organized by the volunteers. Mrs. Gnanasundram Thevathsan was a volunteer at the 
Mount Erskine feeding center, located behind Maxwell market.147 She recalled: 
 
We used to collect these children from this roadside or children who played in 
the streets. Because soon after the war, schools were just beginning to open. 
Those who were educated, who could afford, sent them to school, whereas all 
these children from the village, from poorer home, they just spent their time in 
the streets. So we collected these children and gave them one good meal a day 
and taught them a little bit of English, Maths, handwork, things like that.148 
 
Not knowing a word of Chinese, she had to innovate ways to communicate to the children 
using physical objects and sign language.149 She also described the general situation of the 
children and their families: 
 
Because [the parents] were already finding it so hard to feed these children. 
They had to go and work, both mother and father. When the mother, father go 
and work outside, the children are left on the road. Some met in accident, 
some got into bad habits, some started stealing, joining groups to steal and that 
kind of things.150 
 
The Singapore Family Planning Association 
 
The daily sight of large numbers of hungry, malnourished children, and the inability to 
feed and care for every single one of them made a fundamental impact. Confronted with 
poverty and its implications on a daily basis, volunteers began doing more than just feeding 
children. Mrs. Thevathasan also recalled got together with other volunteers to give 
“scholarships” to some of the children to attend a “good proper school”. Soon, some even 
begun thinking beyond fund-raising for club activities, additional meals, and education needs, 
                                                          
146 Announced at a Social Welfare Council meeting, and publicly in 1948. NAS, SCA 6/48. 16 November 1948. 
147 Born in Ceylon in 1920, Mrs. Gnanasundram Thevathasan arrived in Singapore with her doctor-husband in 
1940. She became active in social and community work after the war, partly because of her participation in 
activities organized by Wesley Methodist Church. She was made a Justice of the Peace, and was active in the 
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to tackling the root causes of the poverty they see every day. Lady McNeice traced the 
catalyst for change to the feeding centers: 
 
When these older children were also brought in, I think, some of us women 
voluntary workers realized that something had to be done about limiting the 
families. And that, you know, quality was better than quantity. And so, that 
started the idea of family planning.151 
 
A dedicated approach to family planning began in early 1949. In February, a Municipal 
Health Officer spoke out, stating that there was a “crying need for scientific family planning”. 
In the course of her work, Dr. Maggie Lim encountered dozens of mothers seeking help at the 
Municipal welfare clinics, including a “38-year-old Chinese woman who had had 18 
pregnancies, and labourers’ wives with families of six or seven children whom they could not 
afford to feed or clothe adequately”.152 Her daughter recalled her mother encountering “[t]ime 
and again, women drained by childbirth or poverty [begging] her to buy the newborn infant 
they could not hope to support. Over and again she faced the consequences of botched 
abortions”.153 In April, her colleague, Dr. Mary Tan, warned of numerous “families in 
Singapore ... who were infecting their babies with such dreaded disease as syphilis, and 
others who were handing down diseases like insanity, haemophelia [sic] and idiocy”. She saw 
such types of children “every day” and highlighted the “hundreds of poor Singapore 
mothers ... who were driven on the verge of desperation and exhaustion by the bearing of 
children every year”.154 The following month in May, McNeice made public his support for 
family planning, based on the Social Welfare Department’s daily dealings with cases of child 
malnutrition, juvenile delinquency, family irresponsibility and neglect.155  
The Municipal lady doctors had been involved in the original version of the child 
feeding scheme during the British Military Administration. As they held official positions in 
                                                          
151 NAS OHC, Lady McNeice, reel 4. 
152 The Straits Times, 23 February 1949, "Crying Need for Family Planning". A direct descendant of Tan Tock 
Seng, Maggie Lim (nee Tan) (b. 1913) was the first schoolgirl in Singapore to win the Queen’s Scholarship in 
1930. She returned to Singapore in 1940 to work as a public health officer. She was camp doctor to the Endau 
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from http://www.swhf.sg/the-inductees/18-health/153-maggie-lim. Accessed 5 July 2015. 
153 Quoted in June Lee, “Rooted in Service: Legacies of a Family of Old Rafflesians”, in Rafflesian Times, 15 
August 2013. https://rafflesiantimes.wordpress.com/2013/08/15/rooted-in-service-legacies-of-a-family-of-old-
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154 The Straits Times, 5 April 1949, “Call for Birth Control Will Not Break Up Marriages”. Talk was delivered 
by Dr. Mary Tan. 
155 The Singapore Free Press, 26 April 1949, “Many Parents Don't Care” 
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the Municipality, their very public comments sparked off a controversy that played out in 
public, stoked even more with a proposed bill to allow family planning advice at services at 
Municipal welfare clinics. The build up to the debate was fiery. Representing the Roman 
Catholic Church, the Bishop of Malacca spoke out, pressuring Municipal Commissioners 
who were Catholic.156 The Catholic Young Men’s Association also held a special rally to 
speak out against the bill.157 The Progressive Party, the party in control of the Municipal 
Commission, lifted the whip, which was a good thing too as its members were split along 
religious lines.158Support for the bill was generally based on social and economic 
considerations, such as overcrowded housing, physical hardships, and disease. Opposition 
was based on religious and moral grounds. One of those against was Yap Pheng Geck, who 
opposed the bill on the basis that family planning was “an intimately personal matter beyond 
the pale of central authority.... There should be no official advocacy of it”.159 Yap’s arguments 
were interesting as they seemingly contradict his earlier support for state involvement in 
social welfare. On 27 May 1949, after a three-hour heated debate, in front of a packed gallery 
(that was mostly women), the bill was eventually passed, with twelve commissioners 
supporting, ten against, and three abstaining.160 Still, there were limits imposed. Family 
planning advice was made available at three of the five Municipal clinics, but only once a 
week for a couple of hours.161  
A parallel plan was however gaining momentum. At a public talk on 16 May 1949, in 
front of a women-dominated audience, McNeice (supposedly in his personal capacity) 
proposed a family planning association.162 There was no immediate action taken after, 
perhaps waiting to see the outcome of the Municipal Commission debate. Incidentally, in 
June, a royal commission in Britain recommended family planning advice should be a duty of 
the National Health Service.163 The Singapore Family Planning Association was officially 
inaugurated on 22 July 1949. McNeice was elected as President, and the wife of the Colonial 
Secretary installed as Patron.164 Progress was slow as the new voluntary organization relied 
                                                          
156 The Singapore Free Press, 9 May 1949, “Freedom to Choose”, and The Straits Times, 7 May 1949, “Clinics 
for The Married”. 
157 The Straits Times, 26 May 1949, “600 Listen to Case Against Birth Control”. 
158 The Singapore Free Press, 9 May 1949, “Freedom to Choose”. 
159 The Straits Times, 20 May 1949, Improper Subject' In Public; The Straits Times, 28 May 1949, “Majority 
Vote for Birth Control”.  
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161 The Singapore Free Press, 3 November 1949, “Family planning: 3 new clinics”. 
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163 The Straits Times, 21 June 1949, “Royal Commission Recommends Family Planning for Britain”. 
164 The Straits Times, 23 July 1949, “Family Planning Assn. Formed”. 
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almost exclusively on support from the public, and a token annual grant from the 
government. Four family planning clinics were opened at the end of 1949, in addition to the 
three Municipal clinics already offering family planning advice. 
There had been little public discussion of family planning in Singapore before 
1949.165 But it had been on the boil since volunteers started helping out at the various child 
feeding centers in 1947. Behind this seemingly sudden outburst was a group of lady 
volunteers led by Constance Goh Kok Kee (nee Wee Sai Poh), the principal volunteer at the 
first child feeding center at Havelock Road.166 A close friend remembered Sai Poh as a person 
who was “absolutely outspoken, absolutely determined that large families were bad for 
mothers, who were unhealthy due to frequent pregnancies; bad for the children because there 
were too many of them and not enough money to go around.... She had a sense of social 
rightness”.167 Sai Poh had the imagination to go along with her gumption. She was one of 
several volunteers who enabled the first child feeding center at Havelock Road to open in 
January 1947. To raise funds to feed an additional fifty children who did not qualify for the 
feeding scheme, she and a fellow volunteer organized a “mahjong party” which raised 
$4,000.168 Before long, the Havelock Road center, housed in a former motor workshop, even 
had a laundry, toilets and showers for the children. 
Just as she was responsible for opening the first child feeding center, Sai Poh opened 
the first Association clinic in November 1949, on the premises of her doctor-husband’s clinic 
along South Bridge Road.169 McNeice might have been founding President, but Sai Poh was 
the significant figure behind the scenes. McNeice candidly recalled: 
 
[I]t was Mrs. Goh Kok Kee who approached me with some other women to 
start a family planning association. I ... frankly it wasn't my own idea and it 
wasn't anything that I was particularly interested in at all.... She was the person 
                                                          
165 See Saw Swee Hock, Population Policies and Programmes in Singapore (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2005), p. 7. 
166 Born in Xiamen, China, in 1906, Constance Wee Sai Poh moved to Singapore in 1918. Raised a 
Presbyterian, she furthered her education in Shanghai Baptist College in 1924, taking an assorted mix of social 
science courses. Those courses exposed her, via home and factory visits, to the industrial exploitation and urban 
poverty of very young girls working in silk factories. After five semesters, she returned to Singapore, along with 
her new name “Constance”, and trained to be a teacher, eventually qualifying in 1930. She married Dr. Goh Kok 
Kee, a health officer in the colonial government, in 1932 in Penang. They spent the remainder of the 1930s in 
Kuantan, Pahang, until the Japanese invasion forced them to retreat to Singapore seeking refuge. Information 
taken from Zhou Mei, The Life of Family Planning Pioneer, Constance Goh: A Point of Light (Singapore: 
Graham Brash, 1996), and Perdita Huston, Motherhood by Choice: Pioneers in Women's Health and Family 
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169 The Straits Times, 5 November 1949, “First FPA Clinic Is Opened”. On that day, the clinic only had one lady 
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who talked me into it, yes…. She said that we needed somebody who was in 
an official position to start this off. And she said it wasn't easy to get a 
government officer who would be prepared to take the responsibility of 
holding this meeting. I don't think it was a great responsibility but she still 
think that it was. Anyway it was she who persuaded me to hold this meeting 
and that was how the whole thing started.170 
 
In Sai Poh’s own words, echoing the thoughts of her fellow volunteers: “Children were 
running wild; if parents could not feed those they already had, how could they add more to 
the family?”171 In the course of her work at the child feeding center, Sai Poh witnessed first-
hand starving children, most riddled with disease, their siblings whom the volunteers were 
unable to feed all, and their desperate mothers. “It was seeing all the poverty of those post-
war months that convinced us that something had to be done about family planning…. 
Family planning was…to allow women to space and limit the size of their families”.172 The 
problems confronting the new voluntary organization were deeply entrenched. Lady McNeice 
spoke of her helplessness when encountering certain cases: 
 
I must say that in coming into contact with these women and hearing about 
their problems, one felt extremely sorry for them; that one couldn't help them. 
Those who already had, say ten or twelve children, one couldn't help them, 
when they came to us and they were already pregnant and about to have 
another child, one couldn't help them not to have that child. It was not our 
policy to encourage abortion. And in those days, no woman could be sterilized 
until she had had seven children. The doctors couldn't do it and were not 
allowed to do it.173 
 
The need for family planning was clear to Mrs. Thevathasan from her experiences at 
the child feeding center. Her impression was blunt and to the point: “And people were just 
breeding. Chinese families, Indian families, they have so many children in one family, they 
can’t afford to feed or cloth [or] send them to school”.174 She recollected the hopelessness of 
certain situations encountered: 
 
I used to meet these young girls and the men. One moment you see her 
expecting, and the next moment you see her with the baby. And after a year 
and soon after, she’s carrying again. And I used to tell her, “How can you  
 
 
                                                          
170 NAS OHC, Percy McNeice, reel 15. McNeice was quoted more pithily by Sai Poh’s biographer: “She bullied 
me into it”. Zhou, Constance Goh, p. 142. 
171 Huston, Motherhood by Choice, p. 59. 
172 Huston, Motherhood by Choice, p. 60. 
173 NAS OHC, Lady McNeice, reel 4. 
174 NAS OHC, Thevathasan, reel 16.  
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expect another child?” She said, “What to do” she would say…. Sometimes,  
the women did not want the additional children, and asked for abortion 
options.175 
 
She could only advise against abortion as the mother might lose her life and her children 
would be vulnerable as a result.  
It was not easy for the new Association. It did have tacit support from the colonial 
government, primarily in the form of annual monetary grants. The running of the association 
was heavily reliant on volunteers in the early years, hence its outreach was limited by the 
time volunteers could put in.176 Opposition came from all sections of society, such as religion, 
husbands, some mothers, and parents, and sometimes even in the least expected places. In 
1950, the Association opened a clinic in Kandang Kerbau Hospital, a significant moment as it 
was the main maternity and children’s hospital in Singapore.177 However, Lady McNeice 
recalled some of the hospital nurses actively working against them.178 McNeice commented 
that the “nurses who were Roman Catholic were advised by the priests to ... they mustn't 
assist in anyway and in fact if they were asked to assist in anyway, they must refuse on moral 
ground”.179 
The Roman Catholic Church was the Association’s most vocal opposition. Sai Poh 
recalled, with some mirth, how a priest apparently condemned Sai Poh to hell, about “twice a 
month”.180 Maggie Lim, as a result of her volunteering her medical expertise at the 
association clinics, was also condemned to hell for “... wickedness in interfering with nature”, 
and stood “accused of corrupting the young and scheming to depopulate the earth”.181 
Members of the Association worked hard and smart. Sai Poh recalled apportioning to her 
comrades the task of reading the main religious texts, so as to defend and fortify the family 
planning movement against religious opposition.182 Moreover, every year when the budget (in 
                                                          
175 NAS OHC, Thevathasan, reel 16. 
176 Funny anecdote of a volunteer nurse leaving halfway “in the midst of inserting a cap” to make another 
appointment. Sai Poh had to don gloves, put on a brave face, and completed the messy procedure she had 
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Service at K.K. Hospital”. 
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181 Quoted in Lee, “Rooted in Service: Legacies of a Family of Old Rafflesians”. Accessed 5 July 2015.  
182 Zhou, Constance Goh, pp. 134-135, and Huston, Motherhood by Choice, p. 60.  
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which a grant for the Association was provided) for the colony came up for debate, there was 
no guarantee that the annual grant would continue. Lady McNeice recalled having “to lobby 
the Legislative Councilors … to either support us when this matter was brought up in 
Council, or, at least, to abstain from voting against us”.183 That the annual grants increased to 
a high of $120,000 in 1958 was a testament to the association’s efforts.184 The grants also 
indicated official recognition of a colony-wide problem with social, economic and political 
implications. By the late 1950s however, lobbying efforts, coupled with the increasing 
awareness of the implications of unchecked population growth on Singapore’s economy and 
society, began to change official and religious minds.185 
It is interesting to read that publicity efforts by the association had to done on the 
quiet so as to avoid too strident a backlash.186 This could have referred mainly to the initial 
stages, when information about clinics were done by word of mouth (due to illiteracy), and 
the volunteers were still feeling their way around. Sai Poh observed during the early days: 
 
The news spread by word of mouth. Few women could read. And we dared not 
say too much: we never had any publicity because if it was known we would 
be accused of trying to thrust something at other women, having nothing to do, 
or trying to get jobs. That was the attitude of the men, the public. So we 
worked quietly undercover. It caught on gradually. We wanted to create the 
climate for government to accept us, for people to think that we were doing 
good things for others.187 
 
However, after the first family planning clinics were established, a cursory scan of 
The Singapore Free Press and The Straits Times issues showed an increasingly vocal 
organization, either announcing new clinics, their opening hours, appealing for volunteers 
and donations, or responding to public jibes. The Association also disseminated information 
through printed materials, though there is not much information on circulation numbers.188 
                                                          
183 NAS OHC, Lady McNeice, reel 4. 
184 Saw, Population policies, Table 2.1, p. 11. 
185 The 1957 and 1958 annual FPA reports included respectively short articles by Goh Keng Swee (Director for 
Social Welfare), and Francis Thomas (Labour Front’s Minister for Communication and Works), both of which 
pointed out the problems of Singapore’s high population growth rate. The 1958 FPA annual report also included 
messages of goodwill and support from the Anglican Church, the Methodist Church, and the Chief Kathi of 
Singapore (representing the Islamic faith). Annual reports, publicity materials, and correspondence can be found 
in the NAS under the Public Relations Office (microfilm no. PRO 11, file reference 419/54: Family Planning 
Association, Singapore), and under the Wellcome Library collection (SA/FPA/A21/19 and SA/FPA/A21/28: 
Singapore Family Planning Association). The NUS Central and Medical Libraries have the reports from 1960. 
186 The impression was given in Mark R. Frost and Yu-Mei Balasingamchow, Singapore: A Biography, p. 337. 
187 Huston, Motherhood by Choice, p. 61. 
188 In Constance Goh (pp. 149-150), Zhou Mei describes two examples of publicity materials, one an actual 
demonstration kit on how to insert the cap properly, and another an illustrated booklet entitled A Dream That 
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Presumably such materials would have been personally given to women attending the clinics. 
As more women visited the clinics, most times in secret, the Association shared more 
desperate stories. A contributor to The Straits Times challenged those who disparaged the new 
organization: 
 
Let those who oppose birth control step over to one of the F.P.A. Clinics in 
Singapore and see for themselves. They will see young mothers with six to 10 
children, and older mothers with 12 to 20 children, who are already 
grandmothers but are still giving birth to unwanted babies, simply because 
they can see no way out. Their pathetic stories would surely change the minds 
of the birth control opponents.189 
 
Sai Poh was especially vocal when she was President between 1950 and 1951. She did not 
hold back when describing situations women found themselves in: 
 
In one of the other clinics where similar assistance is available, a woman who 
had had 22 pregnancies begged the doctors “to do something to stop it all”. 
She had 20 children. Her husband was unemployed.190 
 
About three-quarters of the 650 babies born in Singapore each week are born 
to women who live in the cubicles of Chinatown – the poorest class and the 
one least able to feed, clothe and educate large families…. It is pathetic to see 
how grateful the women are to be taught. If only we had known about it earlier 
is their constant cry.191 
 
She also took aim at polygamy, decrying the “custom in Singapore of keeping two families 
running at the same time….” She shared one case where a forty-one-year-old woman, who 
has had seventeen children, found out her husband took on a younger wife – even though he 
was incapable of supporting his existing family.192 Husbands were one primary source of 
resistance. Sai Poh recalled an irate husband tossing out the contraceptive apparatus his wife 
had earlier obtained, and of another “particularly off-hand” husband who reassured his wife – 
mother of eight children – that additional children could be given away. There was 
precedence, as the latter couple had already given two away.193 Such resistance was deeply 
entrenched in social and cultural norms, and hence difficult to eradicate overnight. Sai Poh 
bitingly summed up men’s general attitude: 
                                                          
Can Come True?!, available in English and Chinese first, and later Tamil. The latter can be seen in the 
Wellcome Library collection in the NAS. 
189 The Straits Times, 10 December 1949, “And this is what a woman thinks”. 
190 The Singapore Free Press, 3 May 1950, “Desperate' Mothers Seek Aid”. 
191 The Straits Times, 20 June 1951, “These Women Are Grateful”. 
192 The Singapore Free Press, 27 May 1950, “Polygamy is a Problem”. 
193 The Singapore Free Press, 27 May 1950, “Polygamy is a Problem”. 
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It was very difficult to persuade men to use condoms. Most men thought only 
of their own pleasure. They thought their fun might be spoiled, their health 
injured. The worship of ancestors influenced their attitudes as well. You must 
have sons to provide for you in the after-life and to carry on the family name, 
to serve you. The daughters get married and go away. It is the sons who 
remain and if you don’t have sons you must try again and again. Many times 
their wives had to come to us in secret.194  
 
The Family Planning Association was not alone in its fight for better family planning 
and birth control. In 1951, Kathleen Hickley’s feature articles laid bare, in graphic detail, the 
more extreme social consequences of the inability to support large families: 
 
It is because parents are vainly trying to support too large a family on too little 
money. Ah Meng’s mother would not have let her baby go if she had been the 
second child born to her. Lee Song would have had a better chance of 
throwing off tubercular germs if this parents had been able to provide better 
nourishment for him.195  
 
She was not alone. Charles Gamba, an economist in the University of Malaya, wrote in 
support of Hickley’s scathing exposé and to defend her against naysayers. Gamba highlighted 
an underlying absence of pride, and by relation, a lack of ownership and will to improve 
Singapore society. The Family Planning Association was not the only organization slowed by 
a lackadaisical attitude: 
 
SATA fights for existence and must rely on mere pittances, FPA is short of 
funds, hospitals are overcrowded yet the last Budget vetoed additions, school 
building has been cut down, Social welfare workers must ‘walk’ their rounds 
from one end of Singapore to the other, cubicle life does not bear describing, 
the price of rice has been allowed to go up regardless of the effect on the lower 
income group, ‘tea’ or key money is still being extorted, the rent racket is in 
full swing, prostitutes of fourteen years of age are common and there is an 
approximate incidence of congenital VD in babies at the rate of 120 per annum 
(12 per 100,000 of population. The rate in England and Wales (1947) being 
only 0.8).196 
 
By then, the child feeding scheme, and its original rationale of providing a meal per 
day for each child (ideally), had been eviscerated by cost-cutting. In 1948, child feeding 
centers became social centers, taking into account a broader range of activities on top of 
                                                          
194 Huston, Motherhood by Choice, p. 61.  
195 The Straits Times, 16 December 1951, “This is One Answer to a Great Problem”. 
196 The Straits Times, 23 December 1951, Sunday Times Postbag [By Charles Gamba, Dept. of Economics, 
University of Malaya] 
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feeding and nutrition. In the same year, there was a discernible drop in the number of children 
below school age attending the centers, from over 750,000 to just below 500,000. On the 
other hand, the number of children aged seven and above did increase as the primary 
rationale of the child feeding scheme shifted. It should be noted too that in August 1948, the 
Social Welfare Department ceased its communal feeding program, leaving only one central 
kitchen to continue supporting the children centers and other institutions in need of food.197 
Volunteers were also difficult to come by. The more active volunteers were the spouses of the 
British colonial officials, but as the latter were periodically transferred, the core group of lady 
volunteers was also diluted. The number of feeding centers was quietly reduced from a high 
of twenty-four to about sixteen by the end of 1948.198 
The Social Welfare Department’s report for 1948 started off with a passionate defense 
of the scheme.199 This was likely in response to subtle opposition to the concept of child 
feeding by the state. As early as September 1947, a query was raised during a Social Welfare 
Council meeting about food wastage in the feeding centers.200 Similar queries were again 
raised in 1948 by the same individual, but now more clearly positing that child feeding 
should be the responsibility of parents, and “not of the Government”.201 Even the 
Commissioner for Labour thought a permanent child feeding scheme, along with other 
“attractive” social welfare features, would not be in Singapore’s best interests.202 
The penny finally dropped in November 1949. The Legislative Council approved 
funding that only allowed the scheme to continue operations for six months in 1950 and at the 
same time requested a committee to look into the viability of the scheme.203 Public response, 
in the form of “wild speculation and accusations” that the decision was taken to avoid 
increasing taxes, was apparently bothersome enough for a Legislative Councilor to urge the 
                                                          
197 Meals were also provided to children in five orphanages and two creches. NAS, SCA 179/50. Report of the 
Committee to Investigate the Child Feeding Scheme, p. 3. 
198 The Third Report, p. 9.  
199 The Third Report, pp. 6-8. The report hinted at (but did not elaborate on) criticisms of the child feeding 
scheme: “He is certainly a short-sighted individual who attempts to decry an efficient and well-conducted 
feeding scheme because it does not produce spectacular results”. The report was published in 1949. 
200 NAS, SCA 5/47. 19 September 1947. 
201 NAS, SCA 6/48. 13 February 1948. Yap Pheng Geck defended the scheme, while Constance Goh, present on 
the Council as a representative of the YWCA, invited the inquirer to visit her Havelock Road feeding center. 
202 NAS, SCA 6/48. 16 November 1948. Related, Gomez, when asked why he did not want to return to Kerala, 
India, cited the better (and free) services he had in Singapore. Coelho, “Old man on public assistance”, p. 56. 
203 The Straits Times, 16 November 1949, “Axe May Fall on Feeding Schemes”. The Legislative Council also 
made inquiries into the Five-Year Plan, with a view to “make economies” in the proposed $750,000 building 
projects for homes, approved school and the rural settlement. See The Straits Times, 20 December 1949, 
“Scotching a Rumour”. 
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committee be convened as soon as possible.204 The committee was given its terms of 
reference in March 1950, and completed its inquiry in July.205 While acknowledging the 
health and social benefits of the scheme thus far, the committee’s report gives the impression 
it was tasked not to inquire into the scheme’s validity, but to make economies as and where 
possible. Appendices to the report focused exclusively on cost savings. Costing eight cents 
per meal, compared to the previous fifteen cents per cooked meal, the new version was 
unmistakably much cheaper. The concept of providing a free nutritious meal a day to children 
was quietly adjusted to a supplementary feeding scheme. The former was deliberately 
designed to provide a third of a child’s daily nutrition requirements, while the latter merely 
supplemented the family’s daily diet.206 In place of a cooked meal, a “snack” was to be 
provided, in the form of a yeast biscuit, fruits and a cocoa-mix drink. Claims the new “snack” 
was more nutritious were moreover not substantiated, at least not in the detail as the earlier 
meal had been.207  
The timing of the cost-cutting measure coincided with the establishment of the Family 
Planning Association. It also came at the tail-end of a public controversy over birth control 
and state involvement in personal affairs. It would not have been difficult to connect the key 
advocates of the association and their ties to the child feeding centers. Did opponents of the 
Family Planning Association attack it through the child feeding scheme? Possible, but there 
were other mitigating circumstances. In 1949, the Singapore government was attempting to 
reduce a deficit without necessarily increasing taxes.208 By then, the year-old Malayan 
Emergency was also beginning to stretch the resources of the British government, limiting its 
capabilities to send aid.209 Indeed, Britain’s own economy was severely weakened by the war 
and postwar recovery costs, leading to the devaluation of the British pound in 1949. That had 
ramifications for its colonial territories. The child feeding scheme was not the only social 
welfare project to come into the cost-cutter’s radar. Capital projects from the Social Welfare 
                                                          
204 The Singapore Free Press, 14 December 1949, “'Wild Talk' About Child Feeding”. 
205 NAS, SCA 179/50. Report of the Committee to Investigate the Child Feeding Scheme. 
206 The Straits Times, 14 September 1950, “Welfare Snacks Will Continue”.  
207 The section on child feeding and the children’s clubs in the SWDAR for 1950 was relatively subdued 
compared to earlier reports for 1947 and 1948. There were no details of the nutritional value of the new snack. 
208 The Singapore Free Press, 15 November 1949, “No Increase in Singapore Taxation”. 
209 Harper, The End of Empire, p. 200. Citing earlier studies, Harper observed the cost of fighting the 
Emergency peaked in 1953 at $250-$270 million (Malayan dollars), not including another $100 million spent on 
police and military forces and an additional $30 million spent by the tin industry protecting itself. At the end of 
1948, the Emergency cost between $250,000 and $300,000 per day. It cost the Malayan government an 
estimated $93 million for the whole of 1949. See Richard Stubbs, Counter-Insurgency and The Economic 
Factor: The Impact of the Korean War Prices Boom on the Malayan Emergency (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), p. 7. 
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Department’s Five-Year Plan, such as new buildings for an approved school, a girl’s home 
and a rural settlement, were also being studied with a view to reduce costs.210 
The Family Planning Association met a pressing social need from its inception, 
particularly throughout the 1950s and early 1960s when state presence in this very personal 
matter was relatively absent. As the sole agency dedicated to family planning and birth 
control in postwar Singapore (until 1966), the Family Planning Association was responsible 
for arresting and reducing Singapore’s fertility rate from 1958.211 The strains of running a 
voluntary organization took its toll, as resources were stretched to the limits. In 1957 and 
1958, McNeice, re-elected as President, made appeals to government to take over the family 
planning clinics and to be more directly involved in a task that had far-reaching implications 
for Singapore’s society and economy.212 The Labour Front government (1955-1959) did not 
acquiesce, though its Education Minister was fully aware of the astronomical costs in 
building more schools and hiring more teachers if something was not done to arrest the 
fertility rate.213 The People’s Action Party government was more receptive, acknowledging in 
its 1959 manifesto its support for family planning.214  
But despite official patronage of the Association (including then Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew opening an international family planning conference in 1963), it was not until 
1966 that an official population policy was adopted. A Singapore Family Planning and 
Population Board was created and public campaigns to limit family size began. For McNeice, 
the benefits of state involvement in family planning were clear: “… [B]ecause as a volunteer 
organization, we could never do things that government had done… [And] once government 
took it over, they were able to put in anything that they like and run the clinics wherever they 
like.215 The Family Planning Association did, with the colonial government’s blessing, open a 
clinic in Kandang Kerbau Hospital as early as 1950. But the underlying sentiment of 
McNeice’s recollections is clear. Government could, and eventually did, execute policy on a 
much broader scale compared to a voluntary organization with limited resources. 
                                                          
210 Long-term plans for expanding education and medical facilities were also similarly frustrated by cost-cutting 
measures. See various annual reports for Education and Medical Departments. 
211 In 1966, the PAP government took over all FPA clinics, and about 90% of the FPA’s work. Saw, Population 
Policy, Table 8.1, p. 115, and pp. 20-21. 
212 The Singapore Free Press, 10 May 1958, “Heading for Disaster”, and The Straits Times, 6 September 1958, 
“Birth Control: A Task for The Govt.”, and FPA annual reports quoted in Saw, Population Policy, pp. 11-12. 
213 The Straits Times, 16 December 1958, “Education: A $975 Million Bill in 10 Years If...”. See also The 
Singapore Free Press, 16 December 1958, “Chew: Where is Money Coming from?” The Legislative Assembly 
was debating the continuation of the annual grant to the FPA. 
214 A strong connection between the two was the late Kwa Geok Choo, wife of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first 
Prime Minister, was Vice-President of the FPA in 1960.  
215 NAS OHC, Percy McNeice, reel 15. 
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The first organization of its kind in Singapore and Southeast Asia, the Family 
Planning Association was a regional and international leader. In 1952, the Family Planning 
Association became a founding member of the International Planned Parenthood Federation 
(IPPF), with Singapore acting as the base for its Southeast Asia Regional Headquarters. It 
acted as a guide and mentor for similar association from around Southeast Asia, hosting visits 
and educational workshops for sister branches.216 McNeice felt the Association was ahead of 
its time. He shared an anecdote that illustrated a striking difference between Singapore and 
England: 
 
One of the interesting things about it is this: when I went on leave one year…, 
I was asked if I would go and visit the family planning center in England.... 
And we drove around and I couldn't find this place. I had the address, alright; I 
mean simply couldn't find this place…. And afterwards I asked the people who 
ran this place, why it was that I couldn't find it. And he said, “Oh well, we 
don't have the sign out you know, it is really hush-hush. We don't advertise 
this!” Well, at this time in Singapore we were putting our signs anywhere. And 
we weren't ashamed of what we were doing at all. But even in England at that 
time, family planning was something you couldn't really talk about too 
loudly.217  
 
Lady McNeice was likewise surprised to hear that family planning was illegal in certain 
states in a supposedly “very liberal and free democracy like the United States (where women 
had so much freedom) ....”218 From here, it can be tempting to use the Family Planning 
Association and its work as an example of false dichotomies between East and West, or 
between metropole and colony, or even as some form of “history from below” or “people’s 
history”. Those approaches do, without doubt, have merit. But in applying them, they should 
not dilute the historical circumstances that led to establishment of the Family Planning 
Association in the first place. The impetus came, innocently enough, from a state policy to 
tackle malnutrition by providing a nutritious meal per day to children in need. It began with 
volunteers and Social Welfare Department officials making do with what they had, in a 
disused motor workshop along Havelock Road, courtyards and sheds in private homes in 
Arab Street, Geylang Serai and Bouna Vista, and spaces in schools and clinics at Prinsep 
Street, Thomson Road and Sims Avenue. It was a movement that emerged from daily contact 
with poverty, disease, neglect and wretched despair, such as: 
                                                          
216 NAS OHC, Percy McNeice, reel 15. 
217 NAS OHC, Percy McNeice, reel 15. 
218 NAS OHC, Lady McNeice, reel 4. She was recounting a conversation with Margaret Sanger, the American 
pioneer activist for birth control, when the latter visited Singapore. 
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Ah Ping ... [who] cannot remember a mother, and his father died last year. At 
eight years old he was living on the streets - sleeping on the five-foot ways, 
begging a meal where he could. No one seemed to want Ah Ping, dirty, wild-
eyed little vagrant, and fast learning to be a petty thief.219 
 
The inability to feed all children imbued in several volunteers a strong sense of mission to 
address the fundamental cause of social problems, that is having more children than the 
means to care for them. The movement was then driven and kept alive by the imagination of 
the volunteers, and at times by their sheer cheek and willpower (particularly from Sai Poh).220 
Hickley had lamented the absence of a sense of civic responsibility (in relation to preventing 
child cruelty): 
 
I mentioned last week the crying need for a Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children. At the moment this is “nobody’s business”. It was also 
nobody’s business in Britain until some-one made it his business, and last year 
more than 10,000 people voluntarily sought help from the N.S.P.C.C. It is the 
public who need help in these matters, and in the last resort it is up to the 
public to help themselves.221 
 
The initial rationale for a child nutrition policy was clear and straightforward. The 
complicating variable was the presence of lady volunteers who were willing to take action to 
redress social ills. Simply put, Sai Poh and her fellow volunteers made family planning their 
business. 
 
A Social Welfare State... Independence and beyond 
 
This chapter has explored some of the impact of an official presence in social welfare 
in late colonial Singapore. It outlines the uneven effects of policy implementation and in 
doing so, illustrates the limits of a top-down policy. The Social Welfare Council did not meet 
the objectives laid down in the wartime policy directive. It was on the whole inert, stifled 
partly by individual goals and overshadowed partly by a new Social Welfare Department. 
Hence, efforts to introduce a less state-involved social service organization were initially 
frustrating. But the pay-off was perhaps worth it, as the new Singapore Council of Social 
                                                          
219 The Straits Times, 1 April 1948, “3,000 Free Meals a Day”. By Susan Scott Skirving. Ah Ping was accepted 
into one of the child centers, and reportedly more adjusted after a couple of weeks. 
220 Sai Poh was officially recognized for her efforts. She was awarded the MBE in 1951, became Honorary 
Secretary / Regional Chairman of the Far East and Australian Region in 1959 (till 1969), and was named Patron 
of the IPPF in 1977. She died in 1996, and was inducted in the Singapore Women’s Hall of Fame in 2014. 
221 The Straits Times, 16 December 1951, “This is one answer to a great problem”. 
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Service represented better and more accurately the breadth and depth of social service 
agencies in Singapore. It was moreover proactive in advancing social services for the long 
term and meeting short-term emergency needs.  
At the other end of the policymaking spectrum was the Family Planning Association. 
An unintended outcome of a child nutrition policy, the Association was established 
predominantly through the will of a few lady volunteers, driven by their firsthand experiences 
with child poverty. Its development did not require much direction from the state, though tacit 
official support (via annual grants) ensured legitimacy for the new organization during its 
early years. Finally, to properly implement the social welfare policy and the work it entailed, 
trained social workers were required. Initially, the Colonial Development and Welfare fund 
and other scholarships helped sent promising locals overseas for professional studies. The 
need for social workers with a familiarity with local conditions, coupled with the movement 
towards self-government, gave additional impetus for a local social work school.  
The successors of these three institutions are still part of a social welfare state in 
contemporary Singapore, as the National Council of Social Service (renamed in 1992), the 
Singapore Planned Parenthood Association (renamed in 1986) and the Department of Social 
Work (established as a stand-alone university department in 2006 after several changes in 
scope and nomenclature since 1966). Including the Social Welfare Department, each in their 
own way buttressed the newly independent republic after 9 August 1965. The circumstances 
surrounding political separation heightened feelings of economic and social vulnerability, 
particularly so when colonial-era social problems, such as high population growth, 
inadequate social and economic infrastructure, and internal ethnic strife, remained unresolved 
at the time of independence. But at least the institutions, structures, and work processes of the 
social welfare state were in place and fully functional, staffed and maintained by a diverse 
group of individuals.
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CHAPTER 6. A BIOGRAPHY OF STATE-BUILDING 
  
A social welfare state, defined by the institutions, structures, and work processes that 
provide and support social services, had been established by the time of independence, and 
continued thereafter. A change in identity from Malaysian to Singaporean did not 
fundamentally affect social needs whenever one was sick, got injured, became unemployed, 
or grew old. The development of the social welfare state in Singapore was unavoidably 
affected by the layered processes of decolonization and political change. But ultimately, their 
histories moved to rhythms underpinned by deeper lying social structures that are the 
evolving individual and family needs at various life stages. Such histories are more than 
narratives of social policy or even social histories of need. They are necessary precursors to a 
thorough historical examination of the transformation of Singapore society, from a transient 
society with diverse loyalties, to one that (ideally) shares the responsibility for the well-being 
of all in the community.  
Still, written histories sometimes have the unintended effect of smoothening rough 
edges, particularly if the historian’s attention had been drawn more to moments and 
personalities pre-identified as “significant”. One such rough edge in establishing a social 
welfare department, and social welfare as part of government work, was the need for staff, 
preferably those with experience and knowledge of welfare work. This was in many ways a 
big ask in the years immediately following the return of the British. Social welfare was a new 
government function. In the context of traditional government functions and the immediate 
needs of rehabilitation, the new addition meant a further division of revenue and resources. 
Moreover, where could one find staff members with the requisite expertise and experience to 
help the social welfare department carry out its functions? 
Many who joined the Social Welfare Department or the almoner’s service had no 
prior experience of social welfare work, and had little inkling of what “social welfare” meant 
– other than rendering assistance during times of need. The early staff of the Social Welfare 
Department was a hotchpotch of personalities and experience. Percy McNeice and Tom 
Cromwell (and most of the other expatriates) were colonial administrative officers, trained 
primarily to handle Chinese affairs. Several were from prewar government departments, like 
Goh Keng Swee, Woon Wah Siang, and Monie Sundram who were from the War Tax 
Department. (Before that, Goh was a tutor in Raffles College, while the other two were 
teachers). Others came from varied backgrounds. Toh Mah Keong was a surveyor-
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draughtsman with the Shell Company before he joined the Social Welfare Department in 
early 1949 as a youth club leader. Peggy Chen was a middle-class housewife in need of 
distraction from domestic woes when her friend encouraged her to apply for a position in the 
Women and Girls section in late 1949. In the same year, Chia Cheong Fook gave up a 
stenographer position (and higher pay) to become a public assistance investigator. There were 
also the fresh school and university graduates. After completing her studies at Paya Lebar 
Methodist Girls’ School, Janet Yee joined the Social Welfare Department as an assistant 
youth officer in 1955 (after her father forbade her to join the police force). The almoner’s 
service started mostly with fresh university graduates, like Daisy Vaithilingam and Cecilia 
Nayar.1  
 
Starting from Scratch 
 
Children’s Homes 
 
Tan Beng Neo was one of the few who had substantive experiences in welfare work. 
She was a trained midwife, and worked for the Salvation Army in various capacities, but 
primarily managing children and young girls at the Oxley Road home. During the war and 
occupation, she continued looking after her wards, first at Oxley Road, and then at the former 
Po Leung Kuk premises in York Hill. Beng Neo remained there until she moved to Malacca, 
before returning to Singapore to work as a nurse in the Japanese-ran Kandang Kerbau 
Hospital. Hence, after the war, she was an invaluable resource in building up an official social 
welfare presence. When the People’s Restaurants were opened in June 1946, she assisted in 
coordinating the operations of restaurants located in Chinatown and the city area. Beng Neo 
explained: 
 
So you needed somebody to sort of organize... you know, to get the crowd to 
queue in an orderly way and that they are being served as quickly as possible. 
Before 12 o'clock I used to go round on my bicycle and go around and see 
how the food was.... Occasionally I tasted a bit to see if they're all right.2 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Information extracted from oral histories and relevant publications. 
2 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 17. See reel 16 for details of her work in the People’s Restaurants. 
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Beng Neo joined the Social Welfare Department officially in September 1947 (at 
thirty-three years of age). Her first position was assistant matron at the Girls' Homecraft 
Centre at Queen Street (initially called Nantina Home). She remembered: 
 
Half the day I was there in the morning. I had the little ones. I had to teach 
them, looked after them, cleaned them up sometimes. And in the afternoon, 2 
o'clock, I had to go to the main office and did investigation work.3  
 
As envisioned by the Singapore Executive, the center symbolized a new approach to the 
rehabilitation of women and young girls at risk (such as orphans, victims of abuse etc.), by 
separating them from known prostitutes to avoid the perceived bad influence of the former – 
who were initially accommodated in Pasir Panjang Girls’ Home. When asked about the type 
of girls in Nantina, Beng Neo recalled a particular family with four girls: 
 
Well, there was a family of four …. Yes, four children, all girls. Mother just 
went mental, no trace of father or anything whatsoever. One little girl, she was 
about three at the most. She wet her pants. I had to clean her up, changed her 
pants, cleaned her up and so on. 
 
She also recalled that the oldest one was about “seven or eight” and she would try to teach 
them the alphabet and a little music. Beng Neo’s recollections outlined in stark terms the very 
basic, rudimental facilities available at the center during its first year of operation:  
 
There wasn't even a blackboard or chairs or anything. So they used to sit on 
the sort of platform. You see, Nantina used to be a sort of Japanese hotel or 
something. So they had those types of platforms which very useful. They 
didn't have to sit on the bare floor. So they sat on this platform with me... The 
little ones would sit on my lap. I used to give them a bit of love and cuddle 
and things like that. And I just looked after them as if they belonged to me, as 
if I was their auntie or mother. 
 
In December 1947, Beng Neo was asked to take over the former Overseas Chinese 
Orphanage at Upper Wilkie Road (off Selegie Road).4 Renamed Mount Emily Boys’ Home, it  
 
                                                          
3 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 17. 
4 The orphanage, initially started by Mrs. Lim Boon Keng and financed by Mr. Aw Boon Haw immediately after 
the Japanese occupation, housed children who lost their fathers during the war and whose mothers were unable 
to adequately care for them. In 1947, the management of the home requested the Social Welfare Department to 
take over “control and running of the Home”, primary reason being the inability to continue financing the home. 
(On this matter, see NAS, SCA 5/47 for discussions during Social Welfare Council meetings and CSO 952/49 
for a background brief before the government took over). In 1953, the home moved to Pasir Panjang, into what 
was originally the holiday bungalow of the Sultan of Perak. It was renamed Perak House Home for Boys. Taken 
from information brochure in NAS, PRO 309/54. 
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had just over a hundred children between the ages of six and fifteen. When she was 
interviewed some forty years after, Beng Neo could still vividly recall that the place was: 
 
[F]ilthy, stinks like a zoo. The children, little boys of six and seven had lice on 
their heads. The bugs were crawling up the walls. They had scabies, red eyes, 
and chicken pox all in one go. There was a teacher who had two adopted 
children. But I don't think they were paid at all. Because she just went out to 
some other work to earn a bit of money, but lived there. 
 
Beng Neo took over a chaotic situation at Mount Emily Home, a consequence of insufficient 
donations in the immediate post-war situation. The residential staff [was] looking after their 
own children and hence the other children were neglected. “And there wasn't any food. Two 
jars of salt, that's all I found in that Home”. The Social Welfare Department supplied extra 
food rations prepared for the child feeding centers, but those were for children from two to 
six years old while Beng Neo had “boys of ten, eleven and twelve, they needed a lot of food. 
So I managed to persuade the parents to bring their rice ration. And every day I cooked a 
huge pot of rice and I got a lot of dehydrated soup mix and boiled these great, big pots....”5 
 Beng Neo remembered “the first year when I landed there, there was no money. There 
was no vote [allocated budget] for that Home”. Here, her wartime experiences in scrounging 
and making do with limited resources came in handy. From December 1947 to December 
1948, she had to essentially work with what was available. Mount Emily Boys’ Home 
benefited from the communal feeding schemes, receiving food from the central kitchens. 
Canvas for temporary shelters supplied by the Red Cross was promptly bartered for 
equipment and other materials more urgently needed by the home, such as sewing machines 
and unbleached calico for clothing. The physical structure of the building moreover had to be 
cleaned and refurbished. With some help from the Fire Brigade (fetching water from a nearby 
hydrant), Beng Neo and the children scrubbed the building clean. There were other issues. 
There was only one light; the wirings in and around the building were exposed in poor 
condition, which was a tempting source of adventure for bored children. A particularly 
mischievous Shanghainese boy found a switch with faulty wiring that gave users a mild 
electric shock. He incited a six-year old boy to touch it and the latter came away with a shock 
and a red mark across his chest. Beng Neo punished the older boy with two smacks of a ping-
pong bat on his backside.6 
                                                          
5 A child could be defined as an orphan if s/he had lost a parent or was abandoned by both parents.  
6 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 17. 
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 Beng Neo found opportunities in adversity. She organized the children into work 
parties as part of their in-house education. She taught the older boys to sew and make 
clothing with the materials and sewing machines obtained through barter. The boys were also 
sorted into groups for cooking and maintenance around the home. She enlisted help from the 
general public, such as staff from a nearby swimming pool to teach swimming, and a scout to 
start up a Scouts Troop. Two girls from the Pasir Panjang Girl's Home were enlisted to come 
to the Home to cook. She also organized a sale of work during Christmas to raise funds, 
getting the boys to use the spare Red Cross canvas to make shopping bags and handles. A 
daily schedule was mapped out, providing some elementary lessons, a duty roster of house 
chores and sufficient playtime. Older boys were encouraged to find outside employment, and 
came back to the Home after work for food and sleep. As there were few other full-time 
departmental staff in the beginning, Beng Neo lived in the Home and became the boys' 
surrogate mother. She took her position very seriously, once to the point of confronting one of 
her former charges for cheating on his wife, long after he left the home and was a working 
adult. 
 Beng Neo worked in Mount Emily from 1947 to December 1949, before moving on 
to York Hill Home. Before the war, York Hill housed the Po Leung Kuk, the home for 
rescued juvenile prostitutes. During the British Military Administration, it was used to house 
transients and the destitute. In 1948, the Girls’ Homecraft Centre at Nantina was relocated to 
York Hill. Staff shortages meant that she had to act for a time as the matron for both Mount 
Emily and York Hill Homes until December 1949, when she took sole charge of the latter. 
The Girls' Homecraft Centre at York Hill went beyond its initial objectives of being a 
rudimentary trade school for girls at risk of falling into “moral danger”. It became a 
residential home for girls from infancy to school-going age, and was considerably larger than 
Mount Emily Boys' Home. Beng Neo recalled that while she made do with a couple of 
assistants at Mount Emily, York Hill had a staff of “about ten, myself, my assistance, one 
House Mistress, three instructors and four amahs”.7 When she took over, York Hill was home 
for nearly two hundred females, including twenty babies in a nursery, a mix of orphans, abuse 
victims, petty criminals or those from troubled families. 
Beng Neo divided them into two broad groups, one school-going and the other 
designated as “Home girls”. The latter were mostly “overage girls, they were all in all sorts of 
trouble, sometimes involved with men. Some were even pregnant. I had every type except 
                                                          
7 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 19. 
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juvenile prostitutes.... So, sometimes they would run away from home. Sometimes they were 
ill-treated. You should see some of them with marks all over their body, legs and ... 
[everywhere]. They had been bashed about. But some had been very naughty, had to run 
away, involved with men. And a few might even be theft cases”. The “Home girls” also 
followed a time-table, oft-times in the educational format originally envisaged by the 
Singapore Executive. The girls learned sewing and embroidery work to make clothing “for 
the younger ones”. They were also involved in the preparation of meals “for the rest of the 
Home and cooking for the nursery children”. Essentially, they were learning to take care of 
infants and younger children residing in York Hill. 
Beng Neo had to deal with similar financial restrictions at York Hill as at Mount 
Emily. To make sure the girls were not cooped up on the Home premises all the time, she 
organized:  
 
[A] lot of outings because you can’t keep children in all the time without ... 
seeing the outside world. It’s not good for them. So I tried to ... take them out 
as much as I could or as much as the Department could afford to give me the 
transport ... because they didn’t give you any extra for food or anything when 
you take them out.... So every now and then, even when I was on leave, I 
would have a bill when I came back. My staff would say, “We bought so many 
chickens and so many this and so many that”. So I used to pay out of my 
pocket.8  
 
The girls would leave York Hill if they found work upon completion of school or if they 
married. Beng Neo recalled that sometimes she had to “persuade” the Department to give a 
“dowry” for the orphaned girls, about “$75”, which she would then use to bring the girl 
shopping:  
 
A pair of shoes, a pair of slippers, a comb, a hair brush, hair oil, a toothbrush 
and toothpaste, a pair of scissors, powder, lipstick, Eau de Cologne, talcum 
powder, a mug, a basin, two pieces of scented soap, two suits of pyjamas, 
three sets of underclothing, three to six dresses, six handkerchiefs and a little 
sort of suitcase to put all the things in. So that she goes out, at least she has a 
certain amount of decent things to start life with.9 
 
Beng Neo was describing a situation where an orphaned girl had no one else to turn to except 
the State, as represented by the Home and the Social Welfare Department. The items 
described above are just about the bare essentials one reasonably expects a person to possess, 
                                                          
8 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 19 
9 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 19 
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or at least the resources to possess them. In retrospect, it is difficult to even conceive of the 
type of life these desperately destitute and abandoned girls would have faced had it not been 
for the Home. 
The situation was something Peggy Chen soon experienced as an investigator with the 
Women and Girls Section from 1949 to 1951. The Social Welfare Department was 
empowered by the Women and Girls Protection Ordinance to detain girls under the age of 
eighteen years. Department staff would accompany police during anti-vice raids on brothels 
or other sites suspected of having juvenile prostitutes. Chen remembered that she was initially 
shocked by the idea of selling one’s body or a person to make ends meet. She helped rescue 
girls and young women – some as young as thirteen – from makeshift cubicle brothels in the 
depths of Chinatown shop-houses.10 Like the little girl Ah Meng seen in Chapter 4, they were 
mostly sold off by impoverished parents, “purchased” and then put to work by pimps who 
were predominantly old Cantonese women. The old women were not necessarily malicious or 
evil, but they themselves might have had little to no social support in their old age.11 
The reach and protection of York Hill Home had its limits. For some girls who left 
York Hill, their lives did not immediately get better despite Beng Neo’s best efforts. She 
remembered a girl repeatedly abused by her husband despite warning signs before marriage. 
Another girl was adopted but returned “beaten up and half-starved”.12 At the wedding of one 
of her girls, Beng Neo recalled “shutting up” several female relatives of the groom after 
hearing their snide comments – because her natural mother could or did not make the effort to 
ensure her daughter was presentable on her wedding day. The stigma of an institutional home 
was omnipresent and left Beng Neo with a feeling of helplessness. She noted that people did 
not “understand that the Home is for training” and received girls who had an assortment of 
problems.13 One particularly poignant story was of a ten or eleven-year old girl who came to 
York Hill because her father was dead and her mother was hospitalized with tuberculosis.  
 
And I used to take her to the hospital to see the mother. I even left the address 
and all that but the hospital never inform us when the mother died. It was, I 
think, a couple of months or when I took the girl back to the hospital that we 
found that she was dead and already buried. And I had to console the girl….14 
 
                                                          
10 NAS OHC, Peggy Chen. Women through the Years: Economic & Family Lives. Accession Number 003052. 
Interviewed in 2006. Reels 4 and 5 (of 5). 
11 NAS OHC, Peggy Chen, reel 4. 
12 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 20. 
13 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 19. 
14 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 19. 
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The presence of Beng Neo was a boon to a fledgling social welfare department badly 
in need of trained staff to execute its designated functions. When she joined in late 1947, she 
had already close to two decades of experience working for the Salvation Army. She was able 
to work independently, not needing much hand-holding or guidance, even during a crisis.15 
She was not the only former Salvation Army staff to join the Social Welfare Department. She 
recalled that a change in the leadership within the Salvation Army, in particular the departure 
of Herbert Lord, led to a mini walk-out straight into the Social Welfare Department, staffing 
positions for probation and home administration.16 
In March 1951, Beng Neo was sent to England on a UNICEF scholarship for further 
education and training. By then, she had given the Social Welfare Department about four 
years’ worth of much needed knowledge, expertise as well as initiative. Beng Neo thought 
that she could have left for England much earlier, “but you know there was so much they 
couldn't get the staff and to run the Home....You see, staff was not easy to get in those days”. 
At one stage, she was even managing two homes simultaneously. She recalled: “Usually, 
most of the staff that helped the Social Welfare [Department] really came from the Salvation 
Army. You see there was nothing, nobody was trained. Nobody was able to do the work. And 
to get somebody to take over my job was quite ... you know, a task”. She suggested in her 
oral interview that 
 
[T]he jobs that [the Social Welfare Department] started did not seem to 
progress until the Salvation Army officers joined them. And they were very 
glad to have us. Because you see, when I got in, they would just leave you and 
gave you the job and nobody bothered to come and see you. They might come 
and say, “Hello! How are you getting on?” and that's about all.17 
 
Boys’ Clubs 
 
Beng Neo was not the only one to experience the hands-off approach. Others, with 
even less experience, remembered a similar situation when they joined the Social Welfare 
Department. In 1949, twenty-seven-year-old Toh Mah Keong had just returned from Brunei 
                                                          
15 One of which was the Maria Hertogh case. Maria Hertogh spent just over three months at York Hill under Tan 
Beng Neo’s supervision, Reels 20 and 21. In his interview (reel 16), McNeice thought the wife of an assistant 
secretary in the Department had gotten information as to Nadra’s whereabouts, resulting in a photo being 
published of an ostensibly Muslim girl kneeling before a statute of the Virgin Mary. T. Eames Hughes was then 
the Secretary for Social Welfare and published an account of the incident in Tangled Worlds: The Story of 
Maria Hertogh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1980). 
16 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 21 
17 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 21 
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after working for Shell. He wanted to remain in Singapore to be close to his family. A friend 
of a friend was working in the Social Welfare Department, and so happened to be looking for 
someone to start up a Boys’ Club. Mah Keong's job interview was noteworthy for its 
arbitrariness:  
 
Mr. MacCormack had a look at me. Then he … went away and came back 
[with] two medicine balls, a very heavy type of ball.... He threw one of the 
balls at me and on reflex action, I received the ball and that action sort of 
proved to him that I think this man can work. I don't know what he meant 
because as he sat down he says, “Well, you have proved yourself and you can 
get this job”.18  
 
Mah Keong was then introduced to Carl de Souza, a local-born Eurasian who had just 
returned from his studies in London to oversee the youth clubs.19 Even so, Mah Keong was 
not aware of what he was supposed to do or the nature of his job, and only had de Souza's 
vague reassurance that they will work together and “find their way around”. De Souza then 
brought him to an “old dilapidated house or bungalow” along Prince Edward Road (behind 
Connell House, on the site of the present-day Temasek Tower). Mah Keong recalled that 
“there were no windows to this house. There was only one tap and doors”. De Souza posted 
Mah Keong there, because it was a “Hokkien area” and the latter could speak Hokkien, with 
the following instructions, “Now, what we do with you is this. I supplied you with a lot of 
sporting equipment. The idea is to get hold of children or young boys initially, get the boys 
first and try and teach them some kind of sports or some kind of games and then keep them 
busy....” Mah Keong went to a storeroom and collected “a lot of footballs and basketballs and 
carom boards”, brought them back to the club house and wondered how to get boys 
interested.20 He likened his approach to the Pied Piper of Hamelin:  
 
So I went round and saw some boys in that area. They were playing cards in 
the streets. But I brought a ball with me. That time perhaps as I said, there 
were very few sporting shops available. When a group of boys sees a ball, that 
was a rubberized basketball, they said “where you get it?” I said, “If you want 
                                                          
18 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong. Special Project. Accession Number 000001. Interviewed in 1979, Reel 4 (of 
10). Charles MacCormack arrived in Singapore with the British Military Administration, and worked in the 
Refugees and Displaced Persons Section. 
19 Carl Francis de Souza (b. 1919) was among the first staff members of the Social Welfare Department, and one 
of the first to be sent overseas for further education. After his studies, de Souza worked in various sections of 
the Department. See The Straits Times, 6 May 1951, “A young man who is going places”. He was also in the 
prewar Straits Settlement Volunteer Corps, and survived incarceration as a prisoner-of-war (including a stint on 
the Death Railway). He was interviewed by the OHC for his experiences during the Japanese Occupation. NAS 
OHC, Carl Francis de Souza. Prisoners-of-War (POWs). Accession Number 000290. 7 reels. 
20 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 4. 
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to play, you come and play with me”, and out of curiosity, they stopped their 
game and they followed me – these five or six of them followed me and I 
brought them back to this Prince Edward Road building and we started to play 
the games. There were a lot of compendium games like ludo and snakes and 
ladders and all that.... They come around and kick the ball that I offered them. 
The field just in front of the building. That started the nucleus of the boy 
members of this club.21 
 
The club officially opened in May 1948.22 There were ambitious plans to open at least 
fifty clubs in the city area.23 The boys’ club initiative was first mooted by the Singapore 
Executive during the British Military Administration, in a bid to address the social dislocation 
in male youths caused by the Japanese Occupation, such as lack of schooling, and general 
poverty that could lead to delinquency and crime. There was also the “small” matter of a 
competing force in the Communists, for whom supposedly idle and impressionable youths 
could form the basis of a mass movement. After much difficulty raising funds, the Singapore 
Executive managed to start a boys’ club at Queen Street in April 1946 (as discussed in 
Chapter 3). In addition to the boys’ club at Queen Street, three other clubs were opened in 
Katong (along Joo Chiat Road), in Keppel Harbor (within Singapore Harbour Board land), 
and in the Malay Settlement in Eunos.24 From June 1946, the Social Welfare Department took 
over the existing clubs and the task of establishing more boys’ clubs. An underlying principle 
of establishing and developing such clubs was that they were to be run by “volunteers”, and 
not by the Social Welfare Department or government. The other clubs were managed by a 
committee, formed by members of the community living in the area, the general public, 
and/or voluntary organizations. The Prince Edward club was the first to be directly managed 
by an officer from the Social Welfare Department. Though it was felt that such a method to 
be “inferior”, it was “desirable at this stage to have at least one club under the immediate 
supervision of the Social Welfare Department for use as a training ground for club leaders”.25 
The “inferior” method was apparently discontinued in November 1949, as management of the 
club was transferred to the Singapore Police Force.26 
Interviewed in 1979, Mah Keong gave a former club leader’s perspective into the 
origins of the clubs. His recollections are presented below almost verbatim to give the reader 
a sense of the work (as Mah Keong remembered it). They give insights not only into the 
                                                          
21 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 4. 
22 The Straits Times, 26 May 1948, “New Boys' Club for Singapore”.  
23 The Straits Times, 30 May 1948, “Singapore Aims at 50 Boys Clubs”. 
24 The Second Report, pp. 17-19. 
25 The Third Report, p. 21. 
26 The Straits Times, 15 November 1949, “S’pore Police 'Adopt' 120 Boys”. See also SWDAR for 1950, p. 7. 
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social conditions of postwar Singapore and their effects on youths, they also illustrate to 
some extent how he acted as a conduit for community building and development among the 
youths he was responsible for. 
 
[The boys] were unschooled during the three and a half years or even if they 
do go to school, they didn't go to English School or a proper Chinese School. 
So they would become overage for the new schools that's already commenced 
in 1946 and they have nothing to do and so some of them are idling their way 
in five-foot ways or running helter-skelter about in the part of the city where 
they stayed and they are becoming... not delinquents but they can become 
unruly sometimes. One of my principal aims was to be able to take them away 
from the streets...and also to perhaps inculcate in them a sense of 
responsibility of having to do the right thing by themselves by...being at home 
when you are required and play when you are allowed to play. And also, don't 
spend and idle your way in five-foot ways gambling...and hope for some other 
boys to come and be swindled by you playing cards.27 
 
Prince Edward Boys’ Club catered to male youths staying nearby, such as “Choon Guan 
Street, Stanley Street and Tanjong Pagar area”. Mah Keong also gave some insight into 
housing conditions then:  
 
Because at that stage there were no proper housing provided by the 
government. So you'll find that those were all rented houses and the people... 
some of them do rent only a front room or another family rents the back room, 
and some of the families – about say eighteen to twenty families stay in one 
three-storied building and all the children did not play in those areas. So they 
get around to play in the streets and from this group, I brought them into the 
club and I think it was my looking into the problem of these boys having 
practically nothing to do in the afternoon or in the early morning, that I made 
it a point to get only those children of lower income group.28 
 
The club leader however did not allow segregation by economic status:  
 
There were a good many who are better-dressed boys. But they do come and I 
do not prevent them from joining these other boys, nor did these boys who are 
from lower income group shun from the type of boys who come from better 
income family, and I have seen that in the sense that some of the boys who 
come from better family sometimes ride beautiful or very nice bicycles to the 
club, parked at the club. They don't lock it. Then the poorer boys will come 
and say, “Can I borrow?” And they say, “OK, OK” because they have new-
found friends. The boys who are from a better income group perhaps have not  
 
                                                          
27 “They do all sorts of funny things. Two or three of them would bully the younger ones and say, ‘Ok, let’s play 
these cards’. But then two or three boys will make signs where they can win off this fellows’ fifty cents or 
twenty cents from them”. NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 4. 
28 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 5. 
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had occasion to mix around with these others and out of curiosity to make new 
friends, they allow them and then there is very good rapport between the 
groups.29 
 
In the end, the club “had a very mixed group of boys”: 
 
There were some boys, as [the] premises is near Tanjong Pagar, there were 
some Malay boys or Chinese boys and these Chinese boys speak Malay. So 
they are Peranakans and they come in and there were also Indian boys who 
come from this Tanjong Pagar area.... Then there were the Hokkien-speaking 
group from Stanley Street, Choon Guan Street. They come and mix. Hitherto 
they were never mixing together. All these Hokkien-speaking were not mixed 
with the Tanjong Pagar boys who are Malay-speaking. But when I established 
this club, they come together and eventually know each other. I think that 
helps.... [The] majority of them are from Chinese schools. Some of them even 
come from Chinese Middle Schools. They do come to my club. In spite of 
their not being able to converse – you know, English-speaking boys and 
Mandarin-speaking boys from different schools – they do get along and if 
there are any difficulty they speak in dialect.30 
 
There were initial teething problems, but somehow the boys managed to resolve them with 
minimum fuss:  
 
We had some difficulty in the sense that some boys who are from English 
schools, Chinese boys from English schools..., they speak Malay among 
themselves. When they mixed with these Chinese, they learned this Hokkien 
dialect a little. They could speak if they want to but they could not express 
themselves. So, the Chinese-speaking boys, either Hokkien or Teochew, sort 
of managed to express themselves with them and eventually these Peranakans 
– the boys from Malay-speaking family – they learned some Hokkien words 
and Teochew words. Surprising, but there you are, they get along.31 
 
Mah Keong recalled that by the time he was forced to step down for medical reasons 
(sometime in late 1948), the club had no less than eighty to ninety boys participating in club 
activities.32 In the context of staff shortages as well as the work he had accomplished in 
getting the club up and running within a short period of time, Mah Keong’s departure was 
seen as a “serious blow” that “set the club back a great deal”.33 His “one-man show” was 
difficult to replicate as the Department encountered problems finding a suitable replacement. 
                                                          
29 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 5. 
30 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 5. 
31 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 5. 
32 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 6. The SWDAR for 1948 (The Third Report, p. 21) recorded a higher 
number of 160 members. 
33 The Third Report, p. 21. 
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His experiences establishing Prince Edward Boys’ Club made him a prized asset. In 1951, 
Mah Keong was employed by the Social Welfare Department on a permanent basis and was 
involved in establishing and developing new and existing boys’ clubs, including one on Pulau 
Tekong (at the request of the Singapore Police Force).34 
 
Forging Social Bonds 
 
When asked to reflect on his role as a youth club leader and on social work in general, 
Mah Keong used his experience running the Pulau Tekong Boys’ Club to frame his response. 
He noted that because he chose to reside full-time on the small island in the club’s first year, 
he came to be seen by the 5,000-odd residents on the island as the government’s 
representative. And not just for club matters:  
 
So sometimes they do have problems they come and ask me and whatever I 
know, I tell them. Even sometimes you’ll have people wanting to get certain 
kind of admission into the maternity hospital. They said don’t know [how to 
go about it]. I said, “You look [for] the nurse, but if you want arrangements for 
certain kind of transport in the night, if there is any complication, I make 
arrangements with the Marine Police Department to help out.35 
 
The above demonstrates the extent an officer of the Social Welfare Department could 
have played in forging social bonds. What Mah Keong did in rendering assistance and 
providing information, was no different to the duties performed by former Protectors of 
Chinese, colonial District Officers, or local heads of villages and communities. But his 
actions were perhaps noteworthy in the context of a new social welfare department and a new 
approach to colonial society. They were significant in the broader context of inculcating an 
                                                          
34 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 7. Interestingly, the Pulau Tekong Boy’s Club was set up at the request of 
the Singapore Police Force (Marine Division). The police had a keen interest in the development of the boys’ 
clubs, and had a representative on each club’s management committee. See NUSCL, CO 1030/268. Progress 
summary for April/May 1954 Progress Summary. 
35 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 7. Mah Keong described in vivid detail (from memory) the club house: “It 
was an old barrack-like building of the British encampment there. The British at that time made the place as one 
of those strategic points where they built gun emplacements and tower. This barrack-like thing is again – is not 
dilapidated – it’s got hard concrete building but without window, without doors”. He also described the 
community: “There is a Malay school and a Chinese school, and there is an English school there which was 
recently instituted…. So I got hold of these boys… of course their parents were also curious. They also came. 
The first day I got boys to come and register, thinking that easiest thing to get them interested is to keep their 
curiosity at bay…. They came, some of them with their parents. Some of them with their toddlers even thinking 
that even the toddlers can be registered. Anyway I told them this is a club and explained to them in Malay…. 
Why? Because the Chinese schoolboys also speak good Malay. Surprisingly. The Malays of course are in a 
bigger majority there. They are a bigger group and then the Chinese are shopkeepers, some smallholders. They 
had to work well with the Malays who are a good number of fishermen”. 
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idea that a government, the colonial version moreover, should be responsible for the general 
well-being of society. This is not to say that such social bonds eventually went on to buttress 
the late colonial state, the process taking place as it did during the period of decolonization. 
That next level of state formation requires the consideration of others factors, such as 
harnessing and managing those bonds for a broader (communitarian, national or even 
imperial) purpose. But at a basic individual and departmental level, the functions and services 
provided by the Social Welfare Department were at the forefront of establishing such social 
connections, laying the foundations for the social welfare state and potential nation-building. 
Mah Keong played this role – of forging social bonds – in other capacities during an 
extended career in the Social Welfare Department. Before he took up the permanent position 
in 1951, he had been the warden for the Prince Edward Boy’s Hostel, also building it up from 
scratch. The hostel was located on the second floor above the boys’ club and designed to have 
twenty-two beds. According to the Five-Year Plan, hostels were an “indispensable corollary 
of a probation system”, to provide accommodation and supervision for working boys and 
girls who were released from or at risk of statutory detention.36 In 1948, the Social Welfare 
Department started a hostel for forty boys alongside the Queen Street Boys’ Club, catering for 
boys who were “homeless and destitute”, working boys with low wages, and reserved a 
number of “vacancies for boys placed on probation by the Juvenile Court with a condition of 
residence in the hostel”.37 The duration of residence in the hostel ranged between three to 
nine months and generally did not exceed a year. Mah Keong recalled: 
 
This [Prince Edward] Boys’ Hostel was started in the sense that there are quite 
a number of potential delinquents – boys who play truant, boys who are in 
their early teens, mix around with bad companies. They were misfits in their 
family, particularly of course [when] their parents themselves [had] no time to 
look after them. So they get around with other boys and learned some of the 
misdeeds, like pick-pocketing. Some even…pilfer shops and then these 
parents find it hard to look after them…. A good number of them were sent by 
the Juvenile Court and to be put in residence for between three to six 
months.38 
 
In the interview, Mah Keong’s earnestness in ensuring the interviewer did not go away with a 
certain impression of the hostel residents was clear. He mentioned several times, at times 
unprompted, that “we don’t treat them as criminals or even delinquents. They may be 
                                                          
36 Five Year Plan, p. 6. The section on Youth Welfare had called for a total of eleven hostels by 1953.  
37 The Third Report, p. 22. 
38 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 5. 
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potential delinquents but we find that they are just wayward – a bit off the track and we sort 
of put him back properly again”.39 In doing so, Mah Keong painted several profiles of the 
boys he supervised:  
 
They have not committed any crime. They were just sent there to see [if] they 
could rehabilitate themselves…. You’ll be surprised some of them have gone 
into police work, some have…become managers of theatres, some have started 
their own business. They were not naughty boys in that sense. In fact some of 
them come from a home where the father drinks, the mother gambles and then 
there is quarreling in the house; and some were orphans, part orphans 
actually.40 
 
To reemphasize the point that the hostel residents were not criminals or out-and-out 
delinquents, Mah Keong cited a case where a “very well-to-do” father actually paid for his 
son’s stay in the hostel. The boy had been spending more money than he had or should have. 
 
[K]nowing that he comes from quite a well-to-do family spends a lot of his 
money – whatever allowance he can get from the parents as well as from the 
grandfather or grandma; so he spends unnecessarily, sometimes to a stage of 
owing some shops in the name of the father to buy twenty ties and five pairs of 
shoes for friends. He was brought in to see me and eventually I sort of 
managed to tame him down on this aspect of his life.41 
 
Such a level of supervision describes a more structured and intrusive approach, going beyond 
his earlier duties as a club leader.  
 
As a warden, we’ll have to see to [the boys’] daily routine, which means must 
keep themselves clean, and if they have to go to work, they get to go to work, 
come back at a time when they finished off work…. Say the boy finishes off at 
4 o’clock, we should expect him not later than 4.30 or at the latest 5 o’clock. 
There are boys who worked very early in the morning. Some of them go to 
work in say Tanjong Pagar or Harbour Board, they do leave the hostel say 
perhaps by 6 o’clock or 5.30 to get their transport and then they come back 
between 3 and 4. After that they are left alone, we see to their meals…. Then 
we see to their recreation.42 
 
For working boys, they registered their earnings with Mah Keong, who would then return a 
portion for their meals outside and place the remainder in a savings account.43 
 
                                                          
39 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 6. 
40 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 6. 
41 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 6. 
42 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 5. 
43 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 6. Most of the boys worked in daily-rated jobs. 
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 It was a similar routine for boys attending schools. Mah Keong actually acted as the 
in-house alarm clock during the early stages. “I’ll see to the boys who are going to school 
getting up as early as quarter to six and then get himself bathed…”, even to the extent of 
ensuring the boy understands what time he should be at the bus-stop so as not to miss the bus. 
“And then after two or three times he finds that he knows the timing, he gets up very early 
and gets himself dressed and go to school….” As all schools finish at about 1 o’clock, the 
boys were expected to be back at the hostel around 1.30 pm. If not, then Mah Keong “would 
either…phone up the school principal or teacher…”, or if the boy was on probation, he would 
check with the boy’s probation officer or with the parents the next day. For those on 
probation, they were usually not allowed to go back home (or more accurately, their friends 
in nearby haunts), so as to prevent them from slipping back into the misdemeanors that 
landed them on probation in the first place. Mah Keong did not resort to this too often as 
“most of the boys would want to come back because they have not much money in their 
pocket”.44 Some boys also went home first because they were near their schools.  
 Mah Keong was new to this “institution type of work”, and stayed in Queen Street 
Boys’ Hostel for two months to experience firsthand operating a hostel. He learned that 
segregation of a “very good set of children” from the “rough and tough boys” may prevent 
the former group from being influenced by the latter. He came to an agreement with the 
Queen Street hostel warden, taking in fifteen “good set” boys from Queen Street hostel and 
using them as a nucleus to start Prince Edward hostel. The latter was structured for boys who 
required minimal supervision; indeed, getting transferred from Queen Street to Prince 
Edward was seen as a “promotion”.45 As it was not a place of detention, as the Gimson 
School was, there were no gates keeping the boys in the hostel or club; they were free to 
leave the grounds as long as Mah Keong was informed of their whereabouts.  
Discipline was more important than security. This was mostly in the form of 
establishing routines. The boys had to maintain personal hygiene, honor their work and 
schooling commitments, eat during stipulated hours, and must be in bed (“lights out”) by ten 
in the evening. Parents were allowed to visit on Saturdays, and on rare occasions depending 
on circumstances, some boys were allowed to go home on Saturdays and return to the hostel 
the following morning. Supervision or surveillance was limited to keeping the warden 
apprised of their work and school schedule and progress, as well as any other after-work or 
                                                          
44 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 6. 
45 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 5. 
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after-school activities, particularly for schoolboys who did work after their classes. Mah 
Keong did not recall any instances where he had to penalize boys who returned to the hostel 
late after their daily schedules; at most, they received a telling-off or a reminder to inform the 
warden of their whereabouts. The boys also participated in the upkeep of the hostel, grouped 
into duty rosters to assist with cooking and daily maintenance of the hostel.46 
Mah Keong’s interview was not as expressive as Beng Neo’s. But he gave a similar 
account of the bonds he shared with the boys. When asked if the hostel could have taken in 
more than its capacity of twenty-two beds, he thought that while it may be ideal, it would not 
have been easy for “one man to tackle more than ... thirty”. This was because, from his 
experience, Mah Keong was like a “mother, father, brother, sister” to the boys. Apart from 
supervising daily routines and maintaining progress reports on individual boys, he maintained 
other information to help with his work: 
 
I do have a format of the boys’ names, the time he comes and his parent’s 
telephone number and the work and the money brought in…. And it was 
almost a 24-hour job for people like us in the sense that even in my sleep 
sometimes I find somebody knocked on my door and said, “Mr. Toh, such and 
such a person has been going to the lavatory for some time. I think he’s sick”. 
So I got up and see how bad he is. And he says, “It’s okay now, much 
better….” I sat up waiting for anymore emergency and I don’t sleep….47 
 
*** 
The bonds Toh Mah Keong and Tan Beng Neo forged with their charges took on 
different forms and had varying implications. It can take the shape of a deep feeling of 
gratitude or bond to a former guardian, such as Beng Neo’s former charges going out of their 
way to acknowledge her in public or attempting to buy her meals, or former hostel residents 
visiting Mah Keong to seek advice about finding work or to pass on news about doing well in 
school. The not insignificant act of providing financial assistance, or even the mere promise 
of it, can bring about expressions of gratitude. After completing his investigations, Chia 
Cheong Fook, who joined the Department’s Public Assistance Section in 1950, would 
sometimes return to his motorbike to see a couple of chickens or several bunches of 
rambutans hanging by the handlebars – ostensibly tokens of appreciation from grateful 
applicants for assistance.48  
 
                                                          
46 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 6. 
47 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 6. His wife was a nurse, and also provided medical assistance when needed.  
48 NAS OHC, Chia Cheong Fook, reel 1. Chia made it clear in the interview that he’d always return the “gifts”. 
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Social bonds could also manifest themselves as feelings of belonging. This Janet Yee 
discovered when she was posted to a youth club located in a “gangster area” part of 
Chinatown (“People’s Park”). At first wary of the gangsters who loitered nearby, Janet 
realized that after establishing a bit of rapport with them, they were more than willing to 
assist her, even providing protective escort to the bus-stop whenever she worked late.49 She 
found that despite outwardly tough appearances, the “boys” just wanted to be accepted, 
“wanted to be identified with me”.50 Working as a probation and aftercare officer during the 
1960s, Krishnasamy Vethiveloo (aka K. V. Veloo) saw something similar in the gangsters he 
came into contact with: 
 
I was frightened because I was so young and I was dealing with all these 
gangsters. But I learnt later they were bound by a good code. If they knew you 
were helping them, they would respect you. But you had to be able to cultivate 
a bond of confidence and trust with them.51 
 
Sometimes, bonds were formed not so much with the people they assisted, but more 
to certain aspects of the tasks some staff did and found personal meaning and satisfaction in. 
As an investigator with the Women and Girls Section, Peggy Chen’s firsthand experiences 
rescuing young girls from prostitution played no small part in her maintaining a sense of 
perspective vis-a-vis her own domestic woes.52 In encountering a side of life she never 
imagined before working in the Social Welfare Department, specifically the idea of selling 
one’s body to make ends meet or forcing very young girls into prostitution, Peggy felt “very 
blessed” and resolved to “learn to live again”, mainly through her keenness to do a good 
job.53 When asked about his “philosophy to social work”, Mah Keong responded: 
 
When I was doing all these I wasn’t thinking so much of whether I was doing 
social work or anything. But in the throes of it I feel that there is satisfaction 
that you’re dealing with human beings. You’ll find that there are so many 
different ways of looking at life, as I said, low-income group. Even in Tekong, 
                                                          
49 NAS OHC, Janet Yee, reel 2. 
50 NAS OHC, Janet Yee, reel 2. They would tell her: “Don’t worry missy, we don’t disturb our own people”. 
(Originally rendered in Teochew in oral interview). 
51 The Sunday Times, 11 May 2014, “K.V. Veloo: Helping people from womb to tomb: Ex-Cleansing Inspector 
made social work his career, despite lucrative bank offers”. 
. See also his autobiography, K. V. Veloo, Life and Times of a Social Worker: A Personal Memoir (Singapore: 
Wee Kim Wee Centre, Singapore Management University; Singapore Indian Association, 2014). Memoir is 
“loosely based” on OHC’s oral history interviews conducted between November 2007 and January 2008. See 
NAS OHC, Vethiveloo Krishnasamy @ K V Veloo. The Civil Service - A Retrospection. Accession Number: 
003238. Interviewed in 2007. 8 Reels. 
52 NAS OHC, Peggy Chen, reels 4 and 5. Her husband was apparently a serial womanizer. 
53 NAS OHC, Peggy Chen, reel 4. Chen mentioned she would be acknowledged on the streets if recognized by 
some of the rescued juveniles. 
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boys come from parents who are not earning very well. The joy of having to 
work with such people gives me another different facet of life altogether. I feel 
that there’s some satisfaction and happiness to do things for people. If the 
result is good I’m happy about what I am doing and because I was also much 
younger and I wasn’t too very worried about whether the job pays me very 
well or not.54 
 
Cheong Fook had a more varied experience, moving from Public Assistance to other 
sections such as Children and Young Persons, Counselling and Advice, and Women and Girls.  
But he shared with Peggy similar sentiments when encountering the hardship cases. When 
queried about how he avoided being emotionally “hardened” or “burned out”, Cheong Fook 
thought it was because he could empathize with some of his cases, having known hardship 
during his childhood. He said: “I knew how it was to be humiliated, to feel a sense of 
humiliation. And so, if you were made of some feelings, I suppose your attitude to these 
things [the people and situations he encountered during the course of his work] is you won’t 
be so harsh”.55 Ideally, positive social bonds, whether between staff and client or between 
staff and their work, form a kind of tangibility that could become the basis of a community or 
an institution, or more broadly, a state. This could happen simply by executing his or her 
duties well, helping to establish a new government department, and developing and 
maintaining its connections to society. In getting the fledgling Social Welfare Department up 
and running, pioneering officers like Beng Neo, Peggy, Mah Keong, and Cheong Fook, 
moreover laid the foundations for their successors to build on.  
Joining in March 1955, Janet Yee started as an assistant youth service officer, and 
remained with the Social Welfare Department (and its successors) till 1989. Ann Elizabeth 
Wee joined the Social Welfare Department also in 1955 as a training officer, contributing 
knowledge and expertise from her time as a student at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science. K. V. Veloo joined the Social Welfare Department in 1964. But he traces the 
impetus for a distinguished career in social work to the time spent in the Katong Boys’ Club, 
from the other side of the fence so to speak. He joined the club in 1951 while still in school 
and was elected to the club committee as assistant club leader when he was seventeen years 
                                                          
54 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 7. 
55 NAS OHC, Chia Cheong Fook, reel 3. Chia recalled students who were unable to pay school fees on time 
were singled out by making them stand outside the classroom or on a chair in the classroom. “Some teachers ... 
treated that as a form of punishment; we were humiliated. I used to dread going to school without school fees”. 
Chia himself experienced impoverished conditions: “Sometimes you had no [electricity]. Couldn’t pay, they cut 
off. And you didn’t want the neighbors to know you had your electricity cut off, so six o’clock, you go out to a 
friend’s place. [I] happened to have a friend [living] on the main road, so you spent your time until seven, eight 
o’clock, then you come back. Your neighbors hopefully will be asleep so they don’t know that you don’t have 
the lights on you see”. 
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old.56 All three individuals went on to assume positions of substantive responsibility and 
influence in the government, and each played influential and pioneering roles in shaping the 
direction of social work and social policy in Singapore.57 From their oral interviews, all three 
shared and expressed similar sentiments in relation to the work they did. These included a 
general preference to work with people, their ability to mix with groups from various socio-
economic (as well as ethnic and linguistic) backgrounds, and the personal satisfaction those 
interactions gave them. For instance, when touching briefly on the political turmoil in the 
early 1960s, Janet Yee replied:  
 
Basically I think I’ve … got no appetite for all these politicking matters. 
Actually, at that point, I was still very idealistic. I want to help people and I 
am not interested in politics or who say what…. I am more interested in social 
justice, welfare and people. Basically I am a people’s person. I like people.58  
 
Similarly, Ann Wee on social work and teaching: 
 
Well, I think for anybody in social work or in teaching, the feeling that 
somebody’s life is a little bit different because you were there. I don’t think 
there’s any satisfaction quite so heart-warming as that … feeling that 
somebody has acquired something or avoided some problem or being 
equipped in some way, in a way that it wouldn’t have been so if you haven’t 
been there. That I think, is the greatest reward of all. I think this is what keeps 
people going in social work.59 
 
Social bonds could also take the form of connections with other organizations and 
associations, indirectly extending the reach of the late colonial state. Taking the youth clubs 
                                                          
56 NAS OHC, K. V. Veloo, reel 2 (of 8). He mentioned he was encouraged to do so by Tan Thoop Lip, the 
brother of Dr. Maggie Lim (nee Tan).  
57 Ann Wee became head of the Department of Social Studies in 1967, maintaining over the years an intimate 
relationship with the social service sector (both government and voluntary organizations). Janet Yee held 
various senior positions in the Social Welfare Department (including Deputy Director of Social Welfare), and 
was influential in policy and programs concerning family services, children, and the elderly. K. V. Veloo was 
the first Chief Probation and Aftercare Officer in 1971 and later became Director of Social Welfare. He also 
launched Prison Welfare Service and Community Probation program in 1973 to aid the families of prisoners, 
and was the first President of the Singapore Association of Social Workers. Information taken from the 
Singapore Women’s Hall of Fame (initiated and maintained by the Singapore Council of Women’s 
Organization), online articles and Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports, Helping Hands, 
Touching Lives: 60 Years Making a Difference. 
58 NAS OHC, Janet Yee, reel 3. Yee was asked why she did not return to the People’s Association in 1961 as 
part of a team from the Social Welfare Department to help with the fallout of the strike by more than a hundred 
PA employees. The strike was organized in support of seventeen former colleagues who had been dismissed 
earlier, and was connected to the split of the Barisan Sosialis from the People’s Action Party in July 1961. For 
contemporary reports, see The Straits Times, 26 September 1961, “Strike by half the People's Assn. staff”, The 
Straits Times, 18 November 1961, “Inquiry Commission for the People's Assn. row”, and The Straits Times, 13 
December 1961, “Govt., Barisan clash over People's Assn. strike”. 
59 NAS OHC, Ann Wee, reel 4 (of 4). 
272 
 
 
 
for example, it was never the Social Welfare Department’s intention to be fully responsible 
for their establishment and management. From the start, the development of youth clubs was 
to be a collaborative effort, between government and voluntary organizations. The 
government’s role was, as far as possible, limited to a supervisory position and/or the 
provision of grants to help with the running of the clubs. In August 1952, the then Acting 
Secretary for Social Welfare (T. E. Smith) contacted various associations requesting their aid 
in “sponsoring and running new Boys’ and Girls’ Clubs in Singapore”.60 He noted that at that 
time, there were only eight boys’ clubs and no club for girls. Smith’s letter gave some idea of 
the resources needs, such as a building or part of it, equipment for sports and other activities, 
and trained club leaders. While the Social Welfare Department was in a position to help (to a 
limited extent) with the latter two, physical buildings were more difficult to come by. Even 
though the Department was willing to consider allowing an extension to the Children’s Social 
Centres (which were themselves mostly in poor condition, a couple operating out of nothing 
more than a shed), it was realized that “some of the associations to whom this letter is 
addressed to might be in a position to provide a building for part or whole time use as a Boys’ 
or Girls’ Club”.61 
 One who answered the call was Shirin Fozdar, a founding member of the Singapore 
Council of Women. On February 1953, the first girls’ club in Singapore was officially 
opened, operating out of a Children’s Social Centre located in Joo Chiat (in the eastern part of 
Singapore).62 The following week, Fozdar made a public appeal to the “Privileged Women of 
Singapore”, requesting volunteers to help teach “English, Chinese, Malay, sewing, dress-
making etc”. to about two hundred girls who had expressed interest in joining the club.63 The 
following year, in March 1954, a second girls’ club opened in Siglap, a predominantly Malay 
area (along present-day East Coast Road). Land for the club had been donated by a member 
of the public and the club was managed by Seow Peck Leng, then a teacher and school 
principal, as well as a member of the Singapore Council of Women.64 Janet Yee’s first job 
                                                          
60 NAS, Singapore Council of Women (SCW). T. E. Smith to Shirin Fozdar, 12 August 1952. (Private Records, 
microfilm number: NA 2044). Reported in the The Straits Times, 26 October 1952, “The Girls with Nowhere to 
Go”; and The Singapore Free Press, 6 September 1952, “Govt. Plea for More Clubs for Youth”. 
61 NAS, SCW. T. E. Smith to Shirin Fozdar, 12 August 1952. 
62 The Straits Times, 20 February 1953, “Dignity is Best Defence”. See also SWDAR for 1953, p. 12. 
63 NAS, SCW, Shirin Fodzar, 26 February 1953. The files include brief information on setting up the club. 
64 Later stood for elections in Mountbatten constituency in 1959 General Elections for the Singapore People’s 
Alliance (SPA) and became the one of the few elected female Legislative Assemblywoman. Siglap Girls Club 
was renamed the Singapore Women’s Association in 1960. See Singapore Women’s Association: Our 
Milestones. http://singaporewomenassociation.org/en/who. Accessed 21 July 2015. See NAS OHC interviews of 
Seow Peck Leng (Political History in Singapore 1945-1965. Accession Number: 000721. Interviewed in 1987). 
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with the Department was to assist Seow in organizing club activities for girls.65 Hence, in 
some ways, the Social Welfare Department’s efforts to involve the general public in its work, 
as included in the original social welfare policy directive drafted during the war, could be 
seen as an extension of the personal bonds discussed earlier. In the case of the youth clubs, 
the Department forged connections with other government agencies, local communities, 
voluntary organizations and advocacy groups, such as the Singapore Police Force, the 
Singapore Harbour Board, the Y’s Men of Singapore (a splinter group from the Young Men’s 
Christian Association), the Singapore Council of Women, and even the youths themselves, 
who formed committees to help manage the clubs. 
Forging personal bonds and building community connections were not all smooth-
sailing. Except for the clubs established in Siglap and Joo Chiat, the Social Welfare 
Department’s appeal for more youth clubs was met with a deafening silence.66 It was a major 
disappointment as the Social Welfare Department’s Five-Year Plan had projected twenty-six 
youth clubs to be built and readied by 1953, including seven girls’ clubs. When the appeal 
was made in late 1952, there were eight clubs in existence and all for boys, far short of the 
ambitious objective of fifty clubs planned for back in 1948. The situation improved only 
slightly in the following year, with a total of twelve youth clubs built. But as it was still less 
than half of the projected number, the Social Welfare Department was forced to reconsider its 
approach of soliciting partnerships to develop youth clubs and services.67 From available 
evidence, it was not so much a lack of money or even trained staff that impeded progress, but 
rather the lack of buildings and structures to house the clubs. There was also the not 
insignificant matter of the absence of stability at the top, as the colonial officials were posted 
out and others dropped in, and sometimes only for short duration. At the individual level, 
there were also moments when staff in various positions had to confront situations no amount 
of training could prepare them, resulting in a range of situations, some humorous, others 
tragic and poignant – all of which offer some insight into the other side of social bonds, 
which were those on the receiving end of social welfare and their needs. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
65 NAS OHC, Janet Yee, reel 2.  
66 The Straits Times, 25 February 1953, “Poor response to Singapore call for youth clubs”. 
67 SWDAR for 1954, pp. 15-16. 
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Vulnerable Individuals 
 
As Lady Superintendent, Tan Beng Neo had to deal with her fair share of unruly 
children and youths. After foiling a plan to escape (which involved inmates forcibly 
restraining Home staff), Beng Neo rolled out her intimidation skills, questioning and 
threatening the “timid” ones until the two ringleaders (at the ripe old ages of fourteen and 
fifteen years) voluntarily confessed. Beng Neo recalled that:  
 
I’m not supposed to cane them. But I don’t let them know. I don’t cane them 
but I banged on the table.... I usually looked so fierce that they frightened. I 
had a good laugh when they’re out of my sight. You’re not really angry with 
them. You’re only trying to teach them, because sometimes they can be very 
naughty.68  
 
The ringleaders in that particular case came from Mount Emily, which from March 1952 
became the home for rescued juvenile prostitutes. From the beginning, the Social Welfare 
Department adopted a strategy of segregating known prostitutes from other girls under its 
care, to avoid the perceived bad influence of the former on the latter.69 Up till that point in the 
interview, Beng Neo had not mentioned any acts of outright disobedience and deliberate 
attempts to escape from the Home.  
The Social Welfare Department’s monthly progress summaries and annual reports 
also included brief case histories of girls sent to Mount Emily and York Hill.70 One case 
involved three Hokkien girls who were found in a brothel in 1953. The elder two girls (both 
fifteen) were “found in locked rooms with their clients at the time of the raid”, while the third 
younger girl (eleven) was alone in another room. One of the elder girls “stated that her 
husband died six months after their marriage. She had come down to Singapore a week 
before her arrest, with a view to take up dancing and becoming a dance hostess”. The second 
fifteen-year old “stated that she was sold by her parents when she was twelve years old. She 
started as a singer and later joined the New World cabaret as a dance hostess. The man found 
with her had been going out with her for some time and had promised to take her as a 
secondary wife”. The eleven-year old was “claimed by the Principal tenant of the premises 
raided as her adoptive daughter. The girl is alleged to be the daughter of her husband’s 
                                                          
68 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, Reel 24. 
69 See The Second Report and The Third Report for a behavioral profile of juvenile prostitutes. In reel 3 of her 
oral history, Janet Yee also gives a more personal and candid take on juvenile prostitution over time. 
70 Except for 1946, the unpublished monthly, and later quarterly, summaries (from 1947 to 1958) can be found 
in SCA files collecting the minutes of the Social Welfare Council. 
275 
 
 
 
cousin”. The principal tenant was convicted and “bound over for a year for $1,000”. The 
eleven-year old was sent to York Hill, while one of the older girls was sent to Mount Emily. 
The remaining girl was returned to the care of her mother.71 
Anti-vice raids led to contrasting experiences for accompanying staff. While Peggy 
Chen laughed at her recollection of being so shocked at catching a couple in the act that she 
immediately dashed out of the room not knowing how to react,72 Chia Cheong Fook’s disgust 
was apparent in his interview when he recalled a particular raid in Desker Road where a 
soldier refused “to stop the act until it’s completed”.73 Their sordid but humorous 
recollections interestingly contrast with the living conditions they found the girls working in. 
Peggy’s slightly embarrassed mirth was tempered by her descriptions of the claustrophobic 
and squalid working conditions of a cubicle brothel, flanked by small opium dens, in the 
heart of Chinatown. In contrast, Cheong Fook’s disdain of brothels – “hovels” as he called 
them – was punctuated by slight awe at a more luxurious “massage establishment” along 
River Valley Road.74  
The social welfare officers experienced varying responses to their presence. Cheong 
Fook recalled the “madam” at the “massage establishment” extended an offer to him and his 
colleague to return. Peggy made passing mention of expressions of gratitude by some of the 
girls she helped rescue. Janet Yee remembered her supervisor and colleagues from the 
Women and Girls Section getting urine thrown at them during anti-vice raids. From their 
interviews, there was no sense that prostitution rackets, at least the ones they witnessed 
firsthand, were part of a larger system. Their focus was more on the individual. Indeed, Peggy 
Chen’s recollections focused more on the elderly “amahs” who acted as pimps, inadvertently 
highlighting the plight of the elderly who were unable to work and support themselves (via 
legal means) as they grew older. In ensuring the care and protection of women and children, 
the Social Welfare Department also maintained a presence at immigration check points to 
prevent trafficking and kept a register of “transferred children” – a legacy of the Chinese 
Protectorate’s functions in keeping tabs on vulnerable girls and managing the registration of 
mui tsais.75 Social welfare officers also conducted regular visits to homes of adopted 
                                                          
71 SWDAR for 1953, p. 17 
72 NAS OHC, Peggy Chen, reels 4 and 5. 
73 NAS OHC, Chia Cheong Fook, reel 3. 
74 NAS OHC, Chia Cheong Fook, reel 3. 
75 “Transferred children” originally referred to females under the age of 14 years not living with their natural 
parents (excluding seven categories as proscribed in the Children and Young Persons Ordinance 1949). In 1954, 
males were included in an amended ordinance. See SWDAR for 1950, pp. 28-29, and SWDAR for 1954, pp 30-
31. 
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children; and responded to calls about children being mistreated. For the latter two especially, 
staff depended on information provided by the public. In August 1954, a twelve-year old girl 
was “found with very extensive burn marks on her body”, allegedly caused by her foster 
mother with boiling water. Receiving an anonymous tip-off, social welfare officers visited the 
home but apparently the foster mother had “successfully concealed” her. After a second (and 
again unsuccessful) visit, the foster mother voluntarily turned up at the Department with the 
child, explaining that the latter had been away with relatives. The burn marks were moreover 
accidental, which the child corroborated. But the girl appeared “scared to speak out”. The 
Assistant Secretary of the Children and Young Persons Section, designated a Protector under 
the Children and Young Persons Ordinance, intervened and placed the girl in the Girls’ 
Homecraft Centre at York Hill for her safety.76 
  
Family Needs 
 
Sometimes, tragically, children were hurt by their biological parents. A case drawn 
from the records of the Social Welfare Department, quoted in full below, illustrates the 
multifaceted problems a family in postwar Singapore might have had to deal with: 
 
There was a case of H, a boy aged four years who was persistently ill-treated 
by his natural mother. The Protector found after an enquiry that the boy is one 
of six children who ages ranged from one to nine years. The mother has had 
little to no rest from child birth and was in fact shortly expecting another baby. 
The father was recently involved in an accident which has immobilised him 
from his waist upwards. The family became destitute and was dependent on a 
Public Assistance allowance. The mother found it very difficult to cope with 
her family, and in frustration vented her anger on H. The other children 
appeared well cared for and it was discovered upon investigation that H had 
been fostered out soon after birth and had only returned about a year or so 
previously. He was kept in a place of safety for a few months and was then 
returned to the family. Periodic visits are made to the home to advise the 
mother on the proper understanding and upbringing of her children and to 
ensure against further ill-treatment.77 
 
                                                          
76 SWDAR for 1954, p. 30/ See also NUSCL, CO 1030/268. The SWDAR paints a slightly but fundamentally 
different picture of what was presumably the same case. It suggested that there was a case, but it was dismissed 
due to lack of evidence despite “neighbours [witnessing] the offence”. The public report made the point that “It 
has been found difficult to get persons to come forward to give evidence against offenders. Good neighbourly 
relations appear to be more important….” 
77 SWDAR for 1954, p. 30. The Monthly Progress Summary for April indicated that the boy’s injuries were 
serious enough to warrant prosecution but was decided against. The boy was discharged to his grandmother. 
NUSCL, CO 1030/268. 
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Poverty was one of several factors affecting this particular family. The injury suffered 
by the father did not only lead to a loss of income, it also added unquantifiable stress on his 
spouse and children. The relative lack of familiarity between H and his natural mother 
possibly exacerbated the situation that then led to physical abuse. As seen in earlier examples, 
poverty, in the crude sense of insufficient income, had led to the sale of children, the resorting 
to prostitution to make ends meet, and/or physical violence out of frustration. The Social 
Welfare Department also encountered “a few desperate cases” where the men deliberately 
planned to take his children, but not his wife, and return home to India or China.78 Desertion 
was not exclusive to a particular gender either. There were instances where the wife was the 
“leading and aggressive party”.79 One report sounded almost exasperated when describing a 
case whereby a wife walked out on a marriage and several kids “for reason[s] known only to 
herself”.80 Families also hit rocky ground due to problems of gambling, drink, and other vices 
such as opium smoking. 
H’s brief case summary is quoted in full partly to demonstrate how the family in 
question came into contact with the various sections within the Social Welfare Department. 
H, the four-year old, was assisted by staff from the Children and Young Persons Section and 
then temporarily placed in one of the Department’s homes. The injured father was given 
financial aid through Public Assistance. The amount given was admittedly below subsistence 
levels, as financial aid was meant to be temporary and was reviewed periodically by public 
assistance investigators.81 Between its original introduction in late 1945 up till to August 
1951, the amount given was still based on the initial rationale of spreading Malayan dollars 
(irrelevant by the 1950s) and for immediate and expedient relief. 
In 1951, the scheme was reviewed and rationalized. The rates were increased, and the 
scope of assistance was considerably expanded. Whereas before public assistance was left 
almost entirely up to the investigator’s assessment (and then approved by the Social Welfare 
Department), now they were guided by criteria of age and residency. Public Assistance from 
1951 targeted the aged (those who had at least twenty years’ residency in Singapore), the 
permanently disabled and widows with children (at least ten years’ residency), and all other 
cases, such as the temporarily disabled or unemployed (at least three years’ residency).82 
                                                          
78 NUSCL, CO 1030/248. Progress Summary for April 1954. 
79 NUSCL, CO 1030/248. Progress Summary for April 1954. 
80 NUSCL, CO 1030/248. Progress Summary for April 1954. Apparently, the wife had also commented that she 
was “giving up everything in the old world” to start life afresh.  
81 The Third Report, p. 36.  
82 SWDAR for 1950, pp. 30-21; SWDAR for 1951, pp. 35-37; SWDAR for 1952, p. 19. 
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When she was with the Social Welfare Department from 1955 to 1956, Ann Wee recalled 
working for some months in a “huge” Public Assistance Section.83 This was a direct result of 
the expansion. The average number of cases per month for 1951 was around 2,700; in 1952, it 
was about 4,200.84 Expenditure unavoidably increased to over $900,000 in 1952, whereas the 
year before it was just under $400,000. In 1953, annual expenditure was just shy of $2.5 
million for an average of 6,800 cases per month.85 
Hence, a substantial bureaucracy of labor and machinery was needed to investigate 
and process applications. The task was not made easier by the physical terrain of 1950s 
Singapore. Each time a public assistance investigator went out to assess their cases, they were 
liable to have a “wonderful geographical experience” as they traversed a mind-boggling maze 
of addresses marked not by orderly numbers, but by physical landmarks. 
 
They had their own maps because people didn't have addresses and it was sort 
of along part of the railings till you [come] to the drain and then you had to 
walk on the pipe to cross the drain. Then you went on to the temple. We went 
round the back of the temple till you came to the right shop then you just had 
to ask the right people. The wall of the investigators’ room was covered with 
maps of how you meandered your way through Lorong 3 and so on. It was an 
incredible world.86 
 
Ann also recalled how “[in] many of the houses [in Jurong] there [was] somebody wheezing. 
It seemed as if the whole of that Jurong vegetable area had a lot of asthmatic problems”. She 
observed that while there was “much destitution”, elderly recipients of Public Assistance 
were actually in the minority. “In those days the problem was young families where even the 
most diligent breadwinner couldn't get a job. Everybody seemed to be living on odd jobs”.87  
Yeo Lee Hock joined the Social Welfare Department in 1966 as an investigator in the 
Public Assistance Section. He remembered similar off-road adventures trying to locate 
addresses in rural Singapore, and also recalled hostile reactions to his intrusive but necessary 
queries. “They ask you, why ask so many things? You want to give, give lah, don’t give, 
don’t ask so many things lah. But they didn’t know that this is our duty to ask”.88 Witnessing 
firsthand the desperate levels poverty and destitution moved Yeo to action. He recalled that 
                                                          
83 NAS OHC, Ann Wee, reel 2. 
84 SWDAR for 1952. Including the other relief funds managed by the Social Welfare Department, each of the 
twelve investigators had an average caseload of over 450 cases per month. 
85 SWDAR for 1953, p. 7. 
86 NAS OHC, Ann Wee, reel 2. 
87 NAS OHC, Ann Wee, reel 2. 
88 NAS OHC, Yeo Lee Hock. The Public Service - A Retrospection. Accession Number 002220. Interviewed in 
1999. Reel 2 (of 7). 
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“these people are so poor…. Some of them, they were without any food….” So he felt moved 
on several occasions to take immediate action: 
 
So sometimes as an investigator, you felt the compassion to help…. You don’t 
just talk about it you see. So sometimes on our own we have to just [give] a 
few dollars that we have, we say, “Come, this is for you”. Our own pockets…. 
So to [tide] them over while the investigation [was on-going].89 
 
Juvenile Delinquency and Probation 
 
In the event that one of H’s elder siblings was caught engaging in an illegal activity, 
he or she would then come into contact with the Social Welfare Department’s Probation 
Services. Probation became a “statutory form of treatment for children and young persons” 
under the Children and Young Persons Ordinance of 1949, though informal probation 
services had been in place since the establishment of the Juvenile Court in early 1946.90 It 
was not until 1948, with the return to Singapore of a local officer sent to London to train in 
probation work and the arrival of an experienced probation officer from Britain’s Home 
Ministry, that work began in earnest in creating a proper probation system.91 Initially, 
probation services were limited to juveniles, but the final version of the Probation of 
Offenders Ordinance in 1951 expanded the scope to include adults as well. By then, the 
Probation Section consisted of a Principal Probation Officer and three other Probation 
Officers. In 1953, only three more probation officers were added to the section, bringing the 
total number to seven – but still three short of the number projected in the Five-Year Plan. 
Each officer was handling an average of at least forty cases.92 
An underlying intent of probation was to allow for differentiation between actual and 
potential criminals, as well as to provide another avenue for the dislocated youth in postwar 
                                                          
89 NAS OHC, Yeo Lee Hock, reel 2. The duration of the investigation depended on various circumstances. 
“Well, the investigation depends on how fast you do it, how fast you can get the information. Sometimes within 
three days, sometimes within one week you can finish the investigation. After that you have to write the report. 
Then the case if approved, then they will come and collect the money and all that….” 
90 NAS, SWD 694D/51. Annual report of Juvenile Court and Probation Section 1951. 
91 The Third Report, p. 12. Local officer was Flight Lieutenant Tan Kay Hai, D.F.C. (b.1914), a former 
reconnaissance pilot with the Royal Air Force. He enlisted after the fall of France in 1940 and left Singapore for 
Canada in November 1941. He took part in Operation Overlord on 6 June 1944, and was shot down later. He 
was interned as a prisoner-of-war but managed to escape during the confusion at the end of the war. He returned 
to Singapore in 1945 as a minor celebrity (The Straits Times, 18 September 1945, “First Straits Chinese To Win 
D.F.C.”), and eventually found employment with the new Social Welfare Department in 1946. For his wartime 
exploits, see Ernest Koh, “The Chinese of Singapore and their imperial Second World War 1939 – 1945”. 
Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies, Vol. 5 (2011-12), pp. 57-78.  
92 SWDAR for 1953, pp. 13. 
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Singapore. Mary Quintal was a former prosecutor in the Juvenile Court. She remembered 
most of the crimes committed by juveniles were relatively minor, such as “stealing bicycles” 
or getting caught in the wrong place at the wrong time, such as a gang fight with weapons. 
She continued: 
 
[They] don’t really prosecute or persecute the child. Parents, one of the parents 
or guardian must attend so that he or she could listen to what is being 
presented in the court…. The procedure is exactly like the other courts; the 
only thing is dealing with juveniles. We dealt with them more gently and not 
like criminals. They are just children who’ve done wrong and you try and lead 
them in the right path. If they are guilty we just tell them, “You are guilty”, 
and we call for a probation report….93 
 
Juvenile court proceedings were very much “like an ordinary discussion, you question, 
there’s no harassment, no threatening attitudes sort of thing”. Quintal recalled working very 
closely with defense lawyers, especially those who were unaware of caveats in the “Juvenile 
Act” that allowed for no punishment even with a guilty plea: “We advised what is best for the 
child, for the person involved…. If he’s [the offender] got a good job, it’s his first offence and 
the parents promised to supervise him better, the magistrate would acquit”.94 
The Social Welfare Department’s unpublished monthly progress summaries were 
more detailed and candid about “closed” (usually satisfactory) and “failure” cases. The 
majority of probation cases generally stemmed from having to deal with broken homes or an 
unstable family situation, such as where one or both parents were missing, parents who were 
unable to support the family for various reasons, a family with multiple spouses and different 
children, or children with adoptive parents. There was a case where a boy came from a 
slightly indulgent environment.95 Son to his father’s second wife, “the atmosphere in the 
home then became more strained” after his father took a third wife. Already spoiled by his 
mother, the boy “began to associate with bad company” and stole from his parents. He was 
placed on probation for two years and admitted into a boarding school. When he stole again, 
his father’s pleas persuaded the Juvenile Court to extend his probation period. But his parents 
separated soon after and his behavior worsened to such an extent that he was finally placed in 
the Gimson School for Boys.  
 
                                                          
93 NAS OHC, Mary Quintal Tshu En (nee Voon). The Public Service – A Retrospection. Accession Number 
002219. Interviewed in 1999. Reel 4 (of 5). 
94 NAS OHC, Mary Quintal, reel 4. 
95 NUSCL, CO 1030/268. Progress Summary for February 1955. 
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Another probationer, B, similarly had a less stable home environment. Raised by his 
grandmother till her death, B had problems adjusting to living with his natural parents and 
siblings. He was thirteen years old when he stole a neighbor’s bicycle. Sentenced to two years 
of probation, he absconded three months before the end of his two-year probation, despite 
being relocated to a hostel and his probation officer’s efforts to find him employment. The 
report observed that the boy as a “rejected child, often feels insecure and unhappy”, 
projecting his “shortcomings onto an imaginary hostile world. Everyone is against him and he 
therefore retaliates”.96 Probation officers also seem to have relatively less success with 
probationers who were members of secret societies, even with those who appeared to be 
cooperating well with the officer.97 
They were not all “failure” cases however. Such instances demonstrated how the 
presence of the probation officer prevented more severe consequences, such as remanded in 
an approved school or even imprisonment. Statistics of “closed” and “failure” cases moreover 
do not always tell the whole story. Sometimes, the relationship between the probation officer 
and probationer continued long after the case was closed. In one case, a probation officer had 
established a two-year relationship with the probationer. After the latter was sentenced to two 
years’ imprisonment (for stealing a bicycle on top of a dozen prior convictions), the officer 
visited him in prison, taking the opportunity to “assist and befriend” him, and laid out the 
choices the former probationer had made that led him to imprisonment. Upon his release, he 
sought out the officer for help to leave Singapore and find a job in the Federation of Malaya 
as he did not have friends who were not ex-prisoners.98 The Probation Section started small, 
supervising juveniles below sixteen years of age. By the late 1950s, the service expanded to 
include young adults up to the age of twenty-one and adult, a group that also included 
discharged prisoners, “namely corrective trainees and preventive detainees” and reformative 
trainees.99 The section became a fully developed probation and aftercare service within the 
Social Welfare Department from 1964.  
 
 
                                                          
96 NUSCL, CO 1030/268. Progress Summary for December 1954. 
97 NUSCL, CO 1030/268. See cases reported in Progress Summary for September and October 1954. 
98 SWDAR for 1954, pp. 23-24. A similar instance of a probation officer going beyond his usual scope of 
responsibilities, see NUSCL, CO 1030/268. Progress Summary for June 1954.  
99 Veloo, Social Worker, p. 110. See also K. V. Veloo, Juvenile Delinquency in Singapore, 1961-1980: Trends, 
Programmes and Outcome of Probation and Discharges (Singapore: Dept. of Social Work and Psychology, 
National University of Singapore, 2004). 
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Counseling and Advice 
 
Financial woes were oft times merely the tip of an iceberg of deeper underlying issues 
within a family, necessitating a more holistic and sometimes more intrusive approach. For 
instance, using H’s case, advice and counseling services would have been necessary for his 
mother, such as to inform her of the laws that empowered the Social Welfare Department to 
temporarily place her son in a home, her legal rights in such a situation, and perhaps to even 
counsel her on coping with family pressures. Since its inception, the Department, mainly 
through its Citizens Advice and Missing Persons Bureaus (both legacies from the British 
Military Administration), had been providing advice and information to enquiries received 
from general public. From 1952, with the return of Monie Sundram (1919-1983) from 
London as a trained barrister, the Department’s counseling and advice service expanded 
considerably. “Monie”, as known affectionately by close friends, was Singapore’s first “Poor 
Man’s Lawyer”. 
Described by the Colonial Office as someone with a “real sense of vocation”, Monie 
was a good example of the “faceless” government official working diligently behind the 
scenes.100 A graduate (with a diploma in education) from Raffles College in 1939, he was a 
teacher before he joined the War Tax Department at the outbreak of the Second World War. 
After the war, he and other colleagues formed the nucleus of the Emergency Relief Center at 
Victoria Memorial Hall, which in turn housed the new Social Welfare Department in June 
1946. He was put in charge of the Relief Section, was also involved in the 1947 social survey 
and in the earliest discussions of social security for Singapore. In 1948, Monie received a 
scholarship to read law at Gray’s Inn in England for four years and was successfully called to 
the Bar in 1952.101 Monie’s qualifications allowed the Social Welfare Department to adopt a 
more professional approach to its counseling and advice services. He dealt with the more 
“technical” legal enquiries that went to a reorganized Counselling and Advice Section 
established in 1954. Another colleague addressed cases that did not immediately come under 
any legislation the Department enforces, such as marriage counseling, family disputes and 
                                                          
100 NUSCL, CO 1030/270. As described by W. H. Chinn during fourth meeting of the Advisory Committee on 
Social Development in Colonial Territories, 19 July 1954 (extracted).  
101 Information taken from The Straits Times, 13 August 1983, “T.F. Hwang takes you down memory lane”. 
Monie Sundram passed away in Leeds, England, in 1983.  
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maintenance issues).102 Together, the Section provided the following services: “legal 
assistance of a technical nature given by the Poor Man’s Lawyer; counseling in marriage 
disputes; advice in family disputes and maintenance cases and other domestic problems; an 
information and enquiry service; the issue of presumption of Death Certificates; liaison with 
hospital almoners and voluntary agencies”.103 Legal aid was also formally established for the 
poor. The neat demarcation of services hides a diverse range of overlapping cases and 
enquiries. In February 1954, the Counselling and Advice Section dealt with over two hundred 
enquiries. The following are some examples taken from progress summary for the month.  
In 1953, a “Miss Y” had approached the Social Welfare Department “for advice in the 
matter of marrying X”. She had done so because she had lost contact with her parents (during 
the war) and had no guardian to give the necessary consent. The Social Welfare Department 
arranged for “a clinical and radiological examination conducted by a Government medical 
officer” to establish Miss Y was of age (and did not require parental or guardian consent), and 
she was able to marry X.104  
A Malay laborer sought assistance claiming insurance for an injury sustained in an 
accident, as he had a major role in causing the accident. The Social Welfare Department acted 
as an intermediary, explaining to the insurance company the circumstances the laborer had 
found himself in: “that he was now drawing public assistance benefits, the full pay leave 
granted by his employer having expired …. [and] he was still undergoing physiotherapy 
treatment and would probably be unfit for work for some weeks. He had a wife and three 
children to support”. The insurance company then offered “an ex-gratia payment on 
compassionate grounds” without admitting liability, which was accepted.  
A (different) Mrs. X, in a “state of acute mental distress”, sought legal advice after 
receiving a solicitor’s letter on behalf of her husband. The latter was seeking the return of his 
“personal effects and furniture” in the midst of separating from his wife. Mrs. X had thought 
existing differences did not “merit a severance of the union”. The Social Welfare Department 
again acted as intermediary, responded to the solicitors requesting a meeting between the two. 
                                                          
102 The Assistant Secretary (Legal) was filled initially by Reverend Yeh Hua Fen. Ann Wee recalled taking over 
(de facto) sometime in 1956, most likely when Rev. Yeh suffered a stroke in July 1956. Hear Ann Wee’s oral 
history, reel 2. Also referenced in by Cromwell in personal letter to parents, 3 July 1956. 
103 NUSCL, CO 1030/268. Progress Summary for February 1954. 
104 NUSCL, CO 1030/268. Progress Summary for February 1954. The story had a happier ending, as the now 
Mrs. X was successfully reunited with her parents in July 1953. She wrote back to the Social Welfare 
Department the following year: “I wish to thank the Department of Social Welfare for the happiness it has 
brought into my life. I led and uncertain and lonely childhood not knowing whether my parents were alive or 
dead. Now I have a husband who loves me, and my heart is full of joy at having found my parents and brothers 
and sisters”. 
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By the second meeting, “the stiff and unyielding attitude … gradually evaporated”, and it 
appeared that reconciliation was possible. Another case was not that successful, as one party 
refused to “budge from her original stand” despite “eminently reasonable proposals” by the 
husband.  
 The following case is quoted in full to properly appreciate some of the more off-beat 
enquiries received: 
 
Mrs. A left Mr. A refusing to share their home with her mother-in-law. Mr. A 
wrote several letters to her entreating her to return and offering to make 
arrangements for his mother to live elsewhere, but Mrs. A refused to accept 
anything short of an undertaking that he would have nothing further to do with 
his mother. The essence of the offence of willfully refusing or neglecting to 
maintain one’s family is the mens rea (intention). There is no such offence 
when a husband gives a wife a bona fide offer to return to his home. 
 
It seems that the wife had gone to the Social Welfare Department enquiring if the husband 
was guilty of neglecting or failing to support her.  
The above (and more) was handled by the Assistant Secretary (Legal). A further 
hundred and fifty “new and old disputes” were handled by the Assistant Secretary 
(Counselling) in the same month. Those included “disputes between husband and wife, 
family disputes between parents and children, maintenance and custody cases, broken 
engagements, unmarried mothers, uncontrollable children, wage and compensation claims, 
applications for [Singapore Improvement] Trust accommodation, tenancy and many other 
disputes….”105 Some were as mundane as ensuring the enquiry reached the appropriate 
government department to resolve the issues at hand. Others were more complicated, 
necessitating at times intimate knowledge of particular norms and culture, relevant languages, 
and often times a fair amount of patience. Janet Yee recalled several moments when language 
acted as an obstacle (with humorous results) and as a connection. Once, attempting to speak 
Cantonese, she inadvertently asked about a “mother chicken” instead of the “mother of the 
family”. In another instance, she managed to convince a hitherto stubborn male client to 
finally pay maintenance for his daughter. He only agreed after being “touched” by Janet’s 
advice and pleas, which was spoken in lyrical Teochew.106  
                                                          
105 NUSCL, CO 1030/268. Progress Summary for February 1954. 
106 What Janet said roughly translates to “Even if your nose smells, you cannot cut it off. She’s your own 
daughter whom you have to raise”. NAS OHC, Janet Yee, reel 2. For an examination of causes of family 
disputes, see Janet Yee Keng Luan, “Disputes among Singapore Chinese families” (Unpublished academic 
exercise - Dept. of Social Studies, University of Malaya, 1960). 
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Medical-related Needs 
 
 The work of the almoner, or medical social worker, was not that much different. 
Almoners were key if understated contributors to Singapore’s social welfare history. Despite 
its generic nomenclature, the Social Welfare Department did not cover all of society’s well-
being. It did not cover all possible social contingencies a child might have, as the legislation 
its officers enforced focused more on juvenile crime, juvenile prostitution, human trafficking, 
and physical abuse (as and when reported). Moreover, the scope and meaning of social 
welfare work evolved as more trained social workers tackled the myriad social issues 
afflicting postwar Singapore society. The social needs of a medical patient and his or her 
family had to be looked after too, despite the obstacles. Cecilia Nayar experienced similar 
linguistic difficulties, not knowing much Mandarin or any of the Chinese dialects in a 
Chinese-majority society.107 Daisy Vaithilingam also initially found “very distressing” the 
Chinese practice of not taking back the body of a younger person after they died.108 
As seen previously, individual members of society initiated civic action to address the 
health and social needs of the mother and to provide more protection for the abused child. 
The almoners were also responsible for establishing new services and organizations to 
address the social needs arising from medical and health situations. One example was the 
fostering scheme. It was started by Daisy Vaithilingam after seeing many children with 
physical disabilities. She recalled that “the Children’s unit we had lots of children who were 
mentally handicapped, severely handicapped to an extent that they couldn’t walk, they 
couldn’t do anything….”109 When Daisy returned to Singapore in 1954, the almoner’s service 
was really still in its infancy. The number of orphanages in Singapore was small, let alone 
institutions dedicated to children with specific needs. Daisy recalled there were not many 
options for her young charges. 
 
When I was in pediatrics, they had a lot of children who were left, as I said, in 
the hospital and we didn’t know what to do with them. We couldn’t trace their 
parents. There was no institution to put them in. The Social Welfare 
Department didn’t want to have them. They did have a little home for retarded 
children [at New Market Road] and it was full. Occasionally we could get a 
child into that institution. Then Woodbridge Hospital [under the Medical 
Department] had a home, and they had a ward for mentally handicapped  
 
                                                          
107 NAS OHC, Cecilia Nayar, reel 3. 
108 NAS OHC, Daisy Vaithilingam, reel 3. 
109 NAS OHC, Daisy Vaithilingam, reel 4. 
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children, where they had low IQ, where they were not mentally ill, but they 
were retarded. And we could get some of the children in there.110 
  
Earlier attempts to solicit support for dedicated homes and schools for children with 
disabilities did not progress far (or quickly).111 The matter gained more publicity in 1952, 
when Elizabeth Milne, an almoner at the General Hospital, appealed for assistance for an 
eleven-year old boy suffering from severe malnourishment and neglect.112 The Social Welfare 
Department managed to open a small home (for thirty children) in August 1952.113 But there 
were many more in the hospital wards. So, much like Beng Neo and Mah Keong in their 
respective fields of work, Daisy made effective use of what was available (and who was 
willing to help). She had noticed that some of the hospital attendants were  
 
very good at looking after these small babies, who were retarded. So I talked 
to them and I said, “Would you be prepared to take these children home and 
look after them, if we give a certain sum of money to cover your expenses for 
the food, and some money for your trouble?” They said, “Yes”. So this was 
how the foster-care scheme started. So, it was with many of the attendants, the 
women, the female amahs, would agree to take the child…. Instead of taking 
up space in the wards, they would take the child home…. A lot of them had 
got quite attached to the children, for they had remained in the ward for a long 
time. So they were quite happy to take them home.114 
 
As the scheme expanded, the almoners collaborated with the Social Welfare Department to 
ensure potential foster parents were properly assessed. The latter took the scheme over 
completely in April 1956.115 
Daisy Vaithilingam lobbied hard for recognition and support for children with specific 
needs, needs that society at large might not always be aware of. She worked with the 
                                                          
110 NAS OHC, Daisy Vaithilingam, reel 4.  
111 The movement for a home for crippled children began in 1948. Progress was excruciatingly slow as financial 
support as well as available land was not immediately forthcoming. The home only opened in February 1953 
(under the auspices of the Singapore branch of the Red Cross). The Straits Times, 17 August 1948, “Corrective 
Home Needed in Colony”; The Singapore Free Press, 15 October 1948, “Fete gets $25,000 for the children”; 
The Straits Times, 24 November 1951, “Start on home for crippled children”; The Straits Times, 31 May 1952, 
“More cash needed to help these children”; The Straits Times, 7 July 1952, “Crippled children to get new 
home”; The Straits Times, 4 February 1953, “The Children met a Countess”. 
112 The Straits Times, 31 January 1952, “Hapless 11-year-old”, and The Straits Times, 12 February 1952, “$100 
for the boy nobody wants”. 
113 From October 1952, the Social Welfare Department began to admit children with intellectual disabilities into 
a dedicated home located at New Market Road (next to the Havelock Road building). See The Singapore Free 
Press, 11 August 1952, “Govt. Care for Sick Children”, The Straits Times, 16 October 1952, “Welfare Home for 
Post-Polio Children”. 
114 NAS OHC, Daisy Vaithilingam, reel 4. 
115 NAS OHC, Daisy Vaithilingam, reel 4. See SWDAR for 1958, p. 23. Hear also reel 3 of Janet Yee’s oral 
history. After she finished her diploma course in 1959, she returned to the Social Welfare Department as a 
childcare officer staffing the fostering scheme. 
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Education and Social Welfare Departments, and directly with the schools, to ensure that 
children with physical disabilities were still able to have an education.116 She arranged for 
teachers to come down to the hospital wards to teach those who could not yet be discharged, 
to ensure “that they would not be at a disadvantage” when they could leave.117 Daisy thought 
the substantial numbers of children with physical disabilities was due to various medical 
conditions. She mentioned polio, “TB of the bones, meningitis which is an infection of the 
brain, which was left with a physical or mental handicap … and there was encephalitis and 
also malnutrition, which left a lot of them handicapped both physically and mentally”.118 The 
problem (and the absence of any immediate remedy) was sufficiently vexing to prompt action 
to help children with mental disabilities. Support was obtained from the Rotary Club and the 
Singapore Children’s Society, and in 1961, a one-room “school” for twenty-six children was 
opened. It was called Towner Chin Pu – the latter two words a direct English transliteration of 
the Chinese characters for “improvement”. The following year, the Singapore Association for 
Retarded Children was formally established with Daisy acting as the Secretary of the new 
voluntary organization.119 
The chronically ill, especially those without family in Singapore, was another group 
that necessitated advocacy on their behalf. Daisy recalled how doctors, sometimes through no 
fault of their own, would send these patients to the almoner because hospital beds were in 
short supply and medically speaking, nothing else could be done for them. But problems 
arose if medical aftercare was still needed after discharge. She recalled: 
 
[T]here were a lot of single, older people who lived in lodging houses, shared 
[between] five, six, seven, eight of ten people in a room in Chinatown. If that 
person falls ill and he will be flat out on his back, who is going to look after 
him?120 
 
 
                                                          
116 NAS OHC, Daisy Vaithilingam, reel 4. The Social Welfare Department provided transportation. She recalled 
a heart-warming example of a school principal ensuring an entire class remained on the ground floor (as classes 
moved up a physical level as they graduated each education level) so as to allow a child who was unable to 
climb stairs to attend lessons within the same group of students. 
117 NAS OHC, Daisy Vaithilingam, reel 4. She recalled how happy she and her colleagues were when all the 
children they were responsible for finished their education. “Our objective was [not only] to get handicapped 
children into the normal school, but to get them to a level where they could compete in the normal school”. 
118 NAS OHC, Daisy Vaithilingam, reel 4. 
119 It was renamed the Movement for the Intellectually Disabled of Singapore (MINDS) in 1985, which is still in 
existence today. For a brief overview of its historical milestones, see “About Us”, 
http://www.minds.org.sg/AboutUs.html. Accessed 21 July 2015. Reel 5 of Daisy Vaithilingam’s oral history 
contains her recollections in setting up the voluntary organization. 
120 NAS OHC, Daisy Vaithilingam, reel 5. 
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The almoners tapped on the existing network of community hospitals, lodgings and even 
temples that the chronic sick could turn to. They arranged for financial grants to such places 
to help take care of their patients, and for locations that needed more facilities (like the 
temples), solicited financial support to pay for nurses, attendants, cooks, and other materials 
for their patients’ comfort. In many ways, they were creating a “semi-nursing home” on 
temple grounds. The main problem was that “there was never a time when you could find a 
home immediately”, despite the number of community hospitals and lodgings available.121 
The almoners’ hopes for a hospital dedicated to the chronically ill were cruelly dashed when 
the Thomson Road Hospital, originally built for such a purpose, was converted instead into a 
general-purpose hospital.122 
 
Social Welfare and Nation-building in the Late Colonial State 
 
The above provides particular insights into social welfare work, from the personal 
memories of the social welfare officer and professional social worker, and from recorded 
cases of received help. The types of issues that brought both sides into contact ranged from 
the mundane, such as seeking information, financial relief, or protection from abuse, to the 
more complex, such as helping a probationer, resolving family issues, or initiating schemes 
and organizations to address a pressing social need. In doing so, contact was made and 
maintained, between the social welfare officer and their clients, between social welfare 
officers and social workers or almoners, or between social workers and government and 
society at large. All of which created a physicality that lent structure not only to an 
increasingly prominent Social Welfare Department, but also gave coherence to a nascent 
social welfare state in late colonial Singapore.123 Given the very personal and focused nature 
of those bonds, it is unlikely they consciously thought their work contributed to the broader 
processes of state- or nation-building. Especially after the communal feeding program, the 
                                                          
121 NAS OHC, Daisy Vaithilingam, reel 6. 
122 NAS OHC, Daisy Vaithilingam, reel 6. Daisy was at the ground breaking ceremony and said she was “very 
heartbroken” when she heard the news. The Thomson Road Hospital is the predecessor to the present-day 
Changi General Hospital. 
123 This is a theme, framed in a straightforward interpretation of nation-building (the process of building and 
sustaining the Singapore nation), which has appeared recently in local social work circles. See for instance Ang 
Bee Lian, “The Soul of Nation Building in Singapore: Contributions from Social Work”, in David Chan (ed.), 
50 Years of Social Issues in Singapore (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2015), chapter 8. Ang is a 
social worker the current (at time of writing) Director of Social Welfare within the Ministry of Social and 
Family Development. The chapter builds on a 2011 speech entitled “The Role of Social Work Professionals in 
Nation-building”, presented at the Singapore Association of Social Workers’ 40th Anniversary Symposium, 
2011. www.ncss.gov.sg/About_NCSS/download_file.asp?speechid=106. Accessed 10 December 2015. 
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Social Welfare Department’s scope was limited to specific sections of society, such as the old 
and the very young, the indigent and destitute, the delinquent and others perceived to be 
vulnerable and at risk of bad social influences. 
Even so, by the eve of political independence from British colonialism, the Social 
Welfare Department, or at least the services it provided, was familiar to Singapore society. As 
evident by some of the cases handled by the Counselling and Advice Section, people knew 
where to go for assistance and advice, even if their needs might be rather mundane. Earlier 
chapters have also demonstrated societal awareness of the Social Welfare Department. In 
1951, someone knew enough of the Social Welfare Department to tell Ah Meng, the little girl 
encountered in Chapter 4, to seek refuge there. During the mid-1950s, an almoner and a 
parish priest assisting Augustin Gomez and Valentine Frois respectively also knew where to 
turn to for the financial and other social assistance their clients required. By the end of the 
decade, long queues outside the Social Welfare Department along Havelock Road waiting to 
collect their Public Assistance allowances were a common sight.124  
Increasing awareness of the Social Welfare Department was not due solely to the 
work its officers performed. Affiliated organizations and institutions, with their own 
structures and work processes, also played significant roles in adding tangibility to the social 
welfare state. Members of the Social Welfare Council, most of whom were providers of social 
welfare in their own way, were regularly briefed on the Department’s activities and services. 
The Council might not have been as effective as initially hoped for, but as a platform for 
discussion, questions, and the occasional calling to attention of particular social needs or to 
an individual in need, the Council helped maintained a focus on the needs of Singapore 
society. The students and faculty of the Social Studies Diploma program also increased 
awareness and the physicality of the social welfare state in their own way. In the search for 
more local knowledge and for placements for their students, faculty members maintained 
close ties to the Social Welfare Departments in Singapore and in Malaya, the Social Welfare 
Council (and later the Singapore Council of Social Service), religious bodies, and voluntary 
organizations, such as the Singapore Children’s Society and Family Planning Association, 
and even commercial and business organizations. Each of those engaged with the different 
needs aspects of Singapore society, through their clients, their employees and their 
                                                          
124 See for instance accompanying photo in The Straits Times, 13 February 1958, “Soon-an end to this queue for 
dole”. Ann Wee notes that the Social Welfare Department then might not have been known to everyone, but 
everyone seemed to know about Public Assistance. (Personal communication). See Chapter 7 for expansion of 
Public Assistance as part of Singapore’s search for social security during the 1950s. 
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dependents. Some of the diploma students were already members of the Social Welfare 
Department, and were hence in a position to advise or even render preliminary assistance in 
the course of interviewing their research subjects. Others were exposed to the social services 
available through their practical placements, and took that knowledge into their work as 
social workers, almoners, or social welfare officers. 
All of these served to buttress a nascent social welfare state, first through awareness 
that certain social services exist, and then utilizing those services either by referring someone 
in need to the appropriate person or department, or by rendering assistance directly. The 
Social Welfare Department acted as a conduit for these processes, such as receiving referrals, 
hearing and investigating cases, and then provided the appropriate assistance or service. To be 
sure, the Department did not set out to replace existing support networks maintained by the 
various communities in Singapore, but it did position itself as central to social welfare 
activities. To some extent, this built on the non-partisan, inclusive approach introduced earlier 
by the Rotary Club and the Salvation Army, which was then interrupted by the war. 
 
Colonial Nation-building 
 
This was perhaps the point where the expansion of local social welfare networks and 
processes met the broader policy objectives of colonial development and welfare, which was 
to mend the fault-lines of a plural society and to create a more cohesive community. The 
structures, processes, and networks introduced and then painstakingly maintained by social 
welfare officers, social workers, and their affiliates, laid the foundations to facilitate 
community development and to prepare for the next stage, nation-building. It is in this 
context we turn our attention to the would-be policymakers, the heads of the Social Welfare 
Department, in particular Percy McNeice and Tom Cromwell, respectively the first and last 
colonial Secretaries for Social Welfare.  
Chapter 4 has earlier recounted McNeice’s efforts to put an untried department on a 
firm foundation, first via the communal feeding program and the deliberate use of print 
media, and then through broader platforms, such as the regional social welfare conference, 
the social survey and the Five-Year Plan. His experiences however differed from those 
highlighted in this chapter. In his oral history recorded in 1981, when queried on the social 
conditions that might have required a social welfare department, McNeice could not 
immediately think of any particular reason. He cited generally the ill-treatment of children, 
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abandoned wives, or needs that required financial assistance, and then commented: “But you 
couldn’t say that there was any widespread poverty or anything of that sort that required 
government action”.125 He then recounted again his memories of the feeding schemes, and in 
doing so, perhaps demonstrated the more pressing issues, for him at least, were dealing with 
food shortages and countering the black market.126 Even though they had all been working in 
the same department, McNeice’s memories demonstrates a different, slightly aloof experience 
of the higher-level policymaker, relative to the direct and regular engagement with various 
kinds of poverty the home superintendent, the youth service officer, or the case investigator 
had. He then concluded: 
 
But other than [that] the Social Welfare Department was intended just to cater 
for anything that might arise involving hardship to people, involving cruelty to 
children involving exploitation. Possibly merely requiring the help of the 
Department to tell the applicant where to go in order to get whatever it was 
they needed.127 
 
McNeice’s oral history also gives the distinct impression that the Social Welfare Department 
acted mainly in a residual manner, and continued the work of the prewar Chinese 
Protectorate: 
 
The work of the Social Welfare Department had been very largely covered by 
the Chinese Protectorate [before the war]. And I supposed maybe the words 
“Chinese Protectorate” possibly had an implication that the Chinese needed 
protection. Anyway the words “Chinese Protectorate” were to my recollection 
hardly used at all after the war…. [L]ooking back, I think that probably the 
words “Social Welfare” were substituted for Chinese Protectorate.128 
 
The interviewer attempted to clarify if the Social Welfare Department was “formed to cater to 
everybody, not the Chinese only?” McNeice replied: 
 
Yes, oh yes. But then since the bulk of the population is Chinese… and even 
under the Chinese Protectorate, we didn’t deal exclusively with Chinese. 
There were cases where Malays were involved and we would deal with those  
 
                                                          
125 NAS OHC, Percy McNeice, reel 13. 
126 NAS OHC, Percy McNeice, reel 14. He noted that Singapore’s situation was similar to England during the 
same period (1946-1948), where “rationing was very strict, you couldn't buy meat, you couldn't buy well, kinds 
of things. So there were certainly no food in Europe that was available to be sent out here to the East”.  
127 NAS OHC, Percy McNeice, reel 14. McNeice’s oral history interview did not cover the conference, social 
survey and the Five-Year Plan. As the purpose of the interview revolves around McNeice’s time as an internee 
during the war and then as President of the City Council, those moments were conspicuously absent in the oral 
account. 
128 NAS OHC, Percy McNeice, reel 14.  
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as well. The same way as women and girls’ protection if we found…a Malay 
girl who had been lured into immoral earnings or anything like that….129 
  
McNeice did not recollect any deliberate discrimination according to ethnicity, just a 
matter of addressing more prominent issues in a Chinese-majority society and adjusting 
according to the situation at hand.130 The case summaries in the monthly progress and annual 
reports were not usually identified by their ethnicity or language, unless it was relevant to 
how the case was being handled, such as ensuring the needs of Muslims in the various homes. 
Functions moreover were focused on needs in general, not the needs of particular 
communities. Whenever differences arose, usually concerning religious practices, it was 
stated factually that individual practices were accommodated as far as possible.131 It is 
perhaps a side effect of policy implementation that the needs of the majority are usually 
catered to first. This does not immediately mean however that the needs of the minority were 
intentionally ignored; they could have simply been in a blind spot until highlighted. 
Thomas Pearson Cromwell was the last colonial Secretary for Social Welfare, joining 
the Social Welfare Department in October 1953, and oversaw its transition from a colonial to 
a partial self-governing administration.132 The Colonial Office noted in 1954 that the 
“Department of Social Welfare in Singapore was highly organized” but “suffered from a lack 
of continuity in leadership”, having had “six heads in seven years”.133 While the 
                                                          
129 NAS OHC, Percy McNeice, reel 13. 
130 He went on to point out that the Labour Department mostly dealt with the Tamils (MCS officers sent to India 
to learn Tamil or Telagu), while Malays came under the purview of the District Officer and had no separate 
government department tasked to manage its affairs. In 1951, the Colonial Office opened a file entitled 
“Suggested Establishment of a Secretariat for Malay Affairs in Singapore, to Safeguard the Position of the 
Malay Community”. (NUSCL, CO 1022/429). As a result of events in Singapore, such as a death sentence 
passed on a rioter during the Maria Hertogh riots and Muslim agitation against a film (David and Bathsheba) 
that supposedly slighted Islam, the Governor of Singapore asked for a discussion at a Malaya / Borneo 
Governors Conference meeting. The meeting agreed some form of action should be taken, as the Singapore 
Malays, “a small leaderless, depressed class”, should not fall prey to Indonesian and Communist agitators. 
However, there is no evidence of a follow-up and the file was archived almost devoid of documents. 
131 For instance, Tan Beng Neo had to ensure Maria Hertogh’s religious needs were met during the latter’s stay 
in York Hill (which incidentally also coincided with holy month of Ramadan). Those included separate cooking 
facilities and helping her to observe the fasting period.  
132 Cromwell was trained for work in Chinese affairs. He arrived in Malaya in 1932 and worked in various 
positions for the Chinese Protectorate. When war broke out, he was the District Officer for Christmas Island 
(usually an official from the Chinese Protectorate due to Chinese labor). Cromwell survived a mutiny by his 
Indian soldiers, and was interned in Java and Sulawesi for the remainder of the war (See The Straits Times, 4 
January 1947, “Questions on White Flag at Mutiny Trial”, for his testimony to certain aspects of his 
involvement. An account of mutiny is given in John Hunt, Suffering Through Strength: The Men Who Made 
Christmas Island (Canberra: J. Hunt, 2011). After the war, he joined the BMA’s Chinese Affairs Department, 
reporting to Victor Purcell, the BMA’s Chinese Advisor. Cromwell was involved in conducting a survey of 
Chinese education in Malaya and Singapore. In 1947, he was posted to Sarawak as an Assistant Secretary of 
Chinese Affairs, overseeing a portfolio that included social welfare and labor matters until he left in 1953. NAS, 
SOAS PP MS 33, Cromwell to Parents, 11 November 1945. 
133 NUSCL, CO 1030/270. 
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Department’s work did not suffer too much from the “revolving door”134 of colonial officers, 
the promising start made by McNeice and his deputy Eames Hughes from 1946 to 1950 
spluttered almost to a halt between 1950 and 1953. The Five-Year Plan fell by the wayside, 
barely mentioned in the annual reports following 1949 except in the negative. Though certain 
functions did expand and the Department was well-established, such as Public Assistance, 
social welfare despite earlier rhetoric and promise seemed low on government priorities.  
 Cromwell’s first impression of the Social Welfare Department was that it was a 
“spending department”, and that it was a potential target for “economies whenever these have 
to be enforced more rigidly than usual”.135 Cromwell gave his parents a breakdown of his 
senior staff. It consisted of a Secretary for Social Welfare, a Deputy for Social Welfare, nine 
Assistant Secretaries, a Lady Assistant Secretary for Women and Children, a Juvenile Court 
Magistrate and a Superintendent of Homes.136 There were also Supervisors – one rank below 
Assistant Secretary – for specific portfolios. Overall the Social Welfare Department employed 
over 200 people. A dividing line can be discerned between the bureaucratic designations of 
Assistant Secretary and Supervisor. Until 1954, Supervisor positions were filled mostly by 
locals (mostly Chinese, with a several Indian or Malay), while the senior positions were filled 
by the British. It seemed less a racial division than a hierarchy organized by education 
qualifications. Once locals received a basic degree, they were promoted to Assistant 
Secretary.137 As more locals obtained higher qualifications, the senior positions of the 
Department began to have a more distinctly local flavor. To give a comparison, in his 1948 
visit, Chinn observed there were nine Europeans and two locals (one Chinese and one Indian) 
as senior staff.138 In 1954, there were six Europeans and seven locals (one Eurasian, one 
Indian and five Chinese) as senior staff, as local officers began returning from England with 
graduate and postgraduate degrees.139 
                                                          
134 See Ann Wee’s essay in Barry Desker and Kwa Chong Guan (eds.), Goh Keng Swee: a public career 
remembered (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies and World Scientific, 2011). 
135 NAS, SOAS PP MS 33, Cromwell to Parents, 19 October 1953. “There is an Organization and Efficiency 
Team working out here. It has its eye on “my” department. Meadows says he’s staved them off. I wonder how 
long for?” Copies (in microfilm) available in NAS, with SOAS holding copyright. 
136 NAS, SOAS PP MS 33, Cromwell to Parents, 25 October 1953. 
137 Goh Keng Swee, Monie Sundram, Woon Wah Siang, and others became Assistant Secretaries after their 
degrees. The issue was not much about rank and recognition, but also of equality in pay and allowances. See 
Turnbull and Yeo for overview of Council of Joint Action. 
138 NAS, CSO 2031/49. Chinn also foresaw the vulnerability of having MCS officers in senior positions as they 
were transferable to other departments in Singapore or even the Federation of Malaya, as happened to McNeice 
and Eames Hughes. 
139 SWDAR for 1954, Appendix IV, p. 57. They were Tan Kay Hai, Carl de Souza, Kismet Wong, Goh Keng 
Swee, Monie Sundram, Gertrude Guok, and Rev. Yeh Hua Fen. Supervisor positions were mostly local, 
predominantly with Chinese names.  
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In Chapter 5, we glimpsed Cromwell’s single-mindedness in paving the way for a new 
social service council. Similarly, he wasted no time reorganizing the Social Welfare 
Department. Flagging efforts at promoting youth welfare, encumbered by the slow 
development of youth clubs in previous years, were reinvigorated with fresh personnel. A 
position for a Principal Youth Service Officer was created, and new youth officers like Janet 
Yee were hired. The expertise of existing youth club leaders was also utilized more 
efficiently. Withdrawn from full-time club duties at particular clubs, they were instead given 
geographical areas of responsibility where their experience in establishing and developing 
youth clubs was spread out amidst different neighborhoods and communities. This 
arrangement boosted the numbers of youth clubs exponentially, from eleven in 1953 to 
twenty-five, with another eleven in the process of formation, in 1954.140 A liaison officer 
position was also created as part of the reorganization to coordinate with hospital almoners 
and voluntary agencies, and later to facilitate visits from international dignitaries. In line with 
earlier attempts to better publicize the Department, a pamphlet entitled “The Work of the 
Social Welfare Department”, was produced in 1954 and then updated in 1956.141 
Cromwell exerted considerable, if slightly misguided, efforts to create a distinct 
identity for the Social Welfare Department, resulting in abortive attempts to get his staff to 
use a distinctive Department symbol and flag.142 He also initiated a new Five-Year 
development plan for the years 1957 to 1962. The plan was never published, and never 
mentioned in departmental annual reports or available monthly progress summaries. At the 
time of writing, I have only seen one rough draft of the second Five-Year Plan. It was 
undated, but accompanied by a memo dated September 1955 asking department staff to read 
before a meeting to discuss the plan.143 The 1955 plan was similar to the first Five-Year Plan 
of 1949, focused as it did on building projects and staffing requirements. But with the Social 
Welfare Department already in its tenth year, there was a key difference. The draft plan 
                                                          
140 SWDAR for 1954, p. 16. 
141 NAS, PRO 10. Copies of 1954 and 1956 versions can be found inside. “The purpose of this pamphlet is to 
explain the work which the Social Welfare Department undertakes at its present stage of development in order 
that voluntary bodies, charitable associations, benevolent individuals, almoners and members of other 
Government departments may have a ready reference when persons in need of welfare help of some kind appeal 
to them for assistance and they have to be directed to this Department”. 
142 Images can be found in NAS, SWD 258/55. The Social Welfare Department emblem was supposed to be the 
qi lin (麒麟), a Chinese mythical creature with lion and dragon-like features, and set against a green background 
for a possible flag. Cromwell even had department vehicles painted green so as to have a distinct presence 
during relief operations and everyday duties. He described his fruitless efforts in a letter to his parents dated 15 
September 1957. 
143 NAS, SWD 328/55. Social Welfare Department Five Year Plan 1957 - 1962. 
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argued that the Social Welfare Department “should ... no longer be concerned with residual 
needs”, a reference to its role in overseeing functions not otherwise provided by government 
or “private agencies”. Instead, it “should be concerned with social development and take a 
positive part in the construction of a society more in harmony with the political physical and 
economic environment of today”.144 The language used could be seen as tacit 
acknowledgment of the limits and residual nature of the Social Welfare Department’s core 
functions, such as financial relief, rehabilitation of delinquents or the care and protection of 
women and children. That it should take a “positive part” in constructing a more harmonious 
society demonstrated an intent, at least on the part of its author (presumably Cromwell), to 
take a more proactive role. Cromwell attempted to do this via a redefinition of the community 
development portfolio the Social Welfare Department took on from 1950.145  
 
Community Development 
 
Community development, in the context of the Malayan Emergency being fought in 
the jungles of the Malayan peninsula, meant “the resettlement of squatters, adult or mass 
education, or with the co-operative movement”.146 In the Singapore context, it was “a 
movement designed to promote better living for the whole community, with the active 
participation and, if possible, on the initiative of the Community....”147 This manifested 
primarily via the building of community centers, particularly in the rural areas, and extending 
the scope of existing children’s social centers. In 1953, the Social Welfare Department 
opened two new community centers in Siglap and Serangoon.148 Cromwell’s plan did not 
deviate much from initial intent, as it saw the community center as integral “for the fostering 
                                                          
144 NAS, SWD 328/55. Social Welfare Department Five Year Plan 1957 - 1962. 
145 SWDAR for 1950, pp. 5-19. A Community Development Section was created in 1950, which then rather 
indiscriminately and haphazardly lumped the youth clubs, children’s social centers, children crèches together 
with the institutional homes. The reorganization separated institutional homes and probation services from the 
clubs, social centers and crèches. 
146 SWDAR for 1954, p. 1. See also for a detailed personnel movement as result of reorganization, CO 
1030/268, annex to January 1954 monthly progress summary. For community development in the African and 
broader imperial context, see Rosaleen Smyth, “The Roots of Colonial Development in Colonial Office Policy 
and Practice in Africa”. Social Policy and Administration, 38:4 (August 2004), pp. 418-436. Smyth commented 
that the social welfare initiatives introduced in Africa were the colonial counterpart of the Beveridge 
recommendations in Britain. The initiatives were initially known as adult education, before changing to 
community development after 1948. Smyth: “Community development at its broadest was about involving 
people in a community in educating themselves to improve the circumstances of their lives through health, 
agriculture, civic education and mass literacy schemes”. 
147 SWDAR for 1951, p. 33. 
148 SWDAR for 1953, p. 14. 
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of a spirit of neighbourliness and common citizenship in the present plural society”.149 The 
draft plan projected for twenty-five community centers by 1962, at a building rate of “two 
large and three small centres per year”. The existing children’s social centers – twelve in total 
(in 1955) – were to form the basis of expansion into “full Community Centres”.150 
The reference to a “common citizenship in the present plural society” is intriguing. It 
not only alluded to Furnivall’s work – the first edition of Colonial Policy and Practice had 
been in circulation for seven years by 1955 – but also boldly challenged the Social Welfare 
Department to expand beyond its residual functions, and into the realm of nation-building. 
Cromwell would have undoubtedly been influenced by circumstances in Singapore. Under a 
section for “Social Centres & Community Development”, the draft plan noted “the rapid pace 
of political change in Singapore on the one hand and on the other the racial complexity of the 
population”, and therefore “urgent measures are required to foster cultural development and 
the growth of integrated local communities”.151 By 1955, the fault-lines within Singapore 
society were becoming clearer, particularly in the aftermath of violent events like the Maria 
Hertogh riots in 1950, as well as election politicking that inadvertently accentuated 
differences. Moreover, from 1954, the Communists, after suffering setbacks in their jungle 
insurgency, had switched to United Front tactics in order to capture power constitutionally. 
Generally speaking, that meant infiltrating, establishing, and influencing trade unions, student 
associations and political parties. Such tactics played some part in three major clashes 
between the government, and students and workers, namely the Chinese students protest 
against the National Service registration drive in 1954, the Hock Lee Bus Company strike 
and ensuing riot in 1955, and the Chinese Middle Schools unrest in 1956.152 
It was perhaps a far less violent event that smothered the social welfare 
developmental plan in its infancy. In April 1955, Singapore took its first step towards self-
government when the Labour Front party, led by David Marshall, formed a coalition 
government that was responsible for several portfolios, including social welfare. This 
constitutional development changed the working dynamics of the Social Welfare Department 
vis-à-vis government and society. Whereas before the Department was a stand-alone agency 
                                                          
149 NAS, SWD 328/55. Social Welfare Department Five Year Plan 1957 - 1962.  
150 NAS, SWD 328/55. Social Welfare Department Five Year Plan 1957 - 1962. 
151 NAS, SWD 328/55. Social Welfare Department Five Year Plan 1957 - 1962.  
152 See Lee Ting Hui, The Open United Front: The Communist Struggle in Singapore, 1954-1966 (Singapore: 
South Seas Society, 1996). For a more recent study, see C. C. Chin, “The United Front Strategy of the Malayan 
Communist Party in Singapore, 1950s-1960s”, in Michael Barr and Carl A. Trocki (eds.), Paths Not Taken: 
Political Pluralism in Post-War Singapore (Singapore: NUS Press, c2008). 
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and the Secretary for Social Welfare reported directly to the Colonial Secretary (or the Officer 
Administering the Government), the Social Welfare Department became one part of a 
Ministry of Labour and Welfare. Cromwell became Director of Social Welfare, reporting to a 
Permanent Secretary, who in turn reported to a Chief Secretary (replacing the Colonial 
Secretary) as well as advised the Minister for Labour and Welfare.153 
Hence, Cromwell no longer had the relative freedom his predecessors had in shaping 
social welfare policy. The restrictions rankled, but not as much as seeing his ambitious plans 
scuttled. After seeing the Social Welfare Department’s budget slashed for the umpteenth time, 
he could not hold back his feelings.154 He elaborated and warned of divisive tendencies: 
 
The amount which the social welfare department is allowed for this (i.e. 1956) 
year’s estimates of new buildings [have] been cut to a literally nominal figure: 
to all intents and purposes it has been cut down to nil.... I cannot understand 
the mentality of people who cut down on the very items which would actively 
promote fellow feeling and good citizenship among the population…. Instead 
of trying to get people together everything is being done not by the diehard 
colonial officers but by the new Government, the elected Government, to 
increase the separatist tendencies of the Malays and the Chinese, obviously 
from the British connection, but ultimately of course from each other.155 
 
It is unfortunate that the departmental annual reports for 1956 and 1957 were not published. 
The monthly progress summaries, which were still being submitted throughout 1956 and 
1957 to the Social Welfare Council and the Colonial Office, presented mainly factual 
                                                          
153 One result of the constitutional changes was a confusing situation that led to administrative oversights. One 
example was the non-publication of the department’s annual reports in 1956 and 1957. See NAS, MLL (Labour) 
18/58 for internal official attempts to trace reports from 1957 to 1959. Lim Yew Hock wanted the annual reports 
for the years 1956 and 1957 to be published in time for the 1959 General Election. The issue however was not 
resolved even after June 1959. Woon Wah Siang finally recommended to publish the 1958 report instead. 
Reaction by Colonial Office can be found in NUSCL, CO 1030/270, specifically minute by R. Terell, 12 Sept 
1958 (p. 26 in file). Cessation of publication was queried, and was speculated that it could have been due to 
constitutional developments and consequent changes to government structures. Minute did acknowledge a “once 
and for all pamphlet describing how the department works, written by Miss Guok Assistant Director (Liaison)”. 
154 NAS, SOAS PP MS 33. Cromwell to Parents, 2 October 1955. “The sooner I get out of this outfit the better. I 
am honestly of the opinion that I should be far happier doing some semi-skilled light manual labour of routine 
clerical work, than I am now kicking against the pricks all the time”. 
155 NAS, SOAS PP MS 33. Cromwell to Parents, 2 October 1955 “Not only does Government negatively refuse 
money for the department, it actively subsidises bodies which it is not Government policy (one would have 
thought) to help by more than token assistance. The total to be spent as we estimated it on youth welfare and 
youth service, youth clubs, camps, assistance to scouts guides etc. etc. salaries of Government officers in charge 
of that work, subsidies etc. came to a certain amount, say X. We were cut to ½X in the first revision of the 
estimates. It is now one-third X. BUT in the meantime Government has decided to give 5/4X (five quarters of 
X) to help to set up a Youth Sports Centre, to be run by a non-Government body. And the City Council are 
giving 5/4X to the same desirable object. It has been on the five year plan to build a Youth Centre (of which 
activities sports would be one) for years – at a cost of $100,000 dollars. This item has been cut out of the 
estimates completely, one fortnight after the Singapore Youth Council drew up their requirements for a Youth 
Centre at Government request. Government here is just nonsense just now”. 
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statements rather than observations. Hence, Cromwell’s “items” that would promote “fellow 
feeling and good citizenship” cannot be fully explored. A letter to his parents, dated July 
1955, gives some insight into Cromwell’s thinking. He first referenced the “exciting” process 
of moving people into “suburbs and satellite towns” without many facilities in the beginning. 
 
My department is responsible for the provision of community centres (so-
called). These are intended to provide a building where there is a hall, big 
enough to play badminton in, with a proper stage for amateur concerts and 
plays, baby shows, lectures and so on, and rooms in which committees of 
clubs and societies can meet; provide first aid posts, a telephone, kindergartens 
(more or less unofficial) and some kind of training for children who can’t get 
into school, facilities for boys and girls, youth clubs and so on…. In short, it is 
our job to build up a feeling of neighbourliness among people who just happen 
to be neighbours. This is to replace the clan system, the provincial or village-
of-origin society among the Chinese, which are largely dead anyway.156 
 
An internal department memo on the “Community Centres in Singapore” dated July 
1957, reiterated the potential of the community center. They “[provide] facilities for the 
development in all sections of the community an interest in, an understanding of, and a sense 
of responsibility for the life and problems of the community”. It caters for all individuals, 
regardless of “sectional” needs and interests, within the boundary of a neighborhood, and 
provides a space for the “pursuit of common interests”. The memo continued: 
 
Neighbourhoodliness does not, of itself, necessarily constitute a social bond; 
but if, by grouping its leisure activities in a recreational and educational 
centre, a neighbourhood can develope [sic] into a socially conscious 
community, learning, by managing the affairs of the Centre, to participate 
intelligently in the affairs of local and central government, then education for 
democracy will have made a real advance.157 
  
Cromwell was not the first to come up with the idea of the community center. But his 
memo was perhaps one of the earliest to connect its functions, and by relation the Social 
Welfare Department, to nation-building. At its most fundamental, nation-building refers to the 
efforts to foster a community with a sense of cohesion, by emphasizing commonalities, such 
as language, culture, loyalty to common ideals and goals, and usually within the set 
boundaries of a territory.158 In the case of Singapore, as with most other colonies looking to 
                                                          
156 NAS, SOAS PP MS 33. Cromwell to Parents, 10 July 1955. 
157 NAS, SWD 145/57. “Community Centres in Singapore”. 
158 Nation-building in Singapore and Southeast Asia, or its history at least, has been understood and studied 
through more political lens, which is usually a focus on government structures and its policies. See for instance 
published monographs under the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak’s History of Nation-building series (edited by Wang 
Gungwu), by Cheah Boon Kheng, Edwin Lee, and Taufik Abdullah, for the countries of Malaysia, Singapore, 
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decolonize after the Second World War, there were several impediments to a post-colonial 
nation-state, namely the presence of divergent loyalties and interests within the plural society, 
as well as the absence of expertise and experience in governing and administering a territory 
with a diverse society. Hence, the potential of community centers to train post-colonial 
leaders of society was attractive, not only for British government officials – who were well-
aware of their expiry date – but also for budding leaders of a self-governing Singapore.159 By 
the end of 1957, the Social Welfare Department built and managed at least eight community 
centers.160 Other community centers were also built and managed by other state institutions, 
such as the Rural Board and the Singapore Improvement Trust.161 In August 1958, oversight 
of all community centers was transferred to a new Community Recreation Division within the 
Ministry of Labour and Welfare. The division returned briefly to the Social Welfare 
Department in July 1959, but a year later in 1960, the management of all community centers 
in Singapore were permanently transferred to the newly-established People’s Association.162 
 
Twilight of the British Colonial Officer 
 
Cromwell’s presence in Singapore, a consequence of colonialism, became untenable 
as soon as the Labour Front formed a partially self-government in 1955, which was in 
contrast a consequence of decolonization. Fiercely anti-colonial, David Marshall as Chief 
Minister accelerated Malayanization, a process whereby locals would replace over four 
hundred expatriate officers in Singapore’s civil service.163 Cromwell saw the writing on the 
wall, “We have to accept the independence of Malaya and later Singapore; already we are 
                                                          
and Indonesia respectively. Each of them focused almost exclusively on the nationalist and post-colonial 
leaders, their ideas and governments, of each country. See also essays in Wang Gungwu (ed.), Nation-building: 
Five Southeast Asian Histories (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). 
159 See Seah Chee Meow, Community Centres in Singapore: Their Political Involvement (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 1973). Seah quoted then Minister for Culture, S. Rajaratnam as saying: “When the 
Government introduced Community Centres its main aim was to use them as training grounds for democracy. 
Democracy does not mean only elected leader running the country or relying on the government to do 
everything…. Democracy means people also learning to do things for themselves; people willing to do service 
voluntarily for the community”. (Quoted in Seah, p. 59). See also his speech at the Anniversary Celebrations of 
Kampong Glam and Kota Raja Community Centres on 6 June 1964. Available at NAS Speech and Press 
Releases, http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/PressR19640606a.pdf. Accessed 6 December 2015. 
Rajaratnam’s references to democracy and civic participation is similar to the language used by Cromwell in the 
1957 memo. The community centers in present-day Singapore comes under the direct purview of the Prime 
Minister’s Office, via the People’s Association. 
160 NUSCL, CO 1030/671-672. 
161 NAS, SWD 145/57. “Community Centres in Singapore”, p. 2. The Rural Board and the Singapore 
Improvement Trust together had thirteen centers under their charge. 
162 SWDAR for 1959, p. 8, and SWDAR for 1960, p. 26.   
163 See chapter on “Towards a National Government” in Yeo, Political Development in Singapore. 
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much less “important” than we used to be”.164 Still, he spelled out the magnitude of the 
change: 
 
In any case I am only one of forty heads of departments in Singapore…. On 5 
XII 56 the Malayanisation scheme will be put before the Legislative 
Assembly, providing for the replacement of European officers (now referred to 
contemptuously as “expats”) as soon as possible.... And the reasons for 
wanting heads of departments to go is of course so that local boys can be the 
“bosses”. Quite understandable.165 
 
The “local boy” who replaced Cromwell in September 1957 was Dr. Goh Keng Swee. 
There is an interesting anecdote on how this change came about. The Colonial Secretary 
Office made the mistake of not consulting representatives from the Staff Side (an ad hoc 
group of local civil servants) before sending out a circular. The elected representative, Goh 
Teck Phuan, was then a Youth Service Officer in the Social Welfare Department and an active 
unionist. He had nursed a grudge against Cromwell for allegedly keeping him from the office 
(and preventing union activities in the office by sending him off to visit rural areas and 
islands). When the Colonial Secretary Office attempted to make amends, Goh asked that 
Cromwell be replaced by Goh Keng Swee in the spirit of Malayanization.166 The anecdote 
might not be entirely accurate, as it comes from a memory several decades after the fact. But 
the underlying sentiments do vividly capture an aspect of decolonization that is not often 
highlighted in Singapore history, which was local resentment of British presence. In any case, 
and in another instance of a messy decolonization process, Goh Keng Swee assumed the 
position of Director of Social Welfare for only six months. In April 1958, Goh (and the entire 
Social Research Section) was seconded to the Chief Minister’s Office in April 1958 to make 
                                                          
164 NAS, SOAS PP MS 33. Cromwell to Parents, 19 August 1956. 
165 NAS, SOAS PP MS 33. Cromwell to Parents, 28 November 1956. “I think most people will resign, collect 
their compensation and depart by April 1957, that is, Administrative Service people like me; professional 
engineers, doctors etc. will stay on longer, perhaps in individual instances as long as four years, but I don’t think 
longer”. In the interests of continuity, a substantial number of former colonial officers stayed on in Singapore or 
Malaya. One was Percival Herbert “Val” Meadows, Cromwell’s deputy in the Social Welfare Department. He 
left in June 1956 and worked in various positions related to the City Council, the Rural Board and local 
government in general. In June 1959, he became Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of National Development. He 
was ostracized by the anti-colonial and populist, Ong Eng Guan (who alleged Meadows was a British 
intelligence officer). Lee Kuan Yew heard of his plight and plucked him out to work from the Prime Minister’s 
Office. Meadows was involved in the reorganization of the City Council functions into new statutory boards, 
such as Public Utilities Board. (Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story, pp. 335-337). For a brief biography, see 
Colin Cheong, Can Do! The Spirit of Keppel FELS (Singapore: Times Editions), p. 45, and The Straits Times, 
21 December 1962, “Special duty' man Meadows to work in Brunei”. 
166 NAS OHC, Goh Teck Phuan. Sports Personalities of Singapore. Accession Number 002128. Interviewed in 
1999-2000. Reels 12 and 13 (of 42). Janet Yee also remembers Goh as fiercely anti-expatriate in her oral 
history, reel 3. 
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economic policy.167 Soon after, he resigned altogether from government service to campaign 
in the 1959 general election on the People’s Action Party ticket. 
Cromwell remained in Singapore until he retired in 1960. His letters, in particular his 
observations of the political and social changes taking place in the late 1950s, make for 
fascinating reading as they reiterate the broader potential of social welfare for nation-
building, albeit from his particular position. In the aftermath of relief operations to deal with 
considerable damage and dislocation caused by floods in December 1954, Cromwell 
reported: “The flood victims for their part have discovered that Government is not solely an 
organization with machinery for imposing and collecting taxes but can in time of need 
provide the wherewithal to alleviate distress and make rehabilitation possible in a very short 
space of time”.168  
Government could therefore be more than a staid, impersonal organization, and 
become an institution with a social conscience. The Social Welfare Department was perfectly 
placed to promote and reinforce such an image. The tangible aspects of social welfare, such 
as officers doling out financial relief, building community centers, and managing youth clubs, 
were coupled with the intangible bonds forged while conducting public assistance 
investigations, managing a home or a hostel, rescuing juvenile prostitutes and abused 
children, or even from the simple act of hearing someone out and providing counsel. 
Government was an organization, from Cromwell’s standpoint, that provided the 
opportunities and the space where the divergent interests of the plural society could be 
harnessed for common purposes, and bring about a “common citizenship”. Cromwell felt a 
strong government presence was necessary as “there is no real nationalism in Singapore…. 
People do not feel to be Singaporeans; at least relatively few”. He commented that “it is just 
possible (justpossible) [sic] that racial antagonisms may be exacerbated after 
independence”.169 He observed 
 
… a natural lack of cooperation between the “alien” Chinese and the local 
Government, because they do not feel they belong to it. They cannot speak any 
of the recognized languages, and like the Englishman abroad they see no 
reason to learn them. They are fearful, easily led by their own kind and they  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
167 NUSCL, CO 1030/673. Jan-Mar 1958 Quarterly Report. 
168 NUSCL, CO 1030/268. Progress Summary for December 1954. 
169 NAS, SOAS PP MS 33. Cromwell to Parents, 11 November 1956. 
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have a remarkable sense for joining a majority in semi-passive movements  
antagonistic to “government”. It is due largely to ignorance of the way 
Government works and what it does.170 
 
Cromwell’s efforts at rudimentary nation-building, that is to redirect the diverse loyalties into 
a shared sense of belonging, were overtaken by the constitutional developments, which were 
initiated ironically enough by decolonization. His ideas however, particularly the use of 
community centers, were not discarded, and indeed remained in practice long after he left.171  
Similarly, the Social Welfare Department remained a part of the administrative 
bureaucracy of post-colonial governments, its structures and functions inherited almost in 
their entirety. The Department no longer exists, and the terms “social welfare” and “welfare” 
have faded from public view and taken on different meanings. But the successors of social 
welfare officers, almoners and volunteers, all of whom played a part in shaping a social 
welfare state in postwar Singapore, continue to serve those in need in contemporary 
Singapore. The social welfare policy introduced and implemented in late colonial Singapore 
was a success, insofar that it created and sustained a social welfare state of government 
departments, social services, and voluntary organizations dedicated to the well-being of 
society. 
The British did introduce the policy of development and welfare, and their officers, 
like McNeice and Cromwell, took the lead in implementing the policy in late colonial 
Singapore. But the structural coherency and continuity of the social welfare state could be 
traced to the single-mindedness of social welfare officers, almoners, and volunteers executing 
their duties and taking responsibility – even in the middle of destabilizing change and 
tensions. Several of them had front-row seats to some of the defining moments in Singapore’s 
postwar history, events that have been woven into the national history trope highlighted in 
Chapter 1. Thirteen-year old Nadra binte Ma’arof, also known as Maria Hertogh, stayed in 
York Hill under the charge of Tan Beng Neo for three months.172 In the wake of the forcible 
                                                          
170 My emphasis. NAS, SOAS PP MS 33. Cromwell to Parents, 28 October 1956. Cromwell also noted an 
unspoken “unholy alliance” between the “secret plotting planning communists and crypto-communists, between 
the vaguely idealistic sentimental young revolutionaries, the racially conscious older Chinese, and the secret 
society men and the out and out hooligans”. 
171 In addition to Seah, Community Centres in Singapore, see Wong Saik Chin and Peter S. J. Chen, The Impact 
of Community Centres on Social Development in Singapore (Singapore: Dept. of Sociology, 1977), G. C. P. 
Riches, Urban Community Centres and Community Development: Hong Kong and Singapore (Hong Kong: 
Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1973), and Jimmy Yap, We Are One: The People's 
Association Journey, 1960-2010 (Singapore: People's Association, 2010).  
172 On 11 December 1950, riots broke out in Singapore following a week of sensationalized media coverage of a 
Muslim girl living in a Catholic convent. Anger had been simmering ever since the High Court had ruled Maria 
Hertogh’s Islamic marriage illegal and transferred custody from her foster mother to her natural Dutch-Eurasian 
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removal of students from two Chinese middle schools in October 1956, social welfare 
officers had to barricade themselves in their offices against an angry mob. The latter had been 
provoked by Cromwell charging through the mob (to escape) after rescuing the Union Jack 
from the nearby children’s social center.173 The split within the People’s Action Party in July 
1961 directly affected Toh Mah Keong’s work of building community centers.174 The Social 
Welfare Department was also at the forefront of relief operations in response to the massive 
Bukit Ho Swee fire earlier that year.175  
In some of the oral histories, interviewees did not seem as eager as their interviewers 
to interpret their actions within the context of the Singapore Story trope. Janet Yee made it 
clear at several points in her interview that she was less interested in the politics than in her 
work for the Social Welfare Department and advocating in general for social justice. When 
asked how the strike by People’s Association employees affected him, Mah Keong 
commented that he did not respond to verbal abuse, and was for the most part left alone. 
Picketers did damage some community centers, which led to Mah Keong erecting fencing 
                                                          
parents. Rioters targeted Europeans and Eurasians in the ensuing violence, which lasted for three days and left 
eighteen people dead and over a hundred injured. Along with the 1964 race riots, the incident is used as a 
warning of the consequences of insensitivity to religion and race, and was also referenced in the White Paper on 
the Maintenance of Religious Harmony published in 1989. Beng Neo’s recollections of Maria Hertogh’s stay in 
York Hill are recorded in reels 20 and 21 of her oral history. 
173 The Chinese Middle School unrest was the violent climax of the Labour Front government’s crackdown on 
alleged Communist groups, and the resulting standoff with students occupying various Chinese middle schools 
in protest. After police forcibly cleared the schools on 26 October 1956, students (by then joined by trade 
unions, rural associations, and affiliated groups) attempted to present a petition to the Hokkien Huay Kuan in the 
city. But their attempts were obstructed by roadblocks. The ensuing violence lasted four days and resulted in 
thirteen deaths. This incident was the third major unrest in Singapore as in many years, following the 1954 
protest against National Service registration and the 1955 Hock Lee Bus Company strike and riots. Cromwell’s 
almost contemporaneous recollections of the incident are detailed in a letter to his parents dated 28 October 
1956, two days after the flag incident.  
174 On 26 September 1961, over a hundred People’s Association employees downed tools in protest of the 
dismissal of seventeen former community center organizers the month before. The latter group were collateral 
damage in the split in the ranks of the People’s Action Party in July 1961. Following sharp reversals in two by-
elections, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew convened a Legislative Assembly ostensibly asking for a vote of 
confidence in his government, but also to out Communist and pro-Communist elements within the People’s 
Action Party that had worked against it. Thirteen Assemblymen who abstained from voting, and others 
including Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan, were expelled from the PAP. They formed the Barisan Sosialis 
(Socialist Front) in September 1961. The strike lost steam by the end of the year, though as late as March 1962, 
the premises of the Kallang headquarters and the Havelock Road community center were still being picketed. 
Happening so quickly after the split and the formation of the Barisan Sosialis, the strike was perceived as the 
“first round of a tussle of power” between the PAP and the Barisan (The Straits Times, 20 March 1962, 
“People's Assn. shake-up” – quote taken from an assembly debate in December 1961). 
175 On 25 May 1961, a massive fire in the squatter settlement in Bukit Ho Swee razed to the ground over 2,000 
buildings and structures, leaving four dead and more than 16,000 people homeless. The fire has always been 
taken as the turning point in Singapore’s housing history, as the Housing and Development Board accelerated its 
building projects after the event. Thirty-five-year-old Goh Sin Tub was then Deputy Director of Social Welfare. 
For his recollections on coordinating relief efforts, hear OHC interviews Reels 5 and 6 (Accession Number 
001422). For a history of the fire, see Loh Kah Seng’s Squatters into Citizens. 
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around the premises. But even then, he was mindful of the broader purpose of the community 
centers as public spaces for the surrounding community. He informed the interviewer that at 
no time was anyone denied entry into the centers, even if they were known to be strikers as 
they were also “member[s] of the community”.176 As the Maria Hertogh riots raged around 
her, Beng Neo had more pressing issues to worry about than to find out “exactly what 
happened at the Good Shepard”: 
 
Because the girl was out of my hand[s]. I had other jobs to do, you see. The 
home had to be run. But when things got very ... dangerous you know, when 
there was a curfew and people were being killed and all that, I had to keep an 
eye on my children, keep an eye on the food because there was no food 
coming in. In fact, I got a curfew pass to go out and collect bread. You see, 
when you have over a hundred in a home, the food situation is very critical 
when nothing comes in. Well, I went and collected my bread. And we were 
able to feed the children with whatever we had....177 
 
Beng Neo’s single-mindedness, and that of dozens of her colleagues in the Social Welfare 
Department, not only ensured the job got done. It gave meaning to social welfare during a 
time when the idea was novel and slightly alien to Singapore’s colonial experiences till then. 
In turn, this gave coherency to a nascent social welfare state. 
                                                          
176 NAS OHC, Toh Mah Keong, reel 9. (This was of course a recollection, rather than a documentation, of his 
sentiments then). 
177 NAS OHC, Tan Beng Neo, reel 21. 
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CHAPTER 7. SECURING THE WELFARE OF A SINGAPORE NATION  
 
The functions and services established by the social welfare state were seen by many 
as the first step to a broader, more comprehensive welfare system. The emergence of the 
British welfare state after 1948, driven by the hopes for a just and better postwar society 
brought about by the Beveridge Report and a Labour government, did not go unnoticed in the 
colonies. Singapore came very close to implementing the classic welfare state, that is a social 
security system based on social insurance. If it had been fully realized, Singapore after 1965 
could have had a social security that, in theory at least, brought individuals together into a 
community, which in turn could potentially support an embryonic Singaporean identity. This 
chapter discusses Singapore’s abortive attempts to introduce social insurance as a 
culminating point of this current study. The history presented below encapsulates the main 
themes of this study, which are the ambiguities of colonial policy during decolonization, the 
shifting positions of colonizer and colonized, and the local histories arising from those 
tensions. Furthermore, the welfare state was in itself the culmination of responses to social 
contingencies on the larger levels of states and nations. It provided an attractive template to 
build a post-colonial future for decolonizing societies. In the quest for the ideal relationship 
between state and society, Singapore’s search for social security is also part of broader 
histories of state formation and nation-building.  
 
Singapore, almost a “Welfare State” 
 
The work of the Social Welfare Department, and that of its affiliates in government 
and society, was limited to the individual, or at most, to the family or household. They 
concentrated on particular social needs that usually emerge near or past the point of 
destitution, and moreover on individuals identified to be vulnerable, such as the elderly, the 
sick, women, and children. The Social Welfare Department was there to assist, primarily via 
the Public Assistance scheme, at moments when loss of income occurred. In the late colonial 
period, those moments included old age, permanently and temporarily unemployed, and death 
of the breadwinner. In addition, sickness allowances were also distributed, while living 
allowances were given to the head of the household and his or her dependents while 
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undergoing tuberculosis treatment.1 But such assistance was conditional on application and 
fulfillment of requirements, investigation of need, and a means test of income.  
The development of Singapore’s social welfare state paralleled Britain’s own welfare 
state. I use the term “welfare state” in its classic understanding as a social security system.2 It 
is a term that has come to be associated historically with the British Labour Government’s 
unified social insurance and national assistance system and the National Health Service that 
were established between 1946 and 1948. Policymakers and scholars, whether for or against 
Beveridge’s ideas, preferred the terms “social security” or “social insurance” instead – even 
Beveridge himself.3 In this context, social security means protection from social 
contingencies resulting in the loss of income or social support. The main contingencies are 
usually death, maternity, raising children or supporting a family, old age or retirement, injury 
or sickness, and unemployment.  
The welfare state that emerged after the Second World War was the result of a 
gradual process that began in the nineteenth century. It was informed by a variety of factors 
and circumstances that included the social and political responses to industrial capitalism 
since the late nineteenth century, persistent economic slumps, and war. The years 
immediately following the Second World War were the high point of open discussions 
concerning “cradle to grave” coverage of the lives of citizens. The period between the late 
1940s and 1970s has been widely perceived as the “Golden Age” of the welfare state.4 At the 
                                                          
1 Sickness allowances were introduced in 1951, and discontinued in the late 1950s. Living allowances for 
tuberculosis treatment were paid out from April 1949. (The Straits Times, 29 April 1949, “Allowances for T.B. 
Victims Being Paid”). It is not immediately clear when allowances were discontinued, but the record shows that 
allowances were still being paid well into the 1980s. 
2 The earliest use of the term in a colonial context concerned Burma. During a parliamentary debate in 1947 on 
the Burma Independence Bill, “the Secretary of State for Burma noted that the new Burmese Constitution was a 
statesmanlike document proclaiming a varied list of individual rights, in complete accordance with the modern 
view of a ‘welfare state’”. This usage was in an international relations context, to contrast with a Power State, 
rather than in the context of social security. Petersen and Petersen, “Confusion and divergence”, p. 47.  
3 William Beveridge never used the term in Social Insurance and Allied Services. Beveridge disliked the term as 
it gave the impression of a “Santa Claus” state, which was contrarian to the contributory and participatory 
principles of his social security plan. See Wincott, “Original and imitated or elusive and limited?”, p. 130. 
Quoted José Harris, William Beveridge: A Biography (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 459-464. 
“Will, in a great state of distress, … said that his original ideas had been mutilated, reversed, and taken 
completely out of his hands although given his name; that he had come to loathe both the caption ‘Welfare 
State’ and the title ‘Beveridge Plan’ which had become like advertising slogans, which taken together had led 
many people hopelessly to misunderstand what he had truly worked for, and in what must have been an extreme 
expression of his desolation … added that he wished he had never started any Beveridge ideas”. (p. 477). 
4 The welfare state’s “golden age” is generally understood to be between 1945 and the late 1970s. In Britain, the 
turn against the welfare state is usually attributed to the ascension of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 
1979, though resistance to welfare state legislation existed even in the late 1940s. See Fraser, British Welfare 
State, pp. 245-264 (resistance against the National Health Service), and pp. 280-288 (Margaret Thatcher rolling 
back the welfare state). See also Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State? The New Political Economy of 
Welfare (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, c2007. Third edition; first published in 
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same time, there were serious discussions in London and elsewhere concerning the 
introduction of social security in the British Empire and in the rest of the world.5  
It is possible to review briefly some of these ideas via the personalities encountered in 
this study. After the Second World War, Augustin Gomez and Valentine Frois could not 
work due to old age and illness. They eventually became dependent on the goodwill of family 
and friends, and financial assistance from the Social Welfare Department. In the ideal 
situation of a functioning social security system, both men would not have had to apply for 
financial assistance from the Social Welfare Department. Assuming they had made regular 
contributions from their wages and/or from employer contributions, both men would have 
been automatically assured of some income during social contingencies. Moreover, going by 
Gomez’ experiences, an aspect of the British welfare state did exist in postwar Singapore, 
such as free or close-to-free healthcare. He did not recall having to pay for medical treatment 
or hospitalization after his enforced stay in the General Hospital. A system would also be in 
place to assess income levels, and to impose taxes and mandatory contributions from wages 
accordingly. Revenue from taxes would then fund social assistance or direct financial aid 
schemes. Mandatory contributions extracted from employer and employee alike would go 
into a common insurance pool, which would provide, when conditions are met, monetary 
benefits for needs during times of sickness, injury, unemployment, or death of breadwinner.  
Decolonization meant that the social security of thousands of workers in Singapore 
could not be ignored. Preparation for self-government involved the canvassing of support by 
both policymakers and aspiring nationalists alike among the general population, a substantial 
portion of whom were organized into trade unions. There were sufficient reasons for all sides 
(government and society) to consider seriously and plan for the social security of workers and 
their families in Singapore. That advanced plans to introduce social security, an actual 
welfare state in its classic meaning, fell through was due not so much to ideological aversions 
against welfarism or opposing political philosophies.6 Rather, the complications of 
                                                          
1991), p. 105, and volume 2 of Nicholas Deakin, Catherine Jones-Finer and Bob Matthews (eds.), Welfare and 
the State: Critical Concepts in Political Science (London; New York: Routledge, 2004). See for a critique of 
“epochalism”, Daniel Wincott, “The (Golden) Age of the Welfare State: Interrogating a Conventional Wisdom”, 
Public Administration, vol. 91/no. 4, (2013), pp. 806-822.  
5 During an international social insurance conference held in Geneva in 1947, several European countries 
announced plans to introduce new or to expand existing social security measures. Reported in The Singapore 
Free Press, 24 October 1947, “The Way Other Folk Live”. See also Chapter 1 of Victor George, Social 
Security: Beveridge and After (London, Routledge & K. Paul; New York, Humanities P., 1968), for an overview 
of global interest in social insurance and social policy matters after the Second World War.  
6 As suggested by Michael Barr in “Lee Kuan Yew's Fabian Phase”, Australian Journal of Politics & History, 
Vol. 46 / No. 1 (2000), pp. 110–126. 
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decolonization, changes in government, and political instability were more decisive in 
undermining such plans.  
 
Early Discussions 
 
 The earliest reported mention of “social security” in postwar Singapore was by the 
newly-formed Malayan Democratic Union in December 1945. Formed by a mixed group of 
idealists, proto-nationalists, and communists, social security was part of a broad package that 
would eventually lead to “democratic self-government”.7 In 1947, the People’s Constitution 
Proposals were published by PUTERA-AMCJA coalition, as an alternative to the White 
Paper drawn up by the British to replace the ill-fated Malayan Union.8 Included within the 
proposals was a call for a social security scheme, mirroring to a large extent Beveridge’s 
schema of addressing the five giants of squalor, idleness, want, ignorance and disease. The 
concrete measures included a minimum wage, the recognition of rights for all Malayan 
citizens to income maintenance in old age, in times of sickness or loss of capacity to work, 
the right to education, and the right to leisure.9  
 As news reached Singapore and Malaya in July 1948 of each step Britain had taken 
toward the welfare state, local discussions for social security apparently also increased.10 In 
accordance with the postwar colonial policy then, there was an in-principle acceptance that 
social security was the government’s responsibility. Representatives of the colonial 
administration from the Social Welfare and Labour Departments admitted as much in a 
                                                          
7 The Straits Times, 19 December 1945, “A Democratic Union: Autonomy Goal Visualised”. The MDU sought 
“the introduction of educational reforms, social security, embracing free medical attention, a higher standard of 
living, and the abolition of colour distinction”. See also Philip Hoalim, Malayan Democratic Union: Singapore's 
First Democratic Political Party (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1972). 
8 PUTERA stood for Pusat Tenaga Ra’ayat (roughly Center for People’s Power). It was a coalition of Malay 
political parties opposed generally to the UMNO exclusivity in negotiations with the British to discuss 
alternatives to the Malayan Union. AMJCA stood for the All Malaya Council of Joint Action, a coalition of 
similar organizations, predominantly non-Malay. See Mustapha Hussain, Malay Nationalism Before UMNO: 
The Memoirs of Mustapha Hussain / translated by Insun Sony Mustapha; edited by Jomo K. S. (Kuala Lumpur: 
Utusan Publications & Distributors, 2005). 
9 Pusat Tenaga Ra'ayat and the All Malaya Council of Joint Action, The People's Constitutional Proposals for 
Malaya 1947 (Selangor: Ban Ah Kam, 2005). 
10 See for instance The Singapore Free Press, 26 June 1947, “Clerks Will Fight for Justice”; The Singapore 
Free Press, 30 June 1947, “Those working in the Empire”; The Straits Times, 8 April 1948, “Social Security 
Proposal”; The Singapore Free Press, 14 April 1948, “Union Urges Labour Probe”; The Straits Times, 24 
January 1949, “Asian Seamen's New Deal Ahead”. The Singapore Free Press, 25 May 1948, “Clerks' Appeal to 
Employers”, The Straits Times, 19 November 1948, “Social Security: "Federation Not Ready For It"”. “Social 
security” went from two and seventeen mentions in 1945 and 1946 respectively, to fifty each in 1947 and 1948, 
ninety-two in 1949, before lessening in the 1950s. The British “welfare state” came into operation in July 1948. 
The Singapore Free Press, 7 July 1948, “Freedom from Want”, and The Straits Times, 6 July 1948, "Social 
Security" Now Rules in Britain”.  
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public talk organized by the Social Welfare Department’s “Departmental Training School” in 
1947.11 The question was how to go about it.12 The 1947 social survey conducted by the 
Social Welfare Department was ostensibly to gather data with a view to support a future 
social security scheme, though no firm timetable was set. Behind the scenes, plans were afoot 
to at least begin preliminary exploration of how to introduce social security. The unpublished 
archival records make for mundane reading, but they do give insights first into how the 
colonial government went about a task it had little to no experience with, and second and 
more broadly, the tedious nature of policymaking.  
In April 1948, the Governor of Singapore began the process by asking if the Social 
Welfare Department was prepared to work with the Labour Department to develop a social 
security scheme involving elements of social insurance.13 Percy McNeice responded 
positively but also extremely cautiously. He suggested that government take the initiative by 
first experimenting with its own employees, and at the same time “stimulate [private] 
employers to start sickness and provident schemes for their own employees based on joint 
contributions from employers and workers”.14 The Social Welfare Department was “vitally 
interested” in the question of “Social Insurance proper, as an element in a system of Social 
Security”, and since the year before, had been working on its own and with representatives 
from the International Labour Organization to collect the necessary information.  
 McNeice did not feel that Singapore was ready for social insurance. But to move 
forward, he recommended a survey be conducted and a statement made listing the existing 
elements that could potentially be part of a social security system: “health services, 
Workmen's Compensation, the Silver Jubilee and other funds, Public Assistance, maternity 
and other social assistance provisions”. Data from the Social Welfare Department’s Relief 
                                                          
11 See Chapter 6. Reported as The Singapore Free Press, 26 November 1947, “Social security is Govt s duty”, 
and The Straits Times, 23 November 1947, “Public Talks on Welfare”. 
12 Interesting situation of demands being made publicly, but no concrete proposals. For instance, when a 
member of the Central Welfare Council (the Federation of Malaya’s successor to the Malayan Welfare Council) 
made a request for a scheme to cover “widows, orphans and the blind”, he had no answer to a question as to 
whether the scheme should be contributory or non-contributory. The Straits Times, 8 April 1948, “Social 
Security Proposal”, and The Singapore Free Press, 8 April 1948, “Demand for social security scheme”. 
13 NAS, SWD 215A/56B & C. Plan for Social Security. (A collection of three files with drafts and 
correspondence concerning social security dating back to 1947/8. It includes a manuscript letter by Goh Keng 
Swee detailing steps to investigate the feasibility of unemployment insurance in Singapore, draft 
lectures/speeches introducing the concept of social security to Singapore (which includes an overview of social 
security measures in other parts of the British Empire), correspondence between McNeice (first Secretary of the 
SWD) and the Governor on the SWD's role in planning social security, and draft papers on the status of 
Singapore's social welfare landscape to assist ILO experts invited to help establish a welfare state in Singapore 
during the late 1950s). 
14 NAS, SWD 215A/56B & C. File minutes. McNeice to Colonial Secretary, 15 April 1948. 
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Section and the 1947 social survey were to be used to estimate the size of the “problem in 
Singapore and to assess priority of need”. He also felt it was “essential to know what the 
minimal [national] income is and is likely over a period (of time), given how social insurance 
was primarily a system of redistributing income (pooled from individual contributions)”.15 
Information would also be gathered regarding “subsistence needs” and to calculate the 
“minimum income standards” in Singapore. 
 For the rest of the year, McNeice and his staff went about collecting information and 
opinions on starting up a social insurance scheme.16 The general feeling, in government and 
in some sections of society, was that Singapore was not ready for the comprehensive social 
security scheme introduced in Britain, New Zealand, and elsewhere. The Social Welfare 
Department’s Five-Year Plan, published in 1949 (but written in 1948), observed that the 
social security advancements made in Britain took more than a century to develop.17 There 
was vast experience and practical knowledge in the administration of social security schemes, 
and a “highly organised scheme of taxation”. The plan also noted that the British system was 
supported by a “homogeneous population with a high rate of literacy”, which had been 
“accustomed to working cooperatively for a long time”. These were attributes that were not 
immediately obvious in postwar Singapore 
Other unflattering comparisons were made with the more advanced situation in 
Britain. A Straits Times editorial poured scorn on a government official’s claim that the 
worker in Singapore was better off than the worker in Britain. The article cited in some detail 
how the social security benefits of the British worker and his family extended “from cradle to 
grave”. While wages were admittedly competitive, the absence of an adequate system of 
social protection meant that workers in Singapore were vulnerable in all aspects of social 
policy – medical, housing, education, income maintenance, and civil society.18 A Social 
                                                          
15 NAS, SWD 215A/56B & C. File minutes. McNeice to Colonial Secretary, 15 April 1948. This was disputed 
by the Economic Adviser then, Frederic Benham. Benham felt a calculation of a national income was not a 
necessary precursor to a social insurance scheme as aggregate benefits would ideally be lesser. See minute date 
11 May 1948. 
16 NAS, SWD 215A/56B & C. File minutes. McNeice to Colonial Secretary, 15 April 1948. These included 
correspondences with the Colonial Office on the progress in other colonies and territories in introducing social 
security. Of particular historical interest a handwritten letter by the late Goh Keng Swee on unemployment 
insurance and assistance. This was written in 1948 when he was studying in London. Another is an undated 
paper entitled “A Plan for Social Security in Singapore: A Preliminary Study of the Possibilities of Introducing 
Social Assistance and Insurance”. Going by the contents, it is likely that it was completed sometime in late 1948 
or 1949. It includes a visual diagram of existing social services, by government and society in Singapore. 
17 Five-Year Plan, p. 4. 
18 The Straits Times, 20 October 1948, “From Cradle to Grave”. This was in response to The Straits Times, 14 
October 1948, “Many Colony Labourers Better off than Britons”. The leader also provoked an interesting 
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Security Working Party was apparently appointed in 1948. There is unfortunately scant 
information on its activities, save for mentions in the newspapers, and almost no mention at 
all in the archival record.19 It does appear as if its work was hindered by the heavy workload 
of the Social Welfare Department during the early years (as discussed in Chapter 4). The 
absence of Goh Keng Swee and Monie Sundram from 1948 until they returned from their 
studies in London also did not help. Both had been involved in the 1947 social survey, while 
Sundram also supervised the emergency relief scheme.  
Still, the Social Welfare Department was not idle. In 1951, the Department 
reorganized the Emergency Relief scheme it inherited from the British Military 
Administration. It was rebranded as Public Assistance, with clearer categories of the types of 
recipients and needs, such as the aged, widows and orphans, the permanently disabled, the 
temporary disabled, the unemployed, and for a time, those suffering from advanced 
tuberculosis.20 From November 1951, sickness allowances were also granted to heads of 
households who were unable to work for more than a month due to illness, and their 
dependents. An attempt was made to put the scheme on a statutory basis, but this failed 
without much publicity.21 A means test was enforced, which also included initially proof of 
residence of not less than twenty, ten, or three years for different categories. From 1953, 
however, residence requirements were reduced to only one year. As a result, expenditure on 
Public Assistance inclusive of allowances increased tremendously, from an annual 
expenditure $913,104 (for a monthly average of 4,162 cases) in 1952, to $2,423,503 (for 
6,835 cases) in 1953, to $3,595,311 (for 9,943 cases). By 1959, the entire annual expenditure 
for direct financial assistance was close to $10 million for over 100,000 individuals.22 Public 
Assistance was perceived as a vital cog in any potential social security system Singapore 
might have. The equivalent in Britain was National Assistance, specifically for those who 
could not be covered by National Insurance. 
The Social Welfare Department did make another significant contribution to the 
advancement of social security via social research. Public mentions of the Social Security 
Working Party were either associated with Public Assistance, or the announcement of 
                                                          
response from a reader who had worked in Britain, and experienced certain aspects of social security. See The 
Straits Times, 23 October 1948, “From Cradle to Grave In Singapore”. 
19 The Straits Times, 30 May 1949, “Security Plan Being Studied”. 
20 SWDAR 1951, p. 34. 
21 The Singapore Free Press, 10 October 1951, “Statutory basis for social assistance”. 
22 The Straits Times, 26 August 1959, “Under Review: Those 22,000 Public Aid Grants”. The People’s Action 
Party was only two months in government then. It began reviewing and identifying areas to reduce spending, 
saving about $800,000 for the remainder of the year. 
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surveys. The Social Research Section came to life again when Goh Keng Swee returned in 
1951.23 After a series of small surveys, Goh undertook an extensive study of the living 
conditions of urban households in 1953 and 1954. These households were deliberately 
selected as their members were predominantly in manual labor jobs or in the lower-paid 
white collar vocations. The maximum monthly income limit to be included in the survey was 
$400, the same limit to be eligible for Workmen’s Compensation. The results were published 
in 1956 as Urban Incomes & Housing: A Report on the Social Survey of Singapore, 1953-
54.24 The survey’s major contribution was a poverty line. More precisely, Goh calculated two 
scales of minimum needs, “one of which covers expenditure on food, clothing, household 
maintenance and personal expenses, the other taking into account children’s education”.25 
Goh’s minimum standards were extremely harsh, “designed to allow a human being enough 
physiological strength for day-to-day functioning with little to no allowance for extraneous 
pursuits”. This amounted to $101.85 per month (Malayan dollars at 1954 prices), and an 
additional $8.10 for educational expenses. 
 
Two Wage-Earners in Late Colonial Singapore 
 
Compare that amount to the night-soil carrier’s average monthly wage during the 
same period of just over $120 (about $4.35 per day for twenty-six work days). Lim Hong 
Cher, originally from Fujian Province in China, worked as a night-soil carrier from March 
1956 until the early 1980s when the night-soil bucket system was completely phased out in 
Singapore.26 His salary then was just above the minimum standards set by the Urban Incomes 
survey. Hong Cher was supporting a family of at least four – he had married in 1950 and had 
                                                          
23 See for instance The Straits Times, 15 December 1951, “Health survey to be taken in Colony”; The Straits 
Times, 10 April 1952, “Sick survey report is ready”, The Straits Times, 13 March 1952, “Survey on sickness 
benefits in Singapore”, The Straits Times, 8 July 1952, “In Singapore on Sickness”, The Straits Times, 2 
October 1952 “No Money -So No Sickness Survey”, and The Singapore Free Press, 4 August 1953, “Too Busy 
To Study”. 
24 Just as Silcock provided the moral anger for the 1947 survey, S. Rajaratnam’s two-part review of Urban 
Incomes was similar in bringing out the human side of Goh’s statistical approach. See The Straits Times, 14 
February 1956, “Tenants who Rent Living Space the Size of a Coffin”, and The Straits Times, 15 February 
1956, “Workers are willing, but 25 per cent live near the poverty line” 
25 The survey is discussed in Ho Chi Tim, “Goh Keng Swee in a Social Welfare History of Singapore”, in 
Emrys Chew and Kwa Chong Guan (eds.), Goh Keng Swee: A Legacy of Public Service (Singapore: World 
Scientific Pub. Co.: S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, c2012), pp. 51-54. 
26 Information taken from NAS OHC, Lim Hong Cher. Vanishing Trades, Accession Number 000745. 
Interviewed in 1986. 6 Reels. Lim was also featured in The Straits Times, 30 September 1986, “A job that's not 
to be sniffed at”. Night-soil refers to human waste, usually collected at night. This vocation predated a modern 
sewage system, and was phased out in Singapore by the late 1980s. See also Brenda Yeoh, Contesting Space, 
pp. 193-204. 
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two children in 1952. Hence, he had to supplement his earnings ferrying passengers in a 
trishaw during the afternoons, after his morning rounds carrying night-soil. He recalled, “In 
the past, just having one job wasn’t enough”.27 
Hong Cher accumulated sufficient work experience to know firsthand the challenges 
of eking out a living in late colonial Singapore. He arrived in Singapore after the Second 
World War in 1947, when he was sixteen years of age.28 His first job in Singapore was to 
help build a sago factory located along Plantation Avenue in the northeast of the island, 
where he later worked full-time washing, cooking, drying, and packing sago from Indonesia 
into sacks (dans) for export. Hong Cher earned anywhere from $2.60 to $2.80 per day for an 
“inside” (indoors) job (washing, frying and drying), and $3.30 to $3.50 for an “outside” 
(outdoors) job (packing and transporting sacks of sago). He worked hard, each day 
completing three – instead of the usual two – sessions.29 He recalled several times in his oral 
history having worked non-stop for the first 170 days before taking a day’s rest. Hong Cher 
earned about $300 every month, a significant amount in the postwar period. His employer 
was the quintessential “good employer”, who provided lodging and daily meals for all 
workers.30 
Unfortunately for Hong Cher, the sago company’s fortunes declined, and he was 
forced to look for new work in 1951. He worked as a coolie at Boat Quay, carrying bags of 
rice and cement from the twakow (bumboats) to the godowns (warehouses) along the 
Singapore River. Hong Cher earned two cents for every sack carried. The sacks were packed 
                                                          
27 NAS OHC, Lim Hong Cher, reel 1. For a journalistic insight into working conditions, see S. Rajaratnam’s 
series of four The Straits Times articles investigating reasons behind industrial unrest in 1955 Singapore: The 
Straits Times, 21 October 1955, “Trueulence is used to hold workers' loyalty”; The Straits Times, 24 October 
1955, “Parasitic economy is an unreal basis for prosperity of Singapore”; The Straits Times, 25 October 1955, 
“Is the craftsman's high wage a threat to Singapore's economy?” and The Straits Times, 27 October 1955, 
“Economic healthy demands the workers' appreciation of the requirements of industry”. 
28 NAS OHC, Lim Hong Cher, reel 1. 
29 NAS OHC, Lim Hong Cher, reel 5. “Yes, I worked three sessions, I had to work until at night. From dawn I 
had to work until at night, for ten over hours. I had to pack the sago, at times I had to work until after 3 o’clock. 
So that was two sessions, $200. As for packing the sago, one month I could earn several tens of dollars, $50 to 
$60. I worked three sessions, including the money I earned by packing the sago, I managed to earn more than 
$300”.  
30 NAS OHC, Lim Hong Cher, reel 5. I use the term “good employer” as described by the Singapore Committee 
on Minimum Standards of Livelihood in its Report of the Committee for Minimum Standards of Livelihood 
(Singapore: Govt. Print. Off., 1957), p. 5. The committee noted that “In Singapore, the “good” employer has 
long been in the habit of providing his employees with medical care and sick leave, and of contributing, by 
means of an employment provident fund, to the accumulation of a capital sum for the benefit of the employee 
when the latter reaches the age of retirement. In recent years legislation has aimed at making the practices of 
“good” employers obligatory on all, for instance in the case of sick leave, and provision of a capital sum on 
retirement”. 
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together into bigger sets called “dans”, usually at ten or nine sacks per set.31 Hong Cher could 
earn about seven to eight dollars a day. But the job depended on the arrival of the boats and 
their cargo. Hence, Hong Cher could work as long as ten hours a day, or sometimes as short 
as two hours. Coolie labor was irregular employment, depending very much on whether the 
headman (kepala) could find work on any given day.  
 
At that time, the place where I worked as a coolie was… they didn’t go and 
tender for the job, so there was no job. If the kepala didn’t have work for us to 
do, then we wouldn’t have work to do…. [O]ur job was not always very 
smooth. Over here [referring to his night-soil carrying job] we had work to do 
every day. We used to go out in the morning and then returned early in the 
afternoon. Over there, sometimes we didn’t have work to do in the morning. It 
was delayed until the afternoon and then we had work to do. We worked until 
at night at that time. Work was like this then.32 
 
Hong Cher applied for a license to become a trishaw rider in 1952, as it was comparatively 
more “permanent and stable”. He practiced, and passed the practical test on his first attempt. 
He then plied his trade in the eastern part of Singapore, as it was nearer his home along 
Chapel Road in Katong. Hong Cher earned between four to eight dollars a day, more if it was 
a rainy day (averaging between $100 and $200 per month).33 He recalled he would “work 
harder” in the afternoons, so as to earn more to support his family 
The need to increase his income led Hong Cher to register at the labor exchange. In 
March 1956, he began working in a night-soil factory at Paya Lebar and was involved in all 
aspects of night-soil collecting. He retrieved night-soil buckets from residences. The buckets 
were solid iron, each weighing about twenty to twenty-five katis (about twenty-seven 
pounds) when empty, and about a hundred katis (about a hundred and ten pounds) when full. 
After disposing of the buckets’ contents, he washed them and the trucks transporting them 
back at the factory. Depending on the type, one truck had the capacity to carry about sixty to 
eighty buckets. In 1956, there were three night-soil factories in Singapore, located at Paya 
Lebar, Waterloo Street, and Park Road (South Bridge Road), in total employing more than 
six hundred workers. Hong Cher worked the full seven days of the week, including public 
holidays (but received a day’s pay for each Sunday and public holiday worked). Each 
workday started at 6.30am in the morning, ending around 2pm in the afternoon. Hong Cher’s 
                                                          
31 A dan of ten sacks could weigh about 168 katis, while a dan of nine sacks about 182 katis. (1 kati is 
approximately 1 1/3 lbs.). 
32 NAS OHC, Lim Hong Cher, reel 1. 
33 NAS OHC, Lim Hong Cher, reel 2. He recalled it then cost a little more than ten cents for a kati of fish. 
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income from night-soil carrying was initially $4.35 per day, a figure that was increased by 
five cents after the first five years, and then by ten cents after ten years.34 To earn more, he 
continued trishaw riding in the afternoons to supplement his income. Hong Cher benefited 
from various sources of social protection throughout his working life. In his interview, he did 
not mention falling sick too often nor did he appear to have suffered any serious injury that 
would have depleted his already meager earnings. If he fell sick, Hong Cher was entitled, as 
part of his job, to paid sick leave and his family also benefited from free or subsidized health 
care. He joined unions opened to trishaw riders and night-soil collectors. The former, Public 
Daily Rated Employees Union Federation, was particularly active in agitating for better 
working conditions during the 1950s.  
The situation of an odd-job or irregularly employed worker was less secure. Take for 
instance Lee Fatt Lor, who plied a barber trade along the five-foot ways in Bugis Street 
during the 1960s.35 Originally from China, he was a proprietor of a flourishing barber 
business in Hong Kong until the Japanese invaded. His wife was killed by a bomb during the 
attack, an incident which he said marked the beginning of his “economic downturn”. Leaving 
his young son behind (in the care of a relative), he migrated to Malaya, working as a barber in 
various towns and cities, before arriving in Singapore sometime in the 1950s. By then, he was 
already fifty years old, and could not find regular work in a barber shop. Hence, he started his 
own five-foot way barber shop, which consisted of “a rattan chair, a box of hair cutting tools 
[clipping razors, scissors, ear digging tools etc.], a mirror and a small pail of water”.  He 
charged considerably less than established barber shops, about thirty cents for a child and 
sixty for an adult (compared to fifty cents and a dollar twenty respectively in shops). He 
earned about three dollars a day on average, which was apparently enough for his expenses, 
such as rent (six dollars a month for a bunk space in a shop house in nearby Queen Street) 
and three meals a day at nearby food stalls. Without any obvious means of support should he 
be unable to work, Lee made a conscious attempt to stay healthy. While he stayed in regular 
contact with his son, he had no intention of returning to China. He told the researcher that 
when he can no longer work because of old age, he expected to “depend on the Public 
Assistance provided by the Social Welfare Department”.36 
                                                          
34 NAS OHC, Lim Hong Cher, reel 2. In 1986, he said he was earning $19.95 per day, which came up to (with 
allowances) about $447. (Reel 4). 
35 Chan Siew Kong, “A Study of a Street – Bugis Street: A Street of No Night” (Unpublished academic exercise 
- Dept. of Social Studies, University of Singapore, 1965), pp. 199-204. 
36 Chan, “Bugis Street”, p. 204. 
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The Complications of Decolonization 
 
Throughout the 1950s, certain components of a social security system were in place in 
Singapore. In the Social Welfare Department, Singapore had a state agency dedicated to 
improving the general well-being of society, which, going by Fatt Lor’s resigned comments, 
was well-established in the public consciousness. This included the Public Assistance scheme 
financed from public revenue and subjected to a means test. The poor and destitute could also 
access medical services. At the individual level, there were varying levels of social protection 
provided by employers or unions. Hong Cher for instance had job benefits, such as bonuses 
and allowances, subsidized medical care for him and his wife, and sick leave. The need for 
such as system was also present, as represented by individuals with little to no social support 
of their own, like Fatt Lor, Augustin Gomez or Valentine Frois. What remained was the 
political will to pull everything together, as Britain and New Zealand had done in 1948 and 
1938 respectively, and the right mix of circumstances to see it through. 
The political intent did exist, first (and more broadly) at the core of postwar colonial 
policy of development and welfare; and second, in local politicians and groups aspiring to 
replace the British. Political parties aspiring to replace the British also made social security 
part of their agenda for postcolonial Singapore. Conducive socio-political circumstances 
unfortunately did not exist, or did not stay stable long enough for a comprehensive social 
insurance scheme to emerge. From 1946 to 1965, the Singapore government changed hands 
twice (1955 and 1959), was subsumed into a larger federation (1963), and then suddenly 
became fully independent (1965). From the British perspective, their executive powers were 
being reduced at a rather quick pace. More than a century’s worth of British rule seemed 
irrelevant as Singapore transited swiftly from having no elections before 1948, to a fully-
elected legislature in 1959. Moreover, all of these events unfolded on the backdrop of 
regional neighbors achieving independence and a Communist insurgency that infiltrated 
significant sections of local society. 
Political intent was manifested in Lim Yew Hock’s representations to the colonial 
government in the late 1940s. Between 1948 and 1955, Lim was an Unofficial Member of the 
Singapore Legislative Council, ostensibly to represent the trade unions.37 In 1948, he 
proposed that all commercial firms should be compelled by law to provide either a provident 
                                                          
37 The Singapore Free Press, 25 March 1948, “Four Unofficials Nominated”. 
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fund or a social insurance scheme for their employees, observing that “there must be some 
social security for workers who are the backbone of any democracy”.38 The following year in 
1949, Lim went further, pushing a resolution through the Legislative Council to commit the 
government to investigate and to make recommendations for social security legislation.39  
The resolution was not unopposed. The representatives from the various Chambers of 
Commerce proposed an amendment to Lim's resolution, essentially to remove any 
commitment on the part of government to legislate for social security.40 The proposed 
amendment was defeated and Lim's motion was carried with the tacit support of Patrick 
McKerron, Colonial Secretary of the Singapore government.41 McKerron also informed the 
council that the Social Welfare Department had been investigating the “question of 
developing social security services” since 1948 and invited Lim to join the Social Security 
Working Party already formed.42 However, other than the activities of the Social Welfare 
Department, nothing else concrete materialized after the council meeting of 15 March 1949. 
Lim did not make any further public statements on social security, nor was there any news 
about the committee looking into social security. It is possible that social security matters 
were overtaken by more pressing concerns, such as political developments within Singapore, 
and the Malayan Emergency and the Cold War. In 1951, at the height of hustings for the 
second Legislative Council elections (and in response to Lim's campaigning), a disgruntled 
reader of The Straits Times asked what had happened to the resolution passed almost two 
years ago.43 Lim was at that time busy running for a Legislative Council seat as the President 
of the Labour Party of Singapore, on a manifesto that included social security for workers.44  
As noted earlier, there was undeniable British caution against the indiscriminate 
implementation of metropolitan-style social policy. There were however real obstacles to a 
welfare state. A point often lost in the euphoric reception of the Beveridge Report was that 
Beveridge's plan was not all that revolutionary. Instead, Beveridge's focus was on efficiency 
via the unification of the social security programs and social services already in place, “a 
                                                          
38 The Singapore Free Press, 18 August 1948, “Social Security: Council Demand”. 
39 The Straits Times, 14 March 1949. “S'pore Social Security Plan Sought”. Lim had probably briefed the press, 
as news of the resolution reached the press a day before the 15 March sitting of the Legislative Council.  
40 The Straits Times, 16 March 1949, “Social Security Move In Colony”. The representatives were Tan Chin 
Tuan (Chinese Chamber of Commerce), R. Jumabhoy (Indian Chamber of Commerce), and E. M. F. Fergusson 
(Singapore Chamber of Commerce). 
41 The Straits Times, 16 March 1949, “Social Security Move In Colony”. See also Colony of Singapore, 
Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 15 March 1949 (Singapore: Govt. Print. Off., 1949). 
42 The Straits Times, 16 March 1949, “Social Security Move In Colony”. See also The Straits Times, 17 March 
1949, “The Beginning of Security”. 
43 The Straits Times, 14 February 1951, “The Egg That Takes Too Long To Hatch”. 
44 The Straits Times, 9 April 1951, “Singapore Will Go To The Polls Tomorrow”. 
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stage ... reached after nearly 100 years of steady advance in the field of social progress”.45 
Singapore lacked Britain’s foundations that had been painstakingly built over a long period of 
time. Thus, there was precious little expertise and knowledge to operate social security 
programs and social services beyond the local level. For instance, the colonial government 
did consider a healthcare system for Singapore similar to the British National Health Service, 
but the proposal was never implemented because of insufficient doctors and hospital beds.46 
There was also apprehension, voiced by the Commissioner of Labour in 1948, as to whether 
workers in Singapore would accept the contributory principle of social insurance, when they 
were already receiving similar benefits from their employers.47 
 However, confronted with a strident and at-times violent anti-colonialism, colonial 
authorities and local political parties could ill-afford to ignore an organized working class. At 
the behest of Lim Yew Hock, the government approved in 1949 treatment allowances for 
workers (and their families) recovering from tuberculosis.48 As seen earlier, eligibility 
requirements to receive Public Assistance was also relaxed from 1953. In the same year, the 
Progressive Party tabled the Central Provident Fund bill for approval, starting a long four-
year process to the Fund's eventual introduction in 1955.49 The Progressive Party was formed 
in 1947 by the English-speaking elite in Singapore society, including the lawyers Tan Cheng 
Chye (or C. C. Tan as he was more commonly known) and John Laycock (who had raised 
public awareness of poverty and destitution in prewar Singapore). Their version of social 
security was a provident fund, to which employer and employee made monthly contributions 
for a sum of money provided on retirement.50    
 Almost at the same time, the colonial government appointed a commission to study 
“desirability and practicability” of retirement benefits.51 The commission was plagued by 
difficulties from the start. There was little to no publicity about its work and purpose.52 There 
was moreover no trade union representation on the Commission.53 Thus, despite repeated 
                                                          
45 Five-Year Plan, p. 4.  
46 International Labour Office, Report to the Government of Singapore on social security measures (Singapore: 
Govt. Print. Off., 1957), pp. 72-75. 
47 The Straits Times, 14 October 1948. “Many Colony Labourers Better Off Than Britons”. 
48 SWDAR 1950, pp. 30-32. 
49 The Singapore Free Press, 16 January 1951, “Provident Fund For All Workers: Progressives Draft New 
Law”, and The Straits Times, 17 January 1951, “Provident Fund For All Workers Proposed”. 
50 First announced in The Singapore Free Press, 12 May 1949, “Security Plan for Clerks”. 
51 The Commission was appointed in May 1951. It was chaired by F. S. McFadzean, the regional representative 
for the Colonial Development Corporation, and completed its work in December of the same year. The findings 
were published as the Report of the Retirement Benefits Commission (Singapore: Govt. Print. Off., 1952). 
52 The Straits Times, 30 May 1951, “Trade Unions in 'the dark”. 
53 The Straits Times, 20 July 1951, “Union Leaders Answer Critic”. 
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solicitations, the majority of the trade unions did not respond positively to the Commission's 
request for their views, forcing one postponement of scheduled hearings.54 The Commission 
considered two options, a provident fund and a pension scheme, and the majority found in 
favor of the latter option, noting that the middle-aged worker fully benefits from a pension 
scheme and that the provident fund may not be adequate for retirement needs in the long-
term.55 
There was one dissenting voice who preferred not to make any recommendations as 
he disagreed with the base assumption of a pension scheme, which was addressing the care 
and needs of the old-aged in Singapore via “ties of kinship and friendship”, as being too 
haphazard to be effective.56 The Commission's report, released in 1952, did not stop the 
Progressive Party's push for the provident fund. Its efforts were further emboldened by trade 
union support, as well as public disdain for the recommended pension amount.57 The Central 
Provident Fund bill was finally passed in November 1953.58 Administrative preparations 
began in 1954, and the provident fund started collecting monthly contributions from July 
1955.59 1955 was also the year Singapore received partial self-governance under the 
conditions stipulated by the Rendel Constitution. The new government, a coalition between 
David Marshall's Labour Front Party and the UMNO-MCA Alliance, also included Lim Yew 
Hock, who became Minister for Labour and Welfare. After taking office, the government 
commissioned two interrelated studies that nudged Singapore closer to becoming a welfare 
state. The first was a study on the feasibility of the state ensuring minimum standards of 
livelihood, a term that included a minimum wage, unemployment insurance and other social 
                                                          
54 The Straits Times, 19 June 1951, “Commission – Nothing To Hear”. 
55 Retirement Benefits Commission, p. 15.  
56 Retirement Benefits Commission, p. 16. 
57 The Straits Times, 17 March 1952. “Unions Prefer Provident Fund”; The Straits Times, 29 February 1952. 
“$30 A Month Pension Ridiculous, They Say: Commission Has Many Critics”. Not all members of the public 
agreed with parting with portions of their salary to the provident fund. A reader of The Straits Times called the 
CPF bill a “step towards a totalitarian state”. See The Straits Times, 21 May 1951. “A Woman Says No”. 
58 The Straits Times, 25 November 1953, “Now The Workers Need Not Fear The Day They Have To Retire”. 
The logo for the CPF has not changed since the Fund’s inception in 1955, i.e. three keys to represent the 
tripartite relationship between employers, employees, and the government. This is a principle continued by post-
colonial PAP governments. Information on the logo can be found at “CPF Logo”, 
https://www.cpf.gov.sg/Members/AboutUs/about-us-info/cpf-logo. Accessed 22 November 2016. 
59 For an introductory overview of the Central Provident Fund, see Lim Tin Seng, “Central Provident Fund 
(CPF)”, Singapore Infopedia:  An electronic encyclopedia on Singapore's history, culture, people and events. 
Accessed 2 November 2012. http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_573_2005-01-05.html. See also Linda Low & 
Aw Tar Choon, Social insecurity in the New Millennium: The Central Provident Fund in Singapore (Singapore: 
Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004), and Linda Low & T. C. Aw, Housing a Healthy, Educated and Wealthy 
Nation Through the CPF (Singapore: Times Academic Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, 1997). 
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security measures.60 The second was an extensive survey of existing social welfare and social 
security measures in Singapore.61 Both studies were to make proposals to improve or to 
establish social protection of the people of Singapore.  
 The Minimum Standards of Livelihood committee was chaired by Sir Sydney Caine, 
a seasoned colonial official and the government's Economic Advisor. The committee started 
work in November 1955 and submitted its findings in September 1956.62 A broad range of 
views was solicited from both employers and employees, leading the committee to conclude 
that there were inherent difficulties as well as detrimental effects in ensuring a minimum 
wage at that time.63 The committee recommended a comprehensive social security scheme, 
beginning with coverage for old age, death and sickness, with a view to covering 
unemployment later. The scheme was to be financed from employer and employee 
contributions.64 To administer the scheme, the committee suggested the reorganization of the 
Department of Social Welfare into three divisions for Insurance (which would be based on 
the existing administrative structure of the Central Provident Fund), Public Assistance, and 
Welfare.65 The committee also agreed with the Retirement Benefits Commission that a 
provident fund “cannot answer fully the need for provision of the aged”. It therefore 
recommended that the Central Provident Fund should cease operations upon introduction of 
the social security scheme.66 
 The second study took place simultaneously and was also intimately connected to the 
government's concerns with labor unrest and the consequences of rising unemployment. 
From the time they took office, the Labour Front government, in particular Lim Yew Hock as 
the Minister for Labour and Welfare, announced several times that it had approached the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) to provide expert guidance.67 The ILO sent G. J. 
Brocklehurst, an official from the New Zealand Social Security Department, who arrived in 
                                                          
60 The Straits Times, 22 November 1955, “Sir Sydney Will Explore Welfare State: Basic Wage, Dole For All”, 
The committee also included S. Rajaratnam, and Lim Chong Yah, then a young economist assisting Caine. 
61 The Straits Times, 4 October 1955, “Minimum Wage On The Way: ILO Man To Study Ways To Link Basic 
Pay With National Income”, and The Straits Times, 25 October 1955, “Dole and Health Service Planned For 
Workers”.  
62 The final report was published in 1957 as Report of the Committee on Minimum Standards of Livelihood  
(Singapore: Govt. Print. Off., 1957). 
63 Minimum Standards of Livelihood, pp. 32-33. 
64 Minimum Standards of Livelihood, pp. 40-41. 
65 Minimum Standards of Livelihood, pp. 57-59. 
66 Minimum Standards of Livelihood, pp. 43-44. 
67 See for instance The Straits Times, 6 June 1955, “Jobs Problem: Govt. Calls In An Expert”, and The Straits 
Times, 31 August 1955, “Govt. Ask ILO Aid On Labour Troubles”. 
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October 1955 and submitted his findings in September 1956.68 Brocklehurst's final 
recommendations were similar to those from the Caine Report: a contributory social 
insurance scheme, covering first “temporary incapacity for work” (due to sickness or 
maternity), and after one year, old age, invalidity and death of breadwinner. More studies 
were needed before deciding on unemployment benefits. Agreeing with the Caine Report, 
Brocklehurst also recommended that all provident fund contributions should cease after a 
year of the social insurance scheme. To administer the scheme, he recommended the 
expansion of the Social Welfare Department into a new Social Security Department, placed 
under the purview of the Ministry of Labour and Welfare.69 
 
The Colonizer Sidelined 
 
Singapore’s quest for social security might have been supported by colonial policy 
and the work of colonial officials, such as McNeice in the Social Welfare Department. But 
just as Cromwell became increasingly redundant, the Colonial Office from 1955 was 
similarly reduced to almost an observer role. In 1957, Sheila Ann Ogilvie, an Assistant 
Labour Adviser to the Social Service Department of the Colonial Office, wrote to the Harold 
S. Robinson, then General Manager of Singapore’s Central Provident Fund. She sought 
detailed information on the scheme, which had by then been operational for two years. She 
also observed that the Colonial Office was “frequently under some pressure to advise on the 
introduction of some rudimentary form of social security in territories which do not seem 
ready for a full scheme on United Kingdom lines”.70  
Robinson’s reply was comprehensive, and in some places moreover highlighted his 
own frustrations with developments in Singapore. Robinson noted that despite 
recommendations for a pension scheme by the Caine and Brocklehurst reports, there was 
“very little popular desire” for such a scheme. Leveraging his position as General Manager 
and drawing on the experiences of his staff, he stated: “Nearly every ordinary person who is 
consulted would prefer a lump sum in his old age to a periodical dole”.71 That realization was 
in stark contrast to his initial attitude when he first arrived in Singapore sometime in 1953. 
                                                          
68 Published as the Report to the Government of Singapore on Social Security Measures (Singapore: 
Government Printing Office, 1957). 
69  Social Security Measures, pp. 79-80. 
70 NAS, CO 1030/897: Social Insurance. Ogilvie to Robinson, 21 March 1957.  
71 NAS, CO 1030/897. Robinson to Ogilvie, 3 May 1957. 
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Robinson had come to Singapore “with the idea that there were considerable advantages 
socially in paying pensions with the certainty of periodical small sums rather than lump sums 
which might soon be dissipated by incompetent individuals....”72 But after four years, he 
came “more and more to the conclusion that in Eastern countries this is unpopular and ... 
probably unwise”. 
 
The type of “do-gooding” by legislation which we favour in the West seems in 
many ways inappropriate to the tradition and outlook of countries of this kind. 
In general the Asian and particularly the Chinese spends his life endeavouring 
to secure a sufficient lump sum either to provide himself with accommodation 
or a small business or both, and he is usually able to secure from his relatives 
enough in the way of the dole to keep body and soul together. He is not 
interested in putting aside in his lifetime money to provide for the speculative 
provision of a pension for the indeterminate period of life which remains to 
him after he has ceased employment.73 
 
While the vast majority of Singapore workers preferred to receive a lump sum upon 
retirement, there was on the other hand considerable pressure by labor unions for cash 
benefits for sickness and unemployment. In 1956, the Singapore Trades Union Congress 
made a representation to the Minimum Living Standards committee. It called for a minimum 
wage (based on the 1953/4 Urban Incomes and Housing survey), adjustments to the 
Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance, and schemes for universal health benefits, 
unemployment, and old age pensions - all of which to be financed by the government, and 
hence public taxation.74 
In his own submission to the Minimum Living Standards committee, Robinson 
suggested adjusting the provident fund structure to provide “day-to-day benefits” for sickness 
or unemployment. The principle of the lump-sum approach would remain for retirement, 
while existing and new contributors to the Central Provident Fund would be given the option 
of joining a new scheme that protects them during periods of sickness and unemployment. 
The principles of the proposed “day-to-day benefits” scheme was similar to the provident 
fund. The only difference was that previously non-contributory employees would now have 
to match the funds contributed by their employers.75 After a qualifying period of one year, 
should the employee fall sick or become unemployed, half of his or her provident fund 
                                                          
72 Ann Wee also recalls Robinson or his colleagues discussing attempting to get people in Singapore used to the 
idea of regular contributions. Personal communication to author. 
73 NAS, CO 1030/897. Robinson to Ogilvie, 3 May 1957. 
74 NAS, CO 1030/897. President STUC (S. Jaganathan) to Secretary Minimum Standards committee, 22 March 
1956. 
75 NAS, CO 1030/897. Robinson to Wilson, Secretary for Minimum Standards Committee, 27 June 1956. 
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accumulated savings would be made available for such contingencies. Government could also 
step in, matching the amount available for the day-to-day benefits. At all times, half of the 
fund’s accumulated savings would remain untouched so as to accumulate interest for 
retirement. 
Robinson’s proposal was introduced at a time of sustained discussion on social 
security in Singapore. As the Central Provident Fund was anticipated to be adopted for the 
new social security scheme, his proposal was also meant to serve as a transition from the 
lump-sum approach. Both the Minimum Living Standards committee and Brocklehurst’s 
survey of social security measures had recommended a form of social insurance for 
Singapore. Robinson’s proposal did capture succinctly the principles of individual, 
community, and state responsibility in matters of social policy. However, his opinion, as 
informed as it might have been, was irrelevant as a member of a group that was departing. 
 
The Stillborn Welfare State 
 
Both the Caine and Brocklehurst reports were published in 1957. In January 1958, 
Lim Yew Hock (who had replaced David Marshall as Chief Minister in June 1956) appointed 
a committee of officials to examine both reports and to recommend to the government a 
course of action.76 The committee agreed with most of the recommendations of both reports, 
which called for establishment of a contributory social insurance scheme, starting with 
benefits for old age, sickness, maternity, and death of breadwinner. Unemployment insurance 
would begin only after a successful implementation of the scheme. Contributions to the 
Central Provident Fund would cease upon commencement of the social insurance scheme, 
with options for fund members to transfer their balances to the new insurance fund. A new 
Department of Social Security would be created by incorporating the administrative structure 
of the Central Provident Fund and the Public Assistance Section of the Department of Social 
Welfare. 
Further assistance from the International Labour Organization was also requested to 
draft legislation for the new social security scheme as well as administrative guidance for the 
                                                          
76 The committee consisted of the Permanent Secretaries to the Ministries of Finance, Labour and Health, the 
General Manager of the CPF Board, and the Director of the Social Welfare Department. The committee 
completed its work in September 1958. The report was published in 1959 as the Interim report of the Committee 
of Officials established to examine the recommendations of the Brocklehurst and Caine Committee reports 
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1959). 
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establishment of the social security department. It duly arrived in December 1958, in the 
person of F. B. Matthews, an official from the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance of 
the United Kingdom.77 Over the course of the following six months, Matthews submitted four 
drafts of a social security bill to the Labour Front government.78 They were eventually 
published as the Report to the Government of Singapore on a Proposed Social Security 
Scheme. The highlight of the report was draft legislation to introduce a comprehensive social 
insurance scheme in Singapore. It also included administrative guidance to establish a new 
social security department to administer the scheme aimed at insuring workers and their 
families against social contingencies such as sickness, maternity, death (of the breadwinner), 
old age, and unemployment.  
At that point, circumstances again went against the social security scheme. Lim Yew 
Hock’s Labour Front Party lost the 1959 general election to form Singapore’s first self-
government. That honor went to the People’s Action Party, led by Lee Kuan Yew and 
included the former Director of Social Welfare, Goh Keng Swee. The People’s Action Party 
did not immediately abandon ten years’ worth of work after taking office, nor was it ignorant 
of the connection between economic development, industrial stability and social security for 
workers. Toh Chin Chye had earlier welcomed the Brocklehurst Report in 1957 in his 
capacity as Party Chairman and noted that its recommendations were an improvement on the 
Central Provident Fund.79 As Acting Director of Social Welfare, Goh Keng Swee had even 
argued against the Caine and Brocklehurst reports' recommendation to delay implementation 
of unemployment insurance.80  
As Minister for Finance, Goh also held talks between December 1960 and January 
1961 with the Singapore Trades Union Congress (STUC) to establish industrial peace. 
During those meetings, the union representatives agreed in principle with the government's 
intention to institute unemployment insurance.81 Unfortunately, progress stalled as union 
representatives opposed employee contributions to finance the unemployment insurance 
scheme. Social security issues moreover became less significant in the turbulent political 
situation after 1959. 1961 was a bad year for the People’s Action Party as it endured one 
                                                          
77 The Straits Times, 8 January 1959, “Welfare State: Expert Aid From Britain”. 
78 International Labour Office, Report to the Government of Singapore on a Proposed Social Security Scheme 
(Geneva: International Labour Office, 1959), pp. 3-4. 
79 The Straits Times, 9 December 1957, “Unionists and Politicians Welcome The Brocklehurst Report: Social 
Insurance Hailed”. 
80 Interim Report, Annex C, pp. 56-57. 
81 The Straits Times, 12 April 1961, “TUC and Govt. Agree On Industrial Peace: Pact For Stability”.  
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crisis after another, such as defeats in the by-elections for Hong Lim and Anson, and the 
Barisan Sosialis defections that almost toppled the government. The issue of unemployment 
insurance was apparently forgotten until March 1962, when David Marshall, then 
representing the Workers' Party in the Legislative Assembly, asked for the government's 
official position on the Caine and Brocklehurst reports.82  
The debate over Marshall's question was heated. Goh Keng Swee and Lee Kuan Yew 
alleged the STUC's opposition to employee contributions undermined any hope of 
introducing unemployment insurance, let alone a more comprehensive social security 
scheme. S. T. Bani, a Barisan Sosialis assemblyman and a trade unionist, disagreed with the 
government’s interpretation of events. He presented the other side of the story. 
Unemployment insurance contributions would be an additional burden to workers already 
contributing to the Central Provident Fund. Moreover, the dissolution of the STUC occurred 
at the same time that the Barisan Sosialis split from the People’s Action Party, which meant 
the issue was not further discussed.83 Lee was characteristically blunt. He suggested that it 
had always been the Barisan Sosialis’ aim to keep the working class agitated, and as such, 
social security was a frivolous by-issue.84 The irony is palpable even now. The STUC leaders 
who allegedly blocked the unemployment insurance scheme were at that time members of 
People’s Action Party, revealing the deep fault-lines within the party that eventually led to 
the split in July 1961.85  
  After 1965, the government did consider unemployment insurance amidst fears of 
rising unemployment, which was exacerbated by the British military withdrawal announced 
in 1967. Yet another expert from the International Labor Organization was invited to 
Singapore in 1968 to provide expert advice.86 This time around, the government was more 
decisive in abandoning plans for an unemployment insurance scheme to be financed by 
payroll taxes. Goh Keng Swee, in his second term as Finance Minister, observed that the 
scheme would be an additional burden on employers and employees already contributing 
increased rates to the Central Provident Fund and that the “best way to tackle unemployment 
                                                          
82 The Straits Times, 30 November 1961, “Singapore Govt. To Call For Talks on Jobless Insurance”.  
83 Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates, Official Report (Hansard) (15 March 1962), Vol. 17, Cols. 121-
126, 132-164. See also The Straits Times, 16 March 1962. “First Things First – Lee: Social Security Scheme To 
Cover Unemployment, Old Age and Sickness Will Come Later, He Says”. 
84 Hansard (15 March 1962), Vol. 17, Cols. 147, 161. 
85 The STUC representatives present at the talks were Lim Chin Siong, J. J. Puthucheary (who was also 
Chairman of the Central Provident Fund in 1960), Dominic Puthucheary, S. Woodhull, and S. T. Bani,  
86 Published by the ILO as Report to the Government of Singapore on Social Security Planning and the Possible 
Introduction of an Unemployment Insurance Scheme (Geneva, 1968). See also The Straits Times, 5 January 
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was by economic expansion”.87 Coming from someone who once argued for unemployment 
insurance, Goh's statement was the final nail in the coffin of any lingering intent to introduce 
British-style social security in Singapore.88 
 
Colonial Continuities (and Their Assumptions) in Post-colonial Nation-building 
 
Goh and his colleagues made good on his statement. Singapore’s economy expanded 
rapidly, ensuring full employment figures and attaining developed society levels of per capita 
income by the 1970s. Basic social needs were not neglected either. The pace and scale of 
public housing development quickened, ensuring more than 80% of Singaporeans lived and 
owned an apartment by the mid-1980s. The Central Provident Fund was the primary survivor 
of Singapore’s stop-start colonial-era quest for social security. The Fund’s basic objective of 
providing for the individual’s retirement was unchanged after 1965. But over time, its 
structures were altered to allow for the purchase of housing, to pay for medical treatment, and 
to finance children’s education.  
Similarly, the social welfare state described in this study was not fundamentally 
altered by political independence. At the time of sudden independence in 1965, the Social 
Welfare Department was nearing two decades of providing social services, ranging from 
financial assistance, institutional care and places of refuge to probation services for the 
young, old, and the vulnerable. The unprecedented official presence in social welfare was 
part of a broader policy to restructure Singapore from a colonial society that had developed 
along laissez faire principles, to a community ideally more cohesive that could then form the 
basis of a post-imperial nation. This was the objective of the new colonial policy devised 
during the Second World War, and implemented thereafter.  
It was however easier said than done. The realization of the social welfare state was 
not a straightforward process of top-down implementation. More than century-old social 
structures and attitudes were not easily swept away. The idealistic enthusiasm of colonial 
planners moreover did not fully consider the implications of introducing social welfare that 
                                                          
87 The Straits Times, 24 March 1970. “S'pore Scraps Jobless Insurance Scheme”. Also see Hansard, 23 March 
1970, Vol. 29, Cols. 865-867. 
88 In “Lee Kuan Yew's Fabian Phase”, Michael Barr presents Goh’s actions as a dissimulation. He cites an 
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was led and coordinated by the government. Nonetheless, the ensuing complications, 
tensions, and outcomes created a social welfare state in late colonial Singapore. New 
institutions were created, some deliberately, such as the Social Welfare Department, the 
Social Studies diploma program, the Social Welfare Council and later the Singapore Council 
of Social Service, while others were less anticipated, such as the Family Planning Association 
or the Singapore Children’s Society. Those institutions furthermore persisted well into the 
post-colonial era. The longevity of the social welfare state was due in no small part to a 
coherency imbued by the processes of effecting social welfare. More critically, the social 
welfare state was held together by the social bonds forged between individuals on one level, 
and between state and society on another. Those processes gave social welfare meaning 
within a society that had not experienced a deliberate and organized approach to social 
services. The social conditions of the immediate postwar period only made more urgent the 
central assumption that government should do more for the personal well-being of 
individuals. 
Two broad points underpin the process of building the social welfare state and social 
security discussions in late colonial Singapore. First was how decolonization complicated 
both processes. The unanticipated manner in which Emergency Relief and the Family 
Planning Association came about, or even the ineffective nature of the Social Welfare 
Council, illustrates how policy implementation had to negotiate and resolve a maze of 
variables. Preceding chapters have demonstrated that some colonial officers were not always 
“bloodless bureaucratic administrators”. McNeice and Cromwell for instance were invested, 
if not in Singapore, then at least in the jobs they were tasked to perform. Even then, while the 
social welfare state was originally a colonial enterprise, colonial officers were not its only or 
primary builders. Earlier chapters have shown that the burden and responsibility were shared, 
shouldered even more perhaps, by the ranks of local social welfare officers, professional 
social workers, scholars and academicians, volunteers and private citizens. The direction of 
the Social Welfare Department was set by colonial policy and led by British officers. But its 
work was executed by home superintendents, youth club leaders, case investigators, 
probation officers, and other social workers, the vast majority of whom were locals. The 
official presence in social welfare was further supported by almoners from the Medical 
Department, the faculty and students of the Social Studies diploma program, the work of 
religious bodies, charitable associations and voluntary organizations, and sometimes the 
initiative of individual volunteers. All of those gave coherency and meaning to the social 
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welfare state in late colonial Singapore. Although the classic welfare state did not materialize, 
the institutions, structures, and work processes that defined the social welfare state mostly 
survived British colonialism and political independence in 1965, and still exist in present-day 
Singapore in updated forms. 
Singapore’s abortive quest for a comprehensive social security scheme similarly 
illustrates the ambiguity of “colonial” during the late colonial period. The introduction of 
social welfare in postwar Singapore was originally a colonial policy, an enterprise that had 
global origins, and then designed and planned in the Colonial Office in London. Envisioned 
social security schemes were moreover inspired by those established in the metropole and 
elsewhere in the world, such as social insurance and a comprehensive healthcare system. But 
its implementation was far from smooth, shaped fundamentally by local-based forces and 
competing interests, all unfolding on a backdrop of constant social and political flux. After a 
while, policy was driven not so much by colonial officers, but its tone and direction dictated 
by aspiring local politicians who worked within the system and were informed by 
unanticipated circumstances. Recommendations for a pension scheme were discarded in 
favor of a provident fund, which originated from a local political party rather than the British. 
Later on, a comprehensive social security scheme centered on social insurance, and moreover 
replete with draft legislation and guidelines, was put on hold indefinitely by political 
uncertainty and internal strife within the People’s Action Party. Both decisions were made 
by, assuming in this instance “colonial” refers simply to the British, “local” individuals and 
organizations.  As the colonized looked forward to a post-colonial future, the British 
colonizer could and did not have it all their way after the Second World War. Decolonization 
moreover was not simply the withdrawal of the British from Singapore. It was more 
accurately a redefinition of the relationship between colonizer and colonized, or in other 
words, a historical process that attempt to redefine and restructure colonial societies into 
national communities.  
This leads to the second, more general, point concerning the nature and impact of 
colonialism in Singapore. The fashioning of a social welfare state, and its continuity into the 
post-colonial period, layers existing perceptions of British colonialism as a backdrop to the 
Singapore Story or as a surveillance state buttressing a hierarchal presence. In the case of 
social welfare, there has been a fair amount of continuity from the colonial to post-colonial 
period. Hence, it is possible to suggest that late British colonialism gave a nation-building 
template for independent Singapore. Post-colonial Singapore did not fundamentally alter the 
329 
 
 
 
policies, institutions, processes and services, as well as their underlying assumptions, that 
emerged to support the social welfare state. The British were however far from simplistic 
introducers of modernity in Singapore. As this study has shown, the manner in which the 
social welfare state developed suggests a considerable amount of local, non-British agency.  
This encourages a more nuanced approach to colonialism in Singapore. To reiterate, 
colonialism was not merely the duration of British presence on the island, or the mere 
instigator of significant historical moments. Colonialism also created deep lying social 
structures and attitudes that were sustained or altered by evolving relationships between the 
colonizer and colonized. Those in turn embedded particular approaches that persisted into the 
independence period in the case of social welfare. Chapter 1 highlighted several historical 
studies of Southeast Asia or of specific Southeast Asian countries that have engaged 
colonialism as a historical experience, and in doing so, acknowledging more clearly the 
colonial legacies that have persisted into the post-colonial era. This present study adds to that 
growing corpus of scholarship.  
The “colonial” in colonial enterprise becomes less fixed, particularly during 
decolonization. This understanding of colonialism connects Singapore history more firmly to 
Southeast Asian history. Singapore is a geographical part of Southeast Asia, just as the 
histories of British Malaya and the Malay-speaking world (of which Singapore was and 
remains part of) are similarly integral parts of Southeast Asian history. Yet, with rare 
exceptions, historical research into Singapore’s past is not immediately congruent with 
certain aspects of Southeast Asian historiography. One possible explanation for this 
disconnect is the inexorable focus on the Singapore Story (or to counter it), bestowing on 
otherwise good histories a narrow nation-state veneer. Such a perception is, on the surface at 
least, seemingly at odds with basic tenets of Southeast Asian historiography, such as the 
search for autonomous (Southeast Asian) perspectives and looking beyond nation-state 
boundaries and colonial-centric narratives. However, in recognizing the vagaries of terms like 
“colonial”, the history presented in this study need not be seen solely as an externalist history 
of a colonial policy or as the pre-history of Singapore as a nation-state. These elements do of 
course exist in the pages above, but still, the histories presented in them also act as a conduit 
to understand the diversity of experiences that unfolded on the backdrop of colonialism. 
The structural approach adopted in this study has illustrated how to reach those 
experiences, namely by asking broader questions of historical interactions, such as how did 
state and society respond to social needs at different points in time. Earlier chapters have 
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outlined how responses over time led to the emergence of a social welfare state during the 
late colonial period. In the midst of decolonization and nationalism, the social welfare state 
supported a nascent sense of community, and hence formed part of foundational structures 
that anticipated a supra-community identity anchored to Singapore.89 Before 1965, the nature 
of that identity was unknown or in flux. It was unclear if Singapore would be part of Malaya, 
become a communist state, remain in Malaysia, or even remaining a territory within a 
rebranded British Empire. After Separation in 1965, people choosing to remain in Singapore 
had fewer choices when it came to a national identity, but they could at least leverage on the 
social welfare state and other nation-building structures that remained in place and functional.  
Taking a structural approach to colonialism, that is to understand colonialism as a 
historical experience with the possibility of varied outcomes, then other issues in Singapore’s 
social welfare history, and in Singapore history generally, stand out. The presence of a social 
welfare state is evidence of a fundamental break in British colonialism in Singapore. This 
was the result of a broader imperial policy, and hence, Singapore history expands beyond 
purely national (1965 and after) focal lens and is connected more firmly to imperial, regional, 
and global histories. The longevity of the social welfare state moreover explains to some 
extent the behavior and activities of the post-colonial state. The invasive state interventions of 
successive People’s Action Party governments were not necessarily born solely out of post-
Separation anxieties. They continued the approaches and their underlying assumptions first 
introduced by colonial nation-building efforts after the Second World War.  
These perspectives provide a foundation from which we can look past political 
rhetoric and to also question presumptions that may inform scholarly observations, such as 
the idea that Singapore is anti-welfare. One could explain it as a difference in definitions, 
which is either social welfare as hand-outs, or social welfare as an approach to redefining the 
relationship between state and society. But the difference is significant enough that the 
former understates substantive histories of state-building, local agency, and social welfare. 
The latter approach on the other hand allows us to identify more clearly the structural 
changes in British colonialism in Singapore, the ensuing tensions from establishing a social 
                                                          
89 In addition to social welfare and social policy, the idea of Singapore becoming a home was given a legal basis 
in 1957 via the introduction of Singapore citizenship by the Labour Front government. Though ultimately 
seeking to be one with a Malayan nation, the enfranchisement of another 250,000 aliens was another state 
structure that delineated a Singapore identity. See the second reading of the Singapore Citizenship Bill in the 
Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates, Official Report (Hansard-SLA), 11 September 1957, Vol. 4. 
331 
 
 
 
welfare state in the late colonial period, the continuities and traces that persist beyond the 
colonial period, and finally, the histories we are able to recover from those events. 
From a firmer base of historical knowledge, we are better positioned to identify 
intriguing parallels. There is for instance a parallel between postwar colonial welfare and the 
Singapore government’s recent shift towards welfare state-like measures, such as a universal 
health insurance scheme (Medishield Life), pension-like grants for the low-income elderly 
(Silver Support scheme), and a dedicated government ministry whose functions are the 
present-day successors of those introduced by the former Social Welfare Department. Both 
moreover have similar end-goals of creating more cohesive communities to support a 
particular vision of a nation; in other words, nation-building in its rawest sense. 
Presenting the country’s budget in 2015, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister for Finance, acknowledged the tilt in policy, and that “Government is 
playing a more active role in redistribution [of income]”.90 Government plays a major role in 
mitigating inequalities. In an adjustment of Lee Kuan Yew’s “fair, not welfare” slogan, the 
primary objective of the policy tilt was to foster and sustain a “fair and inclusive” society. He 
explained the rationale for greater government interventions: 
 
What it boils down to is that we are providing more active support for 
Singaporeans at each stage of life: when you are young, when you are in your 
working years, as you raise your family, and when we all retire and get older. 
Very importantly, we are building a social compact that is not only about 
stronger collective responsibility, but which seeks to encourage personal and 
family responsibility. … That is at the heart of it.91 
 
In keeping with the party line, the Minister pleaded a difference between his government’s 
approach and the “cradle-to-grave welfarism” developed in the “advanced countries”. Social 
expenditure by the Singapore government should not be seen as hand-outs, but rather as 
investments to help people own homes, have access to education and medical services, and 
ensuring support services during periods of unemployment, such as job retraining and income 
supplements.  
Still, the essence of his remarks and the thrust of his economic and social policies are 
not all that different from postwar colonial policy. The historical contexts are different to be 
                                                          
90 Singapore Parliamentary Debates (Hansard-SPR), 5 March 2015, Vol. 93. Debate on Annual Budget 
Statement. The Deputy Prime Minister typically dates the origins of this policy tilt to 2007 (the introduction of 
the Workfare scheme), partly to counter popular opinion that the policy changes began only after the People’s 
Action Party suffered electoral setbacks in the 2011 General Election.  
91 Hansard-SPR, 5 March 2015, Vol. 93. Debate on Annual Budget Statement. 
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sure. Colonial policy then, ideally, was to rebrand the British Empire into a commonwealth of 
self-determining, equal partners. Present-day social policy seeks to address social inequalities 
and related concerns. But the concerns are similar, as the individual person’s needs at various 
life stages do not fundamentally differ over time or geographical space. The approaches taken 
are also alike. Government was to play a leading role, a first in Singapore’s colonial history, 
in repairing the fault-lines of the plural society, and to replace it with a version that could 
hopefully become a cohesive nation. The role of government moreover, as seen in the 
community development efforts of the Social Welfare Department, was to foster greater 
community participation and interaction as a basis for a national society. As part of the social 
welfare state, this central role of government continued well into the post-1965 period with 
few variations. Indeed, the same Deputy Prime Minister has recently and rather subtly 
interpreted the Singapore Story from a social and economic standpoint, as story of “broad-
based social upliftment”, deviating slightly from the typical trope of a heroic (political) 
struggle against the odds. In a speech given in Singapore’s golden jubilee year, Tharman 
observed that: 
 
The story of Singapore’s first 50 years that is best known internationally is of 
economic progress leading to a remarkable rise in GDP per capita. But that is 
not the heart of the Singapore story. The unique Singapore story has been that 
of broad-based social upliftment: jobs for all, rising incomes for all, homes for 
all, quality schools and public healthcare for all, and neighbourhoods and 
parks shared by all.92 
 
The tone and rhetoric of the Deputy Prime Minister’s speech was likely pitched for an 
audience of economists and related professions, but its essence posits intriguing parallels and 
continuities to the contemporary era, namely with the impetus for the imperial policy of 
welfare and development and the establishment of the social welfare state in late colonial 
Singapore. Postwar British colonial policy envisioned the colonies eventually becoming 
“self-supporting units”, where “their citizens must enjoy a proper standard of social services, 
and we shall count as qualifying for assistance … every part of the health and medical 
activities and every part of the educational activities of a colonial Government”.93 In late 
                                                          
92 Tharman Shanmugaratnam, “The Economic Society of Singapore SG50 Distinguished Lecture by Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister for Finance Tharman Shanmugaratnam”, 14 August 2015. URL: 
http://www.mof.gov.sg/news-reader/articleid/1522/parentId/59/year/2015?category=Speeches. Accessed 24 
November 2016. Tharman is currently the Second Deputy Prime Minister and the Coordinating Minister for 
Economic and Social Policies, and has an indirect connection to the social welfare state as a graduate of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science during the 1970s. 
93 HC Deb, 21 May 1940, vol. 361 cc46. (Cited in Chapter 1). 
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colonial Singapore, social welfare, in its broadest understanding, was the understated partner 
in this rudimentary nation-building process. The Singapore government has, since 
independence, similarly sought to build and support a new nation by investing heavily in 
housing, employment, healthcare, and education. In those efforts are echoes of colonial-era 
attempts to find ways to alleviate social contingencies individuals face at different stages of 
their lives. They also continue, perhaps subconsciously, postwar attempts to reorganize a 
colonial society into a national one. The significant increases in social expenditure in twenty-
first century Singapore can be interpreted as the state’s response to changing social needs and 
political pressures. Taking a broader viewpoint of Singapore society and history, they can be 
understood as one vision of what the Singapore nation should be, as an articulation of an 
ideal social compact of collective responsibility, in which individuals are responsible to and 
for each other. From a historical viewpoint, contemporary social policy has come full circle, 
ostensibly returning to the issues Singapore grappled with more than a half-century ago. 
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